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Summary of Thesis 
In view of the general lack of theoretical works on Parliament one of the 
major objectives of the thesis is to contribute to the understanding of 
legislative activity through an examination of organization and 
representative theories. In Part One the mutual interaction of these 
two diverse strands of theory is examined. In Chapter 2 the concept of 
specialization is studied through an analysis of theories concerned with 
societal and organizational division of labour. However, unlike most 
formal organizations studied by organization theorists legislatures are 
exceptional by virtue of their representative functions. The second 
strand of theory, examined in Chapter 3, therefore is representative 
theory. In the light of the examination of these theories a model of 
legislative specialization is developed and outlined in Part One. 
Part Two of the thesis represents the first systematic attempt to 
establish the extent of backbench specialization in the House of Commons 
and to identify the key independent variables influencing the level of 
specialization. Chapter 5 looks at the informal dimension of 
specialization through an analysis of backbench activity in Debates, 
Questions and Early Day Motions. Chapter 6 supplements this 
quantitative analysis by considering the perceptions of M.P.s of their 
individual patterns of specialization and the general division of labour 
on the backbenches. The pattern of specialization at the mezzo-level 
of parliamentary organization in the 'unofficial' committees of the 
House is examined in Chapter 7. Finally, the pattern of formal 
specialization in co~ittee is analyzed in Chapter 8. 
lhe profile of speci.;.lization, -.. :!lilst pronoun::e:1, is y'=!t still closely 
circumscribed in the House of Commons, with the linkage between informal 
and formal subject specialisms being loose and fragmented. The 
contention of the thesis is that this pattern of specialization is a 
product of th'=! specific mix of representative a~d political elements in 
the proxi~ate environoent of the House. 
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Chapter 1 
Parliament Study and Context 
"Parliament may be an overstudied political body, 
particularly if the initial premise •••••••• that 
Parliament has changed little is accepted. 
Thus one is loathe to recommend greatly increased 
research on Parliament. Studying Parliam~nt 
may have reached the point of diminishing returns". (1) 
That such a verdict should have been reached by an American political 
scientist and an A.P.S.A. Congressional Fellow at that is 
somewhat unexpected. For, in comparison with American works on the 
United States Congress, the academic study of the British House of 
Commons appears often to be under-researched, under-conceptualized 
and isolationist. Harris Miller may have been on firmer ground, 
therefore, to have argued that Parliament has been over-described 
rather than over-studied in so far as much of the published 
(2) 
or on material on the House has focused upon either its history 
the minutiae of legislative activity (3) or both. (4) What has been 
notably absent is political research, that is, study which is "grounded 
theoretically, raises questions or focuses on problems having to do 
with explaining why there are variations, unifurmities, or regularities 
in institutionalized political phenomena, and employs research 
strategies which, whenever feasible, lead to the construction of 
quantitative variables so that the maximum power of modern social 
research can be mobilized". 
(/:\ 
,J J Indeed S.C. Patterson in his incisive 
review of published works on the House of Commons rightly observed 
that many British academics substituted illustration for systematic 
data, and the 'evidence' that was provided tended to be essentially 
epigrammatic and anecdotal. (6) 
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The exceptions to this general pattern of study are still rare. 
Nearly two decades ago Finer, Berrington and Bartholomew paved the way 
for a more 'scientific' study of activity in the House with their 
analysis of backbench support for Early Day Motions in the 1955-59 
Parliament. In an era pre-dating the widespread use of computers in 
the social sciences in Britain their Backbench Opinion in the House of 
Commons 1955-1959 did,indeed,mark an innovative and imaginative 
inquiry. (7) One of the co-authors, Hugh Berrington, has subsequently 
extended the investigation to include the 1945-55 period (8) and has 
considerably advanced the methodological sophistication of the analysis 
of E.D.M.s. (9) Another pioneering study was Barker and Rush's 
The Member of Parliament and his Information (10) which utilized 
interview data collected from a sample of 111 M.P.s to study the attitudes 
of Members towards their parliamentary duties. Whilst the statistical 
techniques employed by Barker and Rush did not extend beyond simple 
cross-tabulations and bar charts, their data did provide a systematic 
indication of the information dilemma of backbenchers. 
Unfortunately, the analytical sig~posts provided by these studies have 
only hesitantly been followed by other British academics mainly by 
post-graduate students. (11) One of whom, Philip Norton, recently went 
to the unusual lengths,for a British academic, of prefacing his study 
(into intra-party dissent in the House of Commons) with a statement of 
his intention to pursue "the scientific method" in this investigation. 
In most ways Norton's work, in its meticulous chronicling of the 
incidence of intra-party dissent, is an exemplary study. Yet in one 
specific aspect his inquiry is disappointin~ in that it provides no 
theoretical framework for the examination of the phenomenon of intra-
(12) 
party dissent. A check-list of the factors encouraging and discouraging 
party cohesion is as near as he comes to developing a conceptual model 
capable of specifying the intricate influences at work in determining 
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levels of intra-party dissent. One consequence of the lack of theory 
is that Norton tends to perceive the increased incidence of dissent 
between 1970-74 as being essentially mono-causal: 
" ••••• We have sought to identify the dependent 
variable responsible for the increase in the 
extent and seriousness of intra-party dissent 
within the parliamentary Conservative Party 
in the Pa~liament of 1970-74, and our analysis 
has led us to the conclusion that that variable 
was the prime ministerial leadership of Mr. 
Heath". (13) 
Clearly, Mr. Heath's style of leadership was unquestionably of importance 
(and has its own implications for the present study); yet Norton's own 
evidence allows for the conclusion that ideological divisions within 
the party, as manifested over the issues of Northern Ireland, Rhodesia, 
E.E.C., Immigration and Counter-inflation, were as important, if not 
more so, than the frustrations felt on the backbenches with Heath's 
style. (14) In this respect a more elaborate conceptualization of 
the influences at work in promoting or fragmenting party cohesion may 
have removed some of the ambiguities which appear in Norton's study 
between the 'style' and the 'content' of Heath's leadership. 
But, in the light of other British studies of Parliament, Norton's 
substantial contribution should not be too heavily criticized; for 
there appears to be an endemic lack of theorizing in such works. 
~fui1st British academics ha'J'e willingly described the Horkings of the 
House and have occasionally analyzed its function, they have rarely 
theorized about its role in the political system. Indeed, Patterson 
suspects that the "atheoretica1 character of studies of the House of 
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Commons does not seem to be accidental. Those who have studied the 
House seem to be uninterested in theorizing about the phenomena they 
are studying, as if the fact that Parliament was there and had been 
for a long time was itself sufficient justification for studying it". 
Of course, one can only speculate as to the reasons for the persistence 
of this atheoretical tradition in Britain, but the seminal influence 
of Bagehot does perhaps provide one clue. For 20th century students 
of Parliament in accepting, with minor updating, the categorization 
of parliamentary functions provided by Bagehot in The English 
(16) Cons titution, appear also to have implicitly assented to his 
descriptive style. (17) Bernard Crick as one of the leading British 
students of Parliament asserts, for example, that "for a conceptual 
framework there is little need to go beyond Walter Bagehot". (18) 
(15) 
Indeed, in his own works, particularly in The Reform of Parliament, (19) 
Crick moulds his case for reform around the continuing importance of 
three of the functions ascribed to the House by Bagehot namely the 
expressive, teaching and informing roles. But The Reform of Parliament 
is not simply a descriptive and analytical study it is also, as Crick 
readily admits himself, a work of polemic (20) and as such 
stands alongside many other contemporary studies of Parliament. (21) 
Many of these polemical works appear however to ignore Crick's 
warning that "to have ideas on reform is no substitute for knowing 
how things work. and relate to each other" (22) and consequently 
several seemingly advocate reform as an end in itself. 
At first sight, however, it may appear to be unjust to criticize 
contemporary therapeutic works for being atheoretical pracisely 
because they were intended to be polemical rather than conceptual. 
Nevertheless, because of their unwillingness to theorize about 'how 
things work and relate to each other' many reformist works appear to 
suffer from symptoms of tunnel vision. Thus the refor~ists~ diagnosis that 
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the House had declined in influence over both the executive and the 
electorate (23) led them, not unnaturall~ to seek the cure for this 
malaise; the remedy most commonly prescribed was an internal 
restructuring of the organization of the House through more 
committees, improved research facilities, better secretarial assistance, 
re-organization of library services and re-arrangement of the timetable. 
Yet a conceptualization of the political environment in which these 
changes were to have been effected would have alerted the reformers to 
the inadequacy of structural reform by itself. A theoretical 
examination of the linkages between the executive and the legislature, 
of the significance of partisan competition and of the potential 
contradiction between the concepts of political representation and 
detailed parliamentary scrutiny would clearly have identified the 
limitations inherent within the structuralist schemes. In fact, these 
limitations were apparent at the time to other more perspicacious 
observers of Parliament, such as S.A. Walkland (24) and Nevil 
Johnson, (25) who argued that structural reform would only prove 
effective if accompanied by a fundamental transformation of political 
relationships in Britain. But in turn this analysis was not based upon 
a conceptualization of parliamentary relationships but rather represented 
a more rigorous and academic (in the sense of detachment from the 
reformist cause) assessment of existing power relationships. 
Unfortunately, the very unwillingness of Walkland and Johnson to 
conceptualize leaves them open to the charge that they are just as much 
captives of 'a priori assumptions' about the expected benefits of 
their own brand of reform as were the reformers of the 1960s prisoners 
of "a priori assumptions about executive supremacyll. (:!6) In their 
advocacy of electoral reform the 'academic' analysts of the 1960s 
appear to have become the polemists of the 1970s. Ultimately, the case 
of the 'electoral reform school' suffers from an absence of theory about 
the consequences of a fractionalization of parliamentary parties. 
(27) 
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And affirmations of hope that electoral reform may prove to be the 
catalyst of Parliament's -rejuvenation are thus substituted instead of 
theoretical models of the operation of a multi-party system in the 
British legislature. 
In view of the general lack of theoretical works on Parliament, one 
of the major objectives of the present study is, therefore, to 
contribute to the understanding of legislative activity through an 
examination of two diverse bodies of 'theory'. Each in their own 
right of vital importance to the study of legislatures, but in their 
mutual interaction provide probably the most profound dilemma facing 
legislatures in the 20th century. The first strand of theory is 
organization theory (28) which, despite the consistent demand for 
organizational reform of the House in recent years, remains a neglected 
area in British legislative studies. The concept of specialization 
provides our research focus given the general assumption that 
"legislatures are characterized by varying degrees of specialization 
as are all formal organizations", (29) and the specific contention 
that "the operational code of the House of Commons actually encourages 
specialization". (30) Thus an examination of theories concerned 
with societal and organizational division of labour may prove to be of 
value in furthering our understanding of the phenomenon of specialization: 
firstly, by showing the necessity of specialization in an era of 
complexity; secondly, by highlighting its contribution to the attainment 
of collective and individual goals; and finally by revealing the key 
problems associated with a division of labour. 
Unlike most formal organizations studied by organization theorists 
legislatures are, however, exceptional by virtue of their very 
representative nature. The second strand of 'theory' to be examined, 
therefore, is that concerned with representation; with the linkage between 
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representatives and their constituents. Whether these two sets of 
theory are compatible; whether the organizational requisite of a division 
of labour can be accommodated in the performance of representative roles 
is, however, a matter of contention. The contradictions inherent ~n 
this interaction of theories is of crucial importance in the study of 
legislatures. Yet, astoundingly, this very relationship has never 
been fully analyzed. Chapter 3 therefore seeks to rectify this 
omission by examining the major theories of representation and their 
theoretical compatibility with a division of labour. In the light of 
this exercise and the experience gained from American studies (Chapter 4) 
a model of legislative specialization is developed and outlined in Part 
One of this thesis. This model is intended to serve both as an 
analytical tool a representation of reality and also as a 
predictive device, whereby the conditions under which specialization is 
promoted or hindered in legislatures can be specified. In this manner 
the theoretical section of this thesis may perhaps justly claim to be an 
innovation amongst British parliamentary studies. Like most other 
innovations, however, the model may appear to be somewhat rudimentary 
in its conceptualization. Nevertheless, the elementary nature of t~e 
model may serve to prompt further academic consideration to either 
refine or to refute its premises. 
Part Two of this thesis also, in its own way, marks something of an 
innovation in 50 far as it represents the first systematic attempt 
to establish the extent of backbench specialization in the House of 
Commons and to identify the key independent variables influencing 
the level of specialization. w'hilst other ::;t~dieG :li;ive e:<amined 
specialization on the part of specific groupings of M.P.s, most 
notably Opposition Frontbench Spokesmen (31) and Trade Union 
sponsored Members, (32) it remains true to say that "there has been no 
comprehensive examination of specialization in the House of Co~mons". (33) 
Some traditionalist students may well argue that the need for such an 
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examination is less than essential, as specialization is such an 
acknowledged feature of parliamentary life that to create a profile 
of specialization would merely be to quantify the obvious. But this 
stance immediately prompts the question: what is so obvious about the 
nature of specialization in the Commons? Are backbenchers in both 
major parties, for example, equally specialized or are there discernible 
differences between the two? Are new recruits to the House more, or 
less, specialized than their more senior colleagues on the backbenches? 
Do 'full-time' M.P.s divide their labour in the House more unevenly 
than their 'part-time' colleagues? And does the level of parliamentary 
activity influence the level of specialization? The short answer to 
all of these questions is that one simply does not know, nor could 
one necessarily predict, the answers given the present extent of knowledge 
about specialization in the British House of Commons. Indeed, the 
pattern of informal specialization 
part of individual backbenchers 
that is specialization on the 
remains largely unknown. Quite 
why informal specialization should have eluded investigation is, of 
course, a matter of conjecture: clearly, the tedious and time consuming 
nature of such an enquiry, and the methodological difficulties entailed 
in measuring specialization are significant factors. However, perhaps 
of greater importance is the anti-behaviouralist bias evident in the 
British approach to the study of Parliament. Scepticism of the 
excesses of American behavioural ism and of the validity of many statistical 
techniques appears to predispose many BritiSh political scientists 
against empirical research. (34) In part such scepticism is warranted, 
yet, without accepting the ideology of behaviouralism nor the necessity of 
producing ever more incomprehensible mathematicel models, it is possioie 
to argue that only through quantitative analysis of backbench behaviour 
can we accurately understand how M.P.s perform their legislative 
duties. Only in this manner can research hypotheses be adequately 
tested, and perceptions about parliamentary roles be contrasted with 
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actual patterns of behaviour. 
The Parliamentary Environment 
To ask 'how do backbenchers in the House of Commons decide upon the 
multifarious issues demanding their attention?' is to pose simultaneously 
the most elementary and yet the most profound of questions. Clearly 
the problems associated with decision-making have been a major concern 
of organization theories. Thus the ideal comprehensive rational 
decision-making model, for example, suggests that a backbencher, as a 
rational man, would, when faced with a given problem, first clarify 
his goals, values or objectives and then rank them in order of 
preference; secondly, list all the important ways of achieving these 
goals; thirdly, investigate all the important consequences that would 
follow from each of the alternative policies; fourthly, compare the 
consequences of each policy with his goals and ultimately choose the 
policy with those consequences most closely matching his goals. (35) 
One essential requirement of this model is, of course, information and 
knowledge in ordar to ba able to rank priorities, select alternatives 
and comprehend the consequences of choice. The impossibility of 
collecting, assessing and assimilating total information on any single 
issue has long been recognized as an intrinsic weakness of the rational 
model. This weakness is particularly compounded however by the political 
context of legislatures. The legislative environment is indeed such 
that the backbencher is never confronted solely with one issue for 
decision at anyone time; for as government has expanded its activities, 
and as the populace's expectation of state intervention has increased 
in the 20th century, so the volume of issues arising for consideration 
by Members of Parliament has correspondingly increased. This cycle of 
proliferating workload was neatly described by the Study of Parliament 
Group in its evidence to the 1977-8 Select Committee on Procedure: 
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"Hare powers for Government and for subordinate 
public authorities means more legislation. The 
multiplication of regulatory schemes in social and 
economic affairs imposes the need for more 
delegated legislation and for larger administrative 
services. A larger and more interventionist 
administrative machine is likely to result in a 
bigger flow of complaints from constituents to 
Members, thus enlarging their traditional role of 
seeking redress of grievances. But in addition 
the omnicompetent State suggests the need for 
Parliament to add to its means of scrutiny and to 
widen the opportunities it has for investigation 
and report. At the same time as the powers of 
public authorities have grown, there has been a 
rapid growth in the number of bodies claiming to 
speak for interests affected by the powers 
conferred, and there has been a shift of emphasis 
towards consultation, negotiation and participation 
in the development and application of public policies. 
Inevitably the Member of Parliament is involved in 
this field too and indeed may regard it as essential 
to establish close ties with one or more organized 
interest groups. But this too means further 
demands on his time." (36) 
But not only has there been a quantitative increase in the volume and 
scope of legislation there has also been a qualitative change in the 
nature of many of the issues confronting Parliament. The sheer 
technical complexity of much modern legislation is such that, even 
when backbenchers are supplied with relevant information, it is often 
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apparent that they encounter severe difficulties in comprehending the 
details of the matter. (37) In many instances these problems are 
exacerbated by the reluctance of the executive to make information 
available to backbenchers, (38) with the consequence that they are 
repeatedly asked to decide upon issues on the basis of insufficient 
information. 
In addition the rational model is undermined still further by the 
simple fact that while the scope, number and complexity of issues has 
increased almost exponentially, the amount of time available to M.P.s 
in which to consider these policies has increased only incrementally. 
Thus despite the fact that the "House of Commons sits more often, and 
longer than any other Western democratic legislature" (39) backbenchers 
still have insufficient time to acquaint themselves with the intricacies 
of all policy options. Indeed, a re-arrangement of the times of 
sittings, so that the House would assemble before noon (40) would 
not in practice ameliorate the position. (41) 
The comprehensive rational decision-making model, as was only to be 
expected, bears little relation to the world of parliamentary politics. 
Instead, backbenchers have been forced to adopt partial solutions to 
the problems of decision-making to look to other mechanisms of 
choice. The 'partial-mode' of decision-making most commonly adopted 
in formal organizations; particularly large corporations and 
bureaucracies, is specialization through a division of labour. 
Similarly, most other legislatures have also institutionalized a formal 
division of labour and encouraged informal specialization on the part 
of their members. Most renowned in this respect is, of course, the 
U.S. Congress, and indeed many envious British glances have been cast 
at the high degree of committee specialization in the American 
legislature. Yet, the British House of Commons remains almost unique 
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in its steadfast refusal to develop a comprehensive formal division of 
labour and in its adherence to a set of legislative norms fashioned Ln 
the 19th century era of the 'amateur-gentleman'. 
To understand why specialization as a decision-making strategy has 
never been wholeheartedly accepted by backbenchers individually nor, by 
the House as a corporate entity, requires a knowledge of the political 
and representative environment of the Commons. As the significance of 
the environmental setting of the House will be considered at length in 
the following chapters all that is offered here is a framework within 
which to develop the discussion. In brief, the contention of this 
thesis is simply that specialization in the House of Co~~ons has been 
subverted by a combination of political and representative constraints 
unique to the British parliamentary setting. 
Of the political elements, two above all others the dominance of 
party and the pre-eminence of the executive stand out as major 
impediments to the development of specialization as a backbench strategy 
of decision-making. The development of party organization and cohesion 
in the 20th century has effectively removed the 'independent' Member 
from the House, so that first and foremost backbenchers are now 'party 
men', 'party delegates'. The position of the backbencher is commonly 
held to have been reduced in this process "to the position of a 
subservient cog within the wheel of his great, disciplined mass Party": 
whereby backbenchers are effectively shackled to the party leadership 
through their support of the electoral manifesto. Indeed, backbench 
allegiance to the respective party leaderships in the n~ciern House h~s 
on occasion been caricatured as being mindless compliance on their 
part. Moreover, the high degree of intra-party cohesion has frequently 
been perceived, by theorists of parliamentary decline, as being 
mono-causal as being dependent solely upon discipline and the 
whipping system. (43) What tends to be de-emphasized in these 
(42) 
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analyses is the ideological dimension of party unity the over arching 
consensus on fundamental principles within the ranks of each party. 
Admittedly, both ~~jor parties do display in practice considerable 
internal dissen~on,with the organization of 'factions' and 'tendencies' 
bearing testimony to this heterogeneity. (44) On occasion 
antipathy to the values of the opposing party may appear to be the 
main unifying factor within a party rather than any genuine intra-party 
consensus. Essentially, however, as Ian Gilmour notes "M.P.s have a 
predisposition to vote for their party, otherwise they would not be 
there" (45) the predisposition arising out of some shared 
commitment to either 'socialism' or 'conservatism'. And it is this 
ideological dimension of British parliamentary parties which, far from 
weakening the position of the backbencher, has in fact facilitated 
backbench decision-making by providing one relatively cost-free mechanism 
of choice whereby, individually, backbenchers can begin to cope with 
the complexity and the volume of the demands made upon them. Ideology, 
or more accurately party ideology, siffi?lifies decision-making to the 
extent that once the ideological/partisan implications of a measure 
have been established then choice for the backbencher is normally 
reduced to the simple decision of voting with the rest of his o\Yn 
party (and common values) against the opposing party (and contradictory 
values). The actual ideological content on any single issue may 
often appear minute, but the ascription of partisan cleavage to 
all issues is of crucial significance to decision-making in the House. 
Thus as Gilmour observes "deep questions of principle are seldom 
involved. Many votes are on amendments to bills, and the average 
M.P. who has not taken part in debates on the bill often has no idea 
what the vote is about or on which side he should vote. Party is his 
only mentor." (46) Conformity to the 'party line' consequently 
provides the backbencher with a relatively cost-free mode of decision-
making, which allows him to reach a decision on any particular issue 
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without necessarily having a detailed understanding of the subject 
involved. Thus for the backbencher who is incapable of mastering the 
entire legislative programme, adherence to party ideology provides a 
simple and effective partial solution to the problems of decision-making 
in a complex environment. (47) 
The second crucial feature of the pOlitical environment serving to 
undermine specialization in the British House of Commons is the nature 
of the relationship between the executive and the legislature. 
Theorists of parliamentary decline have long recognized the dominance 
of the executive in the Chamber of the House as a causal factor in the 
demotion of the legislature from its position as a check upon the 
government in the mid-19th century to its present position as merely 
(48) 
"one of the institutions through which the government operates". 
For, in being both 'in and of' the Commons the Government in Britain 
provides the legislature with centralized leadership and imposes its 
own hierarchical structure upon the organization of the House. 
Strictly in terms of decision-making theory, the existence of 
authoritative leadership within the House provides yet another partial, 
cost -effective solution to the problem of information deficiency 
encountered by backbenchers. Executive leadership in the Commons may 
be considered to be 'authoritative' on at least two counts; firstly, 
in that it is 'authorized', in normal circumstances, by the majority 
of backbenchers voting with the Government; (49) and, secondly, in 
that it draws upon the 'authoritative' expertise of the bureaucracy and 
major organized interests within society. This claim to authority 
effectively differentiates the execudve from non-executive ~!.;!mLers in 
the House, forming a hierarchy of roles within the Chamber. This 
hierarchical differentiation in turn has important repercussions upon 
the mode of backbench decision-making for choice again is rendered 
into the simple dichotomy of either accepting or rejecting the 
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'authoritative' claims of the executive. In practice, given the 
conjunction of party and executive leadership roles in the Cabinet, 
backbenchers are thus presented with two mutually reinforcing strategies 
of decision-making voting with their own party and voting in 
accordance with the guidance offered by the executive. Inevitably, 
these two modes coalesce into an 'adversary style' of decision-making, 
which is characterized by government backbenchers, on the one hand, 
accepting both the 'party' and the 'authority' dimensions cf executive 
policy, and by Opposition M.P.s, on the other, denying the authority of 
the Government's case on partisan grounds. In this manner, as Nevil 
Johnson observes "adversary politics becomes more than a way of 
conducting political argument: it becomes a mechanism of choice too". (50) 
A mechanism which conveniently, if over-simplistically, reduces the number 
of options open for backbench consideration to two mutually exclusive 
alternatives. 
The fact that backbenchers h~ve not enthusiastically adopted the 
strategy of specialization, when other less costly modes of choice are 
available is perhaps not surprising. But the existence of alternative 
mechanisms of choice in itself provides only a partial explanation for 
the relative under-development of specialization in the House of Commons. 
What also needs to be taken into account is the successful frustration 
of the emergence of a 'norm' of specialization by successive governments. 
Modern executives, on grounds of political expediency, have supported 
the generalist tradition on the backbenches in an effort to pre-empt 
detailed scrutiny of their own actions. The absence of specialist 
M.P.s in practice benefits the e~ecutive, for as Lord Hailsham recently 
pointed out "even when (the Minister) is wrong. he can usually make it 
look sufficiently as if he were right to get his own supporters into 
the lobby when the bells ring. I have been often enough myself on the 
giving and on the receiving end, and I must say frankly that, more 
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often than not, right or wrong, it is the Minister who wins the 
argument". (51) Indeed, it would appear that the desire to keep 
on 'winning the argument' becomes a consuming passion with most members 
of the government. Even to the extent that these Ministers \>Tho were 
formerly supporters of parliamentary reform through specialization, 
before their promotion to executive office, may become strident opponents 
to the extension of specialization once in the confines of the Cabinet. 
One extract from the diaries of Richard Crossman is particularly 
revealing on this point: in describing the Cabinet discussion on the 
proposal to introduce specialist committees as part of a procedural 
package of parliamentary reform he is led to comment: 
"Most of these Ministers were individually as well 
as collectively committed to parliamentary reform. 
Yet after two years they've become Whitehall 
figures who've lost contact with Parliament. And, 
of course, what they're saying is pure nonsense. 
Ministers aren't bothered by Parliament, indeed 
they're hardly ever there ••••• the amount of time a 
Minister spends on the front bench or in his room 
in St. Stephen's is very small. The Executive 
rides supreme in Britain and has minimum trouble 
from the legislature". (52) 
Opposition to the specialist committee experiment represents, however, 
only but the most obvious manifestation of the general executive 
antipathy towards specialization in the House. More subtly, and more 
pervasively, the executive has undermined specialization through its 
control of patronage in the House and through its stipulation that the 
requisite attributes for executive position are those of the 'intel1ectual-
layman' • (53) Hence, in a legislature in which political careers are 
conceived of primarily in terms of attaining Ministerial Office, 
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backbenchers will tend to conform to those normative rules most likely 
to bring about this result. The very fact that these norms are 
products of executive hegemony therefore serves to perpetuate the 
'philosophy of the amateur' in the House. 
However, the ramificarionsof the executive's perpetuation of 
generalist norms extends beyond Westminster into other spheres of 
political life in Britain, particularly into Whitehall. For, if 
British government can be described as an 'elective dictatorship' in 
which "the sovereignty of Parliament has increasingly become, in practice, 
the sovereignty of the Commons, and the sovereignty of the Commons 
has increasingly become the sovereignty of the government, which, in 
addition to its influence in Parliament controls ••••• the civil 
service": (54) then it is predominantly a 19th century dictatorship 
of 'amateur-gentlemen'. In order to maintain this pivotal position 
at the apex of British governmental institutions, the political 
executive is basically dependent upon the perpetuation of generalist 
norms in both Westminster and ~~itehall. Clearly, increased 
specialization in the Commons, on the one hand, would curtail the 
existing licence of the executive in the House; while, on the other hand, 
increased specialization in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy 
would threaten still further the ability of Ministers to control their 
departments. The convention of ministerial responsibility clearly 
establishes the principle of political control and establishes a 
hierarchy of decision within each department. In the 19th century, 
in a period of limited government, it was entirely feasible to hold a 
Minister personally responsible for the actions of his department as he 
had the capacity to oversee and personally decide upon all matters if 
he so wished. However, it has long been recognized that with the 
expansion of the scope of departmental responsibilities, particularly 
in the post-war period, it is no longer meaningful to speak of 
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individual ministerial responsibility in its original sense. (55) 
Yet each central government department is still hierarchically 
structured in accordance with the principle that the Minister has the 
right of decision on all issues. In practice,the authority hierarchy 
within departments serves to differentiate 'policy' from 'administrative' 
dutie~ and to institutionalize a distinction between 'generalist' and 
'specialist' civil servants;whilst at the same time subordinating the 
latter to the former. Successive British governments in their desire 
to exercise control over the bureaucracy have maintained the authority 
hierarchy within central departments, and in so doing have undermined 
the development of specialization within the Civil Service. As 
we shall see in the next chapter, the requirements of hierarchy (the 
differentiation between subordinate and superordinate roles and the 
monistic assumption that the latter is more capable of taking 
decisions than the former) conflict with the requirements of· 
specialization (with the emphasis upon group decision and the horizontal 
interdependence of organizational units). (56) 
Thus it may be argued that considerations of political expediency 
have led successive British governments to undermine the development 
of specialization both in Whitehall and Westminster. In their desire 
to remain at the apex of government,political executives have 
reinforced the bureaucratic and parliamentary authority hierarchies 
at the expense of the development of specialization. Hence,no 
government has seen fit to fully concede the case for a systematic 
division of labour in the Commons out of the fear of increasing 
parliamentary control over executive policy. However, in the absence 
of effective parliamentary scrutiny,the government is faced with the 
dilemma of exercising political control over the bureaucracy practically 
single-handedly. The solution adopted by Ministers to this problem 
has been to inculcate generalist norms within the Civil Service, so 
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that senior civil servants reflect the same 'intellectual-amateur' 
qualities of Ministers and become attuned to the political sensitivities 
of policy-making. In this way political control by Ministe.rs is 
essentially exercised through the 'self control' of generalist civil 
servants socialized into an acceptance of the basic political 
conventions of ministerial responsibility. 
Undoubtedly, therefore, the antipathy of the executive has to be 
considered alongside the mechanisms of choice associated with the 
adversary procedures of the House as a major impediment to the 
development of specialization within the Commons. But these features 
of the parliamentary environment represent only the most visible and 
hence the most studied obstacles to parliamentary reform and the 
systematization of a division of labour. Ultimately, however, a more 
fundamental obstacle to specialization may be encountered in the very 
conception of the representative role in Britain; in the inherent 
contradiction posed by a 19th century 'miscellaneous assembly' charged 
with controlling the 20th century interventionist state. Indeed, 
this will be our contention in Chapter 3; but, before developing this 
theme, let us first examine the meaning of the term 'specializ&tion'. 
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Chapter 2 
Specialization 
A logical starting point for the investigation of the phenomenon of 
backbench specialization is to establish a precise meaning for the 
word 'specialization', for there is evident confusion in its usage 
by British students of Parliament. However, the concern of this 
chapter is not merely one of semantics but, more importantly, it 
seeks to formulate key propositions concerning the necessity of, and 
the problems associated with, the concept. These propositions being 
drawn from a study of organization theories, in the expectation that 
they will provide a valuable guide to the nature of specialization in 
legislatures. Indeed, just such a supposition has already been 
adopted in the study of the American Congress and state legislatures 
(see Chapter 4). One of the seminal American articles cn the 
phenomenon of legislative specialization, for example, began thus: 
"Throughout American society and government, 
specialization in the division of labour and 
authority is now the rule. One would suppose, 
therefore, that members of legislative bodies 
the persons principally charged with making 
authoritative decisions for society and government -
would have been forced by the increasing complexity 
of the problems they face to devise an appropriate 
(1) 
system of specialization". 
Nevertheless, the validity of such an assumption may be questioned; 
for there can be no guarantee that generalizations drawn from 
organization theory, with its primary focus upon business organizations 
and bureaucracies, will necessarily be applicable to representative 
institutions. Indeed, as the authors of the above quotation go on to 
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recognize there are traditional conceptions about the functions 
of elected representatives which conflict with the organizational 
require~~nts of specialization. However, before developing this line 
of argument, it is perhaps advisable to establish exactly what we take 
'specialization' to mean. 
To attempt a meaningful answer it is necessary to examine the key 
strands of thought encompassed by organization theory. In 1931 
Arthur Sa1z suggested that "specialization is a technical term for all 
those phenomena technological, social and biological as well as 
economic which are usually subsumed under the phrase division of 
labour". (2) But to say that specialization can be equated with 
division of labour raises the problem of defining the latter term. 
Sa1z himself recognized that division of labour is an ambiguous 
expression which is in reality complicated and multiform. J.H. Smith 
in the Dictionary of Social Sciences contends, however, that "though 
the term has not been invested with a precise scientific meaning, it 
should not be equated with specialization". (3) According to Smith, 
specialization may refer to the special characteristics of individuals, 
groups, economic enterprises or social institutions, whereas the 
division of labour is concerned with the special tasks assigned to 
individuals and groups. Unfortunately, he does no more than simply 
assert that this distinction needs to be made. Seemingly the inference 
to be drawn from his analysis of the successive phases in the usage of 
'division of labour' is that the term should be used exclusively in its 
most modern sense, to mean the allocation of tasks in a given system of 
production. Yet Smith's definition is far too restrictive in that, 
in distinguishing between the 'specialization of tasks' and the 
'specialization of people', he completely excludes the latter from 
consideration. Thus, without explanation, he rejects the adaptation 
of the individual to the conditions of his environment as a form of 
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division of labour; and only the element of work specificity is deemed 
to warrant this title. However, without denying that 'division of 
labour' is obviously concerned with the degree to which the tasks of a 
system are subdivided, (4) it appears somewhat strange to then argue 
that the term should not be equated with specialization. Rather, in 
the following discussion we shall treat 'specialization' and 'division 
of labour' as virtual synonyms. (5) 
Considerable confusion can be avoided if at the outset we distinguish 
between the specialization of tasks and the specialization of people. 
The former refers to the element of work specificity and is not of 
major importance for our study, the latter refers to the adaptation of 
the individual to a complex environment and is central to our 
understanding of legislative behaviour. 
Specialization of Tasks 
Specialization of tasks, according to V.A. Thompson, "moves in the 
direction of the ever more specific, the narrowing of activities to 
simple, repetitive routines. It moves in the direction of the micro 
division of labour". (6) This fragmentation of responsibilities into 
simple assignments with routine duties requiring minimum skills is 
labelled more accurately as 'routinized division of labour' by Blau, 
Heydebrand and Strauffer. (7) The impact of the simplification and 
specialization of tasks is perhaps best typified by the factory worker 
in a large as,s.embly plant tightening bolts on the same piece of 
machinery day in and day out. The performance of such simple routines 
produces little change in the individual the person does not become 
specialized by virtue of performing these specialized tasks. Indeed, 
as long as the tasks can be narrowed down sufficiently anyone can 
perform them with a little practice. 
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The industrial revolution is largely credited for the rise of routinized 
division of labour; because mechanization largely determined this 
pattern of specialization. As B.F. Haley explains " •.••• the division 
of labour essentially takes the form of specialization of workers in 
repetitive operations necessary because automation has not yet reached 
these processes. The division of labour in these cases is simply the 
labour counterpart of the specialization of machines". (8) The 
'pay-off' from a routinized division of labour normally is conceived 
of in terms of increased 'productivity' or 'efficiency'. (9) 
Off-setting the advantages of a specialization of tasks are those 
disadvantages which have attracted the attention of industrial 
sociologists upon the impact of an intensified division of labour. 
Such concern, however, is not new: Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, 
1776, recognized that when workers are confined to a fe~ simple 
operations, they become "stupid" and lIignorant". Karl Marx later 
quoted Smith with bitter approval and added that the division of 
labour in manufacture "converts the labourer into a crippled 
monstrosity". (10) "Thus labour in its historical development 
becomes the negation of its Owtl principle, that of creative activity 
through which man makes himself: instead, man makes himself into an 
accessory of the machine". (11) 
However, without becoming immersed in the problems of alienation, it is 
possible to see that J.H. Smith's plea that 'division of labour' should 
not be equated with 'specialization' is in one way valid. For, if we 
take the example of the factory worker, turning a particular nut on a 
particular component all day long, then it is plain to see that he is 
not a 'changed' person by virtue of his job anyone could perform 
it. He is not a specialized person. On the other hand, the ~ of 
the assembly-line worker is highly specialized. Thus routinized 
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division of labour is simultaneously both the antithesis of personal 
specialization and the perfection of task specialization. 
Specialization of People 
Where the prevailing technology of an organization does not allow for 
a routinized division of labour as described above, then the performance 
of less specialized work will cause the person doing the work to become 
specialized himself. Thus, the essential contrast between specialization 
of tasks and specialization of people is that,in the former,the person 
performing the tasks does not become specialized; whereas, in the 
latter,the person adapts to the conditions of his environment. The 
specialized person is, therefore, able to do things he could not do 
before and things that other people cannot do. In this respect, other 
people are to some extent dependent upon him, and this partial monopoly 
of ability provides the specialized individual with a source of power 
and status. But by the same token, the specialist in one sphere of 
social activity becomes dependent upon specialists in other spheres 
with the result that 3 complex series of dependency relationships 
emerge between differing groups of specialists. 
The inter-dependence of individuals within society at large was 
recognized at least as early as the 3rd century B.C. when Plato 
suggested that the divison of labour arose out of the mutual needs of 
citizens. In his view, interdependence arose because "in the first 
place, no two of us are born exactly alike. We have different 
aptitudes, which fit uS for different jobs ••••• Quantity and quality are 
more easily produced when a man specializes appropriately on a single 
job for which he is naturally fitted ••••• one man could not do more 
than one job or profession well". (12) Essentially, therefore, Plato 
held that society originated because the individual was not self 
30 
sufficient and had many needs which he could not supply himself. The 
implicit assumption being that individuals were different from one 
another and were aware of their differences before social differentiation. 
Emile Durkheim, however, questioned whether in fact such an awareness 
of individuality could exist before the division of labour. (l3) In 
primitive collectivist society the unity of society stemmed from its 
'mechanical solidarity'. 'Mechanical solidarity' was characterized 
by little, if any, significant differentiation of labour and by a 
high degree of correspondence between individual conscience and social 
norms and standards. Namely, everybody performed virtually the same 
kinds of actions and shared essentially the same values. Modern 
society on the other hand is founded upon 'organic solidarity'. Its 
coherence depends upon the fact that individuals "are no longer 
similar but different, and in a certain sense ••••• it is precisely 
because the individuals are different that consensus is achieved". (14) 
In other words Durkheim argued that modern industrial society has lost 
a general consensus on norms and values, but instead has become 
integrated in terms of the division of labour. "Difference, as 
likeness, can be a cause of mutual attraction •••••• lve are thus led to 
consider the division of labour in a new light. In this instance, 
the economic services that it can render are picayune compared to the 
moral effect that it produces, and its true function is to create in 
two or more persons a feeling of solidarity". (15) Such solidarity 
being essential to the continuance of society as the 'volume', the 
'material density' and the 'moral density' of society increases. 
Social differentiation, therefore, becomes the so!ution to the struggle 
for survival. 
At the micro-level, differentiation within formal organizations has also 
been regarded as one solution to the problem of survival as their 
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internal processes and their immediate environment increases in scope 
and complexity. Peter Blau makes the point that "formal organizations 
cope with the difficult problems large-scale operations create by 
subdividing responsibilities in numerous ways and thereby facilitating 
the work of any operating employee, manager, and subunit in the 
organization. The division of labour typifies the improvement in 
performance attainable through subdivision". (16) In this setting 
the specialized individual, through the possession of specialist 
skills and knowledge, is endowed with a certain status and power. 
Consequently his 'job satisfaction' is that much greater than the 
non-specialis t. (17) However, the attendant problem of 
differentiation - .faced by the organization as a corporate entity 
is the co-ordination of the various specialized subunits to provide 
for coherent outputs. 
Max Weber believed that the solution to this problem lay in the 
(18) 
'monocratic principle' by which "the principles of office 
hierarchy and of levels of graded ~uthority mean a firmly ordered 
system of super and subordination in which there is a supervision of 
the lower offices by the higher ones". (19) Co-ordination is thus 
imposed in this structure; and 'bureaucratization' subsequently offers 
the "optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of 
specializing administrative functions according to purely objective 
considerations" (20) whilst removing the possibilities of friction 
and delay stemming from the conflicts of equally powerful specialists. 
This notion of Weber's reappears in the mechanistic theories of the 
'scientific-management' school of organization theorists. (21) A 
school of thought which held the view that the objectives of any 
organization could only be realized through the smooth and efficient 
co-ordination of its subparts. The work of each sub-division and 
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of each individual should, therefore, be confined as far as possible 
to the performance of a single leading function, and the whole 
specialized structure should be held together by a highly organized 
authority hierarchy. In this hierarchy subordinates should take 
orders from only one superior and the 'span of control' should be 
rationally settled. Not surprisingly, this formulation has been 
heavily criticized for its authoritarian stance; but more pertinently, 
it may be attacked for its failure to appreciate the contradiciions 
inherent between the needs of hierarchy and the needs of specialization. 
As Peter Self observes the stress upon a unified and disciplined 
system of authority conflicts with the use of specialized skills which 
"tend to complicate and weaken the construction of a hierarchical 
system". 
that: 
(22) 
This point is amplified by V.A. Thompson who clai~s 
"This monistic formulation is based u?on charismatic 
assumptions at various points. It is assumed 
that the superior, at any point in the hierarchy, is 
able to tell his subordinates what to do, and to 
guide them in doing it. That is, it is assumed 
that he is more capable in all of his unit's 
activities than any of his subordinate specialists 
who perform them. The concept of responsibility 
for results assumes the ability or capacity to 
determine the results (or else the responsibility 
is merely ritualistic). The concept of unity of 
command or influence denies the relevance of the 
non-hierarchical expertise within the organization; 
the hierarchy of subordinate-superior roles, the 
'line of command'. is sufficient. When these 
assumptions of superordinate ability are viewed 
against the background of the increasing range of 
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activities subordinate to hierarchical positions 
at successively higher stages in modern 
bureaucracy, the assumptions clearly leave the 
realm of objective reality and become charismatic". (23) 
Thus the 'classical model' is dependent upon asserting the rights of 
superordinates to make decisions and upon ignoring their inability, 
in terms of the possession of specialist knowledge, to do so. The 
'unity of command', the 'right of supervision', the 'right to 
monopolize communication' all emphasize the authority of the superior 
in the hierarchy, and simultaneously undermine the interactions 
between the various subordinate groupings of specialists. But as 
John Garrett rightly notes: "it is difficult to handle complex 
multi-functional projects in a hierarchical structure •••••• because no 
one manager can be held responsible for managing them or. can see the 
total project in perspective; because divisions are jealous of their 
prerogatives and fight to maintain their status and receive 
recognition for their specialisms •••••• ". (24) 
Specialization and Expertise 
One consequence of the specialization of people so far assumed is that 
the concentration of attention upon a narrow field of interest leads 
to increased knowledge of that area • Most common definitions of 
. °d d, k hO 1 0 k °h °1° k ld orsk~110,(25) expert1s~ 1n ee ma e t 1S 1n W1t spec1a 1st now e ge ~ 
and distinguish between 'intellectual' knowledge, derived from formal 
education and the contemplation of ideas; and practical knowledge, 
derived from practical experience. In either case, however, the core 
element of the definition remains the possession of systematized and 
specialized knowledge. Expertise, therefore, is the product of the 
process of the division of labour and thus is not a synonym for 
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'specialization'. 
The possession of such specialist knowledge places the expert in a 
position of power for he can perform duties that non-specialists 
cannot. As issues increase in complexity and technicality so the 
need for specialist knowledge in these areas correspondingly increases 
and the dependency of non-specialists upon the 'expert' is compounded. 
This process appears to be of particular significance in the political 
system, for the potentiality for experts to dominate lay politicians 
is considerable. Some forty years ago Catlin recognized the danger 
posed by the expansion of expertise within state bureaucracies: lithe 
expert knowledge of civil servants, their organization and their 
power have grown in many countries to such a point that attention is 
being directed to the question how far the civil service is 
trespassing upon the proper field of the ••••• legislature". (26) 
fact Weber had earlier argued that this development appeared to be 
inevitable as "under normal conditions, the power position of a 
In 
fully developed bureaucracy is always overtowering. The 'political 
master' finds himself in the position of the 'dilettante' who stands 
opposite the 'expert',facing the trained official who stands within the 
management of administration ••••• ln facing a parliament, the 
bureaucracy, out of a sure power instinct, fights every attempt of the 
parliament to gain knowledge by means of its own experts or from 
interest groups. The so-called right of parliamentary investigation 
is one of the oeans by which parliament seeks such knowledge. 
Bureaucracy naturally welcomes a poorly informed and hence a powerless 
parliament at least in so far as ignorance somehow agrees with the 
bureaucracy's interests." (27) This does not, in practice, mean 
that the politician cannot restrict the degree of dependence upon the 
expert bureaucrat by utilizing other non-official experts and "by 
tending closely the conditions under which experts are used, defining 
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issues and assumptions, taking advantage of differences among experts, 
and determining the limits of expertise, but" and here lies the 
crunch, "as long as experts are thought to have unique access to 
esoteric reality, these endeavours cannot remove residues of doubt 
nor change the essential relationship of dependence based upon 
faith." (28) Indeed, 'the likelihood of reversing the directional 
flow of influence in this relationship is miniscule so long as 
legislators are expected to perform a wide range of miscellaneous 
representative duties on behalf of their constituents. 
Specialization Generalizations 
From this brief review of several of the major strands of organizational 
thought upon specialization, it is possible to extract certain key 
generalizations: 
i). As an organization and its proximate environment increases in 
scope and technical complexity, then the need for a division 
of labour will increasingly be recognized. 
ii). In turn, as specialization develops, the mutual interdependence 
of specialist sub-units within the organization becomes 
apparent creating the necessity of co-ordination and 
co-operation to ensure the attainment of organizational goals. 
iii). In complex organizations, expertise resides primarily in the 
lower ranks of the organizational hierarchy. "And ••••• it is 
inevitable that there tends to be conflict between authority 
based upon expertise and authority based upon hierarchy". (29) 
iv). For an extensive division of labour to develop specialization 
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must be seen to be capable of as~isting 
a). the organization to achieve its corporate goals; 
b). the individual members of the organization to achieve 
their own personal goals. 
These two concerns normally, as V.A. Thompson observes, are 
inter-related: "it helps to think of the organization as a 
means to the participants' goals and the participants as means 
to the organization's goals". (30) 
The above propositions should, in theory, be equally valid for all 
complex organizations including legislatures. And the general 
case for applying propositions derived from organization theory to the 
study of legislatures, has in fact already been made by Lewis Froman: 
"If we view Congress as a formal organization and use 
the general propositions which have been stated, with 
more or less validity, about formal organizations, we 
will be able to avoid strictly ad hoc interpretations 
of Congressional phenomena and, in their place 
substitute a somewhat organized and consistent set 
of empirical generalizations which have been found 
to be true of other formal organizations. Such 
propositions, used in explanation, may be quite 
powerful and parsimonious and aid immeasurably in 
understanding why Congress is as it is." (31) 
However, while accepting the basic premise of Froman's argument, we 
should perhaps remember the special representative and political 
characteristics which may effectively differentiate legislatures from 
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most other formal organizations. Hence, traditional assumptions 
about the functions of representatives may invalidate some of the 
general propositions relating to the normal organizational strategy 
of specialization. Indeed, Buchanan et al have identified several 
long-standing suppositions about the performance of representative 
roles which appear to question the appropriateness of specialization 
in legislatures: 
"It has connnonly been thought proper for legislators 
to perform ••••• functions more closely related to 
broad policy decisions: compromise, adjustment, 
integration of conflicting goals and values. 
Related notions include the assumed omnicompetence 
of the legislator and its corollary, the theoretical 
equality of all members of the Chamber ••••• lndeed, 
legislatures have often delegated their rule-making 
power to independent connnissions, reluctantly 
choosing to divest themselves of some of their 
authority rather than to develop the expertise 
necessary to maintain it." (32) 
Furthermore, the electoral process in itself may undermine the 
foundations of specialization - in so far as the recruitment of specialists, 
and their continued presence in the assembly, is subject to the vagaries 
of electoral competition. 
The general constraints are, moreover, supplemented in the British 
case by specific and unique features of the political environment of 
the House of Connnons. O~e'key constraint, already identified in the 
preceding chapter, is the pre-eminence of the political executive in 
both the organizational structure of the legislature and of the 
bureaucracy. Acting at the apex of the parliamentary and administrative 
systems the political executive has successfully defended the 
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requirements of hierarchy at the expense of greater specialization. 
Executive hegemony and the inculcation of dominant values supportive 
of the generalist in these subordinate institutions has further 
subverted the demand for specialization. But this case rests thus 
far on assertion; our task, therefore, remains to establish the 
existence of executive attitudes that are antithetical to the development 
of specialization and also to discover the actual effect that the 
maintenance of hierarchical structures has had upon the division of 
labour in British political institutions. Given the institutional 
interaction between Parliament and the bureaucracy, whereby the 
organizational structure of the latter is greatly affected by the 
requirement of working within a formal parliamentary system, then the 
emergence of mutual characteristics within the separate institutions 
is to be anticipated. Therefore, an examination of the apparent 
constraints operating upon the extension of specialization within the 
British bureaucracy may well provide more than tangential insights into 
the political inhibitions upon the division of labour within the 
legislature. 
The need for specialization 
In accordance with the first proposition of organization theory 
outlined above, the massive expansion of governmental activity in the 
20th century precipitated the need for a wider range of specialized 
knowledge to be encompassed within the state bureaucracy. However, 
the transition from a negative, regulatory view of the functions of 
government, to the acceptance of positive intervention by government 
brought about not simply a quantitative change but also a qualitative 
change in the role of the civil service. The 'active state' widened 
the scope of administrative discretion and increased the intensity 
and impact of the powers exercised by civil servants in the name of 
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Ministers. Moreover, the 'political masters' increasingly came, as 
Weber predicted, to occupy the position of the 'dilettante' in relation 
to their more 'expert' advisers in the bureaucracy. However, our 
primary concern, for the moment, lies with the degree to which 
specialization was developed within the bureaucracy in the face of 
the expanded responsibilities of the interventionist state. 
The numerical strength of specialist civil servants in Britain is one 
reflection of the bureaucracy's response to the increasing demand for 
personnel capable of dealing with the complex scientific, technological 
and industrial ventures of the modern state. In addition, the growth 
of administration generally has increased the need for the specialist 
support groups found in all large-scale business organizations, such 
as accountants, lawyers and statisticians. So that now there are 
more professional, scientific and technical civil servants than 
administrative and executive officers. (33) Yet, in spite of their 
numbers, the organizational structure of the Civil Service has secured 
the subordination of the specialist to the generalist, intelligent 
all-round administrator. The inappropriateness of this structure for 
modern conditions has been persistently criticized by the Institute of 
Professional civil Servants. In evidence presented to the 1929-31 
Tomlin Commission, (34) to the 1968 Fulton Committee (35) and most 
recently to the 1977 Expenditure Committee (36) the I.P.C.S. has 
consistently argued that the distinction between 'specialists' and 
'generalists' is misleading, divisive and impedes the close team work 
required to efficientlY discharge the duties which the Civil Service 
has to undertake. Other critics of the dominance of the generalist 
have been less restrained; W.S. Ryrie, for example, hammered heme the 
point in his evidence to the Fulton Committee that "the complexity of 
present day problems means that the 19th century notion of the 
intelligent layman, able to turn his hand to anything, relying if 
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necessary on the experts but relegating ther.t to an advisory role, is now 
frivolous and irresponsible. Civil Servants must know much more 
about the subjects they deal with. Picking up the essentials on the 
job is entirelY inadequate." (37) 
~ben the Fulton Committee reported in 1968 it immediately placed its 
finger upon this pulse of discontent with the clear statement in its 
opening paragraph that: 
"The Horne Civil Service today is still fundamentally 
the product of the 19th century philosophy of the 
Northcote-Trevelyan Report. The tasks it faces 
are those of the second half of the 20th century. 
This is what we seek to remedy." (38) 
The symp~OIDS thus spotted, Fulton's diagnosis continued by outlining 
six main inadequacies of the organization of the Civil Service: two 
of which related directly to the question of specialization. Firstly, 
there was "the philosophy of the amateur ('generalist' or 'all-rounder') 
whereby the ideal administrator is still seen as the talented layman 
capable of taking a practical view of a wide range of problems. 
Secondly, this system operates at the expense of scientists, engineers, 
etc. ~7ho are not given the same responsibility or authority as the 
'generalist' ." (39) To remedy these failings the Committee suggested 
that the Service should develop greater professionalism both among 
specialists and general administrators. For the former this was to 
mean more training in management and the opportunity for greater 
responsibility and a wider career pattern; for the latter it was to 
entail greater specialization in particular areas of government. 
Furthermore, the Committee argued that more reference to the previous 
subjects of study undertaken by recruits into the Service should be 
made, in order to point out the direction of their specialization within 
the bureaucracy. 
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But this prescription by itself proved inadequate; indeed, in 
retrospect, many of Fulton's proposals appear to have been little 
more than platitudes. In particular, the Report may be criticized 
for not pressing the case of the specialist sufficiently strongly. 
In calling for fuller professionalism, the Committee accepted that 
"for the administrator to be expert in running the government machine 
is not in itself enough. He must in future also have or acquire the 
basic concepts and knowledge, whether social, economic, industrial 
or financial, relevant to his area of administration and appropriate 
to his level of responsibility". (40) But this allowed for the 
interpretation that a 'specialist veneer' could be grafted onto the 
traditional generalist base, rather than fully developing managerial 
skills on the part of specialists. Not surprisingly, in view of the 
dominance of the generalist at the higher levels of bureaucracy, the 
former interpretation was the one adopted. The specialist, therefore, 
is still faced with a career dilemma, for he is still required to 
'cross-over' to an 'administrative' post rather than to continue with 
his specialism whilst developing basic managerial skills. The Civil 
Service Department, for its part, claims to be aware of this dilemma 
and attempts to make 'special provision' for the career development of 
specialists, yet ultimately "many of the arrangements are aimed 
particularly at giving opportunities to acquire broader experience and 
background outside a narrow specialist field". (41) But, by their 
very nature, these arrangements devalue specialist knowledge by 
insisting upon the necessity of a broad width of experience 
civil servants. 
The Civil Service 'method' has further contributed to the inhibition 
of specialization in the post-Fulton era by subverting its importance 
as a criterion in the recruitment and training of the Higher Civil 
Service. The new Administrative Trainee Grade, introduced in 1971 
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on the formation of the Administration Group (as recommended by Fulton), 
was originally intended to provide special training and accelerated 
promotion prospects to some 250-300 candidates per year. Hopes were 
expressed at the time that the scheme would broaden the type of recruit 
seeking entry to the higher echelons of the Service. Lord Crowther-
Hunt still maintains that "there is a strong case for arguing that in 
the selection for Administrative Trainees there should in fact be a 
bias in favour of those who have studied subjects at University which 
have some relevance to the economic. social. scientific and technical 
problems that Civil Servants will have to handle. At the very least 
such people will require less post-entry training than those whose 
pre-entry knowledge is limited to the problems of Ancient Greece ar.d 
Rome. This was one reason why Fulton recommended that, other things 
being equal, the relevance of an applicant's university course to 
the problems of modern governments have to face should be a decisive 
factor in the selective process". (42) However, the actual operation 
of the Administrative Trainee scheme reveals a bias against those 
entrants whose university studies may be considered to be of relevance 
to the problems of modern governments, (43) and in fact perpetuates 
the dominance of the generalist by giving the "bright young generalist ... 
••• such an early lead that he is unlikely to be overtaken by the bright 
(44) young specialist." 
~lany of the Fulton recommendations aimed at transforming the role of 
the specialist consequently appear to have been still-born; partly due 
to their internal inconsistencies, partly due to the entrenched 
opposition within the bureaucracy but also, significantly for our 
discussion, due to the attitude of the political executive. In the 
first instance, the Labour Government quickly rejected. in November 
1968, the majority recommendations that the 'preference for relevance' 
criterion should be applied in the selection process. In so doing 
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the possibility of greatly extending specialist knowledge within the 
Higher Civil Service was undermined. And a further blow to the 
cause of the specialist was dealt by the subsequent failure of the 
Government to implement the proposal aimed at establishing within 
each department a senior policy adviser with direct access to the 
Minister. In this manner, the creation of expert teams, operating 
under specialist control, and responsible for planning and research 
was effectively frustrated. 
The complacency of successive British Governments has probably 
undervalued the development of specialization more effectively, 
however, than outright rejection of Fulton's proposals. Although 
Harold Wilson and Edward Heath both, as Prime Ministers, welcomed the 
recommendations made by the Committee the implementation of those 
proposals relating to specialization was at best only faltering. In 
Wilson's case the opposition of a significant section of his Cabinet 
to the Fulton Report curbed his own enthusiastic support for its full 
implementation. The strength of this opposition was noted by 
Richard Crossman in his diary entry for June 20th, 1968: 
"He (Wilson) put his case for immediately accepting 
the main recommendations of the report, including 
the creation of a Civil Service Department. Then 
the Chancellor put his case against what he 
described as precipitate action. Denis Healey, 
Michael Stewart and I supported Roy and all the 
support Harold got was from Wedgy Benn and Peter 
Shore, his two hirelings. He was so upset at 
this point he stopped the meeting and asked that 
it should be resumed later". (45) 
Indeed, Mr. Wilson implicitly acknowledged the constraining ·.infl\l~tlce 
of his Cabinet colleagues, in his evidence to the 1976 Expenditure 
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Committee: 
"Q.193l (Mr. John Garrett): You put a lot of 
weight behind the Fulton Committee and your book 
on the 1964-70 Labour Government refers to your 
interest and concern about its speediest 
implementation ••••• In particular, you laid very 
great emphasis, when the report came out, on the 
open road to the top for the professionally 
qualified, the so-called open structure. But 
that has never happened. Some progress was 
made towards it up to 1970, but the issue was 
never returned to again after 1974? 
(Mr. Harold Wilson): I think there was an 
immediate burst of activity after Fulton came 
out and it was very much under Prime Ministerial 
direction. I got the impression ••••• that by 
about 1969 it was tailing off a bit .•••• But with 
so many urgent problems at that time, ! was not 
able to give ~ mind to it sufficiently ••••••• 
the sheer rush and pace of Government at the 
present time, which has changed enormously even 
since 1970, has prevented as much being done on 
this as I think should be. I had to delegate •••• " (46) 
Clearly, in the process of delegation, inertia overwhelmed the advance 
towards an open structure. 
In the case of Edward Heath, however, the failure to promote 
specialization at the highest levels of the Service appears to have 
arisen out of a complacency about the existing opportunities for 
specialists, and also a misguided preconception about the aspirations 
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of specialist civil servants. Indeed, Heath's complacency on the 
position of the specialist appears to be at odds with his reformist 
reputation gained from his wider restructuring of Whitehall. (47) 
Nevertheless, this complacency shone through in his evidence to the 
Expenditure Committee: 
"Q.1870 (Mr. John Garrett): ••••• Some progress was 
made in implementation of the Fulton Report up 
to 1970 then, as far as I can see, it stopped. 
May I ask why that was? 
(Mr. Edward Heath): I do not agree that it 
stopped ••••• From the point of view of the other 
aspects of Fulton, the question of ensuring that 
the chain was there for specialists to move up 
in the Civil Service, that is there, that is 
happening perhaps not as much as some people 
would like to see from the figures that I have 
looked at, but the chain is there. Of course, 
it is also true that many of the specialists 
themselves do not want to move into the general 
administrative line and go up the ladder that way." (48) 
But, as Lord Crowther-Hunt forcefully argued to the same committee: 
"" ••••• It is the concept of transferring across 
which is the weakness of the existing Civil 
Service, and this is why the Fulton Report 
recommended a unified grading structure. People 
say ••••• that it is very difficult to get scientists 
to become general administrators. Putting it in 
that way shows what is wrong. No one ever wanted 
scientists to become general administrators, or 
engineers to become general administrators. What 
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we wanted, and this was the whole point of the 
unified grading structure, was that you could 
come in as a scientist; you then might, after 
a year or two, still be doing a largely 
scientific job but in a quasi-administrative 
area, and your next job might be administering 
science, still in a quasi-administrative 
area ••••• " 
(49) 
The unwillingness, or inability, of Ministers to comprehend this 
latter point is explicable perhaps by their preconceptions about the 
requirements of the conventions of individual and collective ministerial 
responsibility and their faith in the general administrator as a 
positive co-ordinator of inter and intra-departmental activities. 
Indeed, one widely voiced criticism of the Fulton recommendations was 
that the Committee had failed to appreciate the significance of these 
conventions in shaping the Higher Civil Service. (50) Dr. R. Chapman 
makes the point that the Committee "criticized the cult of the 
generalist 'at all levels and in all parts of the Service' without 
appreciating or making it clear that it was criticizing the apparent 
lack of specialist skills in achieving objectives whilst the upper 
levels of the management hierarchy have always been far from amateur 
and, in fact, have constituted a highly developed profession for 
dealing wi th the poB tical environment within lvhich the management 
processes at all levels must be carried on". (51) In this sense the 
Higher Civil Service constitutes a 'specialist division' in the 
·ministerial and parliamentary aspects of departmental business. The 
Association of First Division Civil Servants, as the representative 
organisation of the senior grades of the Service, not unnaturally 
supports this view: 
"The Administrative Group in particular has to 
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apply the skills and techniques called for in a 
very wide variety of functions covering the 
processes of parliamentary government, including 
the preparation of legislation, and advising and 
briefing Ministers. Unlike many other senior 
administrators in the public sector they have to 
understand and operate within a highly sensitive 
and complex political machine". (52) 
The crucial point is that, by this view, the Higher Civil Service is 
seen as having its own expertise and skills; and that its prime 
purpose is the manipulation of the administrative machine in the 
name of the Minister. In this way, as Nevil Johnson points out, 
ministerial responsibility has come to mean that the Minister exercises 
influence over his department, but has negligible influence in the 
(53) department. The department, therefore, requires an intermediary 
to function at the interface between the political sphere and the 
administrative sphere: (54) an intermediary who is sensitive to the 
political world of the Minister, who knows, in Sisson's phrase, the 
"Minister's mind", (55) but who also understands the intricacies of 
the administrative machine so as to facilitate and co-ordinate the 
the work of the department. "Such a role", according to R.G.S. Brown, 
"calls for knowledge of the system and some sense of what is possible •••• 
The most suitable candidate will often be the departmental administrator 
who is attuned to his Minister's views, is aware of the interests of 
other departments and has moved from post to post often enough to 
avoid an excessively narrow or specialized commitment ••••• In short, he 
needs the power of 'judgement' ••••• (which) seems likely to be distorted 
by excessive specialization". (56) 
In this light the defence of the generalist is not merely anachronistic 
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but reveals an appreciation of the specific set of political 
circumstances within which the administrator has to operate. Thus, 
whereas other public bureaucracies, renowned for their specialist 
administrators, are also publicly accountable, (57) their responsibility 
has not taken the form adopted in Britain nor has the corollary of 
anonymity and neutrality in the public service been institutionalized. 
In this respect the unique convention of ministerial responsibility in 
Britain has propagated the specific hierarchical structures within 
Whitehall and has perpetuated the dominance of the generalist therein. 
From the outset the initial structure of the BritiSh bureaucracy left 
little doubt that it was the job of the generalist, working in one 
hierarchy, to determine policy whilst the job of the specialist was to 
advise and to implement policy in a separate hierarchy. Most 
departments still continue to operate parallel hierarchies up to the 
level of Under-Secretary, with most specialists remaining "in advisory 
positions rather than having responsibility". (58) Even where 
experiments with 'joint-hierarchies' have been undertaken (most notably 
in the Department of Transport), whereby professional and administrative 
duties are, theoretically, closely integrated; the practice has 
revealed that generalists have continued to control ministerial, 
parliamentary and financial aspects of a case, while specialists have 
continued in auxiliary and adviso~y roles. (59) 
Undoubtedly, as P. Self notes, the functions of the generalist in this 
structure could be broken down into its component parts of advice, 
arbitration, management and mediation, and handled by specialists 
in each task. "If, however, administrators retain a large part of 
their present qualities and their present influence, the explanation 
will be their continuing usefulness to the political system. Basically 
the general administrator is a political phenomenon". (60) The 
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pre-eminence of the generalist in the centralized hierarchy of 
decision-making in Britain is, therefore, a reflection of political 
need. Above all else, the convention of ministerial responsibility 
requires Ministers to control and co-ordinate the actions of the 
departments of state to ensure coherent, positive and mutually 
supportive policy outputs. Co-ordination has consequently become 
the 'speciality' of the general administrator. Clearly, the post-
entry socialization of the generalist into the normative system of 
the Service and into an understanding of the administrative machine as 
a whole is geared to the needs of co-ordination. As Heclo and 
Wi1davsky point out "co-ordination is facilitated by the fact that 
despite departmental allegiances, all officials are part of a greater 
civil service society. Among those at the top of the service, the 
bond may be particularly close. By the time they have arrived their 
official career paths are likely to be criss-crossed many times. 
Those further down may not know each other but still they know enough 
about each other to understand that they are dealing with 'a member of 
one's own group'." (61) Within this 'common society of officialdom' 
co-operation is enhanced by an intricate network of communication at 
both the informal (telephone conversations, luncheon meetings) and the 
formal (inter-departmental committees) levels. 
However, the common society of generalists not only facilitates the 
process of co-ordination but also provides the potential for 
bureaucratic control over political initiatives. The reinforcing 
elitist tendencies of pre-occupational socialization of shared 
socia-economic and educational backgrounds; (62) and of post-entry 
socialization, mentioned above, have led to persistent accusations 
that the Higher Civil Service in Britain has largely usurped the 
decision-making function of Ministers. One of the most vehement and 
cojent statements of this case is to be found in Brian Sedgemore's 
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proposed amendment to the 1977 Expenditure Committee Report: 
"From the point of view of politicians most of 
the problems of the civil service stem from the 
fact that top civil servants misconceive their 
role in our society. They come to the civil 
service ••••• with what Balliol men used to refer 
to as the unconscious realisation of effortless 
superiority ••••• Their self-anointed superiority 
brings them almost immediately up against their 
obvious and almost complete lack of experience, 
the lack of which does not improve as much as 
it might with their work, experience or 
training. In short, there is a conflict 
between their superior intellect and the little 
that they have to offer in a practical way. 
There is, as should be, no role in our society 
for people with little to offer in a practical 
way but civil servants have got round this 
stumbling block by inventing a role for 
themselves. The role that they have invented 
for themselves is that of governing the 
country ••••• They can and do relegate Ministers 
to the second division." (63) 
It may seem somewhat perverse, therefore, to argue in the face of this 
contention that the continued pre-eminence of the intellectual-a~ateur 
in the Civil Service is but one manifestation of the efforts of 
politicians to maintain a semblence of control over the bureaucracy. 
Yet the role and status of the generalist administrator can only be 
understood by reference to his sy~biotic relationship with the 
intellectual-amateur Minister. 
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British Ministers are not renowned for their specialist kno~Jledge of 
the affairs of the departments of state that they head. Clearly 
their parliamentary apprenticeship does not,as Richard Rose observes, 
"provide men with substantial kno;..;ledge of the subject matter of 
their department". (64) Only 11 of the 51 Cabinet appointees of 
Harold Wilson between 1964-1970, for example, could be regarded as 
having more than a rudimentary understanding of the business·of the 
department to which they were appointed. (65) And at first sight 
the Conservative Cabinet of 1970 appears to have conformed to this 
general pattern. (66) However, Heath's appointees did display a 
markedly different profile to that of their predecessors in so far as 
most had gained some knowledge of the subject area of their department 
through specializing in that field as Opposition Spokesmen. Thus 
the Government formed in June 1970 contained 48 Ministers who had been 
Opposition Spokesmen at some time during the period 1964-1970; 30 of 
them actually holding posts in the area they had previously 'shadowed' 
at one stage or another. Indeed, there was a much greater carry-over 
of personnel and responsibilities from Opposition to Office in June 
1970 than there had been with Labour in October 1964. But, even so, 
still over one-third of Spokesmen were assigned duties unrelated to 
their tasks in Opposition. Nevertheless, Heath's Cabinet was 
sufficiently different in its 'specialist' composition to lead Punnett 
to observe that the continuity between Opposition and Ministerial 
posts may "have been a manifestation of the 'Heath style of 
profess ional ism' • " 
(67) 
This 'style' was also apparent in the pattern of continuity in 
Ministerial posts between 1970-4. Of 17 Cabinet Ministers appointed 
in 1970, 13 were still members of the Cabinet in 1974, 6 (excluding 
Heath) 'Jere sti1l incumbent in their original posts. In absolute 
terms there was a considerable reshuffling of portfolios, yet in 
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comparative terms Heath's Cabinet appears as an island of stability 
in the post-war turbulence of Ministerial change. Ironically, for 
Heath, a recent analysis of intra-party dissent in the Conservative 
party 1970-74, lists as a contributory factor to the increased 
propensity for backbenchers to dissent in this period, his unwillingness 
to significantly alter the composition of his Government. (68) In 
contrast, Labour backbenchers in the 1964-70 period must have been 
mesmerized by the rapidity of Wilson's Ministerial reshuffles. At 
the highest level, departmental Cabinet Ministers averaged only 21 
months service in any single post, and on 30 occasions a Cabinet post 
changed hands within less than 18 months of an initial appointment. 
In this respect ~lr. Wilson was more in tune with the post-war vogue 
for Ministerial reshuffles, though perhaps he did over-amplify the 
theme; for as Bruce Headey comments "Mr. Wilson's Ministers were 
required to be more versatile than even the most fervent. upholder of 
the intelligent layman tradition could reasonably expect." (69) 
Not surprisingly, in view of their own career patterns, Ministers 
themselves are amongst the most fervent supporters of the intelligent-
layman tradition. Bruce Headey, in interview with 50 Ministers, 
discovered that half still held the intelligent-layman to be best 
suited for Ministerial office, in spite of the increase in the scope 
and complexity of government business. Only 29% of interviewees 
emphasized the necessity of specialized knowledge and even some of 
those thought of expertise as a desirable bonus rather than an 
essential qualification for office. (70) Whilst the superficial 
knowledge which intelligent politicians can glean through continuous 
immersion in the politics of Westminster and ~bitehall is not to be 
discounted, their lack of subject expertise does appear increasingly 
to lead to the position wherein Ministers "have to say 'yes' to a lot 
of proposals because (they) have not the time or the basic knowledge 
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to say 'no' (to their officials)". (71) The employment of specialist 
political advisers by individual Ministers and the creation of 
collective machinery of advice, such as the Central Policy Review 
Staff, reflect the growing awareness of, and the first tentative steps 
towards redressing, the imbalance of expertise between Ministers and 
their officials. Ultimately, however, Ministers are still dependent 
upon their senior official advisers to secure the transformation of 
broad policy goals into realistic policy options. 
In this dependency relationship it is easy to caricature the Minister 
as being the 'creature of his department' (72) and equally easy for the 
Minister to assert that this is in fact not the case. (73) Without 
entering into this debate about the actual degree of political control 
it is, however, important to specify the mechanism of control 
available to Ministers. Basically, Ministerial control over his 
department (using Johnson's distinction) is exercised through his 
interaction with the leading departmental officials most notably 
through the Permanent Secretary. The Labour Government of 1978 clearly 
acknowledged the crucial importance of the Minister-Permanent Secretary 
relationship in its published observations on the 11th Report from 
the Expenditure Committee: 
" ••••• the Minister and the Permanent Secretary 
work together in running the affairs of the 
department ••••• and it is the general practice 
that the Permanent Secretary consults his 
Minister about all matters of major ioportance, 
whether of organization or staffing •••••• In 
practice, the Minister and the Permanent Secretary 
work very closely together to ensure, within the 
department, the responsiveness of the Civil 
Service to the needs and wishes of the Government 
54 
of the day". (74) 
The prime advantage, for the Minister, of the hierarchical structure 
headed by a Permanent Secretary is that control of the department is 
essentially rendered into the more manageable form of control over the 
actions of his Permanent Secretary. (The reverse of this argument 
is, of course, that this structure in fact allows the Permanent 
Secretary to effectively foreclose Ministerial options). (75) On 
the whole, this symbiotic partnership does appear, with a few notable 
exceptions, to function remarkably smoothly. Arguably the smooth 
nature of this relationship is due in no small part to the 
unspecialized background of both partners. The non-specialist 
Minister, with only a skeletal personal political and specialist 
advisory team, is dependent upon his senior officials to translate the 
technicalities of departmental work into 'layman's language' and to 
apply the 'Minister's mind' to the numerous issues that he cannot 
personally supervise. Defenders of the generalist civil servant, 
therefore, make a virtue of their man's 'amateurism'. The epitome of 
their case being provided perhaps in Enoch Powell's statement that 
"it's important in my view that the Minister should be strictly a 
layman. Because in the last resort government decision is lay 
decision. Now, if that is so at ministerial level, there must be 
something which corresponds to it in the structure of a department. 
The Minister who has got to take the ultimate layman's decision 
requires the administrative lay mind applied to his problems even 
though the content of the problems may be technical and professional." 
The supporters of the generalist thus emphasize the point that the 
(77) 
training and the "instinct" of the administrator makes him 
sensitive to the political implications and the inherent limitations 
of the administrative machine. which are likely to have a bearing on 
(76) 
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departmental policy. The generalist in this sense comes to be seen 
as a quasi-politician who is conscious of the political ramifications 
of decisions made in the name of the Minister. And so by virtue of 
this political nous, of the .. alleged commitment to working within the 
parameters of the "Minister's mind" the elected politician is able 
to exercise influence over his department, indirectly through the 
self-control exercised by the higher civil servants. Thus as long as 
politicians and general administrators continue to match each other in 
respect of style and capacities then Ministers retain a simple 
mechanism of control over their departments. 
If this view is adopted, and our contention is that successive 
governments have indeed accepted this case, then the promotion of 
specialization within the Service poses a threat to the ability of 
Ministers to direct the affairs of the departments of state. The 
spectre of the committed specialist civil servant pressing his case upon 
an amateur politician, without due regard to the administrative or 
political costs of the policy, is one that haunts both Ministers and 
(78) general administrators alike. Clearly, Ministers would be 
hard pressed to authoritatively debate the merits of a technical 
recommendation with a specialist committed to a specific course of 
action, in which case the balance of dependence would be tipped over-
whelmingly in favour of the bureaucrat. However, the implicit 
assumption made in such an argument is that the specialist is incapable 
~ specialist of tempering his expertise with the requirements of the 
wider social and political environment. Yet the political executive 
in Britain appears to accept this supposition; for their continuing 
opposition to the full development of specialization at the highest 
levels of the bureaucracy seemingly is founded upon the belief that as 
long as the Minister is not an expert then his capacity to control his 
department (even minimally) is dependent upon the senior administrators 
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talking the same vague language. Stated at its crudest this contention 
holds that, for purely pragmatic reasons, the politician would prefer 
his senior officials to be in the dark with him (the blind leading the 
blind!) rather than to be led in directions that he may not wish to 
follow by bureaucrats guided by the light of expert knowledge. The 
danger in the existing arrangement is, of course, apparent for the 
very smoothness of the partnership of amateurs "may have bred reliance 
upon both political and administrative methods of recruiting executives 
which are too unspecialized for modern needs". (79) 
Conclusion 
It is clear, therefore, that more than a decade after the condemnation 
of Fulton, the concept of the generalist administrator is still the 
basic philosophy of the Higher Civil Service. Yet, this philosophy 
appears to be at odds with the first proposition derived from our study 
of organization theory. Although it is true that the British 
bureaucracy has responded to the increased scope and complexity of its 
political environment through greater specialization this process 
has not been as extensivelY developed as in other bureaucracies in the 
Western world. The specific political context of wbitehall, 
particularly the requirements of ministerial responsibility and the 
normative predispositions of political executives, appears to have 
effectivelY undermined specialization within the Higher Civil Service. 
Certainly, the centralization of decision-making and the maintenance of 
a rigid hierarchy within departments, wherein all major decisions are 
funnelled upwards to the Minister and the Permanent Secretary, has 
frustrated deeper specialization within departments. Indeed, the 
requirements of authority and hierarchy have certainly predominated 
over those of expertise and specialization. This dominance has been 
attained on the strength of demands made by the convention of ministerial 
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responsibility for co-ordination and control of the activities of the 
bureaucracy. Hence the background and training of the generalist 
administrator socializes him into the 'common society of officialdom', 
into a service-wide community of amateur-gentlemen and thereby 
facilitates the process of co-ordination within the bureaucracy. At 
the same time the generalist,acting as a quasi-politician, serves the 
Minister as an instrument of control within his own department. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, Ministers for expedient reasons have tacitly, 
but effectivelY, upheld the position of the generalist civil servant 
against the claims of his specialist counterparts. 
The significance of the preceding examination of specialization in the 
British bureaucracy for our purposes is that the major political 
influences determining the level of specialization in the Civil 
Service are also at work in Parliament. For the obverse of the 
Minister-Civil Servant relationship is, of course, that existing 
between the Minister and Parliament. Specialization in Parliament 
cannot, therefore, be considered in isolation from the division of 
labour in the bureaucracy. In both organizations the political 
executive heads the authority hierarchy, and in both,its position is. 
dependent upon maintaining the requirements of hierarchy at the 
expense of the requirements of specialization. Modern executives have 
found the convention of ministerial responsibility to be an invaluable 
aid in this respect. Firstly, collective responsibility has been 
invoked to deny the House vital information about executive actions, 
and, more importantly, to enforce discipline within the majority party 
(80) by treating all substantial votes as matters of confidence. 
Secondly, individual responsibility has served to differentiate 
Ministers, as the heads of departments with access to departmental 
repositories of information and expertise, from backbenchers who have 
no such access,other than through the intermediary of the Minister. - On 
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the basis of this differentiation Ministers claim authority, derived 
from their possession of superior information, to make decisions 
largely unhindered by backbenchers. Yet the validity of this claim 
can only be upheld as long as backbenchers are denied access to such 
information as long as they are kept in ignorance of the options 
and details of policy. Hence, developing the analogy used earlier, 
if the Minister and his senior departmental officials are navigating 
in the dark, it strengthens the Minister's position considerably if 
the scrutineers of his progress are also blindfolded. Should the 
'generalist blindfold' be removed from backbenchers then the Minister 
could anticipate that his task of answering for the actions of his 
department would become more exacting, and would require a more 
demiledunderstanding of the issues involved. On grounds of political 
expediency Ministers have traditionally, as we shall see later in 
this thesis, subverted procedural change designed to promote 
specialization within the House of Commons. 
Thus our examination of the tenets of organization theory, and the 
applicability of these propositions to the peculiar political context 
of British government, provides a basis for the study of specialization 
in the House of Commons. From the propositions derived from 
organization theory it is possible to hypothesize that Parliament, like 
other formal organizations, will be subject to the pressures caused by 
an increase in the scope and the complexity of its proximate 
environment. In response to this pressure it is to be predicted that 
the legislative body will institute an internal division of labour; 
there being an obvious need for specialist knowledge to be brought to 
bear in the deliberation, scrutiny and legitimation of policy in 
Parliament. Tha division of labour within the House will be expected 
to take on a formal and an informal dimension. Formal specialization 
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taking the form of the macro division of labour through the committee 
system, and informal specialization being the division of labour on 
the part of each individual M.P. Furthermore, our study of 
organization theory leads us to predict that the institutionalization 
of an extensive division of labour will create problems of 
co-ordinating legislative activity so as to provide for a coherent and 
extensive overview of governmental actions. 
However, there are, as our analysis of specialization in the bureaucracy 
revealed, crucial political impediments to the development of an 
extensive division of labour in British central government. In 
particular the pivotal position of the political executive at the apex 
of the bureaucratic and parliamentary authority hierarchies, and its 
reliance upon the maintenance of these hierarchies, provides a crucial 
block to an extensive division of labour. Executive hegemony within 
the House of Commons also effectively means that the dominant normative 
values in the Chamber are those perpetuated by the executive itself. 
Thus the generalist values of the government permeate the Commons, just 
as they shape the character of the Civil Service. And as long as 
political careers in the House are oriented towards promotion to 
executive office, then backbenchers will conform to those norms most 
likely to secure this goal. Thus, in conflict with the final 
proposition of organization theory outlined above, it is not at all 
certain that the strategy of specialization will help the British 
backbencher to attain the personal goal of promotion to Ministerial 
office. Yet, for all that these factors are of importance in 
modifying our expectations of an extensive division of labour in the 
House of Commons, they do not, perhaps, provide such a fundamental 
obstacle to specialization as that presented by the representative 
tradition in Britain. So it is to the contradictions inherent in the 
relationship between organization theories and representative theories 
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in Britain that we must now turn. 
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Chapter 3 
Representative Theories 
In the study of legislatures the concept of representation is of vital 
importance to the comprehension of their role and behaviour. So much 
so that M. Cotta regards the representative role as the "most typical 
parliamentary function". (1) Parliamentarians themselves have long 
acknowledged the importance of representative theories as both a 
source of legitimation for their legislative actions and as a defence 
against the electorate's disapprobation of specific parliamentary 
outputs. Furthermore, the centrality of representative theories, or 
more specifically the conceptions held by legislators of such theories, 
is reflected in the common belief that the behaviour of representatives 
in the legislature is deeply influenced by their representative role 
orientations. Successive studies, following the furrow ploughed by 
Eulau et a1 in 1959, (2) have, indeed, sought to delimit the nature 
and determinants of these role orientations. More significantly, 
recent empirical analyses have attempted to explain actual legislative 
behaviour in terms of conceptions of representative role. (3) In 
so doing these studies have concentrated attention upon the elemental 
link of representation the bond between the elector and his 
representative. 
Without denying the fundamental significance of such analyses there are, 
nevertheless, other implications of representation for legislative 
behaviour worthy of examination. The significant area for present 
purposes is the effect that differing conceptions of representation 
have upon the division of labour within representative assemblies. 
Clearly, the first proposition of organization theory, as outlined in 
the preceding chapter, would appear to apply for all legislatures. 
Increasingly, representative assemblies are called upon to extend 
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their scope of activity into ever more complex and technical matters; 
with the attendant pressure to institute a formal division of labour. 
The paradox of parliamentary institutions arises, however, when they 
are called upon not only to develop specialization in their attempts to 
check executive activit~ but also,are simultaneously required to 
represent and be responsible to 'lay' opinion and the views of the 
'common man' • wbether the two requirements that of political 
responsiveness and that of technical competence can be met by the 
same political structure, is problematical. For an inherent 
contradiction may be posited between the importance of knowledge, 
expertise and specialization in a legislature on the one hand and, on 
the other, the importance of reflecting the, often, non-specific views 
and prejudices of the electorate. Karl Dietrich Bracher, for one, is 
is no doubt that: "An elected representative cannot, by the nature of 
the thing, be equal to the many sided detailed problems with which 
society and bureaucracy confront him". (4) 
This chapter seeks, therefore, to analyze the nature of this apparent 
contradiction by examining the compatibility of commonly accepted 
theories of representation with the propositions of organization theory. 
The very fact that the debate about representation in Britain has, as 
A.H. Birch notes, (5) been confined to a narrow range of issues, 
with only a few doctrines gaining widespread support, facilitates this 
analysis. This constriction in itself, it will be contended, may go 
some considerable way towards explaining the failure of the House of 
Commons to systematize a formal division of labour if it can be 
established that the prevalent doctrines of representation are 
essentially antithetical to specialization. The extent to which 
British theories logically restrict the development of a division of 
labour within Parliament needs, therefore, to be established. 
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The obvious point of departure is a consideration of Edmund Burke's 
ideas on representation. Such is "the spell of the Burkean formulation 
of the interpretation of representation" that it is corrrrnonly held to 
be the "starting point of theoretical clarification". (6) 
The importance of Burke's notion is that it provides a classic 
statement of both the 'what' and the 'how' of representation that is, 
'what' the representative should represent and 'how' he is to perform 
his representative duties. He also indicates the major areas of 
confusion in representative theory: 
i) • 'what' should the representative advance 
of his locality or that of the whole? 
the 'interest' 
ii) . 'what' should he act upon the 'interest' o.r the 
'opinions' of his constituents? 
iii) . 'how' should he perform his representative role 
'mandated' or as an 'independent' Parliamentarian? 
as a 
Of the above dichotomies the last one has attracted most attention. 
This being perhaps the fundamental dichotomy in representative theory, 
where the question at issue distils into: 
i). Should/must the representative be bound by instructions 
from his constituents or principal? 
ii). should/must the representative have the freedom of choice 
to act as he sees best? 
These represent the two poles of 'mandate' and 'independence'. Around 
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these two axes have been intertwined the related issues of the areal 
focus of representation and the interest/opinion dichotomy. However 
the basic issue remains the ;delegate' versus 'trustee' controversy. 
Trustee 
The epitome of the trustee's case is presented in Edmund Burke's 
address to the Sheriffs of Bristol in 1774. So great is the importance 
of Burke's thought upon the subsequent discussion of representation 
that it is worth quoting his address at some length. 
"Certainly, Gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness 
and glory of a representative to live in the 
strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the 
most unreserved communication with his constituents. 
Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; 
their opinions high respect; their business unremitted 
attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, 
his pleasure, his satisfaction, to theirs and above 
all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest 
to his own. 
But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgement, his 
enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice 
to you, to any man, or to any set of men living •••••• 
Your representative owes you, not his industry only, 
but his judgement; and he betrays, instead of 
serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion. 
My worthy colleague says his will ought to be 
subservient to yours. If that be all, the thing is 
innocent. If government were a matter of will upon 
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any side, yours, without question, ought to be 
superior. But government and legislation are 
matters of reason and judgement, and not of 
inclination; and what sort of reason is that 
in which the determination precedes the 
discussion, in which one set of men deliberate 
and another decide, and where those who form 
the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles 
distant from those who hear the arguments? 
To deliver an opinion is the right of all men; 
that of constituents is a weighty and respectable 
opinion, which a representative ought always to 
rejoice to hear, and which he ought always most 
seriously to consider. But authoritative 
instructions, mandates issued, which a member is 
bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote, 
and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest 
conviction of his judgement and conscience; 
these are things utterly unknown to the laws of 
this land, and which arise from a fundamental 
mistake of the whole order and tenor of our 
constitution. 
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from 
different and hostile interests, which interests 
each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, 
against other agents and advocates; but Parliament 
is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one 
interest, that of the whole where not local 
purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but 
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the general good, resulting from the general reason 
of the whole. You choose a member, indeed; but 
when you have chosen him he is not a member of 
Bristol, but he is a member of Parliament. If the 
local constituent should have an interest or should 
form a hasty opinion evidently opposite to the real 
good of the rest of the community, the member for 
that place ought to be as far as any other from any 
endeavour to give it effect ••••••• Your faithful 
friend, you= devoted servant, I shall be to the end 
of my life: a flatterer you do not wish for ••••• " (7) 
The essence of this view is that M.P.s should not be obliged to take 
instructions from their constituents. Certainly a representative 
should keep in close touch with his constituents, but his first duty 
is to the interests of the nation as a whole. He must discover and 
enact the national interest. The way the M.P. discovers this 
interest of the whole community is through representation, not of 
people, but of 'interests'. Such interests are largely economic, e.g. 
a mercantile interest, a professional interest, a shipping interest 
or an agricultural interest. Each constituency is seen as having 
one interest which affects the populace and in which they 'participate'. 
(8) (This allows Burke to argue his case for "virtual representation"). 
Such an interest "is completely independent of wishes and opinion ••••• 
this means, on the one hand, that an intelligent, honest representative 
can find it; and, on the other hand, that his constituents will accept 
it." (9) The prime objective of the representative is the promotion 
of the constituency interest. Thus on any issue confronting Parliament 
Burke held that, as public opinion is unreliable, the representative 
should ignore it and seek only to advance constituency interest. 
'Personal representation', the representation of people's 'opinions' 
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is, therefore, excluded from Burke's scheme. For he believed that 
such representation would simply make the M.P. subservient to the 
opinions of his constituents. Hence the representative would act as 
a delegate bound by 'opinions' which, in Burke's view, were often hasty, 
ill-considered and biased. To prevent the Member becoming the 
instructed agent of his constituents it was important, therefore, that 
he "maintain your interest even against your opinions". 
But, even if we accept Burke's view of 'what' is to be represented, 
(~e. interests) it is not yet apparent 'how' constituency interests are 
to be amalgamated into the national interest. For in asserting that 
the M.P. should represent the interest of his constituency,does not 
this thwart the emergence of the national interest? In the quotation 
cited above the conflict is readily apparent: 
i) the representative is to prefer his constituents' interest 
to his own. 
ii) Yet "Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different 
and hostile interests". 
iii) Rather "Parliament is a deliberate assembly of one nation with 
one interest, that of the whole." 
The clear implication of the 1774 address being that the "different and 
hostile" interests could not simply be summed to obtain the national 
interest. However, Pitkin found that in his other works Burke 
maintained that interests were broad, objective and additive. 
Accordingly "the interests of the realm, added together, compose the 
interest of the realm. All the different localities and functional 
groupings in the nation are part of the nation, and consequently have 
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an interest in the welfare of the whole." (10) 
Thus, each interest is but one part of the interest of the whole. 
Through the process of deliberation Parliament, therefore, is able to 
discover the national interest. Each local interest is vented in 
discussion. Armed with information from each interest Parliament is 
then able to rationalize the national interest. Every representative 
having heard each sectional view in the course of the complex 
deliberative process will discover the interest of the whole. In 
participating in debate, in assessing all the arguments, representatives 
of sectional interests can achieve consenSUS concerning the nature of 
the interest of the whole nation. (11) For Burke the end result of 
parliamentary deliberation' is thus agreement and consensus; not a 
divided House where the majority prevails. What matters is not the 
vote of the representative but his arguments. The information utilized 
in his arguments will alert Parliament to the interest he represents. 
The transmission of information from all sections of the nation enables 
a rational deliberation and formulation of the interest of the whole. 
Hence the paramount importance of Parliament as a "deliberative 
assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole" (mY emphasis). 
What can be deduced from Burke's ideas concerning legislative 
specialization? An initial analysis may lead to the conclusion that 
all Burke's trustees are specialists. For they all have an intimate 
knowledge of their own constituency 'interest'. They are sent to 
Parliament with the knowledge of this interest to promote it in the 
Chamber. In this sense the trustee, as Pitkin points out, is an 
expert. (12) However, the distinction between expertise and 
specialization, made in the previous chapter, must be remembered. For, 
although the trustee possesses knowledge of a specific economic or 
corporate interest, Burke's theory does not maintain that the 
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representative should restrict his activity simply to the advancement 
of that interest. Instead, the trustee must look to the national 
interest. He must deliberate on all issues: he must be aware of all the 
arguments raised and, in the light of wide discussion, come to a 
reasoned verdict on the true interest of the nation. Hence the 
representative does not concentrate his activity upon one issue area, 
rather, the opposite. He is expected to participate in debate with 
representatives of every other interest so that all considerations 
will be brought to light in debate. 
Liberal Theory of Representation 
The independent status of M.P.s found support throughout the 19th 
century with the development of the Liberal theory of representation. 
The key to parliamentary representation was the independent, rational 
Member who mirrored the ideal (middle class) "sober, national, 
intelligent and honest feeling" of the electorate. (13) This 
agreement between IVhig and Liberal theory that representatives 
should not act as delegates was reached from two differing premises: 
Burke, as explained above, conceived of the Commons composed of 
representatives of 'interests', who through deliberation would arrive 
at the national interest. Liberal theory, on the other hand, saw M.P.s 
as the representatives of rational, independent individuals rather 
than of corporate bodies, classes or interests. Such individuals, 
according to Utilitarianism, were aware of their true interest that 
is what gave them pleasure. However, the individual did not necessarily 
know in advance exactly what would provide pleasure. Furthermore, as 
most men prefer their private, self-regarding interest, the job of the 
legislator thus is to promote the 'universal interest', the good of 
the whole, over the "short-lived ebullitions" of the individual. The 
legislature, therefore, enacts law to make it unattractive for the 
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individual to act contrary to the common good. Hence the individual, 
in obeying the law, acts in his own interest and,at the same time. 
furthers the interest of the whole. 
wbilst the individual elector participates in the formulation of law 
through the election of a representative, that representative is allowed 
room for independent action. The M.P. is to use his wisdom and 
available information to promote the true interest of the people. He 
is to ignore hasty, ill-considered opinions of his constituents and to 
act in the common interest. Only if the long-term 'real' interest 
of the electorate is followed will maximum pleasure ensue. Thus, for 
example, John Stuart Mill is able to argue that "the delegation theory 
of representation seems to me false, and its practical operation 
hurtful". (14) For: 
"superior powers of mind and profound study are of 
no use if they do not sometimes lead a person to 
different conclusions from those which are formed by 
ordinary powers of mind without study: and if it 
be an object to possess representatives in any 
intellectual respect superior to average electors, 
it must be countered upon that the representatives 
will sometimes differ in opinion from the majority 
of his constituents, and that when he does, his 
opinion will be the oftenest right of the two. 
It follows that the electors will not do wisely if 
they insist on absolute conformity to their 
opinions as the condition of his retaining his 
seat." (15) 
This position adopted by Mill closely parallels Burke's belief in the 
independence of the representative. 
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The primacy of the deliberative function of the Commons brings further 
concord between Burke and Mill. Burke, as illustrated earlier, was 
able to reconcile the representation of specific interests with that of 
the national interest through the process of deliberation. However 
this very process militated against the development of specialization. 
No representative is able to concentrate his attention upon one subject 
or issue. Instead, he is expected to participate in all discussions 
so that the national interest may be elicited. Even though the 
representative of, say, the manufacturing interest is an expert, in the 
sense of knowing the interest of that sector, he is inhibited from 
specializing solely in the affairs of this interest. 
Mill's representatives, on the other hand, are not considered to be 
experts in the Burkean sense. They do not represent identifiable 
economic interests. Instead their stimulus for action is the 'opinion' 
of their constituents. The prime purpose of a representative assembly 
thus becomes the airing of pUblic opinion; "a place where every 
interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even 
passionately pleaded ••••• " (16) Parliament acts therefore as a 
"Congress of Opinions", "an arena in which not only the general opinion 
of the nation, but that of every section of it, and as far as possible 
of every eminent individual whom it contains, can produce itself in 
full light and challenge discussion; where every person in the country 
may count upon finding somebody who speaks his mind, as well or better 
than he could speak it himself ••••• " (17) Criticism of Parliament as 
merely being a talking shop is, according to Mill, misplaced. III know 
not how a representative body can more usefully employ itself than in 
talk, when the subject of talk is the great public interests of the 
country, and every sentence of it represents the opinion either of some 
important body of persons in the nation, or of an individual in whom 
some such body have reposed their confidence." (18) Rather Parliament 
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should be faulted for attempting to do "what they cannot do well to 
govern and legislate", for "doing ••••• is the task not of a miscellaneous 
b.adY,but of individuals specially trained to it." (9) 
The role of the representative in such a popular assembly is to voice 
the opinions of his constituents on all the heterogeneous issues 
confronting Parliament. The representative possesses no expert 
knowledge of constituency interest in the Burkean sense. Neither does 
he concentrate his parliamentary activity upon one or a few issues. 
For his task is to voice and hear the opinions of the electorate on 
all subjects. Only through parliamentary deliberation will the 
"opinion which prevails in the nation make itself manifest as 
prevai ling" • (20) Thus, as with Whig theory, Liberal doctrine views 
Parliament as a "miscellaneous" body whose Members are expected to 
participate in all its debates. The deliberative function being the 
fundamental task of the representative assembly. 
Delegate theory 
The antithesis of the independence doctrine is that the representative 
should act solely on the instructions of his constituents. The 
obligation of the legislator is to his electors alone. In stark 
contrast to the Whig and Liberal view the delegate is expected not to 
use his independent judgement, or convictions, as criteria for decision-
making. However, given the strength of support for Whig and Liberal 
convictions at the crucial stage of the development of British 
parliamentary institutions the debate on representation has tended to 
operate within their confines. Consequently, as Birch observes "no 
serious politician has suggested that representatives should be bound 
by specific instructions from their constituents and subject to recall 
if they do not follow these instructions." (21) To find any serious 
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discussion of delegatory theory one has to cross the Atlantic, where 
'authoritative instructions' from the electorate have played a 
significant part in discussions on representative theory. 
In America, the Colonists for the most part looked favourably upon the 
doctrine that a representative should be bound by a clear expression 
of the will of the majority of his constituents. Indeed, a proposal 
was made in the first Congress to include in the Bill of Rights the 
right to instruct representatives. Whilst this particular proposal 
was rejected; such provision for the instructing of legislators was 
included in the state constitutions of Pennsylvania, North Carolina, 
Vermount and Massachusetts. And the Acts of Commonwealth of Virginia 
1812 provided a clear statement of delegate theory. This document 
reasoned that the nature of representation demands the right of 
instruction of the representative by the constituents: 
" ••••• that representation is substituted for the direct 
suffrage of these people in the office of legislation. 
The representative, therefore, must in the nature of 
things, represent his own particular constituents only. 
He must, indeed, look on the general good of the 
nation; but he must look also, and specially to the 
interests of his particular constituents as concerned 
in the common weal; because the general good is but 
the aggregate of individual happiness. He must 
legislate for the whole nation, but laws are 
expressions of the general will; and the general will 
is only the result of individual wills. Fairly 
collected and compared: in order to which collection 
and comparison ••••• it is plain, that the representative 
must express the will, and speak the opinions, of the 
constituents that depute him." (22) 
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The view that the representative should act as a delegate is not 
confined solely to constitutional documents. Leading politicians, 
amongst them John C. Calhoun and Abraham Lincoln, also espoused this 
doctrine. Calhoun claimed that the diverse geographical interests of 
the U.S. would be best reflected by representatives, controlled by the 
electorate, acting as agents; a~spokesmen for their constituents. 
Calhoun was sceptical of the 'common will' or 'national opinion' 
emerging in the legislature. For public opinion "is usually nothing 
more than the opinion or voice of the strongest interest, or combination 
of interests". (23) To safeguard minority interests (especially 
Southern state interests in the American Congress) Calhoun espoused his 
principle of the 'concurrent majority'; whereby a numerical majority 
was prohibited from passing laws depriving a minority of rights essential 
to its welfare". (24) 
Abraham Lincoln similarly believed in the delegatory principle, as his 
electoral address of 1836 illustrates: 
"If elected, I shall consider the whole people of 
Sangamon my constituents, as well those that oppose 
as those that support me. While·· acting as their 
representative I shall be governed by their will on 
all subjects upon which I have the means of knowing what 
their will is, and upon all others I shall do what 
my own judgement teaches me will best advance their 
interests". (25) 
Highlighted in this statement is the inherent problem of delegate 
theory namely, ascertaining the 'opinion' of the electorate. In 
the first instance empirical evidence suggests that most electors are 
either unaware of, ignorant of, or disinterested in, the legislative 
issues demanding decision by their representative. Secondly, even 
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if constituents do form personal opinions, the chances of a single 
homogeneous 'will' emerging throughout the constituency is highly 
remote given the diversity of opinion encapsulated within most 
geographical constituencies. Indeed, thirdly, the creation of even 
majority support for any given view within a constituency seems to be 
an equally remote possibility on many issues. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, it is often argued that "the instructed-delegate theory must 
be viewed as political folklore rather than as a defensible theoretical 
concept". (26) Such criticism is perhaps particularly apt when the 
delegate is claimed to be bound by the 'opinion' of his electorate 
given the multi-faceted, transient nature of constituency opinion. 
Sidestepping these practical limitations for the moment, delegate 
theory is, nevertheless, of considerable importance to the development 
of our theoretical model. For a close relationship between delegatory 
orientations and a division of labour may be posited. Indeed, if we 
examine the representation of 'interests' then the representative may 
come to consider himself to be 'bound' to the promotion of his 
constituents' 'interest' where the 'interest' is objective, apparent 
and homogeneous. The identification of this 'interest' obviously being 
facilitated where a single functional interest predominates. However, 
homog~neity of 'interest' may also conceivably be identified where 
several significant interests exist if they are compatible, if 
there is a 'single lowest common denominator' shared by all. In either 
case the existence of a homogeneous interest makes possible the 
instruction of the delegate either by the direct expression of that 
interest by affected constituents, or by the perception of that interest 
held on the part of the representative. (27) Consequently, the delegate 
will be expected to specialize in the area of interest of his constituents. 
On those issues upon which he receives no direct instructions, or has no 
personal cognisance of constituency interest, then it is to be predicted 
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that the elected member will play little part in their deliberation 
in the legislature. 
When 'opinions' rather than 'interests' are represented, then the 
association between representative style and legislative specialization 
becomes rather more intricate. Theoretically, it is feasible to 
contend that a delegate should receive instructions from his constituents 
on all the issues requiring his vote within the legislature; in which 
case he would not be expected to specialize. However, if the important 
variables of 'time' and 'human capacity' are introduced into this 
equation, then it becomes apparent that no representative can be 
expected to receive instructions from each and every constituent on 
each and every legislative decision. Nevertheless, he may still be 
required to seek instructions from his constituents on the widest 
possible range of issues. Even so, it may be predicted that the exact 
range may be remarkably limited, given the problems of eliciting 
'constituency opinion' from a territorially delimited constituency 
which contains a multitude of differing opinions, non of which 
necessarily predominates over the others. In which case, the 
representative seeking to fulfil the delegate role must adopt a strategy 
capable of distilling out the essence of opinion 'back home' • To this 
end he is likely to come to perceive his constituency as a series of 
concentric circ1es,wherebY his 'geographical' constituency is fragmented 
into a 're-election', a 'primary' and a 'personal' constituency. (28) 
The broadest of these is naturally the territorial unit, which is likely 
to provide the focus and voice of instruction in direct variation with 
the homogeneity or heterogeneity of opinion encompassed therein. 
Normally, it would be anticipated that the 'geographical' constituency 
would be unlikely to be the source of clear, unambiguous directions for 
the representative. 
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The second circle consists of the 're-election' constituency in which 
the supporters of the elected member are differentiated from non-
supporters. The 're-election' constituency of electoral supporters 
may provide a more coherent source and voice of opinion than the wider 
geographical constituency; but again, empirically, this narrower 
constituency still contains a diversity of opinion. The difficulty 
of determining the opinion of this constituency may be further 
compounded by the fact that the representative may be unsure of the 
nature of his support. (29) 
Within the 're-election' constituency the representative may make a 
further distinction between his routine or temporary supporters and 
his strongest supporters. This latter group forms the third, and for 
our purposes perhaps the most important circle the 'primary' 
constituency: the membership of which includes the loyalists who first 
recruited the representative, along with those who assisted and 
financed his election. Indeed, it is this circle of associates that 
is most likely to attract a special measure of the representative's 
attention, and in attending to their views he is likely to be presented 
with a more sharply focused range of opinion than in either of the 
two aforementioned circles. The 'primary' constituency may, therefore, 
come to act as the source of coherent instructions and, subsequently, 
the elected member may concentrate upon those issues deemed to be of 
sufficient importance by his loyal supporters for them to issue clear 
candates. Within the 'primary' constituency the representative may 
well perceive a fourth and final circle of friends and confidants 
which Fenno labels the 'personal' constituency. (30) Whilst this 
group serves to advise and inform the representative, its representative-
ness of wider constituency opinion is necessarily limited and therefore 
of restricted value as a source and a voice of such opinion. 
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Thus the inherent weakness of delegate theory rests ultimately in the 
remote probability of a single, clear expression of opinion arising 
within anyone of these 'constituencies' on any given issue. In 
narrowing down the perceptions of his constituency the delegate may hope 
to identify a specific opinion capable of directinghis legislative 
activity. But, given the diversity of 'interest' and 'opinion' within 
even the 'primary' constituency, it is doubtful whether a delegate can 
in practice be truely mandated by his constituents on all issues. At 
best, as Fenno observes from the American experience, "there probably 
are, in every district, one or two issues on which the Congressman is 
constrained in his voting by the views of his re-election constituency •••• 
But on the vast majority of votes, a Congressman can do as he wishes 
~ provided only that he can, if and when he needs to, explain his vote 
to the satisfaction of interested constituents". (31) Indeed, 
perhaps the only means of surmounting the inherent dilemma of delegate 
theory is to divorce the delegate from the representation of a 
territorial unit and, instead, to acknowledge that clear instructions 
are likely to arise only from a coherent and cohesive functional 
constituency. 
Functional Representation 
Theories of functional representation provide perhaps the clearest 
critique of geographical representation, and as such stand at the 
opposite end of the spectrum to Burke's national focus of representation. 
In the strict sense of the term, functional representation is used to 
describe specific economic groups, such as workers or employers in 
particular industries, or professions. (32) However, S.H. Beer 
widens its usage to include "any theory that finds the community 
d~vided into various strata, regards each of these strata as having 
a certain corporate unity and holds that they ought to be represented 
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in government ••••• The unity of such a stratum ••••• is seen as arising 
especially from objective conditions that give its members a function 
and are the ground for deeply rooted, continuing even 'fixed' 
interests." (33) 
The essence of functional representation is, therefore, that the only 
base for representation is a specific and functional interest, for 
this theory holds that the individual can never be represented, as no 
man can represent another, and the will of the many can never be 
represented by the will of one representative. In many ways this 
contention is analagous to Rousseau's belief that legislative 
representation is impossible because it means willing for others, 
and no man can will for another •. (34) As it is impossible for an 
individual representative to reflect the diverse interests of all his 
constituents, let alone the multifarious interests of the nation, 
functional theory therefore maintains that existing systems of 
representation, based on geographical areas, are meaningless. 
In Britain the functional attack on the dominant Whig and Liberal 
notions of representation reached its height in the early decades of 
the 20th century. In the vanguard of this movement were the Guild 
Socialists who provided, in the opinion of one American commentator, 
"the sharpest statement of this current of thought". (35) However, 
given the variety of views propounded by Guild Socialists (36) it is 
difficult to discern a sir.gle statement of theory therefore, the 
account of Guild Socialist ideas proferred in the following paragraphs 
is drawn from the works of,perhaps the most eminent of Guild Socialists, 
G.D.H. Cole. (37) 
Existing forms of representation are, for Cole,misrepresentation "based 
on a totally false theory of representation". (38) Two reasons are 
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adduced,: firstly, the theory is false in assuming that it is possible 
for an individual to be represented as a whole, for all purposes; 
instead of being represented in relation to some well defined function. 
Secondly, under existing parliamentary institutions, the elector is 
unable to exercise control over his representative: "having chosen 
his represe~tative, the ordinary man has, according to that theory, 
nothing left to do except let other people govern him." (39) 
The essence of democratic representation, for Cole, is that the elector 
could only be represented in relation to some particular purpose or 
group of purposes: "All true and democratic representation is, 
therefore, functional representation." (40) Thus, for each group of 
functions there must be separately elected groups of representatives: 
"True representation, therefore, like true association, is always 
specific and functional, and never general and inclusive." (41) 
Cole's critique of parliamentary representation is thus double edged. 
Firstly, he questioned the territorial basis of representation and, 
secondly, he attacked the single omnicompetent representative assembly, 
which claims to represent all citizens in all things. "It is chosen 
to deal with anything that may turn up, quite irrespective of the fact 
that the different things that do turn up require different types of 
persons to deal with them. It ••••• therefore ••••• does everything badly. 
because it is not chosen to do any definite thing well." (42) "Real 
Democracy" would occur only when Parliament was replaced by a system 
of co-ordinated functional representative bodies. 
To comprehend Cole's schematic institutional plan for reform it has to 
be remembered that his inspiration was Socialism. His abhorence of 
the centralized capitalist state and its attendant l.iberal democratic 
parliamentary institutions forms the back-cloth to his Guild Socialist 
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reforms • In his future Socialist state Cole envisaged a host of 
democratic institutions based on guilds of occupations and interests. 
The "basic building block" (43) of this scheme was to be the workplace, 
which was to be, to a large extent, internally self-governing. From 
the workshop would be drawn managers to control the factory. The 
factory, in turn, was to be the basis of the larger 'democracy' of the 
Guild. A district Guild Committee would co-ordinate the various 
factories belonging to the Guild in the local area. Above the 
district Guilds would function a National Guild Committee whose duties 
would be mainly those of co-ordination, regulation and the representation of 
the Guild in its external relations. 
The activities of the individual Guilds were to be co~ordinated by a 
Congress of National Guilds. This was to be the final representative 
body of the Industrial Guild system, performing the function of 
establishing and interpreting the essential principles of Guild 
organization and practice. 
Paralleling the Guilds, Cole envisaged a series of consumer organizations. 
The "Co-operative Movement" and "Collective Utilities Councils" were 
to make representations to the Guilds on behalf of the consumers in 
such matters as the provision of gas, electricity, transport services 
etc. A "Cultural Council" to consider all goods and services offered 
by the Guilds of education, of dramatists, musicians, etc., would be 
established, as would be a "Health Council" in direct contact with the 
Medical Guild. Contact between all these bodies would take place at 
local, regional or national level. All Guilds and Councils would be 
members of a co-ordinating body, namely the "Commune", (44) with all 
inclusive Communes being organized at village, town, regional and 
national levels. 
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What Cole seeks to achieve by this arrangement is a meaningful system of 
representation, whereby power is decentralized throughout society and 
the omnicompetent Parliament is replaced by a series of self-governing 
associations. The implications for specialization are considerable. 
Firstly, specialization would be the norm each occupation, each 
industry is to be functionally represented with the representatives of 
each Guild, each Council, speaking purely on behalf of its members. 
Each Guild providing a homogeneous economic interest capable of being 
represented, because, as Cole states, " ... . ~t ~s qu~te poss~ble to 
represent ••••• so much of human beings as they themselves put into 
associated effort for a specific purpose." (45) As the focus of 
representation is sharply defined the attention of the representative 
is concentrated upon one interest. Gone is the "muddle" of Members 
of Parliament "set the impossible task of being good at everything, 
and representing everybody in relation to every purpose~" (46) 
The fact that a representative acts on behalf of a functional association 
ensures that "not only will the representative be chosen to do a job 
about which he knows something, but he will be chosen by persons who 
know something of it too." (47) This fact removes the representative 
from the realms of "pure 'representation' without instructions or 
counsel from the electors" which approaches, in Cole's view, "false 
representation". (48) Does this mean, therefore, that the functional 
representative is to be a delegate? 
The above rejection of the trustee orientation would appear to provide 
an affirmative answer to this question. Yet, Margaret Cole contends 
that although her husband did in fact use the term 'delegate' he "would 
never agree to having the representative bound to act in a particular 
way; the man who was chosen must do what he thought right". (49) 
Indeed, an initial survey of Social Theory and Guild Socialism Restated 
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may lead one to concur with this opinion. For G.D.H. Cole clearly 
states that "attempts to make the elected person a mere delegate must 
always break down, whatever the form of representation ••••• Our functional 
democracy ••••• makes it possible to abandon the theory of delegation 
without imperilling democratic control". (50) And, even more 
categorically: "! am not suggesting that the representative should be 
reduced to the status of a delegate". (51) 
Nevertheless, it is possible to question Margaret Cole's contention 
on the grounds that nowhere in the chapters on d~mocracy in these two 
works does G.D.H. Cole argue that the representative should be 
independent to determine what he thought was right. Thus, although 
he holds that it is impossible to tie down a representative by 
instructions, "because the delegate is so often waiting for further 
instructions that nothing gets done", (52) he does not go to the 
other extreme of espousing representation without 'instructions' or 
'counsel'. These extremes of mandate and independence are relevant 
only in parliamentary democracy where "the elected person must either 
receive full instructions at the time of election ••••• or else act on 
his own will and not those of his constituents". (53) With the 
advent of 'functional' democracy, however, the electorate no longer 
has to instruct its representative "because it can continue throughout 
his time of office to criticise and advise him, and because ••••• it 
can at any time recall him if it is not satisfied with the way in 
which he is doing his job". (54) There is little need, therefore, 
to instruct the representative if the association is constantly 
advising on and participating in those matters which directly concern 
it, and which they fully comprehend. Furthermore, the power of recall 
would ensure that the 'will' of the association prevailed over the 
independent 'will' of the r~presentative. Thus, although the 
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representative is not formally comnlitted/mandated; the informal, 
constant, group influence over the representative serves to ensure the 
harmony of interest between association and its representative. 
is, therefore, little practical scope for the use of independent 
judgement or convictions by the representative. 
There 
In allowing the represented a "free choice of, constant contact with, 
and considerable control over, his representative" (55) in relation 
to "the common point of view ••••• (of) some definite social purpose" 
Cole appears, therefore, to exclude the trustee style. Indeed, he 
actually uses the term 'delegate' in talking of the structure of the 
ComnlUne: 
" ..... ! have no faith at all in the virtues of direct 
election except when it can be combined with a 
constant touch of the body of voters with their 
representative. Thus direct election is good in the 
village or ward, because all the electors can meet 
with, question, and instruct their representative 
face to face ••••• The real safeguard for the voter is 
to preserve the fullest form of democracy, including 
the right of recall, in the small units within which 
real contact is possible, and to rely on this 
contact and power of recall to the carrying out of 
the popular will in the larger bodies. 
bodies can themselves best be composed of 
(56) delegates ••••• " 
These larger 
From this statement there appears to be little room for the 
representative to act as he thinks right. The very nature of Cole's 
system of. representation would appear, therefore, to exclude a trustee 
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orien ta tion. For, as we stated earlier, the trustee style of 
representation is dominant where the interest/opinion of the electorate 
is: 
i) heterogeneous, not easily identifiable 
ii) when the electors are unaware of their interest through 
ignorance, disinterest, etc. 
iii) where unforeseen situations and complications constantly arise 
and when, because of factors i) and ii), there is no guide to 
action from the electorate. 
However in Cole's scheme the interest of each electorate is: 
i) homogeneous, readily identifiable 
ii) the electors are conscious of their interest: "the member is 
connected with the association because its business is his 
business." (57) 
iii) whilst "the Member of Parliament of today is elected ••••• in 
the void, to deal with anything that may chance to turn up", 
the functional representative is in "constant contact" with 
his electorate. The norm is "constant participation" on the 
part of the voter (59) so that the view of the electorate 
is always known by the representative. 
(58) 
Such an outline does not fit well with Margaret Cole's conclusion that 
her husband believed that the representative should act as he thought 
was right. The evidence of Social Theory and Guild Socialism Restated 
seemingly leads to the opposite conclusion that the representative 
has no room for independent action. He represents a coherent, 
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cohesive group; the members of which are fully aware of their specific 
interest and are in constant contact with their representative. 
Consequently, there is no scope for interpretation of the association's 
interest because it is known by all its members. The very fact that 
the interest of the association is known means that its representative 
does not have to be instructed upon that interest. He does not have 
to be formally mandated to pursue the objectives of the group because 
he is already committed to the association as "its business is his 
business". Gone, for the most part, therefore, are the formal 
instructions and mandates of delegatory theory. However, the 
representative in Cole's theory must be seen as being equally bound by 
his voters through the acceptance of a common interest, through constant 
contact with them and through their right of recall. In both the 
formal delegate theory and in Cole's revised version the end result is 
the same namely, little scope for independent action on the part of 
the representative. 
'Focus' and 'Style' of Representation 
Thus far in the discussion of delegate and functional theory the implicit 
assumption has been that a delegate style of representation can only be 
meaningfully adopted when a cohesive, homogeneous 'interest' or 'will' 
forms the focus of representation. Developing this contention it may 
subsequently be argued that, as a general proposition, there exists a 
positive relationship between the type of constituency represented (on a 
continuum from homogeneous/functional to heterogeneous/geographical) and 
the style of representation (on a continuum from delegate politico 
trustee). (60) Indeed, as noted earlier, Burke appeared to have 
reached a similar conclusion in as much as he believed that the interest 
of the nation could only be represented by a trustee style. In so doing 
he linked the style of representation to a focus of representation. 
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However, Eulau et a1, in their seminal article of 1959, (61) claim 
that Burke's linkage of a conception of the focus of representation 
with a conception of the style of representation is misleading as 
these two notions should, for analytical purposes, be kept distinct. 
In particular they criticize Burke's contention that a representative 
pursuing the national interest could not be bound by instructions but, 
instead, must follow his "unbiased opinion, his mature judgement, his 
enlightened conscience". They proceed to argue that this "linkage of 
a particular areal focus of representation with a particular 
representational style constitutes only a special case in a generic 
series of empirically viable relationships between possible and different 
(62) foci of representation and appropriate styles of representa tion" • 
Accordingly they contend that the style of representation is neutral as 
far as the focus of representation is concerned, for "a representative 
may base his decisions on his own conscience or judgement, but the cause 
he promotes may be parochial. Or he may follow instructions, but the 
mandate may be directed towards the realization of the general welfare". 
This distinction between focus and style has been universally, and 
uncritically, accepted into the literature on representation. (64) 
Yet, arguably the analytical neutrality of these two notions is not as 
pronounced as Eulau et al suggest. If we take, in the first instance, 
the trustee orientation it may well be contended that such a style is 
necessarily associated with the representation of wide, heterogeneous 
'interests' or 'opinions'. Not necessarily the national interest, as 
Burke maintained, but more generally, any geographical constituency or 
association comprised of a diverse membership. In this sense Eulau 
et al's analysis is defensible as the focus of the trustee need 
not be restricted solely to the areal focus of the nation but may be 
linked with other foci such as a territorial constituency, or a 
political party or an administrative agency etc. Hence, analytically, 
(63) 
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the trustee orientation is not solely, nor necessarily, associated 
with the representational focus of the nation. What is of importance 
in this fact for our purposes, however, is that all of the foci listed 
by Eulau et aI, as being compatible with the trustee style, are 
composed of disparate elements, where no single interest or opinion 
prevails. Therefore, for all the reasons outlined earlier (see p.90 ), 
the representative of a heterogeneous electorate is required to use 
his 'superior' knowledge and information to determine and promote the 
'will' and the 'interest' of his constituents. What is an essential 
pre-requisite of the adoption of a trustee style of representation 
is, therefore, the width of electoral opinion or interest to be 
considered by the representative. 
~~ere the spread of opinion and interest is as narrowly defined as in 
Cole's Guild system, then it is unlikely that the representative would 
be allowed to, or for that matter be inclined to, act as a trustee 
primarily because of the homogeneous nature of the interest which he 
represents. Indeed, the very specificity of this functional focus 
appears to demand a delegate style of representation as instruction~, 
recall and constant interchange between the representative and the 
represented are an integral part of Cole's scheme. The scope for 
independent action by the representative consequently appears to be 
theoretically restricted. 
Empirically the delegate style of representation is largely untenable 
when separated from all but the narrowest and most uniform of interests. 
For as Bruno Leoni argues "the more numerous the people ••••• one tries 
to 'represent' ••••• and the more numerous the matters in which one 
tries to represent them, the less the word 'representation' has a 
meaning referable to the actual will of actual people other than that 
of the persons named as their 'representative'." (65) This is 
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particularly true in the representation of a geographical constituency 
in which a myriad of interests and opinions are to be found and from 
which a clear, unambiguous voice of instruction for the representative 
is unlikely to emerge. In practice, therefore, the representative 
seeking to perform the delegate role may be obliged to perceive his 
geographical constituency as a series of concentric, smaller 
'constituencies' and to seek instruction from the more cohesive segments 
of the 're-election' or 'primary' constituencies. Unfortunately, the 
representative may simply be confronted at these levels with microcosms 
of the multifarious opinions and interests of the wider constituencYt 
in which case the fundamental dilemma posed by delegate theory is left 
unresolved. Should the focus of representation be perceived to be the 
political party, rather than a territorial district, the same problem 
of diversity again arises to confound the possibility of the 
representative being clearly mandated as political parties are 
themselves aggregates of opinions and interests. Thus the practical 
problems of performing a delegate style of representation, for all but 
the most homogeneous of foci, are manifest. Indeed, even Eulau et al 
concede that the exigencies of modern government make it increasingly 
difficult for electorates to instruct their representatives in any 
meaningful way. And suggest that "rather than being a 'pious formula', 
the role orientation of trustee may be a functional necessity" (66) 
as the business of government becomes more intricate and technical. 
Consequently it is possible to argue that the delegate style of 
representation is both analytically and empirically linked with a 
specific focus of representation. Our contention has been simply 
that a refinement needs to be made to Eulau et aI's initial distinction 
in as much as what appears to be of importance in the determination of 
the style of representation is not the focus (in its location in a 
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geographical area, an association or even the nation as Eulau et al 
rightly observe) but the homogeneity of interest or opinion encompassed 
within the 'focus'. Where the interest is single and homogeneous, as 
in Cole's functional theory, then the trustee style is analytically 
excluded. However, the wider the range of interest or opinion 
culminating in the truly heterogeneous national focus the greater th~ 
possibility, and indeed the necessity, for the representative to 
'interpret' the interest or will of the e1ectora~e. If the distinction 
between homogeneous and heterogeneous foci of representation is accepted 
then the analytical linkage between a 'specific' focus and the delegate 
style, and a 'non-specific' focus and the trustee style may also be 
made. This formulation does not deny, therefore, that a generic 
series of relationships between the style and the focus of representation 
may exist as it is theoretically possible for a delegate to act in 
the national interest, where that interest is singular and cohesive; 
or alternatively fer a representative to act as a trustee for a 
constituency where the interests are diverse and multiplex. But the 
important point is that each representational style is respectively 
associated with either a homogeneous or an heterogeneous focus of 
representation. 
Later Formulations of Functional Representation 
Cole's theory of functional representation recognizes the importance of 
specialization in modern industrial society. Every industry, every 
consumer interest is to have its own representative body to deal with 
th~ specific problems of that association alone. Every citizen in 
turn would belong to a variety of groups in his role as producer and 
consumer with a different representative representing each of his 
different interests. In this manner Cole's representatives would act 
as acknowledged specialists, each dealing primarily with one subject 
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area. The inherent problem of this schema however lies in the 
co-ordination of the disparate functional interests into some common 
policy. Cole's initial reaction is to wash the question away by 
stipulating that "the Guildsman has not to face any problem of 
arbitrating between divergent interests. In a democratic society, 
the whole body of consumers and the whole body of producers are 
practically the same people, only ranged in the two cases in different 
forma tions • There can be no real divergence of interests between 
thee" • (67) This statement has much in common with David Truman's 
notion of 'overlapping membership' in pluralist thought, whereby "it 
is the competing claims of other groups within a given interest 
group that threatens its cohesion, and force it to reconcile its claims 
with those of other groups active on the political scene". (68) 
However, later in Guild Socialism Restated, Cole does countenance the 
possibility of "differences arising on questions of policy between 
functional bodies". (69) Yet he simply affirms his belief that 
consensus over policy would ultimately emerge through the process of 
deliberation at Guild Council level. Exceptionally, where such 
deliberation fails, the Commune would be called upon to arbitrate: 
"this the, would probably do, as a rule, through special committees 
(70) 
ass is ted by experts". But the difficulty then arises that if 
the difference of opinion stems in the first place from the conflict 
between functional experts, how are the 'expert' assistants of the 
Commune to be recrui ted, and hmJ are they to impartially adj udicate 
between the rival claims of tr.eir expert colleagues? 
A rel3ted problem to the general one of co-ordination concerns the 
ability of powerful functional groups to promote their sectional 
interests over that of the co~unal interest. Prophetically, for the 
"d f' d ' 1970s, Cole acknowledged that we 0 not 1n 1t easy to coerce large 
and powerful groups today, although the state is nominally 
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and theoretically equipped with full authority to do so". (71) 
Society, however, is to be "built on the basis of trusting people, 
and of placing power, and with it responsibility, in the hands of 
Guild 
functional bodies". (72) Hence, the powerful group will restrain 
itself and bow to the "social opinion of the community, which is a far 
more effective instrument than direct coercion." (73) 
A further objection to Cole's analysis of future pluralist society 
concerns the question of the allocation of all social interests into 
functional groupings. Indeed, Cole recognized that no matter how fully 
the functional organization of society is developed there "will remain 
matters which neither fall readily within the sphere of any of the 
functional bodies, nor call for the creation of a separate functional 
organization to deal with them." (74) Inevitably, he resorts to the 
typical pluralist device of invoking the concept of 'potential' groups 
so that it would be possible to create a separate functional body for 
a particular purpose if circumstances so de~anded. However, unlike 
later pluralist theory, in which new groups are self-generating from 
latent interests, in Cole's scheme it would be the function of the 
Communes to call such bodies into existence. Whether the Communes 
would acknowledge the legitimacy of all interests (take, for example, 
the 'environmental' interest which in its strictest sense is neither 
the concern of 'producer' nor 'consumer') is open to question. 
The inconsistencies of Cole's functional schema do raise serious 
doubts as to the possibility of instituting a functional scheme in 
practice. Nevertheless, there is, particularly in his condemnation 
of liberal democratic parliamentary institutions, a compelling logical 
consistency to his analysis of the problems facing representatives in 
a complex industrial society. A good case could be made in support 
of this section of Cole's works against David Nicholl's scathing 
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attack that "Cole ••••• tended to write too much and too rapidly; he 
seems very often to have published the first half-baked idea which 
came into his head". (74) 
Certain contemporaries of Cole would undoubtedly have concurred with 
Nicholl's view, the Webbs, in particular, disagreed strongly with his 
functional analysis. The antipathy of Beatrice Webb to Cole can be 
gauged from her diary entry of May 1924: "The waste of so brilliant 
an intelligence is pitiful; it is he who is strangled by stale doctrines, 
stale not because they are old but because they are not true." (75) 
wl1ilst sharing Cole's opinion that the existing state machinery in 
Britain would, unless reformed, become increasingly incapable of performing 
its tasks, the Webbs did not agree with either the decentralization 
of state power or the functional principle as advocated by Cole. 
Indeed, they firmly believed that the central control of the economic 
agencies of the state would be in the best interests of a 'Socialist 
Commonwealth' • Thus Parliament should remain in existence as "the 
most influential, and in many respects the most important, constitutional 
organ of the democratic state ••••• by which the community, as a whole, 
formulates and declares its will in national affairs". (76) And the 
national Parliament was to be elected from geographical constituencies, 
or from groupings of 'citizens' rather than on a functional basis. 
For, although the Webbs acknowledged the considerable advantages to be 
gained from functional representation when "what is to be discussed 
and decided concerns peculiarly the vocation in question". ~h~y 
nevertheless believed that "the case is reversed when what is dealt 
with concerns not the vocation as such, but the community". (77) 
Their objection to the functional principle is stated thus: 
"When what is in question is mining or agriculture, 
medicine or accountancy, there is much to be said 
for those who are engaged in the occupation voting 
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as miners or agriculturalists, doctors or accountants 
and choosing representatives of these several 
vocations. ~ben, however, what is in question is 
how the future interests of the community as a whole 
are to be safeguarded, or what is to be done to 
maintain us all in health or to train the young, or 
how the national taxation is to be levied, or what 
shall be the nation's policy in foreign relations, 
it is neither necessary nor desirable for men and 
women to vote as members of particular vocations, 
accentuating the feelings distinctive of these 
vocations, rather than as citizens, accentuating 
their consciousness of a common interest as members 
of one and the same community, in the future wel1-
being of which they are all involved. The very 
argument which is used in favour of vocational 
representation against the manner in which the 
House of Commons is today chosen namely that 
among the electors in a geographical constituency 
there is and can be no cc~~n will that is possible 
to represent on any vocational question is equally 
applicable against the election of representatives 
by vocations as such, when what is to be represented 
is no will that all the members of the vocation have 
in common. If it is the vocational will, not the 
civic will, that ought to be represented when vocational 
issues are involved, it is equally the will of the 
citizens as such, not that of carpenters or engineers 
as such, that needs to be represented when the questions 
at stake touch their feelings and emotions as citizens, 
and not as carpenters or engineers". (78) 
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Thus, the purpose of the new representative institutions in the 
Socialist Commonwealth, should be to express the desires, and to 
formulate the will, of the whole community. Hence, sectional interests 
would, therefore, be submerged in the search for 'the common interest'. 
Yet, having dismissed the functional principle of representation the 
Webbs proceeded to advocate the re-organization of the national 
representative institutions along functional lines. Parliament was, 
therefore, to be split into two co-ordinate national assemblies 
each independent, yet both co-equal. On the one side the 'Political 
Parliament' would be confined to its "proper and original functions" (79) 
of administering justice, conducting foreign affairs and defending the 
nation. On the other side the 'Social Parliament' would be assigned 
"the function of exercising whatever national control may from time to 
time be required over the nation's economic and social activities". (80) 
This new body was, therefore, to control the domestic affairs of the 
state by supervising health and educational services, industry and the 
public utilities, and by controlling the power to raise taxation. 
Standing committees of the Social Parliament, shadowing each major 
department of state, were to supervise the various operations of the 
state. The membership of each committee was to be determined in 
accordance to those members "specially interested in the subject" (81) 
and in any case "the constant occupation of the members of each 
committee with the affairs of one particular industry or service will 
soon render them acquainted with it". (82) But, although specialization 
was to be the nor~the Webbs recognized that the Social Parliament, 
acting through its standing conunittees "can never know enough, and 
can, merely by the eyes and ears of its own members, never know 
anything accurately enough, even to come wisely to an independent 
decision upon issues of policy". (83) They subsequently recommended, 
therefore, that each standing committee should be assisted by a 
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'National Board' with full power over the administration of a 
department. Each Board was to be appointed by the Social Parliament 
and subject only to specific directions as to policy from its parent 
committee. or the Social Parliament itself. The membership of these 
Boards was, significantly, to be determined primarily along vocational 
lines as the "large majority of which would be either engaged as 
principal officers in the service or would be representative of the 
vocations to which the bulk of the employees belonged". (84) In this 
way it was hoped that the Boards would promote the highest efficiency 
in each service; and to prompt them in this direction each standing 
committee would engage specialist staff to monitor the activities of 
its functional Board. 
The basic flaw in the Webb's reformist fabric, however, is that 
whilst recognizing the necessity of incorporating functional expertise 
into the governmental process,they refused to endorse the principle of 
functional representation in Parliament. Both Houses in their 
parliamentary dyarchy were thus to be elected on the basis of 
geographical areas with each Member charged with the representation 
of the myriad of interests encompassed therein. Consequently, although 
Members of the Social Parliament would be required to serve on, and 
to specialize in the area of, a standing committee they would still 
remain 'amateurs', in comparison with the functional representatives 
on the Boards and the specialist staff of the committee itself; 
precisely because they were there to represent, and to take cognizance 
of, the diffuse interest of the comnrunity as a whole. In all respects, 
therefore, the elected representative would be cast in the role of the 
'dilettante' (as described by Weber) in opposition to the functional 
'experts' serving in the administrative system of the National Boards. 
Indeed. the Members of the Webbs' Social Parliament would appear 
likely to have faced similar, but greatly aggravated problems, to 
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those encountered by present-day Members of Parliament in the 
practice of 'group politics'. Leading pressure groups in Britain 
now appear to have established a conventional right to direct 
consultation with the Government as their aura of expertise, 
respectability and representativeness has allowed the major sectorial 
interests to penetrate into the formative stages of policy-making. 
Two effects appear to stem from this practice, "one is to raise the 
question in the public's mind of whether they are better represented 
through their pressure group or through their Member of Parliament? 
Secondly, the status and efficacy of M.P.s and Parliament is further 
reduced". (85) Thus the incorporation of functional interests 
in the administration of state industries and services in the Webbs' 
scheme may predictably have led to the loss of "status and efficacy" 
on the part of the elected representatives in the Social Parliament. 
This problem, however, is not confined solely to the Webbs' scheme of 
reform,but,indeed,recurs in a series of works advocating the inclusion 
of vocational expertise in the parliamentary process, while simultaneously 
retaining the representation of the 'miscellaneous' interests of 
geographical districts. In 1928, for example, Dr. Temple in 
Christianity and the State (86) advocated the creation of an 
Industrial, an Ecclesiastical and an Educational Parliament to legislate, 
subject to the veto of the 'Political' Parliament, in their own spheres. 
Their memberships were to be drawn from voluntary organizations 
operating in their respective fields and would thus bring expertise 
to bear in the consideration of specific functional policies. 
Legislative activity would, therefore, be highly specialized in each 
of these added assemblies in stark contrast to the i8ctivity of 
the 'Political' Parliament. 
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A more moderate scheme was adumbrated by Winston Churchill when he 
briefly flirted, in his 1930 Romanes lecture, with the notion of a 
'sub-Parliament' to advise on industrial matters. This 'House of 
Industry' was to draw its merr~ership from the trade unions and 
employers organizations, along with a few recognized economic experts, 
and its task would be to draw up resolutions or draft bills for 
consideration by the Government. In this way functional 
representation was to be grafted on to the existing territorial form 
of representation. Indeed, L.S. Amery in adopting and developing 
Churchill's idea in his Thoughts on the Constitution believed that 
"the advantage of setting up a separate 'House of Industry' or 
'sub-Parliament' is that the new principle of functional representation 
can in this way be tried, without destroying the existing 
geographical principle". (87) However, the inherent contradiction 
contained within this statement is revealed in Amery's projection of 
the working relationship between the two Houses. On the one hand, 
the new Chamber was to be subservient to the House of Commons, which 
would remain as the "central and dominant element in the parliamentary 
system". (88) Yet, on the other, the new House was to be the "one 
in which the great economic problems of the day could secure practical 
and responsible discussion" (89) by the "best elements" from both 
sides of industry. In which event the standing of the 'amateur' 
constituency representative in the House of Commons may well be 
undermined by the formal representation of major functional interests 
much more so than under the modern practice of group politics as 
outlined earlier by J.P. Mackintosh. 
The quintessential importance of these later formulations of 
functional representation is that they implicitly recognize the 
constraining role of the prevalent notions of representation in 
Britain on the development of legislative specialization. In 
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advocating the creation of functionally based, specialist advisory 
assemblies they acknowledge the inability of territorial1y"based. 
trustee oriented representatives. who are pledged to reflect the 
diversity of constituency or national opinion on the miscellany of 
public affairs, to adequately control the activities of the complex 
modern state. The focus of representation is, therefore. altered 
in these models to allow for functional specialization in the 
subordinate assemblies (whether sub-Parliaments, or National Boards). 
Yet an inherent contradiction is evident between the claims of 
superiority on the part of the 'amateur' geographically based 
Political Parliament, and the actual capacity of the functionally 
based sub-Parliaments to dominate legislative outputs. 
Party Representation 
"It is a remarkable fact that most theoretical 
writings about political representation have 
ignored the existence of organized parties. 
This is odd in the United States, where parties 
play an important part in the representative 
process even though party discipline is weak; 
it is extraordinary in Britain, where the scope 
for individual action on the part of M.P.s has 
been drastically reduced by the development of 
strict party discipline since the Reform Act 
of 1867". (90) 
Indeed, one of the greatest ironies of British parliamentary politics 
is that the very time of the assertion of the trustee style of 
representation in the 19th century witnessed the development of 
disciplined political parties. The Commons has remained 
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schizophrenic over the position of parties ever since. On the one 
hand, the business of the House is conducted strictly in accordance with 
party dictates. Yet, on the other, the formal record of proceedings 
(Hansard) refuses to acknowledge the existence of party. The 
pre-eminence of party, nevertheless, is manifest and is so 
comprehensively chronicled elsewhere that little purpose is served 
here in repeating a description of party control. What is, however, 
of importance is an examination of those theories developed to 
justify the role of party in the representative process. 
Whilst it is true to say that a theory of 'party representation' has 
emerged in Britain, no single theorist has been accredited with its 
development. Instead vague references are made to the "Labour 
doctrine", (91) or "British left-wing writers", (92) or even to 
"Socialist and Tory Democracy". (93) Perhaps the notion of "party 
representation" is best considered as a rationale of practice 
rather than as a theory as such. Nevertheless, for both major 
parties the doctrine maintains that the Member of Parliament is 
primarily a representative of his party. As Herman Finer noted in 
1954 "Representative Government is party Government." (94) The 
M.P. becomes a delegate of his party; his task is to carry out the 
party progrannne offered to the electorate at the last election. "The 
growth of party and of party organization has destroyed the 
possibility of any independence for the average Member who belongs 
to them and has reduced him to the position of a subservient cog 
within the wheel of his great, disciplined, mass party." (95) 
This style of representation is justified, particularly by members of 
the Labour Party, by the theory of the electoral mandate. Simply 
stated the notion of the mandate holds that the Party should present 
to the electorate a manifesto listing the policies to be pursued if 
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the party is returned to office. Once in power the party should 
translate these promises into action. (96) Individual Members of 
Parliament pledged to these promises are consequently obliged to 
support the party's programme in the House. Their individual views 
are largely irrelevant. What matters is the programme sanctioned by 
the electorate, for through the mandate the 'will' of the people will 
be realised. The fact that the electorate pronounce upon specific 
policies at election time leaves little scope for independent 
judgement on the part of their representative. - hence the justification 
of party discipline and the norm of party support in the House. The 
grave danger with the mandate theory is that, given the oligarchical 
tendencies of political parties, (97) the policies presented to the 
electorate will emanate from a small group of party officials: with 
the attendant risk that M.P.s will be bound to support, not the 
expressed will of the people, but merely the programme of the party 
leadership. To guard against this possibility the 'Labour theory' 
maintains that the party platform should be determined by the mass 
membership of the party. Through the medium of the annual conference 
the 'rank and file' membership is held to shape future party policy. 
In the words of Clement Attlee, conference is the "final authority of 
the Labour Party": the body that "issues instructions which must be 
carried out by the Executive, the affiliated organizations, and its 
representatives in Parliament." (98) Attlee's view draws strictly 
upon clause v (i) of the Labour Party's constitution,which states 
that conference "shall decide from time to time what specific proposals 
of legislative, financial, or administrative reform "shall be 
included in the party programme. S.H. Beer sympathizes with this 
doctrine: "According to this theory of democracy, voters organize or 
join a political party and by means of its conference agree on a 
programme; they then nominate candidates who advocate this programme 
before the electorate at large. Candidates elected on this programme 
- --- ----- ---- -- ----- - - -
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must stand by it. This is precisely how they fulfil their 
responsibility to the electorate. In short, if British democracy is 
'government by the people', then programme-making by a party 
conference is a perfectly reasonable device for putting into effect 
this basic principle." (99) 
As a prescription for party representation the Labour doctrine has 
much to commend it. However, as a description of reality its 
shortcomings are legion. It is widely recognised that the Labour 
leadership has never felt itself to be fundamentally bound by 
conference decisions. Even though conference, by a two-thirds 
majority, can ensure the acceptance of a resolution as part of the 
party programme: the decision as to which parts of the programme 
enter the manifesto rests with the National Executive Committee and 
the Parliamentary Committee of the P.L.P. The wishes of conference 
are frequently "re-interpreted" in this process. For example. the 
1973 conference accepted the policy proposals of Labour's Programme 
"arguably the most radical socialist document to be endorsed by a 
Labour conference since 'For Socialism and Peace' in 1934". (100) 
One of the radical proposals endorsed in 1973 was for the creation 
of the National Enterprise Board, as a major step towards state 
control of industry. Yet with its creation in 1976 the N.E.B. was 
seen to be "a million miles away from the all-conquering machine that 
the Labour party originally envisaged in 1973." (101) Indeed. 
Dr. Stuart Holland, one of the N.E.B.'s original designers viewed the 
" 11 " progeny of the Labour Government as a se -out. However, at 
least one Labour M.P. was satisfied with his prediction made in 1973 
that the "extreme and unrealistic decisions taken at the conference 
would never be implemented. They (would be) buried by Labour 
Cabinets and Labour M.P.s who ar~ accustomed to commonsense decisions 
and poli tical reali ties." (102) The fate of the N.E.B. simply 
~ -~ -- -~------
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highlights the P.L.P.'s persistent disregard and re-interpretation 
of conference decisions. R.T. McKenzie emphasized this point in his 
observation that "from Keir Hardie to Harold Wilson the parliamentary 
leaders, with varying degrees of difficulty, have resisted all 
attempts to encroach their autonomy". (103) 
One leg of the Labour theory of representation is thus seriously 
riddled with woodworm. The other leg, that the manifesto provides a 
viable mandate, has all but crumbled from the 'dry rot' of psephology. 
Studies of voting behaviour clearly indicate that general images, 
attitudes and beliefs about parties influence voting patterns far more 
than specific policy pledges. Indeed, surveys have consistently 
shown that a majority of people are either ignorant of, or disagree 
with, the specific policies of the party they support. (104) This 
undermining of the pillars of party representation leads to the 
paradox that "while British political practice is now dominated by 
the assumption that the Parliamentary parties will behave as disciplined 
blocks, British political thoughtstill lacks any justification of 
party discipline that is generally accepted." (105) 
It is possible, however, to advance a partial theoretical justification 
of party representation,and its attendant discipline, if the focus of 
attention is directed from specific mandatory pledges to the more 
general area of 'values'. A revised theory can be constructed 
whereby the electorate votes for the 'image' of the party: the 'image' 
being dependent upon the ideas subscribed to. Thus the image of the 
Labour Party as being 'for' the working class mirrors the party's 
belief in Socialism. In turn the parliamentary representatives of 
the party are mandated to operate within this framework of ideas. The 
boundaries of the frame not being too closely guarded: 
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"The word 'socialism' is not in any wayan exact 
descriptive term, connoting a particular social 
structure, past, present or even imminent in some 
ideologue's mind. Rather it describes a set of 
values, of aspirations, of principles which 
socialists wish to see embodied in the 
organization of society". (104) 
Whether the dominating concern of the Labour Party, i.e. equality, 
provides a sufficiently precise g~ide to parliamentary action remains, 
however, uncertain. For, within the broad view of the need for 
equality, the proposed routes to achieve this aim within the party 
have been remarkably diverse. Ernest Bevin held that socialism 
"which is the common ownership (of the means of life)" (107) was 
the only solution to the inequalities fostered under capitalism. 
Crosland, on the other hand, maintains that "Yle can ••••• pursue our 
goals within the framework of a mixed economy, with public ownership 
taking its place as only one of a number of possible means for 
attaining our objectives". (108) With such manifest navigational 
discrepancies on the road to equality it remains doubtful whether the 
paradox outlined by Birch is resolved. 
Nevertheless, the theory of the electoral mandate still finds support 
amidst the ranks of politicians, especially those on the left-wing 
of the Labour Party. Ann Helmes (then prospective Labour Parliamentary 
candidate for Kensington) highlighted the continuing appeal of the 
mandate in a letter to The Guardian: "The fact remains that Labour 
M.P.s to be accountable to their electorates, must be bound to those 
election pledges (of the manifesto) for their sense of direction". (109) 
By this view the M.P. remains a 'party man'; a party delegate. Yet 
it may be argued that a delegate style of representation is dependent 
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upon the existence of a specific focus of representation. Does such 
a clearly defined, cohesive interest exist in the Labour Party? 
One can assert that the economic condition of the working class 
provides a common unifying interest. Laski made the point some 
forty years ago that "the programme of the Labour party, like that of 
any other party is implied by the economic interests of its own 
supporters." (110) However, doubts may be raised about the 
cohesiveness of interest within the Labour Party on two counts. 
Firstly, the economic interest of the working class may be viewed as 
being heterogeneous. Secondly, the supporters of the Labour Party 
are not confined to the ranks of the 'objective' working class. 
(111) For the inexorable "competitive struggle for people's votes", 
leads the P.L.P. to broaden its appeal beyond the working class. 
Hence the party becomes a coalition of differing groups whose 
interests are aggregated within the party. In this process the 
'interest' of Labour supporters becomes diffuse, with the result that 
"the interests of (Labour) backbenchers are now less concentrated 
on matters directly affecting the welfare of the working class." 
Indeed, Marxists and some Tribunite Members would go so far as to 
say that the 'interest' of the working class is no longer advanced 
by the Labour Party. 
(112) 
Nevertheless, the theory of 'Labour Democracy' still maintains that the 
representative should act as a delegate bound by the wishes of his 
supporters. The diversity of interest and opinion among these 
voters bei~g harmonized through support of the party's programme. The 
manifesto, in turn, acting as a guide to those parliamentary 
representatives committed to it during the election campaign. Thus, 
although elected on a territorial basis the focus of the representative's 
attention is the national party programme. As ~e party's platform 
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is a comprehensive one, the individual representative who is bound to 
it will be expected to deal with the full range of issues confronting 
the legislature. The implication for legislative specialization 
being that the party representative will be concerned to support his 
party across the whole range of subject areas. 
An alternative hypothesis, however, is that as the focus of 
representation is now the party, rather than the nation or the 
constituency, it becomes possible for the party to organize a division 
of labour within its ranks. Given that each representative of the 
party is committed to its value system, decisions reached in the light 
of this ideology would obtain the unanimous approval of the 
Parliamentary Party. Hence all party representatives may be predicted 
to support policies guided by shared values, even though they did not 
personally participate in the making of the specific decision. Thus, 
under the umbrella of a common ideology the party may encourage a 
division of labour: firstly, through the selection of specialists 
and, secondly, through the creation of specialist groupings within the 
legislature. Herman Finer noted the first development over twenty 
years ago: 
"Now, since the party must, for its very life's 
sake, have a minimum number of experts of 
different kinds good debaters, able 
committeemen, financial experts, some especially 
expert in each great branch of social and 
economic legislation and in international 
affairs headquarters seizes every 
opportunity that offers to claim a comparatively 
safe seat for such candidates, and local 
caucuses rarely dispute such claims. Nowadays, 
112 
the number of such experts is at least about 
one tEnth of all the seats contested by a 
party ••••. England is more earnest and 
rational in this respect than either France 
or the Cnited States •••.• " (113) 
However, Finer appears to exaggerate the influence of central party 
leadership in Britain. In theory the N.E.C. of the Labour Party does 
possess the necessary resources to 'place' candidates in constituencies. 
But in practice the Constituency Labour Parties have considerable 
autonomy in the selection of their candidates; though the independence 
of C.L.P.s may appear to be limited by the influence of trade unions 
on the General Management Committees, and on the N.E.C. itself. Thus 
trade unions are often in a powerful position to place their own 
sponsored 'specialist' candidates in constituencies. In 1970, trade 
unions sponsored 112 Labour Members, (114) many of whom may be 
regarded as specialist in the area of their sponsoring union's activity. 
In this manner specialists can be brought into the legislature. 
Yet there is no comprehensive effort to rationalize the selection 
procedures to facilitate their entry. The national party organization 
cannot enforce its will consistently against the wishes of constituency 
'party selection committees. As Karl Bracher explains: "The central 
dilemma of modern parliamentarianism becomes apparent here. A 
strong influence of the central party leadership is the only guarantee 
for the nomination of objectively suited, specialized candidates for 
parliamentary and party work: but this method endangers precisely 
that immediate contact with the constituency which seems to be 
possible only by way of local electoral committees, through a 
decentralized party organization". (115) 
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Even though the recruitment of specialists remains a random process in 
practice, the theory of party representation can be modified to allow 
for specialization; initiallY, through the rr.edium of selection 
procedures and, secondly, through an intra-party division of labour 
within the legislature. Thus the theory of Party Democracy has an 
ambiguous relationship with the theory of specialization. In one 
sense the M.P. is bound to support the entire party programme and to 
deliberate upon all the issues involved. In another sense the 
individual representative may specialize, for the representative is 
mandated simply to an ideology, which he holds in common with his 
party colleagues. The shared values in the party enable 
representatives to specialize: for each Member knows that the view 
he adopts on one subject will be that of his colleagues if they had 
personally participated in that area. Similarly the representative 
is aware that his party colleagues will reflect his views on those 
subjects he is not directly concerned with. (116) 
Representation in Practice 
From the foregoing review of representative theories it has proved 
possible to deduce the nature of the linkage between representative 
orientations and legislative specialization. On the one hand, the 
trustee orientation of wbig and Liberal theories suggests that each 
representative should be concerned in the deliberations on all 
matters coming before the attention of the legislature hence 
militating against the division of labour within the Chamber. 
Similarly, the initial formulation of the notion of party democracy 
holds that the party representative is committed to the support of 
the entire electoral programwe and, therefore, may be anticipated to 
spread his legislative activity evenly across all subjects. On the 
other hand, however, a division of labour appears to be compatible with 
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delegatory conceptions of representation. Indeed, it has been our 
contention that the delegate style of representation is tenable only 
in relation to a specific. homogeneous focus of representation 
as the very specificity of interest concentrates the elected member's 
attention upon that interest in his legislative activity. The 
clearest expression of this association is perhaps provided in the 
functional theory of Cole, but may also be seen, in a modified form, 
in the second formulation of the Labour theory of party representation, 
wherein party ideology provides a sufficiently homogeneous foundation 
for an intra-party division of labour. (117) 
However, the very fact that the delegate theory of representation, 
(whether in its American form, or the revised version of functional 
theory, or for that matter in the latter formulation of party 
representation), has failed to establish firm roots in the British 
political soil strengthens the belief that part of the explanation 
for the failure of the House of Commons to develop a comprehensive 
division of labour lies with the nature of the prevalent theories of 
representation. For the three strands of thought, Whig, Liberal 
and Collectivist, providing the major positions in the continuing 
controversy over representation in Britain are essentially anti-
the tical to the development of legislative specialization. In this 
debate, political practice has long been on the side of collectivist 
ideas of 'Party Democracy', though Burkean notions still attract 
considerable support. Part of the fortitude of the 'trustee' case 
stems from the support of the 'independent' Member offered by the 
official procedure of the House. The Committee of Privileges, for 
example, is constantly on the guard against any outside encroachment 
upon the 'independence' of Members. Whilst the Committee has 
pragmatically reconciled itself to the impingement of party into the 
corridors of ~cstminster, it has rigorously opposed any limitation 
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of a Member's freedom of action stemming from the acceptance by the 
M.P. of outside financial aid. The 1947 Resolution of the House 
underscored the limits of propriety: " •.••• it is inconsistent with 
the dignity of the House, with the duty of a Member to his constituents, 
and with the maintenance of the privilege of freedom of speech, for 
any Member of this House to enter into any contractual agreement with 
an outside body, controlling or limiting the Member's complete 
independence and freedom of action in Parliament ••••• the duty of a 
Member being to his constituents and to the country as a whole, 
rather than to any particular section thereof". (118) 
The Privileges Committee has had frequent occasion to reiterate the 
sentiments of this resolution. (119) But the Committee is only one 
bastion of support for Burkean ideas of independence. Sections of 
the electorate still cling to the vision of the independent Member of 
Parliarr.ent. Alan Beith, M.P. is in no doubt that "Edmund Burke has 
followers still", (120) after the receipt of a clergyman's letter 
ending with the words "I must abstain on what is the church's 
professed policy and trust to your judgement after having consid~red 
all representations". Such thoughts are not solely the preserve 
of the clergy, even the Royal Commission on the Constitution concurred 
that: "it is sometimes the duty of politicians not to respond to 
popular feeling, but to go against it. They are elected to use 
their own judgement on behalf of the people". (121) 
Members of Parliament themselves are not above reiterating 19th century 
noticns of independence when the need arises. Invocation of Burkean 
theory is frequently a corollary of intra-party conflict~ (122) the 
typical recitation of 'trustee' theory being reserved for conflicts 
between an M.P. and his constituency party. Nigel Nicholson, Dick 
Taverne and Reg Prentice, the three most celebrated victims of 
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rejection by their constituency parties, have all defended their 
stance against criticism in pure Burkean terms of 'independence'. 
Irrespective of party ccnflict there is, however, one realm of 
parliamentary activity where the independence of Members is largely 
sacrosanct: an area where most Members are in agreement that their 
judgement should prevail over that of the electorate. This is the 
twilight zone of 'moral' issues where, it is commonly asserted that 
M.P.s are elected not to do the bidding of tha electorate but to 
formulate programmes for it on the basis of their own judgement. (123) 
A view eloquently supported by Brian Walden, who in the emotionally 
charged debate on the re-introduction of hanging for terrorist 
offences in December 1974, told M.P.s that they "were not agents of 
outrag~d public opinion. They must listen to what their constituents 
said, but they come to Westminster as their own men, not as delegates. 
woen that principle died, parliamentary democracy died wi th it". (124) 
'Independence' theories still, therefore, attract widespread support 
in Britain. In spite of this, however, there can be little doubt 
that the predominant mode of representation concerns "party', the 
essence of both Tory and Socialist Democracy is the rejection of 
the independent Xember freely following his own judgement. Not 
surprisingly the simultaneous homage paid to these two contrasting 
representative theories leads to a certain degree of confusion. The 
electorate, for example, persists in voting for party labels rather 
than individuals (witness the fate of Dick Taverne, Eddie Milne, and 
Eddie Griffith in 1974) but at the same time grumbles about the "lack 
of independence" of backbenchers at Westminster. The "lack of 
clarity (very marked with the late Victorian period) over the value 
and meaning of representative democracy tends to mean that M.P.s and 
Parliament lose or are blamed whatever they do." 
(125) 
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This confusion over representation in Britain is further heightened by 
Members 'representing' personal or sectional interests over and above 
that of their party. their constituents or the nation. The phenomenon of 
Members acting on behalf of sectional economic interests was well 
established before the 1832 Reform Act. Although the focus of 
representation has altered since those times the House still permits 
Members to reflect sectional pressure, on the understanding that they 
will declare their interest openly and not enter into any contractual 
agreement limiting their freedom of action. As long as outside 
groups refrain from instructing or limiting the freedom of action of 
individual M.P.s, so that the Member maintains his 'independence', 
then the relationship between group and representative can be 
accommodated in the ~nig theory of representation. Similarly with the 
'collectivist' theory, as long as the aims of the group and those of 
the Member's party are harmonious, then little difficulty arises out 
of the M.P.'s connection with an outside interest. Indeed. in times 
of conflict between party and group, M.P.s have a reputation for 
following party programmes at the expense of group sympathies. (126) 
However, the representation of sectional interests does raise the 
possibility of conflict between the Member's duty to 'the nation' 
or his 'party'. This possibility was acknowledged tacitly in the 
establishment of the Register of Member's interests, with its purpose 
of providing "information of any pecuniary interest or other material 
benefit which a Member may be thoughtto affect his conduct as a 
Member or influence his actions, speeches or vote in Parliament". 
(127) 
The practice of representation in Britain, therefore. is far from 
uni-dimensional. The adhesion to contrasting principles of 
representation within the political culture leads to an ambivalence 
in the interpretation of the representative's role. On the one hand 
most Members of Parlianent owe their allegiance to the political party 
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that secured their election. (This loyalty has little to do with the 
use of discipline by the party, for on most issues backbenchers are in 
sympathy with the programme of the party). To this extent Members 
subscribe to the doctrine of the mandate to the notion of party 
representation. However, at the same time M.P.s may assert their 
'independence' in line with Burkean tradition. To complicate matters 
still further, whilst still espousing a trustee or a party delegate 
orientation an ~.P. may be simultaneously acting as the agent of a 
sectional interest. 
What emerges, therefore, is not a compartmentalization of theories; 
but rather a fluidity of thought that allows a representative to 
determine his own 'style' of representation at any given moment. 
Thus, representation can be conceived as a continuum, with the 
trustee orientation at one pole, and the delegate style ,at the other. 
In between lies a grey area where the two styles may be adopted 
serially or simultaneously by the representative. (128) 
But, if the representative is able to reconcile two, apparently, 
contrasting conceptions of his role in this manner: what utility do 
such theories hold in practice? The answer may well be "none". 
Heinz Eulau, for one, has argued that "our common conceptions of 
representation are obsolete". (129) Nevertheless, this does not 
inhibit politicians from calling upon these conceptions to justify 
their actions. Representative theories are far from being obsolete 
as a source of legitimacy. In stressing the responsibility of the 
elected to the electorate these theories propagate the myth of 
popular control whereby the action of the representative is held to be 
legitimate through his responsibility to his voters. The link 
between represented and representative is thus claimed to be a strong 
one. Representatives, indeed, are always at pains to stress this 
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bond between themselves and their voters. In this manner 
representative theories serve the function of mobilizing consent for 
the action of representatives and conferring upon these actions an 
aura of legitimacy. 
Yet in practice the gap between representatives and the represented in 
the 20th century is ever widening in the face of increased complexity, 
the range of legislation and the speed required to expedite such 
business. The enormous restraints upon the time and knowledge of the 
electorate effectively excludes the ~ss from communicating their 
thoughts to their representatives. In practice, therefore, the 
representative is granted considerable freedom of discretion to act 
as he sees fit on the intricate and rapidly varying issues coming 
before the legislature. Yet the value of representative theories, 
for the representative, is that they imprint in the electorate's 
consciousness a vision of a strong bond between the mass and the 
legislators. Thus common conceptions of representation keep the 
blood of legitimacy flowing in an artery of responsiveness that in 
actuality is all but severed. The ambivalent interpretation of 
representative role ascribed to British M.P.s suggests that they are 
capable of holding, at any given time, a mix of 'styles' and 'foci' 
of representation. It is, therefore, possible to hypothesize that the 
particular 'mix' adopted by the representative will affect the degree 
to which he specializes. From the foregoing review of the major 
strands of British representative theory it is possible to deduce 
the relationship between these theories and the degree of parliamentary 
specialization. On the one side, 'independence' theories, both tVhig 
and Liberal, appear to be antithetical to the development of 
specialization as does the notion of 'party representation' in its 
strictest formulation. On the other the 'revised' version of party 
delegate theory may accommodate an intra-party division of labour. 
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Hence, in the representative mix, the more pronounced a 'trustee' style 
and the 'wider' the focus of representation, the lower the likelihood 
of specialization. The greater the emphasis placed upon a 'specific' 
focus and 'mandate', the greater the likelihood of concentration of 
activity. To a considerable degree, therefore, the individual 
representative may, within the limits of accepted theories, determine 
his own pattern of representation. The individualistic conceptual 
mix of representation may thus provide some partial explanation for the 
variations of the development of specialization both within and between 
legislative bodies. 
Postscript. The Representational, Political and Organizational 
Influences upon Legislative Specialization: A Model. 
Having identified, in the last two chapters, the key variables likely 
to have an impact upon the level of legislative specialization (both 
formal and informal) we are now in the position to create a 'model' 
(130) 
of such a division of labour. By arranging each variable along a 
continuum, defined by the two poles of (i) specialized activity/ 
extensive division of labour, and (ii) generalized activity/restricted 
division of labour it will be possible to identify and predict the 
level of specialization resulting from any given mix of these variables. 
The elements in our model are arranged into its two discrete, but not 
mutually exclusive, categories of macro-, and micro-. level phenomena. 
In practice. as the findings in the next chapter illustrate, these 
elements tend to be closely interconnected in the pattern of formal 
and informal specialization. 
The first element in the model (see Figure 1) is the nature of the 
authority hierarchies within the legislature. Where 'leadership' is 
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segmented into different and competing hierarchies (between 'party', 
, ., , , 
executlve , and house structures for example); in other words, 
where a decentralized, horizontal pattern of the distribution of 
authority exists then the conditions for an organizational division 
of labour would appear to be more favourable than those pertaining 
where centralized, vertical hierarchical patterns of leadership exist. 
The second element concerns the nature of ideological or partisan 
competition within the representative institution. It may be 
stipulated that where such conflict is seen as a zero-sum competition 
where all major issues are reducible to a choice between two mutually 
exclusive alternatives then decision-making is simplified, and 
the necessity for specialized knowledge as a criterion for choice is 
de-emphasized. At the other extreme, where ideological or partisan 
factors play little or no part in determining choice, then rational 
decision-making is more dependent upon the possession of expert 
knowledge and hence the necessity of specialization. Thirdly, 
representative theories can be arranged on the continuum in accordance 
with their theoretical compatibility with a division of labour. 
In so arranging the variables in this manner it is possible to 
hypothesize that the particular mix of elements will determine the 
extent of the division of labour within a legislature. Thus it seems 
reasonable to predict that the combination of a decentralized 
distribution of authority with a non-adversary style of intra-House 
politics, in a legislature in which functional/delegatory modes of 
representation predominate, will lead to an extensive division of labour. 
While, at the other extreme, the existence of a centralized authority 
hierarchy, taken in conjunction with an adversary style of partisan 
politics, and prevalent notions of geographical/trustee theory, will lead 
to comparatively low levels of specialization; in between these extremes 
the extent of specialization will vary in accordance with the 
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particular mix of variables. 
In addition to these macro-level phenomena the individual aspirations 
and goals of representatives may be anticipated to influence the level 
of specialization (both formal and informal). As the essence of 
legislators' individual goals will be considered at length in later 
(131) 
chapters, our intention at this juncture is merely to locate 
each of the major goals along the continuum. The legislator ranking 
'influence within the Chamber' as his primary goal may be anticipated, 
(132) 
normally, to seek the respect of his colleagues through a 
display of the capacity to wed sound political judgement with specialist 
knowledge. Similarly, the representative primarily concerned with 
'making good public policy' may regard specialist knowledge, and hence 
the strategy of specialization, as a requirement for contributions to 
the formulation and scrutiny of legislative outputs. However, the 
picture becomes more complex for the legislator ranking 're-election' 
as his primary goal as at least two contrasting locations on the 
continuum may be identified. Firstly, the representative who perceives 
his constituency to be homogeneous and electorally secure may regard 
specialization in the subject area of greatest concern to his 
constituents as the best strategy. In contrast, the member who sees 
his constituency as being both heterogeneous in character, and electorally 
vulnerabl~ may feel obliged to spread his legislative activity widely 
in the hope of maximizing his electoral support. Finally, the 
representative who's primary goal is 'political career advancement' 
may find that his adoption of the specialization strategy is directly 
influenced by the prevailing mix of macro-level phenomena and the 
resultant normative system. Thus in legislatures with no centralized 
authority hierarchy (specifically where there is no dominating 
executive leadership) and where conditions are therefore conducive to an 
intra-House division of labour the normative system will support 
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the decentralization of power, the status quo. Consequently, the 
career aspirant in this setting will conform to the dominant values 
(including in this case the norm of specialization) i~ the expectation 
that conformity will assist his political advancement in the House. 
In legislatures in which a centralized hierarchy of authority exists 
(most notably where the political executive dominates the legislature) 
then the normative system will sustain the existing distribution 
of power and the requirements of hierarchy against the requirements 
of specialization, in which event the career aspirant will conform 
to the generalist norms prevailing within the Chamber. 
Obviously such characterizations are, of course, gross over-
simplifications, but, it is believed that they do have sufficient 
validity to serve as a basis of prediction, and a guide for the study 
of the nature and extent of legislative specialization. , 
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Chapter 4 
The American Experience 
The ~ode1 of legislative specialization developed at the end of the last 
chapter identifies the key variables influencing the development of the 
division of labour within legislatures namely, the nature of 
authority hierarchies, of ideological/partisan conflict and of 
conceptions of representative role. The hypothesis being that where 
decentralized authority structures, non-adversarial mechanisms of 
decision-making and delegatory styles of representation predominate 
then an extensive division of labour will develop. Conversely, where 
the environmental mix combines centralized authority hierarchies, 
adversary mechanisms and trustee styles of representation then 
specialization will be less well developed. Between these extremes the 
extent of specialization will be determined by the specific mix of 
these elements at any given time. 
However, before we consider the implications of this model for the 
British House of Commons it is of value to examine the assumptions of our 
model in a context distinctly different from that of the Commons. Such 
an undertaking will be useful firstly, in counteracting the pronounced 
tendency of British studies to examine the House of Commons "as if there 
were no other social scientists engaged in legislative research 
elsewhere whose theoretical accomplishments could be useful". (1) 
Hence, the voluminous literature on specialization in legislatures in 
the United States provides a comparative point of reference for this study. 
And secondly, the very dissimilarities between the political ana 
representational setting of the British and American legislatures 
enables us to assess the impact that environmental influences have upon 
the internal organization of representative institutions. In this 
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manner the traditional objection to the cross-national comparison of 
the British and American legislatures that each institution is 
unique and, therefore, cannot usefully be compared with the other 
can be stood on its head to argue that an understanding of the 
contextual differences is essential to our comprehension of the 
different patterns of specialization that have emerged within each 
institution. The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, initially to 
explain, in the light of our model, why Congress "has provided 
effectively for specialization, much more effectively, indeed, than the 
national legislature of any other country", (2) secondly, to 
determine the actual extent of this strategy and,finall~ to identify 
the organizational problems encountered in the pursuit of specialization. 
The basic contention of this chapter is that the high profile of 
specialization in the United States Congress is directly attributable 
to the specific mix of political and representational elements within 
its environment; a mix which is remarkably conducive to the development 
of specialization. In the first instance, in accordance with the 
proposition derived from organization theory, there is no centralized 
authority hierarchy in Congress to subvert the importance of 
specialization. The separation of powers, in the formal division of 
authority between the President and Congress, effectively denies 
the legislature centralized executive leadership inside the Chamber. 
Congress, therefore, lacks what the British House possesses 
members whose claim to authority stems from their direct access to the 
expertise of the state bureaucracy, and who are thus differentiated 
from the rest of Members by their tenure of ministerial office. In the 
absence of executive leadership, the development of expertise through 
formal specialization, becomes a necessary mechanism of choice in 
Congress. The development of formal specialization in turn provides a 
pattern of leadership that of seniority leadership of the chairrren 
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of the standing committees of Congress. But this pattern is essentially 
horizontal and incapable of replacing the vertical hierarchy of 
executive leadership. Indeed, the dispersion of power amongst 
co~ittee chairmen effectively acts as a countervailing force against 
the development of other forms of centralized hierarchical command 
structures particularly within the political parties. The pOTNer 
of the floor leaders within Congress consequently appears to be 
"interstitial and personal rather than formal and authorized". (3) 
Overall, therefore, there is little centralized leadership in Congress. 
Instead, there has been, as S.P. Huntington notes, a dominant trend 
throughout the 20th century towards the dispersion of power: "This 
leaves Congress only partially equipped to deal with the problems of 
modern society. In general. the complex modern environment requires 
in social and political institutions both a high degree of specialization 
and a high degree of centralized authority to co-ordinate and to 
integrate the activities of specialized units .•••• Congress, however, 
has adjusted only half-way ••••• it has failed to combine increasing 
specialization of function with increasing centralization of authority. 
Instead, the central leadership in Congress has been weakened, and as a 
result Congress lacks the central authority to integrate its specialized 
bodies". (4) However, this 'failure' is far from co-incidental, for 
as we shall argue, the inherent tension between the requirements of 
hierarchy and those of specialization are resolved in accordance with 
the locus of institutional power. Thus, in Congress, where power is 
diffused, the power-holders seek to perpetuate the centrifugal forces 
already in operation; whereas, as this study seeks to show, in the 
British House of Commons, where power resides in the vertical hierarchy 
of executive leadership, then the holders of power seek to maintain 
centripetal forces. 
A second feature of congressional politics differentiating the American 
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practice from that of the British legislature is the relative 
unimportance of ideological and partisan considerations as criteria of 
choice withi~ the Chawber. The weakness of partisan allegiance in 
Congress has been comprehensively chronicled (5) and it is commonly 
agreed that ideology plays a very small part in Congressional decision-
making generally. Cross-party voting is subsequently an accepted 
part of American representative life, and as M.J.C. Vile observes 
"American Senators and Congressmen ••••• vote against their party 
leadership with a frequency and a regularity which would be intolerable 
in a more ideological context." (6) In contrast to the position in 
the House of Commons, where party organization invokes an image of 
corporate action in support of, or opposition to, executive policies; 
in Congress there tends to be government by individuals rather than by 
party. 
Finally, in line with the hypothesis of the preceding chapter, that 
extensive specialization is most likely to develop in those legislatures 
in which delegate styles with specific foci of representation predominate, 
there is indeed a strong tradition of legislators adopting delegatory 
orientations in the United States. (7) It is to.be anticipated, 
therefore, that representatives oriented in this manner would 
concentrate their legislative activity primarily upon those interests 
which directly and immediatelY affect their constituents; and would 
seek the views, or act in accordance with the established opinion, of 
their constitutents on these subjects. Of course, the objection to 
this view is that the heterogenous interests of most geographical 
constituencies militate against the adoption of such a strategy. 
Nevertheless, recent evidence suggests that representatives may perceive 
their constituency in a number of different ways so that the 
. ,. geographical constituency comes to be segmented lnto a prlmary 
constituency', which includes solidary or functional groups such 
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as ethnic and economic groupings whether organized or not, as well as 
're-election' and 'personal' constituencies. (8) Arguably. the 
'primary constituency' becomes the main focus of legislative attention 
for the professed delegate. Indeed, the strength of constituency 
influence upon the choice of specialisms within the legislature can 
be gauged from the finding of Matthews and Stimson that fully 82% of 
members interviewe~who considered themselves specialist. tended to 
specialize in subjects of particular interest to their constituents. (9) 
The need for specialization 
According to the first proposition of organization theory noted earlier 
in Chapter 2, an organization will increasingly feel the need for a 
division of labour as the quantity and complexity of demands made upon 
it increases. Indeed, all studies of specialization in u.s. 
legislatures implicitly accept this proposition. Hence, H.B. Asher 
notes, for example, that "external constraints, such as the heavy 
demands placed upon the Congress, are certainly conducive to the 
develop~~nt of a division of labour organized around substantive 
policy areas. The expansion of the federal government in the 1960s 
into such areas as health care, space exploration and education makes 
it even more difficult for the legislator to be a policy generalist". 
And D.R. Matthews,in noting the increase in environmental demands upon 
the Senate, argues that legislators "ought to specialize because they 
must". (11) Whilst the growing scope and complexity of legislative 
(10) 
activity undoubtedly makes specialization advisable, it is the relative 
absence of other, more cost-efficient, mechanisms of choice which actually 
makes it imperative in the U.S. Congress. Faced with a mass of 
technical issues, the U.S. legislator, who is unable, or unwilling, to 
accept the authoritative directions of executive and party leadership, 
is dependent upon his own expertise, or that of his Congressional 
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colleagues, as the means for making a rational choice amongst policy 
options. 
But specialization has been developed to its present extent in Congress 
not simply because of its importance as a decision-making strategy, 
but also,because it has facilitated the attainment of the organizational 
goals of Congress, and the personal goals of individual Congressmen. 
Thus the institutionalization of a formal division of labour has 
maintained the capacity of Congress to perform vital legislative and 
oversight functions. Nelson Polsby has no doubts that in the lower 
House "the total impact of a cadre of specialists operating over the 
entire spectrum of public policies is a formidable asset for a political 
institution; and it has undoubtedly enabled the House to retain a 
measure of autonomy and influence that is quite exceptional for a 20th 
century legislature". (12) Concomitantly, individual legislators 
have benefitted in this process as the decentralization of power in 
Congressional committees "has created a great many important and 
interesting jobs within the House, and thus increased the attractiveness 
of service therein as a career." (13) Reforms ained at re-centralizing 
Congressional power would, therefore, in Polsby's opinion, only reduce 
the effectiveness of Congress "because the House would come to be less 
valued in and of itself, its division of labour would provide less of a 
power base for subject matter specialists, and the incentives to stay 
within the organization would sharply decline." (14) 
The necessity of specialization in the Congressional decision-making 
process finds further reflection in the normative system of both Houses. 
In each House a set of legislative norms or 'folkways' serve to define 
the expected conduct of legislators. These unwritten, informal rules 
prove to be "highly functional to the (Congressional) social system 
since they provide motivation for the performance of vital duties and 
138 
essential modes of behaviour which, otherwise, would go unrewarded." (15) 
In other words, legislative customs enable Congress to act, to get 
things done, by emphasizing the importance of traditional modes of 
behaviour and by underpinning the prevailing power structure. Through 
the proc~ss of socialization, an acceptance of clearly defined 
legislative roles is inculcated in new recruits so as to ensure that 
they cause minimum disruption to the operations of Congress. Thus 
the key norms, identified by Matthews, as those of apprenticeship, 
legislative work, specialization, courtesy, reciprocity and institutional 
patriotism; all facilitate the functioning of Congress. Apprenticeship, 
for example, effectively limits the contribution of Freshman Senators 
and Congressmen to debate; thus redlJcing the time consumed by 
deliberation on the floor of the Chamber. And when this norm, with its 
emphasis upon deference to senior members, is combined with the norms of 
courtesy and reciprocity, friction within the legislature is effectively 
minimized. 
The norm of legislative work is functional to the operation of Congress 
by encouraging the belief that respect from colleagues is increased by 
the legislator devoting the major proportion of his time to detailed. 
often dull and politically unrewarding work. Similarly, the norm of 
specializatio~by encouraging the division of labour and the development 
of expertise, buttresses the organizational requirement for ~pecialization. 
Yet the norm cf specialization also secures the perpetuation of the 
decentralized character of Congressional decision-making and 
subsequently legitimizes the existing distribution of power. by 
emphasizing the prestige of the expert, and by discouraging any major 
challenge to the authority of the committee experts. In conforming 
with this nor~Congressmen are, therefore, essentially underpinning the 
fragmentation of power within the legislative system and consenting to 
the maintenance of the status quo. (16) While conformity to this 
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norm, as with all of the folkways, is obviously not absolute, considerable 
majorities of Congressmen (17) still adhere to it; partly, out of 
organizational necessity, and, partly, out of the belief that conformity 
enhances respect a;ld effectiveness within the legislature. (18) 
The importance of the 'folkway' of specialization in both Houses is, 
therefore, not only a reflection of the need for a division of labour 
in the environmental setting of Congress but also is an indication of 
the decentralized power structura within Congress. For the norm of 
specialization not only facilitates the functioning of Congress but 
also serves to justify the power of committee experts and to pre-empt 
the centralizing claims of party leaders. In so doing, this norm helps 
to legitimize the existing distribution of power and is, therefore, 
instrumental in the perpetuation of the status quo. 
The extent of specialization. 
Whilst the necessity of specialization as a strategy of decision-making 
has been conceded in theory, the extent to which this strategy is 
employed in practice by Congressmen remains somewhat ooscure. For the 
~in source of information about informal patterns of specialization 
remains the early works of Matthews (19) and Clapp, (20) and mucQ 
of their evidence on this phenomenon is perceptual and limited. 
Matthews, on the basis of a limited number of interviews with twenty-
five Senators, reached the conclusion that informal specialization was-
highly developed in the Cpper House and cited the opinion of one 
leading Senator in support: " ••••• 1 have picked out two or three 
sub-committees in which 1 am es?ecially interested and have concentrated 
on them. 1 believe that this is the usual practice around here." (21) 
Clapp, on the evidence gained from conversations with thirty-six 
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Congressmen reached a similar conclusion that "faced with an impossible 
workload, Congressmen have responded in different ways, most of them 
seeking refuge in specialization." (22) Unfortunately, given the 
limited number of representativES interviewed in both of these studies 
• 
there is no guarantee that the perceptions recorded are in fact 
representative of opinion generally in Congress. 
The importance of Matthews' work, however, does not rest upon interview 
data, but rather its significance is to be found in its pioneering 
attempt to quantify the extent of informal divison of labour by means 
of an 'index of specialization'. This index sought to measure 
specialization according to the proportion of public bills and 
resolutions introduced by each Senator that were referred to the two 
committees receiving the largest number of his sponsored bills and 
resolutions. (23) The assumption being that, the greater the proportion 
of bills referred to just two committees, the greater the degree of 
informal specialization. However, the validity of such an assumption 
may be questioned on at least two counts; first, the index does not 
reflect the scope of a Senator's wider legislative activity in debate 
and service en committee; and, secondly, there is the problem, which 
Matthews' acknowledges himself, that the jurisdictions of Senate 
committees are sufficiently broad and overlapping that two bills on very 
different subjects may be referred to the same committee, while two 
bills on similar subjects may be referred to different committees. (24) 
In spite of these deficiencies the index is of value in revealing that 
informal specialization is not as highly developed in the Senate as the 
perceptions of Senators might have led one to anticipate. Although 
there was a pronounced profile of specialization the largest single 
group of Senators (48%) in the 83rd and 84th Congresses displayed only 
a 'low' level of specialization; a further 36% were ranked as being 
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mode=ate1y specialized and only 167. of Se~ators were highly specialized 
in their legislative activity. 
The work of Matthews on the Senate has recently been replicated in the 
House of Representatives by Olson and Nonidez. (25) Unfortunately, 
whilst claiming as their objective the application of Matthews' 
measures of legislative activity to members of the House of Representatives, 
these authors, in fact, significantly alter the computation of the 
original index of specialization. Whereas Matthews measured the 
proportion of all bills introduced by a Senator which were referred to 
his highest two committees, Olson and Nonidez arbitrarily increase 
this number to three committees. The effect of this change is both to 
(26) 
weaken the stringency of the index (out of a preconception on the 
authors' part of a lower profile of specialization in the House) 
and also to remove the opportunity for an inter-House comparison of 
informal specialization. Furthermore, Olson and Nonidez ultimately 
fail to specify the profile of specialization; so that one is left not 
knowing the extent of informal division of labour in the House. 
L.V. Grant's (27) evaluation of a simple theory of specialization 
in the House of Representatives similarly leaves one unenlightened as 
to the degree of informal specialization. In fairness to Grant. however. 
his primary concern is with the development and testing of a mathematical 
model of decision-making rather than with an empirical investigation 
into the extent of the existing division of labour. Nevertheless, 
Grant does produce an index as a measure of the degree to which the 
individual Congressman concentrates his sponsorship of bills in a 
specific subject area, weighted in accordance with his relative activism 
in the introduction of bills. However, Grant's index is, at best. 
simply a means of identifying specialists in any given area. and. at 
worst, there is the suspicion that his index is as much a measure of 
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activism as of specialization. (28) 
One attempt to break away from the measurement of specialization in 
terms of the sponsorship of legislation is provided by R.E. Lehnen in 
his analysis of debate on the floor of the Senate. (29) Lehnen tests 
the proposition that not all Senators act in the same way, or 
concentrate equally on all issues coming before the Senate, by 
examining the number of subject areas members speak upon. In detail, 
he observed that although there is a wide variation in the number of 
legislators speaking upon an issue; the number that contribute to a 
'substantial' degree. that is over 2% of the debate, is in fact small. 
Thus, of the 59 Senators who spoke a substantial amount, 14 (24%) spoke 
extensively on three or more issues and were classified as 'generalists'; 
13 (22%) spoke extensively on two issues and the remainder, 32 (54%), 
spoke substantially on only one subject. In total, therefore, 45 
Senators just under half of the total membership met the 
specialist role. However, 40 Senators, in th~ session studied. made 
no contribution whatsoever to debate a phenomenon regarded as 
surprising and with no evident cause by Lehnen. Lehnen's analysis is 
incapable of resolving the question of whether this latter cohort of 
members were in fact specialists whose specia1isms did not feature in 
discussion in the single session under study. And a further limitation 
upon the utility of his study concerns the nature of Senate deliberation 
itself; given that "speeches in the Senate are usually set, poorly 
attended, indifferently received and frequently interrupted". (30) 
Existing quantitative analyses of informal specialization thus appear, 
on the whole, to be of only limited value in revealing the true extent 
of the employment of the specialization strategy in Congress. 
reliance is still, therefore, placed upon the perceptions of 
Heavy 
legislators about the pattern of specialization. The views most 
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frequently quoted still derive, however, from the works of Matthews 
and Clapp; yet, as we have already noted, the representativeness of 
these opinions is open to question. A welcome addition to this 
perceptual information, therefore, is the data provided by Matthews 
and Stimson in their recent work Yeas and Nays. (31) From interviews 
with 100 members of the House of Representatives they discovered that 
97% of Congressmen regarded themselves as 'specialists' in some field 
of legislative work. Indeed, 22% of the sample claimed to focus their 
attention primarily upon one issue area, a further 41% focused primarily 
upon two issue areas, 19% concentrated upon three subjects, 8% on four 
areas and the remaining i% claimed five or more specialisms. (32) 
These findings clearly point, therefore, to the existence of a 
pronounced pattern of informal specialization within Congress. However, 
as of yet, no quantitative analysis of specialization has succeeded in 
discovering the extent to which these perceptions are matched by actual 
patterns of behaviour. 
For a more comprehensive examination of the phenomenon of informal 
specialization one has to turn away from the works on Congress to 
consider the studies of state legislatures. At the state level 
legislators are faced with similar problems to those of their 
Congressional colleagues in dealing with the increased variety and 
technical complexity of public issues. For, as H. Owen Porter comments, 
although the state legislator "is not intentionally recruited to be 
expert in any area, he is expected to choose among alternatives in many 
areas, and he is often given little time to assemble relevant 
informa t ion." (33) One key strategy for "avoiding inappropriate 
information while securing the discrete information needed to make 
rational decisions" (34) is, of course, that of specialization. The 
extent to which individual legislators actually adopt this strategy is 
clearly revealed in Buchanan et aI's (35) seminal study of legislative 
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role orientations in four state legislatures. In total 471 out of 504 
legislators in California, New Jersey, Ohio and Tennessee were 
interviewed, and the extent and character of specialization was gauged 
from their responses to the following questions: 
i). Is there a particular subject or field of legislation in 
which you consider yourself particularly expert I mean 
when it comes to dealing with proposed legislation in that 
field? What (field) is that? 
ii). Why is that (i.e. that you are expert)? 
iii). Could you name five or six members of the House (Senate) 
whom you consider particularly expert in their respective 
fields? (36) 
917. of interviewees named one or more members they considered to be 
specialists in some substantive field, and 83% named fields in which 
they personally specialized. While differences in the amount of 
specialization noted amongst the four legislatures did exist, such 
differences were not consistent and did not follow any obvious pattern. 
Other studies, most notably that of Porter and Leuthold (37) in 
Michigan, have replicated Buchanan et aI's original questions and have 
discovered similar patterns namely, "that almost every legislator 
(38) listed areas in which he was trying to specialize or become expert." 
Porter and Leuthold's study is of particular significance in so far as 
the analysis was conducted over two sessions (1964 and 1968) and 
revealed that the pattern of specialization was fairly stable over time. 
In the light of these findings, the claim made by H.B. Asher (39) 
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that specialization is assigned lesser importance in state legislatures 
than in Congress appears to be somewhat misplaced. Yet Rosenthal 
also contends that the norm of specialization is only weakly held at 
state level and that "one of the major problems in state legislatures •••• 
is the lack of specialization". (40) Both authors cite the evidence 
provided in Wah Ike et aI's The Legislative System, that only very small 
percentages of state representatives specifically mentioned "an 
acceptance of the committee system" as one of the rules of the 
legislative game, in support of their claim. But, ultimately, the 
dispute between Asher and Rosenthal. on the one hand, and Wahike et aI, 
on the other, (who claim that specialization, is in fact "more obvious 
in state legislatures than in Congress") (41) resolves into a matter 
of semantics rather than of substance. The former set of authors 
take specialization to mean formal specialization, while the latter set 
focus essentiallY on the informal dimension of the division of labour. 
In practice informal and formal patterns of specialization overlap, but 
it is worth noting, as Matthews and Stimson point out, that although 
"the committee system and the strategy of specialization by individual 
members are related to one another ••••• they are not the same thing". (42) 
Nevertheless, in Congress this relationship does appear to be remarkably 
strong: in one recent survey 98% of specialists in the House of 
Representatives stated that the subject matter of their committees 
provided at least one of their specialisms, and fully 56% claimed that 
their specialisms corresponded exactly to their present or former 
committee assignments. (43) At the state level, however, the 
distinction between formal and informal patterns of specialization is that 
much more pronounced. In the four state legislatures studied by 
Buchanan et aI, for example, the percentages of members attributing 
their own expertise to experience gained on committees ranged only from 
11% to 25%. Nevertheless, when state representatives were asked to 
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identify experts within the legislature, 65% of the most 'visible' 
experts were found to be committee chairmen in their respective subject 
fl"elds. (44) S'"l l~ arly, Porter and Leuthold discovered that two-
thirds or ffiore of the nominations of experts in the Michigan assembly 
went to the chairman or members of the relevant committees. So that, 
even at the state level, a substantial correspondence of formal and 
informal patterns of specialization can be observed; enough, perhaps, to 
cast some doubts upon the contention of Asher and Rosenthal. 
Unfortunately, this debate on the relative significance of specialization 
in the state and the national legislatures becomes even more convoluted 
by the propensity of U.S. academics to use the terms 'expertise' and 
'specialization' as synonyms. Thus, Asher, in arguing that specialization 
is of lesser importance at the state level, focuses his attention upon 
the depth of expertise, and clearly conceives of committee service as 
being the primary means of acquiring such expertise. Subsequently, 
in contrasting the high rate of turnover of personnel in state 
legislatures with the relatively stable membership of Congress, he draws 
the conclusion that "obviously, if tenure of office is shorter, the 
likelihood of developing expertise is less". (45) But this argument 
largely ignores the importance of 'primary' expertise: the knowledge of 
a specific subject area gained from the occupational or personal 
experience of the legislator outside of the legislature. Indeed, the 
significance of extra-parliamentary experience at the state level is 
evident in Buchanan et aI's study for previous occupational 
experience was identified as the major source of expertise in the four 
state legislatures. (46) The part-time nature of state legislatures 
may go some way towards explaining this emphasis upon 'primary' expertise; 
as the legislator may be encouraged to devote his attention to those 
matters with which he is already familiar rather than to expend time 
developing 'secondary' expertise in committee. The advantage of such 
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an informal system is that it allows the legislature readily to adapt 
to the changing problems within the state. (47) The disadvantage, 
however, is that the vagaries of the electoral system make it impossible 
to guarantee that the required experts will be elected at the necessary 
time. For it remains a truism that the legislature must take the 
particular mix of experts elected at any given time. Individual 
representatives may subsequently be required to develop expertise in 
areas of importance for the legislature on top of their primary 
expertise.-especially if the subject area of that primary interest is 
deemed to be relatively inessential to the needs of the legislature. In 
which case, 'secondary' expertis~ gained from sustained attention to a 
particular issue in committe~ becomes important in the legislative 
system. And, in which further case, Asher's point about the high rate 
of membership turnover in state legislatures becomes significant, 
because membership instability on standing committees impedes the 
development of 'secondary' expertis~ as members do not serve long 
enough to acquire familiarity, in depth, with the subject matter of 
their committee assignments. However, before proceeding to examine 
the importance of formal specialization, let us simply draw to a 
conclusion the somewhat inconsequential debate over the relative 
importance of specialization at the state and Congressional level by 
noting that both sides in this discussion appear to talk past each other. 
Hence, Buchanan et aI, on the one side, focus upon the informal pattern 
of specialization, whilst Asher and Rosenthal, on the other, concentrate 
upon the formal division of labour. If for no other reason, therefore, 
an examination of the dispute between these authors has been of value 
in demonstrating the confusion that can arise, unless it is clearly 
specified whether it is the infor.na1 or the formal dimension of 
specialization that is being studied, and also, unless specialization, 
as the process of the division of labour, is distinguished from expertise, 
as the product of such specialization. 
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Formal Specialization Congressional Committees 
The centrality of the formal system of specialization in the U.S. national 
legislature is such that "it is hard to imagine Congress without committees, 
they seem a natural, as well as indispensable, part of the legislative 
process." (48) 'Natural' that is as an organizational response to 
the increased scope and complexity of the legislative demands made upon 
Congress. For committees enable the individual legislator to develop 
his knowledge of a specific policy area, whilst at the same time enabling 
the legislature as a body to develop expertise across the widest range 
of issues. In this way Congress, working through standing committees, 
has reacted to its increased legislative role in the 20th century. 
Moreover, formal specialization can also be viewed as a 'natural' 
response to the problems encountered in securing Congressional over-
sight of the activities of the executive during this period. Thus 
Rieselbach argues that "to avoid being overwhelmed by executive-branch 
specialization and sophist'ication, Congress must, as a counterpoise, 
possess similar information and know-how. And it is precisely these 
skills and resources which the committees generate. Freed from any 
necessity to focus on all subjects, some members concentrate on the 
topics ujder the jurisdiction of the committee on which they serve. 
The knowledge they develop ensures that Congress will have among its 
(49) 
numbers men who can effectively challenge administrative behaviour ...... 
Indeed, the importance of this oversight function has led to a 
protracted debate as to whether or not the Congressional committee 
structure is solely a response to executive branch advantages. Morrow, (50) 
for example, contends that the Re-organization Act of 1946, by 
consolidating committees and assigning to them exclusive oversight 
responsibilities over specific executive agencies, simply reflected the 
organizational changes accomplished within the bureaucracy. Neustadt, (51) 
on the other hand, argues that the shape of the bureaucracy, in fact, 
reflected the jurisdiction of Congressional committees. Without 
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becoming too immersed in this controversy it seems reasonable to 
suggest, as indeed Neustadt ultimately concedes, that the relationship 
between legislative and executive structures may in practice be 
reciprocal. For our purposes, however, it is merely necessary to 
note that committee based specialization in Congress represents one 
obvious organizational mechanism for coping with the increase in 
legislative workload and also for exercising control over the executive. 
Furthermore, the development of a formal division cr labour appears as 
an even more 'natural' phenomenon given the absence of other structural 
arrangements capable of simplifying the process of decision-making 
within Congress. In the first instance the constitutional separation 
of powers, as we noted earlier, effectively denied Congress a 
centralized hierarchy of decision. "It, therefore, lacked" as 
Bradshaw and Pring point out " ••••• ministers who were able to put 
before it the results of all the routine work, done by the executive •••• 
in the circumstances the gradual growth of small bodies capable of 
doing the groundwork is understandable". (52) Secondly, the political 
parties in Congress proved incapable of providing effective leadership. 
The marked lack of party cohesion, reflecting the ideologically denatured 
electoral competition and the decentralized structure of U.S. parties, 
largely removed 'ideological' and 'partisan' criteria from decision-
making. Therefore, while ideological voting undoubtedly occurs in 
Congress it does not happen "often enough to serve as a general model 
of how Congressmen usually make up their minds". 
(53) In addition, 
the representative tradition in America,with its emphasis upon narrow 
'foci' and delegatory 'styles', is generally supportive of a division of 
labour. Thus concentration upon sectional district interesm, aL1d "the 
promotion of those interests in the legislature,is accepted as a 
legitimate part of the role of most Congressmen. And nowhere have 
these interests been seen to be better promoted than in committees. 
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For, if it is the case that institutional arrangements directly affect 
the representative's ability to represent his policy constituency', as 
C.O. Jones contends, then committees dealing with specific subjects, 
such as the House Agriculture Committee, can be seen to be "organized 
to allow a maximum of constituency-oriented representation". (54) 
Committees in Congress are, therefore, both a cause and a consequence 
of the decentralization of power within the legislature. Their 
propagation was initially facilitated by the absence of rigidly 
centralized authority hierarchies; and their continuance institutionalizes 
a horizontal dispersion of authority within the House and the Senate. 
In accordance with our contention that organizational structure is not 
simply a product of organizational necessity, but also closely reflects 
the predilections of the most powerful actors within the institution, 
it is not surprising to find, therefore, that committee chairmen have 
consistently frustrated all attempts to centralize power into the hands 
of party leaders and the Speaker in Congress. However, the chairmen 
have been less effective in maintaining their position against the 
inherent centrifugal forces at work in Congress. Indeed, the very 
conceptual foundation upon which their power rested the division 
of labour and the possession of expert knowledge contained the 
potentiality for a fragmentation of their power. Precisely because 
the logic of specialization, which was capable of supporting the existence 
of 22 committees, was equally capable of sustaining a more extensive 
division of labour. Hence, as J.D. Lees notes "as Congressmen, in 
response to the sheer pressure of work, have become more specialized, 
so an internal division of labour within a committee seems to be 
sensible". (55) The use of subcommittees in turn permits greater 
specialization as the legislator need not grapple with the full range , 
of questions within the jurisdiction of the full committee, but, 
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instead, may concentrate specifically on one facet of the subject. 
The seeds of the proliferation of subcommittees in congress were 
largely sown by the Legislative Re-organization Act of 1946 which, 
whilst successfully reducing the number of standing committees, had as 
an unintended consequence, the internal fragmentation of the 
responsibilities of the full committees. In most cases, however, the 
subcommittees were the creatures of the chairmen their numbers and 
their scope for influence was closely regulated. Ultimately, 
therefore, the extent of a subcommittee's power was determined by the 
licence the committee chairman was willing to concede to it. In three 
cases the committees on Internal Security, Rules, and Ways and 
Means all operated without subcommittees until the mid-1970s. Not 
surprisingly, these were the committees most tightly controlled by 
their respective chairmen. (56) 
Underpinning the power of the committee chair~en in their committees, 
and more generally in the House as a whole, was the seniority system, 
whereby the member of the majority party with the longest continuous 
service on a committee automatically became chairman. The strength 
of the norm of deference to committee decisions also contributed to 
the chairman's power. However, the radical transformation of the 
composition of the House of Representatives, brought about by the influx 
of new members in the 1970, 1972 and 1974 elections, (57) led, in turn, 
to a reassessment of some of the traditional procedures of Congress. 
A prime target for reform was the seniority system, and the introduction 
of secret ballot votes for nominations for committee chairmanships, 
in 1971 and 1973, effectively undercut the power base of the chairmen. 
The challenge to the chairmen's autonomy was pressed still further in 
Session 1974-75 when the proposals of the Bolling and Hansen committees, 
on the re-organization of the committee structure,were considered in 
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the House. (58) In adopting the Hansen proposals, the House 
strengthened the position of subcommittees and their chairmen vis-a-vis 
full committees and their chairmen: for each committee of more than 
twenty members was required to set up at least four subcommittees. 
This requirement, taken in conjunction with the earlier 'Subcommittee 
Bill of Rights' of 1973 (59) (which had specified the range of the 
powers and privileges of subcommittees) effectively curtailed the power 
of standing committee chairmen to control the activities of their 
respective subcommittees. The new ascendency of subcommittees in the 
late 1970s has now been accepted by committee chairmen if not 
enthusiastically, then at least as something about which nothing can 
be done. Indeed, it was perhaps almost inevitable that their po,~er, 
resting as it did upon the centrifugal force of specialization, should 
be fragmented by the very strength of this force itself. Consequently, 
whereas the standing committees have dominated the House throughout 
the last sixty years "it would not (now) be completely surprising to . 
see the House of the 1980s built around subcommittee hegemony, with 
subcommittee chairmen controlling the legislative output of committees 
and members deferring to the subcommittee chairmen's expertise on the 
House floor". (60) 
In fact this vision of the future has already been long actualized in 
the House Appropriations Committee. As long ago as 1962 Richard Fenno 
observed that decision-caking was decentralized to the extent that: 
"Each subcommittee holds hearings on the budget 
estimates of the agencies assigned to it, meets 
in executive session to decide what figures and 
what language to recommend to the full committee 
(to 'mark up' the bill), defends its recommendations 
before the full committee, writes the committee's 
report to the House, dominates the debate on the 
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floor, and bargains for the House in conference 
committee. Within its jurisdiction, each 
subcommittee functions independently of the 
others and guards its autonomy jealously". (61) 
In working through a dozen or so subcommittees the Appropriations 
Committee has not simply been responding to the magnitude of its task, 
by more effectively dividing the labour of its membership, but it has 
also enabled its membership to achieve personal goals "by giving to 
each member nearly certain influence within the restricted scope of 
his subcommittee activity". (62) The outstanding benefit of 
subcommittee service for most Congressmen, therefore, is increased 
influence in the policy-making process; albeit over a limited range of 
issues. As the expertise of the legislator deepens through protracted 
consideration of one facet of a subject in subcommittee, so his influence 
within that sub-unit increases; to the extent that his subcommittee 
colleagues may defer to his recommendations in his field of competence. 
In turn, full committee members, as Fenno and Lees show for the 
Appropriations Committee, usually defer to the recommendations of their 
subcommittees, and the House as a whole normally defers to the standing 
committee. In this way it becomes possible for a single subcommittee 
member to directly affect the policy outputs of Congress. (63) 
The extension of this pattern of subcommittee activity, (64) 
following the reforms enacted in the 1970s, has, thus, simultaneously 
facilitated the attainment of the corporate goal of expeditiously and 
effectively processing legislation, and also the attainment of the 
personal goal, held by many subcommittee members, of exercising more 
influence within the House. However, the darker side of this change 
is the "riSk of so fragmenting the policy process so that nothing 
gets done". (65) Thus, in line with the second proposition derived 
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from our study of organization theory (see Chapter 2, page 35), the 
extension of the formal division of labour has brought in its wake 
problems of integrating the fragmented specialist knowledge of the 
diverse range of subcommittees. This problem has become even more 
acute than at the time when J.A. Robinson counselled that: 
"Arriving at creative decisions on public problems 
demands something more than knowledge of the 
particular subject in hand. What is primarily 
required is combining bits and pieces of 
information on many different subjects, or 
relating what is known about one aspect of a 
problem to what is known about relevant aspects 
of other problems. Inventive problem solving 
requires, in a word, integrative solutions. The 
decentralized character of Congress, however, 
does not lend itself to the ready integration of 
specialized knowledge indeed, some of its 
subcommittees are so autonomous that their 
decisions are rarely reviewed, much less reversed 
by their parent committees ••••• the knowledge of 
a few individual experts is an insufficient 
foundation for public policy decisions." (66) 
Furthermore, the intensive specialization brought about by subcommittee 
activity also heightens the problems of decision-making on the part of 
individual Congressmen, because· the other side of the coin of 
legislative specialization is the.dramatically decreased r-apability of 
members to deal with matters outside of their specialisms. Thus 
specialization in one subcommittee area produces dependency upon specialists 
in other subject areas for information in those areas. Horeover, the 
non-specialist is confronted with a further dilemma, in so far as he 
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is incapable of evaluating the value of information offered by an 
expert on technical criteria. Therefore, it is not enough for the 
specialist to act as a simple repository of information for the 
non-specialist he must also act as an interpreter and an adjudicator 
for his Congressional colleague. So that the non-specialist is 
dependent upon the expert both for the provision of technical 
information and also for 'judgement' upon such matters, in which 
case decision-making for an individual legislator, acting as a non-
specialist, is rendered into the simpler form of choosing a particular 
specialist on whose judgement he feels he can rely. The particular 
choice is determined by the expert's capacity for sound political 
discernment in addition to his policy expertise. 
The process by which non-specialist legislators select a 'primary 
decision-maker' (67) has recently attracted the attention of L.V. 
Grant, Matthews and Stimson, and D. Kovenock. (68) Grant, in an 
effort to predict the specific primary decision-maker for each member, 
for each decision that the member must make, produces a "simple 
arithmetic representation" of legislative decision-making. His model 
is based upon the initial propositions that "(i) individual 
Congressmen make decisions in a specific issue area by selecting as a 
primary decision-maker a specialist in that area; (ii) the probability 
that a Congressman will select a specialist as a primary decision-
maker depends on the degree of specialization, and the degree to which 
a particular specialist and non-specialist are likely to interact on a 
regular basis". (69) Sixteen pages of formulating and testing this 
theory only leads Grant to concede that "it is impossible at this time 
to judge whether or not the representation is so unstable as to be 
unreliable", (70) though he does believe that the predictive value of 
his theory is reasonably good given the limited expectations of such a 
simple model. 
156 
A rather more comprehensive and conclusive test of 'normal decision-
making' (71) is, however, presented by Matthews and Stimson, who 
reached the conclusion, on the basis of detailed interviews with 
Congressmen and a computer simulation of decision-making, that members 
vote by taking cues. (72) In this process the cue-givers (both 
initial and intermediary) (73) exert influence over the cue-takers. 
Committees and subcommittees as collectivities, and their members as 
individuals, are potent cue-givers by virtue of their expertise. 
Indeed, 86% of Matthews and Stimson's interviewees mentioned committee 
members as cue-givers. And the recommendations of committee experts 
were found to have a legitimacy not possessed by non-committee experts. 
The danger iri this situation is that key cue-givers may be 'captured' 
by outside interests and subsequently the whole decision-process of 
Congress may come to be skewed in their favour. That Congressmen, 
recognized as experts, do act as nodal points of access for outsiders 
into the legislative system is made apparent in David Kovenock's 
statement that "policy specialists outside the Congressional system 
'wholesale' communications to parallel specialists within the legislature; 
these men in turn 'retail' it to others in the House". (74) A similar 
point is made by Matthews and Stimson who observe that "the House experts 
what we have called the initial cue-givers have become the Chamber's 
'windows on the world'. These men and women are in more or less 
continuous contact with those persons and groups bureaucrats, 
lobbyists, academic experts, media representatives, and others who 
are interested and knowledgeable about the subject at hand". (75) The 
opportunity for manipulation of the experts clearly exists in this 
interchange. Yet it should be remembered that the specialist in 
'retailing' outside communications is not simply 'selling' raw data, he 
is also 'selling' his political judgement of this information. So that 
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if it is apparent that the Congressional expert is merely acting as 
the mouthpiece of outsiders then his credibility as a cue-giver will be 
undermined. However, the transmission of information may not always 
be a conscious process. For, the expert, when telling a colleague 
what the content of a particular piece of legislation is, what it 
means, or what effect it is intended to have, may well be unaware of 
just where he got the specific information from himself. He may well 
have attended committee hearings, talked with lobbyists and departmental 
officials, and generally absorbed the views of interested organizations. 
on the subject over a long period of time. Consequently, the specialist 
legislator may effectively, if not consciously, transmit information 
on behalf of outside interests in Congress. 
This 'two-step flow of communication' is equally apparent at the state 
level. In Michigan, for example, H. 'Owen Porter found that a 
substantial majority of 'reputed legislator experts' acknowledged 
that they frequently communicated with lobbyists. (76) Whilst 
recognizing the problems associated with the recall and quantification 
of legislators' contacts with organized interests and their transmission 
of 'outside' information, Porter, nevertheless, feels sufficiently 
confident that his interview data supports the supposition that reputed 
experts frequently transmit information received from outsiders. (77) 
Indeed, a higher proportion of recognized experts than self-nominated 
.experts believed that they frequently passed on outside opinion about 
legislation in their specialist fields. But, as in Congress, the 
specialist legislator does not act as a mere transmitter of information; 
he also distils and interprets the data for his legislative colleagues. 
"Those who act as interpreters must", as Porter notes, -"inevitably gain 
influence within their spheres". (78) However, expert legislators 
are not available in all subjects, so that differences in the quantity 
and reliability of outside information varies between policy fields. 
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The absence of experts in particular subjects in Michigan led non-expert 
legislators, and lobbyists alike, to remark upon the added complications 
and frustrations they felt in the performance of their duties in those 
areas. UltimatelY, therefore, "the process of representation itself 
may be affected by the availability of such middlemen as well as by 
characteristics of the issue and policy fields". (79) 
The bases of specialization 
The foregoing analysis has concentrated upon the necessity, the exten~ 
and the problems associated with formal and informal specialization in 
state and federal legislatures. One issue that has so far been avoided, 
however, concerns the bases of subject specialization; the reasons for 
selecting a particular subject specialism. At the national level, at 
least three considerations are held by Matthews to enter ,into a 
Senator's choice of specialism; either his personal and professional 
background, or his perceptions of the interests of his present and 
possible future constituents or his committee assignments. Personal 
background affects the area of specialization in so far as "a former 
economist •••••••• for example, is likely to want to focus his energies 
on the subject in which he possesses some skill". (80) However, the 
factor more important in most cases, according to Matthews, is the 
Senator's perception of the interests of his constituency. Hence 
most Senator's are believed to specialize in subjects of particular 
concern to their constituents. Unfortunately, Matthews does no more 
than assert that this is the case, and he fails to quantify the importance 
of constituency influences upon the choice of subject specialisms. A 
clearer indication of the importance of constituency factors in 
determining this choice is, however, provided in }~tthews and Stimson's 
study of specialization in the House of Representatives. Ther~ fully 
82% of Members interviewed, who considered themselves to be specialis~ 
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claimed to concentrate on subjects of particular importance to their 
constituents. However, this does not necessarily mean that 'constituency 
relevance' is the primary source of subject specialization, as the sheer 
heterogeneity of interests within a district may enable a representative, 
who is primarily interested in a subject for 'personal' reasons, to 
claim that his specialism is also of importance for his constituency. 
Thus personal background, educational training and previous occupational 
experience may initially determine the choice of specialism, but the 
legislator may subsequently, and legitimately, claim that the subject 
is also of relevance to his constituents. An indication of the 
relative importance of the varying reasons cited for the choice of 
special isms can be gauged from Table 4.1 
TABLE 4.1 Reasons for choice of specialisms: House of Representatives 
and state legislatures. (81) 
Reasons 
Occupational experience 
Personal experience 
Constituency experience 
Political experience 
Committee assignment 
House of Representatives 
(Matthews and Stimson) 
N. of responses 
(221) 
% 
10 
25 
36 
8 
21 
100 
4 State Legislatures 
(Buchanan et al) 
N. of responses 
(636) 
% 
37 
31 
9 
5 
18 
100 
At the state level it is noticeable that 'constituency relevance' is 
cited far less frequently, whilst occupational experience assumes greater 
importance. than in the House of Representatives. One reason for the 
greater influence of previous occupation on the choice of specialisms 
at state level. already mentioned earlier in this chapter, is that the 
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part-time nature of state assemblies may lead state representatives 
to focus upon those subjects with which they are already well acquainted. 
This factor may similarly account for the importance assigned to 'other 
personal experience' at the State level. Unfortunately, the evident 
insignificance of 'constituency relevance' is not so readily explained f 
unless it is argued that state constituencies are somehow more homogeneous 
than Congressional districts so that district interests at state 
level are more specific, and the disjunction between them and the 
'personal' interests of the representative are more apparent. However, 
it is not altogether certain that a smaller geographical area is 
automatically correlated with more specific interests. Furthermore, 
such an interpretation does not consider the representative role 
orientations of legislators for there is no evidence to suggest 
that state legislators have a wider focus (than their constituency) 
(82) 
than their federal colleagues. 
In spite of the differences of emphasis evident in Table 4.1, the reasons 
listed therein do appear to form the accepted bases of specialization. 
Yet essentially this categorization is inadequate, as it isolates the 
choice of specialism from the legislator's general concern with the 
attainment of his personal goals. For, just as the level of informal 
specialization is influenced by the particular mix of legislative goals, 
so, it may also be contended that the choice of subject specialisms is also 
related to the personal aspirations of the representative. The close 
association between the extent of specialization and particular legislative 
objectives was highlighted by J.A. Schlesinger, who noted in Ambition and 
Politics, (83) that representatives with serious legislative objectives 
and concerns for accruing seniority would be more likely ceteris paribus 
to specialize than members with progressive ambitions and major policy 
goals. The most comprehensive examination of the association between 
personal goals and specialization is to be found, however, in Richard Fenno's 
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Congressmen in Committees: wherein Fenno assumes that members will 
work in committee to achieve their stated goals. Three basic goals 
are identified in this study, these being 're-election', 'influence 
within the House' and 'good public policy'. Whilst all Congressmen 
hold all three simultaneously, each Congressman has his own set of 
priorities and personal ranking of these goals. From the initial 
proposition of basic goals Fenno proceeds to argue that members will 
act on committees in ways calculated to achieve their goals. However, 
the opportunity to achieve personal objectives varies widely among 
committees, so that members will attempt to match their personal goals 
with service on those committees most likely to secure the attainment 
of such objectives. Obviously, this matching process is far from 
perfect, and this, in itself, may have ramifications upon the level of 
informal specialization. "Quite clearly, legislators who received 
their desired assignments~ •••• are more likely to perform the activities 
required by specialization than members who were placed on a committee 
they did not seek. In short, specialization need not automatically 
follow simply because the legislator is assigned to a committee; 
individual goals and situations must also be taken into account." (84) 
Our concern at the moment, however, is not with the level of specialization 
but with the choice of the areas in which to specialize, the contention 
being that the specific mix of legislative goals affects not only the 
extent, but also the subject area, of specialization. Fenno's finding 
that "House committees come to be characterized, at any point in time 
by distinctive, nonrandom distributions of individual member goals" (85) 
is thus of significance for our case. Whereas Fenno is concerned with 
the member's choice of a committee, our concern focuses upon the 
selection of a subject area. Yet the two are necessarily related, 
for a committee patently deals with a specific subject. Hence, it may 
be suggested that, in choosing to serve on a particular committee, the 
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representative is also selecting a subject specialism; the fact that 
there appears to be a remarkable consensus of goals among each 
committee's membership in Fenno's study strengthens our claim. For 
particular mixes of legislative goals are clearly associated with 
particular types of committee, in so far as they present differing 
opportunities to pursue re-election, influence, and public policy; and 
so are linked with specific subject areas. This point is perhaps 
best clarified by example. 
Starting with the goal of 'influence', in Congressmen in Committees 
Fenno found that members of the Appropriations and Ways and Means 
Committees are essentially 'influence-oriented'. "The desire to 
have more influence inside the House than other Congressmen is the 
distinctive, dominant goal of Appropriations and Ways and Means 
members". (86) Hence membership of these financial committees is sought 
primarily because a position on either guarantees the ear and deference 
of other Congressmen. (87) Although the subject matter of finance 
has its own independent appea~ there is no doubt from Fenno's 
interviews that the reputation for power of the Appropriations and the 
Ways and Means Committees is their basic attraction. Nevertheless, 
even though influence-oriented members are attracted initially by this 
reputation,they also choose at the same time a subject area in which 
to specialize. It is largely immaterial to our case that this choice 
of specialism is derivative,rather than a primary concern for a 
specialism has been selected, even if it is on the basis of the 
putative importance of the subject rather than its actual content. 
Similarly, interest in the content of a subject appears to be of 
secondary importance to the member who holds re-election as his primary 
goal, and who seeks committee assignments in areas of importance to his 
constituency. As far as the representative is concerned, the importance 
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of a subject derives from its significance for his constituents. So 
that he will specialize in any issue area,as long as that course of 
action increases his chances of re-election. The primacy of this 
motivation is clearly seen on the Interior and Post Office Committees, 
where members rationalize their choice of assignments specifically in 
terms of service to constituents. Such comments as "I was attracted 
to it (Interior), very frankly, because it's a bread and butter 
committee for my state ••••• l had vested interests I wanted to protect" 
peppered the responses. A desire to wield influence within the House 
and a concern with the making of good public policy are, therefore, 
distinctly secondary considerations for such members. 
Indeed, it is only when the third goal of making good public policy 
is predominant, that a personal interest in the content of the subject 
area of a committee becomes apparent. Only on those committees where 
the internal consensus favours policy-making, rather than influence or 
re-election, does the choice of assignment and the selection of a 
subject specialism tend to be conterminous. This association is clearly 
shown in the Education and Labour and Foreign Affairs Committees where 
the goal of making good public policy mirrors the memberships' "strong 
personal interest in and a concern for the content of public policy in 
their committee's subject matter". (89) Unlike his re-election-
oriented and influence-oriented colleagues the pel icy-oriented member, 
therefore, appears to make a primary choice of subject specialism. 
Nevertheless, in all three cases the selection of committee assignments 
in accordance with the legislator's personal aspirations leads ultimately 
to the choice of an area of subject specialization. In this manner 
legislative goals and the choice of an area of formal specialization 
are inextricably linkEd. 
But, how significantly does this generalization differ from the accepted 
(88) 
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wisdom as to the source of subject specialization? If we take the 
three factors cited by Matthews and simply list them alongside the 
three basic goals identified by Fenno then a fairly close relationship 
may be seen to exist between them (see Figure 1). 
FIGURE 1 Bases of specialization and personal goals. 
Reasons for choice of specialism 
Constituency relevance 
Personal/occupational background 
Committee assignment - wanted 
- unwanted 
( ) 
) 
~ , 
----~~ " 
, ,,~ 
-----
.,t. , 
Goals 
Re-election 
Policy 
Influence 
Our contention, therefore, conflicts with Asher's view that "while a 
member's goals will help explain whether or not he will specialize, 
other factors must be considered as well in accounting for the areas 
in which he chooses to specialize". (90) However, for the relationship, 
identified in Figure 1, to be validated then it must clearly be 
established that a member with, say, the primary goal of re-election 
will tend to cite constituency relevance rather than personal interest 
or committee assignment, as the source of his subject specialism. 
Without detailed and extensive primary research this hypothesis cannot 
be fully tested; but, fortunately, sufficient secondary information is 
available from which it may be possible to at least infer the strength 
of the relationship. 
There does appear to exist a strong association between constituency 
relevance_asastated reason for subject specialization. and the goal of 
re-election. Fenno explicitly recognizes this link in his comment 
that "Congressmen who sought membership on the Post Office Committee 
did so ••••• for reasons of constituencies and re-election". (91) This 
point is further substantiated by the explanation of one re-election 
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oriented member that "you have to look out for the interests of your 
people ••••• Politics is a great way to promote your ideals, but first 
you have to help your constituents". (92) But perhaps the connection 
between the goal of re-election and choice of a specialism relevant to 
the legislator's constituency is most concisely expressed by one of 
Buchanan's interviewees who noted that "if I don't become an expert 
in civil service legislation I'll be out on my ear. It''s dictated 
by my constituency, with a tremendous number of governmental employees". (93) 
The representative citing personal or occupational experience as the 
source of his specialism is unlikely to be concerned primarily with 
re-election: unless, he is able to demonstrate that his own interest 
. 
in a subject in fact reflects the importance of that subject in his 
cons ti tuency. Nor does it seem likely that the influence-oriented 
member would normally claim that personal interest in a subject leads 
him to specialize in that area, for such a member will specialize in any 
area as long as that strategy brings him prestige within the House. 
We are, therefore, left with the link between persenal or occupational 
experience and the goal of making good public policy. Fortunately, 
for the purposes of our argument, Fenno did, indeed, find that the 
policy-oriented members of the Education and Labour, and Foreign 
Affairs Committees "punctuate(d) their statements of policy aspirations 
with statements about their pre-Congressional involvement in the two 
fields ••••• (they) voice a similar combination of personal interest, 
prior experience, and policy commitment." (94) 
Finally, members ranking influence as their primary goal and seeking 
assignments on the most prestigious committees may be expected to cite 
'committee assignment' as the reason for their choice of specialism. 
A study of the House Appropriations and Ways and Means Committees does 
in fact reveal the close connection between these factors. Indeed, 
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such is the strength of this relationship, between a committee's 
reputation for prestige and the choice of an area of specialization, 
that Fenno is led to observe: "if the men presently serving on the 
Appropriations and Hays and Means Committees believed that the 
District of Columbia Committee was the most powerful committee in the 
House, they would seek membership on it". (95) At face value, 
therefore, this association between the goal of influence and committee 
assignment appears almost complete. Unfortunately, however, the 
match between members' aspirations and their committee assignments is, 
as we noted earlier, not absolute. (96) Consequently, not all 
influence-oriented members may serve on the committees of their choice, 
and so may be unwilling to specialize in the subject area of an 
unwanted committee assignment. This complication to our hypothesis 
may, however, resolve itself in one of two ways. Either, the legislator 
may temporarily relegate 'influence' in his ranking of priorities 
until he is able to move onto a more prestigious committee. Or. 
alternatively, the unwanted assignment may be turned to advantage by 
building a reputation in that area. Thus as one Eastern Democrat 
pointed out to Fenno: 
"I was elected in a special election. They didn't 
know what to do with me so they put me on the 
first (committee) with a vacancy Interior. I 
was a little horror-stricken at first •••••• But 
they just put me on it because there was no place 
else. But then I started thinking it over. ' I 
looked around and saw everyone was leaving and 
this might be a good place to stay and move up. 
And I was right. Within two and a half years I 
was sub-committee chairman and in six years I was 
ranking majority member •••• (Later) I had a chance 
to go on to Appropriations but I wouldn't take it". (97) 
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Influence in a limited sphere of legislative activity can thus be 
developed outside of the most powerful committees in the House. But 
still, as the above quotation illustrates, the choice of a subject 
specialism for the influence-oriented member rests primarily upon 
committee assignment rather than upon personal interest or constituency 
relevance. 
While the exact strength of the relationship between legislative 
aspirations and stated sources of subject specialization cannot be fully 
determined (here at least), the evidence provided above does suggest 
a fairly close asso~iation between these two factors. In questioning 
Asher's assertion that "other factors" than legislative goals, must be 
considered in accounting for the choice of specialisms all that is being 
suggested is that these goals themselves affect this choice. Thus to 
paraphrase Fenno "each Congressman has his own mix of priorities and 
intensities ••••• if every (subject area) provided an equal opportunity 
to pursue re-election, influence, and policy, Congressmen holding 
varying mixes would appear randomly distributed across all (subject 
fields). Such definitely is not the case. The opportunity to 
achieve the three goals varies widely among (issue areas)". (98) 
Conclusion 
The American experience of legislative specialization clearly provides 
important insights for our study. The analysis of the division of 
labour has enabled us to assess both the relevance of the propositions 
of organization theory and the utility of our theoretical model. Hence, 
the need for, the extent of, and the problems associated with, 
specialization in American legislatures have all been identified. Yet, 
perhaps the real value of this study of the American experience lies in 
the spotlighting of the inextricable intertwining of political and 
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organizational factors in the determination of the institutional 
structure of legislatures. Indeed, it is apparent that while the need 
for specialization arose out of the increased scope and complexity of 
legislative business,the need was only satisfied because of propitious 
political circumstance. For the separation of powers effectively 
prevented a centralized hierarchy of decision developing in the national 
legislature. And the ideological environment of Congress further 
restricted the development of partisan political conflict capable of 
reducing choice to zero-sum conpetition. The institutionalization' 
of a formal division of labour reflected more than organizational need, 
it also, more importantly, reflected political necessity. 
Once established, the committee system provided, in the offices of 
committee chairmen, a focus of Congressional leadership and also, 
concomitantly, formalized the dispersion of power within the legislature. 
In this respect the formal division of labour was both cause and 
consequence of the decentralization of power. Indeed, the centrifugal 
logic of specialization has proved incapable of resisting a further 
fragmentation of power in the extension of the sub-committee 
system in the 1970s. Clearly, the balance between the requirerr~nts of 
hierarchy and those of specialization has tipped overwhelmingly in 
favour of the latter in the United States legislature. One obvious 
consequence,resu1ting from this imbalance,has been the problem of 
co-ordinating legislative activity in order to ensure coherent and 
cohesive policy outputs from Congress. 
At the micro-organizational level the individual representative has 
adopted specialization as a strategy of decision-making, again, for a 
mixture of organizational and political reasons. Firstly, in face of 
the complexity of his proximate environmen~ and the general problem of 
information deficiency, a division of labour appears to be a natural 
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organizational response. However, secondly, the process of legislative 
socialization whereby legislators are inculcated into an acceptance 
of the predominant norms of the assembly (norms which legitimize the 
existing distribution of power and defend the status quo) makes the 
adoption of this strategy almost certain. For representatives come to 
believe that their personal goals whether they are re-election, 
influence or policy oriented are attainable primarily through 
specialization. 
The study of the American experience, therefore, provides a comparative 
reference point from which to launch our examination of specialization 
in the House of Commons. Of particular importance has been the 
confirmation that political and representational elements cannot be 
divorced from organizational requisites in the development of 
institutional structure. And that this structure, and the normative 
system defending these institutional arrangements, reflects the 
distribution of power within the legislature. Hence, it is to be 
anticipated that the dissimilarities between the political environments 
of the British and American legislatures would be manifested in 
distinctly different patterns of formal specialization (as we already 
know) and of informal specialization (of which we have] ittle knowledge). 
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Chapter 5 
Informal Specialization in the House of Commons 
As a theoretical construct the model outlined in Part One is of 
importance both in its specification of the key contextual variables 
influencing the level of legislative specialization and also in its 
predictive capability. Indeed, it is possible to predict on the basis 
of this model that informal specialization in the British legislature 
would be relatively underdeveloped given its peculiar environmental 
setting. The primary purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to test 
the accuracy of this prediction by means of a quantitative analysis of 
the activity of backbenchers in the main formal procedures of the House. 
In fact the profile of informal specialization outlined in this chapter 
represents the first systematic analysis of the extent of the 
specialization strategy on the backbenches in the House of Commons. 
Such an analysis is, however, beset by problems. The first difficulty, 
and one common to all studies of activity in the House, concerns the 
lack of academic and parliamentary consensus as to the practicability 
and utility of analyzing the 'behaviour' of backbenchers. "There are, 
after all", as Anthony King points out "as many ways of being an M.P. 
as there are M.P.s". (1) Indeed, many Members appear to be convinced 
that their personal pattern of activity in the House is unique, a point 
endorsed by one backbencher in his statement that "the activity of a 
Member of Parliament and the way in which he distributes his time and 
energies is a fairly complex subject. I would think that there are 
630 answers and each one of them different". (2) Nevertheless, the 
uniqueness of individual patterns of backbench behaviour is perhaps 
overstated, for general patterns, though frequently complex and 
convoluted, can be discerned in parliamentary activity. 
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The second problem of analysis, and one specific to this study, concerns 
the measurement of specialization. In its literal sense to specialize 
means, according to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, to specially or 
exclusivelY study one particular branch of a subject. Hence, R.M. 
Punnett in the only major study of specialization in the House of Commons 
(on the part of Frontbench Opposition Spokesmen) constructed an 'index 
of specialization' which measured the extent to which a Member's 
parliamentary activity was concentrated upon any single issue area. (3) 
The major advantage of this index is its simplicity. Unfortunately, 
however, its very simplicity may prevent the accurate measurement of 
the level of specialization. Indeed, it is possible for two M.P.s to 
score identically in Punnett's index, yet for them to display markedly 
different profiles of specialization. For example, both Members may 
devote 50% of their attention to a single subject, and so receive the 
same score in the index; but one Member might spread the· remaining 50% 
of his activity evenly over twenty or more subject areas, while the 
other Member concentrates upon a single additional area. Clearly the 
first M.P. is less specialized than the second, but Punnett's index is 
incapable of making such a distinction. Indeed, an earlier 'index of 
specialization' used at a preliminary stage of the present study 
suffered from a similar weakness. (4) 
To overcome the deficiencies of earlier indexes, the 'index of 
specialization' used in this, and successive, chapters is based upon 
the 'coefficient of variation' (sometimes referred to as the 'coefficient 
of variability'). (5) This coefficient provides a relative measure of 
dispersion related to the mean as a measure of central tendency. 
Whilst taking into account the spread of activity, the coefficient 
essentially weights contributions according to their deviation from the 
mean. In this manner, the more extreme the deviation the higher the 
coefficient score. The advantage of this coefficient is that it 
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allows a comparison of the same variable to be made in spite of 
different arithmetic means. Hence it is possible to compare the 
dispersion of activity across the various subject areas, for M.P.s with 
widely differing total levels of activity. (6) 
To supplement the 'index of specialization' an additional index, 
measuring the total spread of attention on the part of each backbencher, 
is also used in this chapter. 
Methodology .-
A stratified random sample of 113 backbenchers, that is one-quarter of 
the total number of backbenchers in 1970-1, was constructed to 
reflect differences within the House according to (i) party, (ii) length 
of parliamentary service, (iii) occupation, (iv) activity at Question 
Time. (7) The sample was drawn from 451 backbenchers; frontbenchers 
namely members of the Government (including Parliamentary Private 
Secretaries), Opposition Spokesmen, along with the Chairman and 
Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means were excluded; 
The activity of each of the 113 backbenchers was monitored in four 
procedures over a period of two parliamentary sessions. The procedures 
examined were Parliamentary Question$, both oral and written, Debates 
on the floor of the House, Early Day Motions and Standing and Select 
Committees. (8) Two parliamentary sessions were chosen to enable 
cross-time comparisons of the level and nature of backbench 
specialization to be made. The two sessions studied were 1970-1 arid 
1972-3; the 1970-1 session was selected primarily because it was the 
first session after the 1970 general election, and as such provides 
an opportunity to study the pattern of 'socialization' of a cohort of 
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newly elected M.P.s. It also represents the last parliamentary 
session to be left relatively undisturbed by the constitutional 
debate over entry into, and continued membership of, the European 
Connnunity. (9) The second session, 1972-3, in contrast, represents 
the first full session after accession to the Community, and also the 
last complete session of the 1970-74 Parliament. No claims are, 
however, made that either session represents a 'typical' parliamentary 
session. Indeed, few sessions can ever be described as 'typical'. 
Each session since 1968, for example, has manifested a-typical 
features: 1969-70 witnessed the unusual events concerning In Place of 
Strife and the abandonment of the Parliament No. 2 Bill; 1970-71 saw 
the protracted struggle over the Industrial Relations Bill on the 
floor of the House; 1971-72 was dominated by the consideration of the 
European Communities Bill; session 1973-74 was foreshortened by the 
events of January-February 1974, and subsequent sessions. up until May 
1979, have been characterized by minority governments. 
The activity of each Member in the sample, in each of the formal 
(10) 
procedures in both sessions, was noted and coded by subject area. 
A classification of thirty-five subject areas was devised, based 
largely on the classification used by Oakley and Rose. (11) This 
categorization was preferred to the more widely used one, based on the 
areas of responsibility of each central government department, as it 
allowed for a more precise differentiation to be made between subject 
areas. In using a department-based classification the three discrete 
areas of local government, housing and transport would have had to 
have been classified under the nebulous heading of 'environment'. 
However, it is apparent that backbenchers do not think of subjects in 
such amorphous categories. (See Chapter 6). 
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The Spread of Backbench Attention 
The basic proposition to be examined throughout this chapter is that 
the backbench Member of Parliament, in response to conditions of 
complexity and diversity will be expected to divide his attention 
unequally amongst the multiplicity of issues demanding his activity 
in the House. The extent to which the backbencher specializes, and 
the degree to which "the operational code of the House of Commons 
actually encourages specialization" 
research focus. 
(12) 
therefore provides our 
One simple, but crude, measure of the concentration of attention in 
the House is the total number of subject areas in which the backbencher 
is active. And as Table S.lA reveals, most Members in our sample 
confine themselves to a fairly narrow range of issues. Indeed, only 
in signing Early Day Notions do most Members spread their activity 
relatively widely; and, even then, the mean number of subject areas 
covered per Member is less than half of the total number of subjects 
in the coding frame (15 in 1970-1, and 12 in 1972-3). 
The mean range of attention at Question Time is somewhat narrower at 
10 and 8 subjects respectively for the two sessions under study. 
Indeed, between one-sixth of Members in 1970-1, and one-quarter in 
1972-73, focused upon three or fewer issues in asking Questions. In 
view of the 'freedom' and 'scope' of this procedure the limited spread 
of attention is perhaps surprising. The fact that most Members did not 
take the opportunity to range widely over the areas of government 
policy is even more notable, given that Questions, unlike most other 
parliamentary procedures, are absolved from the direction of the party 
Whip. Indeed, "Question Time remains almost the only vestige of the 
rights backbenchers enjoyed in the 19th century" (13) and the freedom 
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of the backbencher is further enhanced by the fact that he is allowed 
to raise, with relatively few restrictions, any issue at any time during 
the session. Thus as Henry Lucy noted, over eighty years ago, " •••• the 
question hour, touching on all subjects under the sun, is a microcosm 
of the sitting", (14) and as Chester and Bowring still maintain 
"Questions ••••• remain much the most personal of all the activities of 
the House, reflecting much more closely than any other form of 
procedure the everyday activities of Members, the problems that concern 
them, their personal predilections and idiosyncracies". (15) 
TABLE 5.lA Number of subject areas covered by each Member* in 
Debates, Questions and Early Day Motions. 
* Conservative and Labour Members. (All tables in 
Chapter 5 refer to Conservative and Labour Members only). 
No. of subjects 
1 - 3 
4 - 10 
11 - 35 
Mean 
Median 
Std. Dev. 
Debates 
1970-1 
(n 108) 
% 
45.3 
52.8 
1.9 
100.0 
4.3 
3.8 
2.5 
. 1972-3 
(n 95) 
54.7 
43.2 
2.1 
100.0 
3.9 
3.3 
2.4 
Procedure 
Questions 
1970-1 
(n 107) 
16.8 
39.3 
43.9 
100.0 
10.0 
9.3 
6.5 
1972-3 
(n 91) 
26.4 
44.0 
29.6 
100.0 
8.1 
6.4 
5.7 
E.D.M.s 
1970-1 1972-3 
(n 109) (n 98) 
% % 
3.7 
19.3 
77.0 
100.0 
14.5 
14.9 
5.5 
4.1 
35.7 
60.2 
100.0 
11.6 
11.4 
4.4 
The smallest spread of attention is, however, to be found in activity 
in debates, for in the first session of our study just under one-half 
of Nembers confined their speeches to between one to three subjects; 
in the second session, just over one-half of the sample spoke on this 
number of issues. Indeed, only two Hembers in each session spoke on 
more than eleven subjects, and, even then, the maximum spread was 
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thirteen subjects. The narrow range of activity for most M.P.s on the 
floor is adequately reflected in the mean number of subjects spoken 
upon, which is notably low at four subjects for both sessions (standard 
deviation 2.5 and 2.4 respectively). 
A further point worthy of note in Table 5.lA is that the proportion of 
Members in each of the cells in the frequency distribution, for each 
procedure, remains relatively consistent over time. Indeed, as the 
correlation coefficients set out in Table 5.lB reveal, there is a strong, 
positive association between the number of subject areas in which a 
backbencher is active in 1970-1, and his spread of attention in 1972-3. 
TABLE S.lB The number of subjects covered per Member in 1970-1 
correlated with the number covered in 1972-3. (Pearson's r) 
Debate 
(n 95) 
r 0.57* 
r2 0.32 
* significant 0.0001 
Questions 
(n 90) 
r 0.70* 
r2 0.49 
E.D.M.s 
(n 97) 
r 0.65* 
r2 0.43 
One final point to be noted in Table 5.lA is that the mean number of 
subjects covered per Member is smaller in all procedures in the second 
session. This narrower spread of attention may indicate that 
backbenchers, after an explosive release of energy in the House in the 
first session after a general election, eventually settle into more 
restrained patterns of behaviour in later sessions. 
The level of backbench specialization 
Whilst it is clear from Table S.lA that most backbenchers, in debates and 
Questions at least, restrict their activity to a fairly narrowly defined 
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group of subjects, it is not apparent whether their attention is 
focused evenly, or unevenly, upon the differing subject areas. In 
order to measure the distribution of activity across subject areas an 
index of specialization, based upon the coefficient of variation as a 
relative measure of dispersion, was therefore constructed. The upper 
limit of this index being 5.92 and the lower limit being o. Thus the 
true generalist scores 0 by dividing his activity evenly among all 
thirty-five subject areas, while the true specialist scores 5.92 by 
focusing solely upon one subject. The more extreme the deviation of 
activity on anyone subject from the mean, the higher will be the score 
in the index. In practice, however, no Member in the sample scored 
as a true generalist; the lowest score noted was 1.16, whereby the 
activity of the backbencher was fairly evenly spread across eighteen 
issue areas. Although several other Members had a wider spread of 
activity (the widest being twenty-nine subjects) their attention was 
less evenly distributed across the range of subjects. Their index 
scores were, therefore, greater than 1.16, as the index essentially 
weights scores according 'to their deviation from the mean, even though 
it does take into account the total spread of activity. 
The profile of informal specialization in each procedure in 1970-1 and 
1972-3 is shown in Table 5.2A. The categories in this frequency 
distribution represent high, medium and low levels of specialization. 
To be ranked as 'highly specialized' a backbencher required a score of 
at least 4.34, which approximates to a concentration of activity in the 
ratio 67:33. A score of 2.75 (approximating to a dispersion of 
activity of roughly 30:30:20:10:10) or more, is required for a Member 
to be ranked as 'moderately specialized', whilst Members scoring 2.74, 
or less, are classified as 'low specialists'. 
(16) 
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TABLE 5.2A Index of Specialization 
Level of seecialization Procedure 
Debates Questions E.n.M.s 
1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 
(n 108) (n 95) (n 107) (n 91) (n 109) (n 98) 
% % % 7. % 7-
High 5.92 - 4.34 20.4 22.1 15.9 17.6 1.8 3.1 
Medium 4.33 - 2.75 62.0 63.2 38.3 38.5 2.8 6.1 
Low 2.74 - 1.16 17.6 14.7 45.8 44.0 95.4 90.8 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Mean 3.72 3.83 3.10 3.13 1.83 2.10 
Median 3.54 3.58 2.84 2.92 1.65 1.87 
Std. Dev. 0.98 1.07 1.45 1.19 0.73 0.77 
It is apparent from Table 5.2A that the profile of specialization varies 
from one procedure to another, though the profile is pretty stable over 
time. This latter point is reflected in Table 5.2B where fairly strong 
and statistically significant correlations are to be observed between 
the index scores of Members in 1970-1 and those in 1972-3. In 
questioning activity 38% of variance between the two sets of scores is 
explicable in terms of their linear association, in E.n.M.s the proportion 
of variation explained falls to 27% and in debates falls further still 
to only 15% 
TABLE 5.2B Seecialization scores 1970-1 correlated with 
seecialization scores 1972-3: (Pearson's r). 
Debates Questions E.D.M.s 
(n 95) (n 90) (n 97) 
r 0.38*** r 0.61*** r 0.52*** 
r2 0.15 r2 0.38 r2 0.27 
*** significant 0,0001 
Returning to Table 5.2A, it is clear that activity in debate is most 
specialized, with one in five backbenchers being ranked at the highest 
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levels of the index. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of Members in 
this procedure specialize to a high, or moderately high, degree (82% in 
1970-1, and 85% in 1972-3). However, the backbenchers in the sample 
appear to be rather less willing to concentrate their activity in asking 
Parliamentary Questions. For, although questioning activity still 
appears to be relatively specialized, with one half of backbenchers 
ranking as high, or moderate, specialists; the single largest proportion 
of Members in anyone cell is to be found at the lowest level of the 
index. Activity in E.D.M.s is, however, the least specialized of all 
three procedures, with over 90% of Members in either session failing to 
reach a score of 2.75. The corollary of the wide mean spread of 
activity in E.D.M.s thus appears to be a fairly even dispersion of 
attention amongst subject areas. 
These variations in the level of specialization between procedures 
suggest important differences in the nature of each mode of parliamentary 
activity. Indeed, each procedure appears to offer differing advantages 
to the backbencher in the performance of his legislative duties and in 
the pursuit of his personal goals. In turn each mode exacts its own 
'costs of participation', calculated in terms of the preparation time, 
the performance time and the 'wasted' time (i.e. the probability of 
participation) needed to reap the advantage of each procedure. An 
assessment of these relative costs may, therefore, provide some 
explanation for the differences in the aggregate levels of specialization 
observable in Table S.2A. For it may be argued that an 'inexpensive' 
procedure, in terms of its costs of participation, may enable the 
backbencher to range widely at minimal cost, whilst a more 'expensive' 
mode of activity may serve to focus the Member's attention upon 
specific issues, because of the high costs involved: However, before 
examining the relative costs of each of the three procedures, a 
distinction should perhaps be drawn between 'theoretical' and 'actual' 
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costs as these may not always be identical. 
Costs of Preparation 
In theory the highest costs of preparation are exacted by debates. 
Few Members can speak, and expect to be listened to, without some 
prior organization of their thoughts. A reasoned contribution to 
debate normally requires considerable preparation particularly as 
it is commonly believed in the House that the quality of a speech is 
more important than its length. Thus, as one Member remarked at the 
Granada dinners, "you don't win respect only by making speeches. 
You've got to give some indication of work, of doing some research, 
of knowing what you're talking about". (17) Most Members, therefore, 
at the very least, prepare short notes to guide their thoughts; many 
are in addition briefed by outside associations, (18) and still 
others undertake their own research. 
Somewhat lesser preparation costs appear to be incurred in the tabling 
of Questions, though in practice these costs may still prove to be 
substantial. To be in order a Question must ask for information or 
for action; must relate to a matter within the Government's 
responsibility; and must not have already been covered by an answer, 
or by a refusal to answer, given in the same session. (19) A 
backbencher may, on occasion, have to spend some considerable time 
drafting a Question so as to circumvent these restrictions. Furthermore, 
if a Member's oral Question is eventually answered in the House, he 
needs to be "well prepared", as Fred Willey notes, "to make the best of 
it and ••••• take the t-linister by surprise". (20) Similarly, a 
backbencher may incur considerable preparation costs in drafting written 
Questions, particularly when mounting a campaign by tabling fifty or 
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more Questions on the same topic, as substantial reserves of ingenuity 
and stamina are often needed on such occasions. 
In comparison the preparation costs involved in signing Early Day 
Motions appear to be small. With the exception of the sponsors of 
the Motion, who will have spent time drafting and canvassing support 
for the Motion, the sole cost for most other signatories is the time 
expended in reading and signing the Motion. 
If procedures are ranked in accordance to their theoretical preparation 
costs then it can be seen that E.D.M.s feature at the least expensive 
end of the scale, Questions occupy an intermediate position, while 
debates rank at the most expensive end of this scale. In ranking the 
procedures in this manner it may be posited that the less time needed 
to prepare for participation, the greater the likelihood that the 
backbencher will be able to afford to spread his activity widely and 
evenly across subject areas; whereas, in contrast, the greater the 
preparation costs the lower his capability to range widely over the 
various issue areas. Indeed, Punnett makes a similar point in his 
comment that "the higher level of specialization of debates than in 
oral or written questions (for Opposition Spokesmen) to some extent may 
be consequent upon the level of preparation that is necessary for most 
debating contributions". (21) 
However, it should be noted that the actual preparation costs may not 
always correspond to the theoretical weightings set out above. On 
occasion, Members may have spent no time at all in preparing for a 
contribution in the Chamber. It is not unknown, for example, for 
backbenchers to be exhorted by their party lVhips to speak in a debate, 
for which they are unprepared, simply to prolong the discussion. Other 
fortuitous circumstances may also prompt a Member to speak in debate 
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without prior preparation: thus Michael O'Halloran "in a recent debate 
of palpitating boredom confessed he couldn't take a moment more, and 
rose to creep away. At which very moment, the Tory who'd been speaking 
sat down; the Speaker called O'Halloran: and the Member for Islington 
delivered the least prepared speech of his life". (22) However, the 
willingness of most backbenchers to intervene in debate in such bizarre 
circumstances appears to be closely restricted. For example, of those 
backbenchers interviewed by the author, all could easily recall 
occasions when the Whips had called upon them at short notice to 
contribute in debate. Yet none admitted to having actually complied 
with their Whips' requests; (23) for they all believed, along with 
Tam Dalyell, that "it's absolutely vital for a pOlitician to know 
when not to speak. The best thing I've learnt is not to open my trap 
about things I know nothing about". (24) 
Costs of Performance 
The three procedures can also be ranked on a scale of 'costs' according 
to the length of performance time required for participation. E.D.M.s 
appear to exact the lowest 'performance costs',as the time expended in 
signing the Motion is the sole cost incurred by most signatories. 
Similarly, the tabling of written Questions is an 'inexpensive' mode 
of parliamentary activity in terms of its 'costs of performance'. Oral 
Questions, on the other hand, require that the Member be present in the 
Chamber at the time that his Question is raised, in order for him to 
ask his 'penetrating' supplementary Question; (25) and so exact 
greater performance costs. 
in participating in debate 
However, the greatest costs are incurred 
for the backbencher is customarily 
required to be present in the Chamber, at the very least, for a short 
period before, and after, his own contribution. 
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When these costs of performance are added to the costs of preparation 
they serve to accentuate the differences between each procedure. 
Indeed, as these costs are cumulative, the relative 'distance' between 
each procedure on our scale of costs increases, and, concomitantly, 
the strength of the relationship between low procedural costs and a 
wide and even spread of activity, and between high costs and specialized 
activity, also increases. 
Cost 'Efficiency' 
If the 'efficiency' of each procedure, in terms of the ability to 
secure maximum reward for the minimum expenditure of energy, is 
considered in relation to the above costs, then clearly some modes of 
parliamentary activity are more 'cost-efficient' than others. (For 
the purposes of our discussion the 'reward' accruing to the backbencher 
is the public expression of his interest in any particular subject 
in the form of print in the published records of Parliament). The 
'cost-efficiency' of each procedure may be of consequence in determining 
the profile of specialization. For it may be postulated that a 
highly 'efficient' procedure, that is one in which the probability of 
reaping a printed 'reward' is high while the costs of participation are 
low, may encourage the backbench Member to be relatively active across 
a wide range of subjects. Conversely, where the probability of 
obtaining a 'reward' in a given su~ject area is uncertain, yet the 
procedural costs of participation are simultaneously high, then it may 
be anticipated that the backbencher will focus his attention upon a 
narrow range of issues in an attempt to maximize his chances of 
participating in the consideration of a specific subject area. 
By this argument E.D.M.s rank as the most cost-efficient procedure, 
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insofar as they reap the maximum recognition of activity (a signature 
in print) for the minimum preparation and participation costs. The 
next most cost-efficient mode of parliamentary activity is the written 
Question in that a guaranteed printed response is secured at relatively 
little cost. (26) The cost-efficiency of the oral Question is, 
however, much lower than that of the unstarred Question. In the 
first place the number of oral Questions asked per Member is limited, 
to the extent that an M.P. may table no more than eight Questions in 
the period of ten sitting days ahead of the date on which the Minister 
is able to answer, with no more than two Questions for answer on any 
day. Secondly, the backbencher stands only a one in three chance of 
having his Question answered in the House, given the combination of the 
tabling restrictions, the rota system, the total number of Questions 
asked, and the shortness of Question Time itself. To surmount these 
obstacles the backbencher may well adopt the specialization strategy 
in an effort to improve his chances of obtaining an oral reSponse on 
an issue of specific concern. 
The least cost-efficient mode. of activity of all appears, however, to 
be debates: the probability of a backbencher being called to speak 
upon a particular issue of concern is low, yet costs of participation 
are, as we have seen, high. Firstly, the choice of subjects for 
discussion on the floor of the HOUSe is largely the prerogative of the 
frontbenchers. The Government initiates the majority of debates, 
while the opposition frontbench determines the choice on Supply Days. 
Backbenchers are subsequently left with very few opportunities to 
initiate debate: the main occasions arising on the adjournment (27) 
or, to a lesser extent, on matters of emergency under standing order 
nine, or on the Second Reading on Consolidated Fund Bills. 
Moreover there is no guarantee that a backbencher will be called to 
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speak in debate even when an issue of personal concern is chosen for 
discussion on the floor of the House. The time available for backbench 
contributions in debate is still severely restricted; a fact noted with 
disapproval by Frank Hooley, who calculated that in an average one-day 
debate there are "six hours of debate, two and a half hours of which 
are used by frontbenchers, with three and a half hours being taken up 
by backbenchers. That means that about seven honourable Members from 
each side contribute to the debate ••••• it is not satisfactory". (28) 
One common strategy, adopted by backbenchers to increase their chances 
of contributing to a debate on a matter of special interest to them, 
is to limit their intervention in discussions on other matters. In 
the 1970-74 Parliament this strategy was underpinned by the system 
employed by Selwyn Lloyd, as Mr. Speaker, for selecting speakers in 
debates. As John Grant notes, this system appeared to take into 
account the number of times a backbencher had spoken previously in a 
session and also allowed for special interests too. (29) Indeed, 
one Labour backbencher interviewed by the author was adamant that he 
would be unwilling to "jeopardize" his chances of speaking on a matter 
of prime concern by contributing widely on other, :nore "peripheral" 
issues. But even in adopting this strategy' there is no certainty that 
the backbencher will be called by the Speaker. For example, Maureen 
Colquhoun bemoaned the fact that in spite of having a degree in 
economics "I have sat through every single economic debate in the House 
since I've been here, right to the very end, trying to speak, but I have 
never been called". (30) And it is this very uncertainty of being 
called to speak which makes debate an inefficient mode of activity,for 
there is a high probability that the time spent in preparation, and 
sitting in the Chamber waiting to speak, will not produce a tangible 
reward in terms of column inches in Hansard. 
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Cost 'Effectiveness' 
'Participation costs' and 'efficiency' are not, however, the sole, nor 
necessarily the primary, factors influencing the backbencher's choice 
of procedure. Probably of more importance, is the 'effectiveness' of 
each mode in facilitating the performance of his legislative duties 
and in the advancement of his personal goals. Each procedure may, 
therefore, be seen to offer differing advantages to different groups 
of backbenchers, according to their legislative objectives and personal 
goals. In turn, the motivations for using one procedure rather than 
another may buttress the patterns of specialization associated with 
each procedure. However, before developing this argument it should 
be noted that there are certain problems associated with an assessment 
of the 'effectiveness' of each procedure. Firstly, any advantage to 
be gained from the use of one procedure, rather than another, ultimately 
depends upon the skill and technique of an individual backbencher. 
Two M.P.s may obtain totally different effects, for example, in tabling 
broadly similar Questions, simply because of differences in their 
inquisitorial style. Secondly, an assessment of 'effectiveness' needs 
to consider the distinction between 'theoretical' and 'actual' 
parameters of influence; and thirdly, a comparative judgement of the 
three procedures needs to take into account the multiplicity of roles 
and goals that a backbencher may seek to fulfil in anyone of them. 
Bearing these problems in mind, it is possible to argue, nevertheless, 
that a particular procedure may appear more attractive to a Member with 
a certain mix of personal goals than to another backbencher with a 
different ranking of priorities. 
If, for example, the paramount goal of a backbencher is to enhance his 
chances of re-election, he would naturally seek to publicize his 
concern for the interests of his constituents. Whilst the M.P. would 
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use any procedure for this purpose, Question Time would appear to hold 
distinct attractions for him in view of the widespread media 
coverage of Questions. For, as one of the participants at the Granada 
dinners noted: "You get much more publicity per line for a Question 
than you will ever get per line for a speech". (31) Furthermore, as 
Cranley Onslow argues, Question Time offers a valuable opportunity "to 
satisfy your constituents that you are an active Member of the House 
(by doing) something on the floor of the House", particularly "as 
opportunities to make speeches are more limited now than they once 
were". 
(32) Question Time may not, however, hold such pronounced 
attractions for the ambitious backbencher, intent upon promotion. 
D.N. Chester does not think that "anybody has reached Cabinet status by 
asking oral Questions. It is not one of the ways of climbing rapidly 
up the ladder ••••• ! do not think I would advise the young man wanting 
to reach the frontbench to ask a lot of Questions". (33) 
The ambitious backbencher may well be better advised to further his 
political career by building a reputation in debates on the floor of 
the House. Indeed, Julian Critchley recently offered this advice to 
the newly elected Vivian Bendall on how best to rise in the ranks of 
the Tory party: "He should speak regularly in the House. He must not 
be discouraged if not called, or by the fact that no one listens and 
that few read Hansard, The Whips notice". (34) Critchley's advice 
reflects the almost universal belief in the House that reputations are 
to be made on the floor of the Chamber, and that the demeanour of the 
backbencher in debate is a key indicator as to his potential for 
frontbench office. Performance in debate is so yarticularly important 
in the House of Commons because "there is probably no other political 
system in the world where a politician's career depends so much on his 
ability at the despatch box". (35) This point was recently emphasized 
by Sir Peter Rawlinson who stressed the importance of drawing Ministers 
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from a Parliament "in which prominence is won by effectiveness in 
debate ••••• 'imported' Ministers have not been particularly successful 
(witness Mr. Frank Cousins) since the art of parliamentary debate ••••• 
is not quickly mastered". (36) 
In addition to alerting the frontbench of his presence, activity in 
debate may also prove of value to the backbencher as a means of 
establishing his ideological 'pedigree' within the House. However, a 
more effective and cost-efficient method of making explicit the 
particular notion of socialism or conservatism that a Member may 
subscribe to is through the signing of Early Day Motions. In this 
procedure a backbencher may display his allegiance to a particular 
'faction' or 'tendency', and so establish his doctrinal credentials 
with his party colleagues as E.D.M.s represent "spontaneous un-whipped 
backbench manifestos". (37) Whilst backbenchers sign E.D.M.s for a 
variety of motives, (38) these Motions do nevertheless represent 
free and public statements of support for a particular point of view. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, most of the academic attention focused 
upon E.D.M.s has been devoted to their use as a tool of analysis in the 
study of backbench attitudes. (39) Thus Berrington, for example, has 
established that a common approach is evident over a wide range of 
issues on the left of the Labour Party: 
"The apostles of a socialist foreign policy usually 
stand for a militant programme of common ownership 
at home, faith in nuclear disarmament, hostility 
to the American alliance, antagonism to the level 
of defence spending, have tended to be accompanied 
by a messianic belief in the reconstruction of 
society, i.n the establishment of a new economic 
and social order. The left wing socialist would 
claim, moreover, that his opinions on what appear 
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to be separate and distinct issues, are informed 
by a single and coherent doctrine". (40) 
This very coherence of outlook may subsequently prompt wide ranging 
activity in E.D.M.s on the part of a significant number of Labour 
Members. Although such homogeneity of outlook may be lacking within 
the Conservative party, it is perhaps not unreasonable to suggest that 
those Tory backbenchers keen to display their ideological inclinations 
will do so across a range of issues, even though these issues are not 
perceived to be logically inter-related as on the Labour left. The 
exact extent of intra-party differences will be examined later in this 
chapter, all that is being suggested here is that the purpose of 
signing E.D.M.s be it an expression of opinion, or an alignment 
with some informal friendship group (41) leads to activity across 
a range of issues. 
In practice the nature of the relationship between a representative's 
personal goals and his usage of particular procedures is unlikely to 
be so clearly defined as that outlined above. Nevertheless, as a 
general proposition it is reasonable to suggest that each procedure 
offers distinct advantages to differing groups of Members holding 
particular legislative and personal goals. These objectives may in 
turn influence their level of specialization in each procedure. Thus 
the re-election oriented !-iember, using Parliamentary Questions to 
publicize his concern for his constituents' interests, may take advantage 
of the low procedural costs of that procedure to spread his activity 
fairly widely across the subjects of importance in his constituency. 
Likewise, the backbencher intent on establishing his ideological 
pedigree may seek to do so across a wide range of policy fields and 
the low procedural costs exacted by E.D.M.s assists him in this task. 
However, the backbencher, keen to develop his reputation in the House, 
may be aware that to intervene too frequently in debate, and across 
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too wide a spread of subjects, may prove to be counterproductive, 
should he come to be regarded as a 'dilettante' by his parliamentary 
colleagues. Furthermore, the procedural costs of debates may serve 
to limit the number of contributions made by any single backbencher. 
Thus the various costs incurred in participating in any given mode of 
parliamentary activity may, in conjunction with the 'effectiveness' of 
each procedure, directly influence the level of specialization in 
each procedure. 
Specialization and Party 
The first hypothesis to be tested is that the profile of specialization 
will differ markedly between backbenchers in each of the two major 
parties. The assumption underpinning this hypothesis is that 
conceptions of representative role are roughly dichotomized between 
Labour and Conservative Members. Indeed, Kenneth Newton contends 
that "a common knowledge of Conservative and Labour policies leads one 
to expect a stronger preference for the trustee role among 
Conservatives and a stronger Labour preference for the delegate role". (42) 
Clearly the Conservative party has traditionally been the bastion of 
the trustee 'style' and the national 'focus' of representation. It 
has consistently rejected any form of 'delegation', (43) and has 
fervently supported the belief that "the real importance and strength 
of the House is founded on the independence of its Members ••••• voting 
according to the judgement that they form on their own independent 
assessment.of the facts and debate". (44) And its 'focus' is clearly 
the nation, for as Disraeli propounded: "the Tory party, unless it is 
a t ' 1 . h'" na 10na party, lS not lng • (45) Therefore, in line with our 
contention in Chapter 3, that the adoption of a trustee 'style' and 
, 'd ' '" Wl e representational focus has as ltS corollary a generalized 
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pattern of legislative activity, it is to be anticipated that 
Conservative backbenchers will disperse their attention fairly evenly 
and widely across the various subject areas in the House. One 
established Conservative backbencher implicitlY accepted this hypothesis 
in his statement that "the pattern of my activity in the House of 
Commons, and indeed in my constituency, varies from day to day, since 
one is obviously, by one's very representative duty, influenced by all 
issues which crop up". (46) 
In contrast, it is frequently asserted that Labour Hembers of Parliament 
should act as delegates from their constituencies, or more accurately, 
from their constituency parties; and that they should seek to promote 
the 'interest' of the working class and more specifically the 'interest' 
of functional groupings of working class members. To this extent a 
Labour backbencher may be expected to concentrate upon those "matters 
directly affecting the welfare of the working class such as insurance 
benefits and housing". (47) In particular the activity of trade Union 
sponsored Members may skew the aggregate profile of specialization 
within the Labour party, as their conception of the representative 
role appears to entail a narrow, neo-functional focus of representation. 
In fact W.D. Mu11er argues that "the organisational affiliation of the 
trade union M.P.s gives emphasis to their specialization and lays them 
open to the charge of neglecting the public interest •••••• By publicly 
flaunting their rejection of the 19th century liberal or radical 
concepts of representation concepts which emphasise the independence 
of the M.P. from outside commitments and are still among the more 
common definitions of the role of the M.P. the trade unionists 
offend the defenders of these traditional myths of representation". (48) 
A rough dichotomy of :epresentative role orientations may thus be 
easily posited between Labour and Conservative backbenchers. Indeed, 
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if this split is in practice as pronounced as that suggested above, 
then marked differences should be apparent between the levels of 
specialization of the two groups of backbenchers with Tory 
backbenchers being generally less specialized than their Labour 
counterparts. However, the data on the spread of activity for our 
sample reveals no consistent differences in the aggregate patterns of 
activity between the two parties (see Table 5.3). Only in the 
crosstabulations for activity in E.D.M.s do these differences become 
statistically significant, by virtue of the fact that the activity of 
Labour M.P.s is more widely dispersed particular in the second 
session. Similarly the only statistically significant correlation 
coefficients for the association between the number of subject areas 
covered per Member and party (49) are found in E.D.M.s. The 
positive nature of these coefficients indicate that the wider spread 
of activity is generally associated with Labour M.P.s. . However, this 
association is still substantially weak as the coefficients explain 
only 12% of the variance between the two variables in 1972-3, and 
only 6% in 1970-1. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the differences 
observable in activity in E.D.M.s are explicable in terms of divergent 
representative role orientations. (Indeed, the direction of these 
differences is the opposite of that posited above, as Labour Members 
display a more generalized pattern of activity than Conservative 
backbenchers). A more plausible explanation may, therefore, be sought 
in the nature of E.D.M.s and the purposes for which they are signed. 
Thus, many Labour backbenchers may willingly sign E.D.M.s concerned 
with a wide range of issues because they see such issues to be 
inextricably linked as part of a coherent ideological perspective. The 
activity of Conservatives, on the other hand, may be more circumscribed 
as they are inclined to renounce over-arching doctrinal views and so 
regard subjects as discrete areas with no inexorable link between them. 
More simply, the Conservative backbenchers in the sample, as supporters 
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TABLE 5.3 Number of subjects cross tabulated with Party (Labour 
and Conservative) 1970-1 and 1972-3 
a). 
b). 
1970-1 
No. of subjects Procedure 
Debates Questions 
Cons Lab Cons Lab 
(n 57) (n 51) (n 56) (n 51) 
% % % % 
1 - 3 43.9 47.1 14.3 19.6 
4 - 10 56.1 49.0 39.3 39.2 
11 - 3S 0.0 3.9 46.4 41.2 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
X2 0.02 dfl n sign X2 0.62 df2 n sign 
(1 - 3 x 4 - 35) 
r 0.02 r -0.06 
r2 0.00 r2 0.00 
1972-3 
No. of subjects Procedure 
Debates Questions 
Cons Lab Cons Lab 
(n 46) (n 49) (n 44) (n 47) 
% % % % 
1 - 3 50.0 59.2 15.9 36.2 
4 - 11 47.8 38.8 56.8 31.9 
11 - 35 2.2 2.0 27.3 31.9 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
X2 0.48 df1 n sign X2 6.91 df2 sign 
(1 
- 3 x 4 - 35) 0.05 
r -0.07 r -0.04 
., 
r" 0.00 r2 0.00 
** significant 0.01 
*** significant 0.001 
E.D.M.s 
Cons Lab 
(n 56) (n 53) 
% % 
3.6 3.8 
26.8 11. 3 
69.6 84.9 
100.0 100.0 
X2 2.77 dfl sign 0.1 
(l - 10 x 11 - 35) 
r 0.25** 
r2 0.06 
E.D.M.s 
Cons Lab 
(n 47) (n 51) 
% % 
6.4 2.0 
48.9 23.5 
44.7 74.5 
100.0 100.0 
X2 7.88 df1 0.01 
(1 - 10 x 11- 35) 
r 0.35*** 
r 2 0.12 
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of the Government, may also have refrained from signing Motions 
critical of the frontbench, or those demanding action on its part, 
across a wide range of issues. 
In the two other procedures of Questions and debates, the association 
between party and the spread of activity is notably weak in both 
sessions. The cross tabulation for Questions in 1972-3 in Table 5.3 
does produce a statistically significant difference between the 
profile of the two major parties. Most of the difference is accounted 
for by the majority of Conservatives being grouped in the medium range 
of the distribution, whereas Labour Members are fairly evenly dispersed 
among all three cells. 
When we examine the index of specialization (Table 5.4) no significant 
differences are to be found between the respective prof~les of 
specialization of the two major parties. Correspondingly, although 
there is a positive correlation between the level of specialization and 
party in all procedures in both sessions which indicates that high 
scores in the index are associated slightly more with Labour than 
Conservative Members the correlation coefficients are notably 
weak and, at best (in Questions), explain only 2% of the variance. 
Therefore our hypothesis, that the differing conceptions of 
representative role held by Conservative and Labour backbenchers will 
lead to distinct patterns of specialization on their part, can be 
rejected. Yet this is more a rejection of the simplistic 
dichotomization of role orientations along party lines than a rejection 
of the fundamental hypothesis that conceptions of representative role 
are associated with the level of legislative specialization. In reality 
the distribution of representative role orientations in the House of 
Commons is far more complex than suggested above in the simple 
hypothesis. Indeed, as we have already suggested in Chapter Three, 
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TABLE 5.4 Index of specialization crosstabu1ated with Party 
(Labour and Conservative) 1970-1 and 1972-3 
a) • 1970-1 
Level of 
specialization Procedure 
Debates Questions E.D.M.s 
Cons Lab Cons Lab Cons Lab 
(n 57) (n 51) (n 56) (n 51) (n 56) (n 53) 
% % % % % % 
High 19.3 21.6 12.5 19.6 3.6 0.0 
Medium 64.9 58.8 39.3 37.3 0.0 5.7 
Low 15.8 19.6 48.2 43.1 96.4 94.3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
X2 0.45 df2 n sign X2 1.03 df2 n sign 
r 0.10 r 0.14 r 0.07 
r2 0.01 r2 0.02 r2 0.00 
b). 1972-3 
Level of 
specialization Procedure 
Debates Questions E .D.M. s 
Cons Lab Cons Lab Cons Lab 
(n 46) (n 49) (n 44) (n 47) (n 47) (n 51) 
% % % % % % 
High 19.6 24.5 15.9 19.2 4.3 2.0 
Medium 67.4 59.2 29.5 46.8 8.5 3.9 
Low 13.0 16.3 54.5 34.0 87.2 94.1 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
X2 0.69 df2 n sign X2 4.07 df2 n sign 
r 0.04 r 0.15 r 0.07 
r2 0.00 r2 0.02 r2 0.00 
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individual Members may hold different styles of representation either 
serially or simultaneously, so that a mix of styles is to be anticipated 
on the part of backbenchers within each of the major parties. To 
determine the relative mix of sty.les and foci within the parties would, 
however, entail a detailed and extensive interview programme with M.P.s: 
a task which is unfortunately beyond the resources of the present 
study yet one which is an essential stage for further research. 
Specialization and length of service in Parliament 
A second hypothesis to be tested is that a backbencher's 1ev~of 
specialization in his parliamentary activity will be influenced by his 
length of service in the House. Sufficient evidence is already available 
to suggest that Member's attitudes to their parliamentary duties vary 
significantly according to their length of service in the House. (50) 
Indeed,_ Barker and Rush have found pronounced 'generational breaks' 
in the attitudes of Members, with the 'breaks' corresponding to the 
dates of general elections. Significantly, the shared attitudes of 
each 'generation' tended to transcend party lines, in the sense that 
Members of a common 'generation' tended to agree more with each other 
than with party colleagues of a different generation. Although Barker 
and Rush, on the basis of their data, could not 'prove' the existence 
of parliamentary generations they nevertheless believed that the 
concept offered a fruitful line for further research. 
One reason for the selection of the 1970-1 session for study was, 
therefore, because it offered the opportunity to observe the activity 
of a new 'generation' of M.P.s in their first session in the House, 
and so to discover whether their pattern of activity differed 
significantly from that of more established backbenchers. Subsequently 
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Members were grouped into three 'generations', according to their length 
of service in the House by the end of the 1970-1 session. The cohorts 
were formed on the basis of (i) one year's service or less (entry 
corresponding to the 1970 general election and subsequent by-elections), 
(ii) two to seven years service (entry at the 1964 and 1966 general 
elections and subsequent by-elections) and (iii) eight years service or 
more (entry at general and by-elections before 1964). 
On the basis of the existing literature on backbench behaviour in the 
House it is possible to develop at least three hypotheses as to the 
nature of the relationship between specialization and the length of 
experience in Parliament. Firstly, a negative, linear relationship 
may be posited, whereby 'new' M.P.s specialize to a greater degree 
than their longer serving colleagues. Indeed, new Members are, according 
to W.D. Muller, immediately counselled to specialize on first entering 
the House. (51) Many M.P.s appear to take this advice, for as Paul 
Rose M.P. points out there are a "growing number of newer Members 
concerned with serious research and pressure on specific issues. They 
do their homework in depth and their contributions are made when they 
have expertise to offer and something original to say". (52) At the 
other end of the scale it is possible that as parliamentary 'senescence' 
takes its toll the satisfaction of the long serving Member with the 
traditional methods and workings of the House, and its inherent 
amateurism, increases. At least one new Labour Member is convinced 
that "on average older Members tend to be generalists in that they 
spread their interest, though some of them are positively disinterested 
in anything". (53) A somewhat more charitable view is that senior 
backbenchers become drawn to the 'generalist' role by an incremental 
extension of their interests over time. So that an interest in one 
issue area may gradually extend into activity in a related area, and 
so on, until the M.P. comes to view all issues as being necessarily 
204 
interrelated. 
A second, and conflicting, hypothesis is that the level of specialization 
increases along with the length of parliamentary service. In which 
case a positive, roughly linear, relationship may be posited, with the 
new Member acting as a 'generalist' and the more senior Member 
performing the specialist role. One strategy open to the new Member 
on entering the House is indeed to adjust to his new role by acquainting 
himself with a wide range of issues. In fact, one established 
Conservative Member characterized new recruits in their first session 
as "blue ass flies flitting around from policy area to policy area". 
Moreover, ambitious novice backbenchers may also recognize that "to 
become too highly specialized is to commit oneself to being a career 
backbencher". (55) It may be, therefore, that senior Members with 
(54) 
no hope, nor prospect, of promotion may more readily adopt the specialist 
role. In addition, former Ministers on the backbenches may continue 
to focus upon the areas of their former ministerial responsibilities, 
rather than return to the performance of the generalist role. This 
trend was highlighted by a former Labour Cabinet Member, who noted 
that his specialization in defence and international affairs as a 
backbencher stemmed basically from his tenure of office as Foreign 
Secretary, and an earlier post as a junior Minister in the War Office. 
Thirdly, the association between the level of specialization and 
parliamentary service may possibly be non-linear in form - insofar 
as the peak level of specialization is reached at some intermediate 
stage of a backbencher's career, or alternatively the generational 
profile is affected by the impact of a particularly specialized cohort 
of Members. The generation of Members first elected in 1964 and 1966 
have in fact been identified as just such a cohort. Bernard Crick, 
for example, argues that in the 1960 s "a kind of sea change was 
(56) 
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passing over the Parliamentary Labour Party ••••• here were new men with 
strong emotional commitments still to the 'Labour Movement' ••••• but 
with professional habits of mind and work". (57) This impression was 
substantiated by Barker and Rush's finding that 9 in terms of attitudes, 
the image of the 1960's Labour intake as a 'reformist element' was 
indeed justified. In view of this image it may reasonably be 
hypothesised that the profile of specialization of the 1960's entrants 
will be generally higher than that of the other generations in the 
House. 
In practice, however 9 there appears to be a weak positive association 
between the level of specialization and thekngth of service in the 
House. The actual relationship appears to approximate most closely 
to the roughly linear, positive association postulated in the second of 
our hypotheses. A11 of the correlation coefficients in, Table S.SA 
are positive and, apart from those for activity in debates 9 are 
statistically significant. Yet 9 once again9 the coefficients explain 
little of the variance between the two variables at best 8% (in 
Questions, 1972-3) and at worst only 1% (in debate, 1972-3). 
TABLE S.SA Index of specialization scores correlated with length of 
parliamentary service, 1970-1 and 1972-3. (Pearson's r) 
Session 1970-1 Debate 
(n 108) 
r 0.12 
r2 0.02 
Session 1972-3 Debate 
(n 9S) 
r 0.08 
r2 0.01 
* significant 
** significant 
Questions 
(n 107) 
r 0.17* 
r2 0.03 
Questions 
(n 91) 
r 0.29** 
r2 0.08 
0.05 
0.01 
E.D.M.s 
(n 109) 
r 0.23** 
r2 O.OS 
E.D.M.s 
(n 98) 
r 0.23** 
r2 O.OS 
._------------- .. _--_ .. _ .... _------_. __ ._-- ----.. ----_._-----------_ ... _-----._-----
206 
The generational differences in the profile of specialization are 
clearly illustrated at Question Time (see Table 5.5B) where the activity 
of the 1970 cohort is markedly less specialized than that of the other, 
more senior, generations. This difference is particularly pronounced 
for activity in 1972-3, with nearly three-quarters of new M.P.s 
ranking at the lowest level of the index - more than double the 
proportion of 'older' Members at this level. 
TABLE 5.SB Index of specialization cross tabulated with parliamentary 
'generations'. Parliamentary Questions 1970-1 and 1972-3. 
Level of 1970-1 1972-3 
Specialization Par1iamentar~ Generations Parliamentarl Generations 
1970 1964/6 Pre 1964 1970 1964/6 Pre 1964 
(n 31) (n 21) (n 55) (n 27) (n 17) (n 47) 
% % % % % % 
High 6.5 14.3 21.8 3.7 29.4 21.3 
Medium 35.5 52.4 34.5 22.2 35.3 48.9 
Low 58.0 33.3 43.7 74.1 35.3 29.8 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
X2 6.13 df4 n sign X2 15.92 df4 sign 0.01 
Several factors'may help to explain the relatively low level of 
specialization by new M.P.s at Question Time; firstly, a new entrant 
may feel the need to publicize his attention to a wide range of 
constituency matters; and, secondly, a new backbencher may table a wide 
range of Questions to gather basic information - information which 
his more experienced colleagues have already accumulated. Indeed, 
the wider span of attention of new Memb~rs in the sample at Question 
Time, is reflected in the finding of a negative correlation between 
the number of subject areas in which an M.P. is active and the length 
of parliamentary service. In the first session the correlation 
coefficient is -0.24 (significant at 0.01, r2 0.06), but increases to 
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-0.42 (significant at 0.001, r2 0.17) in the second session. When 
the sample is analysed in terms of 'parliamentary generations', the 
cross tabulation with overall spread of activity reveals significant 
differences between the cohorts. (At Question Time in 1970-1 
X2 - 7.78, df4, significant at 0.1; and in 1972-3 X2 = 15.93, df4, 
significant at 0.01). The major contribution to the statistical 
significance stems from the wider spread of attention on the part of 
the 1970 'generation'. 
In activity in debates no clear relationship exists between either the 
level of specialization, or the number of issue areas covered per M.P., 
and the length of service in Parliament. The correlation coefficients 
for the association between the level of specialization and length of 
service fail to reach statistical significance in either session 
(r 0.12, r2 0.02 in 1970-1. and r 0.08, r2 0.01 in 1972-3). Similarly, 
the correlation coefficients for the relationship between the number of 
subject areas covered per Member in debate and the length of service in 
the House are substantially weak at -0.06 in 1970-1. and -0.19 in 
1972-3. Not surprisingly, therefore, the cross tabulation of 
parliamentary generations with index of specialization scores, or with 
the number of areas covered, produces no significant differences. 
The strength of the association between the level of specialization and 
length of service increases however in activity in E.D.M.s. In both 
sessions the correlation coefficient is positive and significant at 
0.23 (significant at 0.01), but, as in questioning activity, little of 
the variance (5%) in the level of specialization is explained by the 
linear regression line with length of parliamentary service. Likewise, 
only 8% of the variance between the spread of activity in E.D.M.s and 
the length of experience in the House is explained by the product -
moment coefficient (r -0.28, significant 0.01, in both sessions) • 
. ---- - --_ .. _-_._--_ .. _ ... _ •...... - .. _._-_._ .. _-_ .. _. __ ._ .. _ .. _--_ .... _---
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Nevertheless, these significant correlations do appear to support the 
hypothesis that new Members are generally less specialized in their 
activity in the House than their more experienced colleagues. 
Specialization and Full Time/Part Time Membership of the House 
The fact that membership of the House of Commons continues, even in 
the 1970s to be a 'part-time' occupation for most M.P.s, (58) arguably 
may influence the profile of backbench specialization. Clearly, the 
pursuit of an extra-parliamentary career may have implications for the 
performance of a Member's parliamentary duties. In fact pronounced 
attitudinal differences towards the parliamentary role have been found 
to exist between 'part-time' and 'full-time' M.P.s. (59) Barker and 
Rush found in their 1967 survey of opinion in the House, that 'part-
timers' tended to adopt a more generalized and independent approach in 
their use of the facilities of the Common's Library, and that they 
generally disapproved of developments, such as specialist committees, 
which would "press them towards a professionalization of their 
parliamentary role". (60) As a group, therefore, ~art-timers' may 
see themselves firmly within the tradition of the 'amateur-gentleman' 
politician, and believe that their outside occupation keeps them 
attuned to 'political reality' and the 'best interests of the nation'. 
In keeping with this view, they may come to display a 'generalist' 
approach in the performance of their parliamentary duties. 
Alternatively it may be postulated that 'part-timers' may in fact 
adopt the 'specialist' role in the House, as the shorter period of time 
open to them to perform their legislative duties may well compel them 
to focus their activity narrowly in the Commons. Moreover, involvement 
in particular subject areas outside the House may lead 'part-timers' to 
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specialize in their respective fields within the House. Hence a 
, " 'h' If b ' part-t~mer may perce~ve 1mse to e, and be seen by h~s colleagues 
to be, a 'specialist' by virtue of his specialized knowledge gained 
from the performance of an outside occupation. Indeed, a common 
defence of the position of the 'part-timer' emphasizes this latter 
point: 
"As for specialization, the House of Commons has 
been renowned for it throughout the ages, and it 
has been the specialization of the Member who is a 
part-timer, following another vocation ••••• and, 
therefore, with his own expert knowledge". (61) 
Some M.P. s go so far as to sU'ggest that the term 'specialized Member' 
should be "reserved for the part-time Member with specialized sources 
of cutside information". (62) While the usage of the word 'specialized' 
in this context muddies the distinction between 'expertise' and 
'division of labour', this line of argument does nevertheless suggest 
that the specialist strategy may well hold considerable appeal for the 
'part-time' Member of Parliament. 
When we analyze the relationship between the 'part-time' and 'full-time' 
status of Members (63) and their respective levels of specialization, 
the correlations in each procedure are substantially weak and 
inconsistent in their direction over time (see Table 5.6A). Only in 
E.D.M.s does this relationship reach a level of statistical significance, 
but, even then, very little of the variance is explained by the 
correlation coefficient. 
A stronger association is, however, observable between the spread of 
activity and 'part-time' membership in the House. Positive, 
statistically significant correlations are to be found for activity in 
Questions and E.D.M.s in both sessions the direction of the 
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TABLE 5.6A Index of specialization scores correlated with full-time/ 
part-time membership of the House (Pearson's r). 
Debates Questions 
1970-1 (n lOS) (n 107) 
r -0.07 r 0.09 
r2 0.00 r2 0.01 
1972-3 (n 95) (n 91) 
r 0.03 r -0.10 
r2 0.00 r2 0.01 
* significant 0.05 
** significant 0.01 
TABLE 5.6B Number of subjects covered crosstabu1ated with 
fu11-time/part-time membership of the House. 
No. of subjects 
covered by M.P. 
Debates 
Procedure 
Questions 
E.D.M.s 
(n 109) 
r- 0.16 * 
r2 0.03 
(n 98) 
r- 0.26 
** 
r2 0.07 
E.D.M.s 
1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 
P.T. F.T. P.T. F.T. P.T. F.T. P.T. F.T. P.T. F.T. P.T. F.T. 
(n67) (n41) (n54) (n41) (n67) (n40) (n53) (n38) (n67) (n42) (n57) (n41) 
% % % % % % % % 70 70 % % 
1- 3 44.8 46.3 53.7 56.1 20.9 10.0 28.3 23.7 4.5 2.4 7.0 0.0 
4-10 53.7 51.2 44.4 41.5 41.8 35.0 54.7 28.9 26.9 7.1 45.6 22.0 
11-35 1.5 2.4 1.9 2.4 37.3 55.0 17.0 47.4 68.7 90.5 47.4 78.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
x2 0.17dflnsX2 0.11dflnsX2 3.85df2nsX2 10.41df2X2 5.76 df1 X2 S.42 df1 
Sign 0.02 Sign 0.01 (1-3 x 4-35) (1-3 x 4.35) Sign 0.01 
(1-10 x 11-35) (1-10xl1-35j 
r 0.02 
r2 0.00 
r 0.09 
r2 0.01 
* significant 0.01 
** significant 0.001 
r 0.25* 
r2 0.06 
0.41** I r 0.23* r 0.24* r 
r2 0.05 r2 0.06 r2 0.17 
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correlation indicating that a wide spread of activity is slightly 
more associated with 'full-time' Members than with 'part-timers'. 
(See Table 5.6B). Again it is noticeable in Table 5.6B that debate, 
as a procedure, appears to suppress differences between groups of 
backbenchers (in line with the cross tabulations for party, and 
parliamentary generations) presumably because of its inherent 
costs of participation. 
Specialization and OCCuEation 
In stratifying the sample for this study due regard was paid to the 
'occupational' composition of the House. (64) Unfortunately, the 
representation of manual workers in the sample was only six in number: 
being a proportionate reflection of the under-representation of 
working-class Members in the House. To generalize from such a small 
base would perhaps be misleading therefore, the cross tabulations 
between the various measures of specialization and occupational status 
have not been recorded in the text, but, instead have been set out in 
Annex 1. It is sufficient to note here, however, that there appear 
to be no significant differences between the profiles of activity for 
'professional', 'business' and 'miscellaneous' occupational groupings 
of M.P.s in the sample. 
Specialization and Levels of Parliamentary Activity 
R.M. Punnett in his study of frontbench specialization argues strongly 
that an examination of the relationship between the degree of 
specialization and the level of activity "is essential to the proper 
understanding of the situation". (65) Naturally enough, therefore, 
this relationship is also of significance in the analysis of backbench 
212 
specialization. At its simplest the relationship between these two 
variables may be conceived of as being linear in form, and negative in 
direction; so that, as the level of activity increases, so the level of 
specialization decreases. Correspondingly, it may also be hypothesized 
that as the level of activity increases so the overall spread of 
attention widens. Indeed, just such an assumption guided Chester and 
Bowring's comment that "Questions put down by a persistent questioner 
are likely to cover a wide variety of matters. A Member who wants to 
make a regular practice of asking Questions will find material for them 
in every field in which he is interested, or in his constituency, or 
from any source". (66) 
If this relationship between the total number of issue areas covered 
and the level of activity is considered. it soon becomes apparent that 
there is a strong, positive association between these variables in our 
sample. So that, generally. as the activity of Members in the sample 
increases so too does their spread of attention. (See Table 5.7A). 
TABLE 5.7A Number of issues covered correlated with the level of 
activity, 1970-1 and 1972-3 
Debates Questions E.D.M.s 
(n 108) (n 107) (n 109) 
1970-1 r 0.77 *** r 0.74 *** r 0.75 
r2 0.60 r2 0.54 r2 0.57 
1972-3 (n 95) (n 91) (n 98) 
r 0.78 *** r 0.70 *** r 0.80 
r2 0.62 r2 0.48 r2 0.63 
*** significant 0.001 
*** 
*** 
A simple linear relationship between the level of specialization and 
the level of activity may also be posited. The very nature of the 
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index of specialization, at its extremes, clearly suggests just such a 
relationship. For the M.P. who tables a single Question, or speaks 
in one debate, or signs only one E.D.M., will automatically score as a 
'true specialist' in each of these procedures (i.e. the coefficient of 
variation will equal 5.92); whereas the 'true generalist' in this 
index needs to be active in each of the thirty-five subject areas, and 
by definition, therefore, is fairly active. However, in reality, 
there need not necessarily be an inevitable link between the degree of 
specialization and the level of parliamentary activity. It is 
entirely conceivable that a highly active M.P. may devote his entire 
attention to the consideration of one issue, whereas a relatively 
inactive backbencher may spread his infrequent contributions evenly 
across a range of issues. In fact when we come to consider the 
relationship between the index scores and the level of activity no 
simple linear association is observable. While the direction of the 
correlation is roughly negative, the strength of the correlation 
coefficient is undermined by the fact that a linear regression line 
cannot adequately describe the relationship. It is apparent from the 
scattergrams for these variables that a high level of activity does 
not always lead to a low level of specialization. This point is 
illustrated in Table 5.7B where highly active backbenchers can be 
found ranked at the highest level of the index proving significant 
exceptions to the general rule of decreasing levels of specialization 
being associated with increasing fevels of activity. 
An interesting aside on the topic of parliamentary activity is that 
there is a strong relationship between a Member's activity level in 
1970-1 and that in 1972-3. In all three procedures this association 
is significant at the 0.001 level. The strongest correlation is found 
in activity at Question Time (r 0.83, r2 0.70), followed by E.D.M.s 
(r 0.78, r2 0.62) and, finally, Debates (r 0.71, r2 0.51).. Although 
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TABLE 5.7B Cross tabulation of the index of specialization with the 
level of activity. Parliamentary Questions and Debates 
1970-1 and 1972-3. * 
Questions 1970-1 1972-3 
Level of Activity (a) Activity (a) 
.§£..e cia li za ti on V Hi~h High Medium Low V Hi~h High Medium 
(n 33) (n 24) (n 25) (n 25) (n 21) (n 19) (n 23) 
% % % % % % % 
High 6.0 16.7 4.0 40.0 4.8 21.0 0.0 
Medium 27.3 25.0 52.0 52.0 9.5 31.6 65.2 
Low 66.7 58.3 44.0 8.0 85.7 47.4 34.8 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
x2 29.8 df 6 sign 0.001 X2 36.03 df 6 sign 0.001 
(a) Activity - Very high 
High 
Medium 
= more than 51 P.Q.s 
= 26-50 P.Q.s 
.. 11-25 P.Q.s 
Low .. 1-10 P.Q.s. 
Debates 1970-1 1972-3 
Level of Activitl (b) Activitl (b) 
Specialization V High High Medium Low V Hi8h High Medium 
(n 29) (n 18) (n 33) (n 28) (n 27) (n 28) (n 15) 
% % % % % % % 
High 10.3 22.2 12.1 39.3 3.7 10.7 13.3 
Medium 58.7 55.6 69.7 60.7 63.0 75.0 80.0 
Low 31.0 22.2 18.2 0.0 33.3 14.3 6.7 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
X2 16.11 df 6 sign 0.02 x2 36.65 df 6 sign 0.001 
(b) Activity Debates -
1970-1 1972-3 
Low 
(n 28) 
% 
39.2 
42.9 
17.9 
100.0 
Low 
(n 25) 
% 
60.0 
40.0 
0.0 
100.0 
Very High .. more than 301 col inches Very High .. more than 39 columns 
High .. 201-300 col inches High .. 26 to 28 columns 
Medium - 101-200 col inches Hedium .. 14 to 25 columns 
Low .. 1-100 col inches Low .. 1 to 13 columns 
(The division for categories in 1972-3 para11e11ing those for 1970-1 
on the basis of one column .. 8 column inches). 
* E.D.M.s are excluded from this analysis as the majority of Members are 
concentrated in the 'low' cell of the index - leaving most cells in 
the activity frequency empty. 
215 
somewhat weaker correlations are found for the relationship between the 
spread of attention per M.P. in 1970-1 and in 1972-3, again the 
coefficients are significant at the 0.001 level - with the relationship 
at its strongest in Questions (r 0.70, r2 0.49), followed by E.D.M.s 
(r 0.65, r2 0.43), and Debates (r 0.57, r 2 0.33). 
Subject Specialization 
Thus far in this chapter we have examined the extent, and consistency, 
of the division of labour on the backbenches without analyzing the 
extent to which backbenchers concentrate upon the same subject areas 
over time. The finding that backbenchers tend to focus their attention 
unevenly on different subject areas in each session does not inevitably 
mean that they specialize in the same issue areas in successive 
parliamentary sessions. It is entirely possible for a'Member to score 
as a true specialist in both of the sessions under study, yet for him 
to focus his attention upon completely different subjects in each. 
However, for the individual backbencher, and the House as a corporate 
body, to reap the benefits of specialization it requires that attention 
be focused upon the same subjects over a period of time. 
To measure the extent of subject specialization on the part of back-
benchers in the sample an index was developed which measured the absolute 
differences between the proportion of activity devoted by each M.P. to 
each subject area in each session. (67) The index has an upper limit 
of 1 and a lower limit of 0; a zero score indicates that a backbencher 
specializes in the same subject areas in exactly the same proportion 
in either session, while a score of 1 indicates that a Member focuses 
his attention upon completely different subjects in 1972-3 to those in 
1970-1. 
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Table 5.8 reveals the extent of 'subject specialization' as measured by 
this index. The most striking feature of this table is the very small 
proportions of Members classified in each of the three procedures as 
being highly 'subject specialized'. Whilst activity in Questions and 
E.D.M.s appears to be moderately specialized, with one-half and three-
quarters of Members ranked respectively in the medium range of the 
index, activity in debate, for most Members in the sample, appears to 
fluctuate considerably among the subject areas over time. Part of the 
explanation for the low level of subject specialization in debates, and 
for the different profiles observable between the procedures in Table 5.8, 
undoubtedly rests in the relative 'cos~of participation' of each mode 
of parliamentary activity. For, as we noted earlier, such costs are 
greatest for debate, both in terms of preparation and performance time, 
and in terms of the probability of 'wasted' time. Consequently a 
backbencher may encounter considerable difficulties in participating 
in debate on the same issue over time; firstly, the topic may not be 
chosen by the frontbench for discussion and, secondly, even if an issue 
recurs in successive sessions, there is no guarantee that the Speaker 
will call upon the Member to speak on each occasion. Thus the very 
fact of the greater dispersion of activity around the mean in debates 
(see Table 5.2A), when taken in conjunction with the lower probability 
of participation on a given subject (compared with Questions or E.D.M.s), 
~~y subsequently account for the greater absolute differences between 
subject areas over time in this procedure. 
TABLE 5.8 
~- - --- - ------ ----
Index of absolute differences in subject areas between 
1970-1 and 1972-3 (Subject specialization). I 
---- -- ---------.---------.---.-
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TABLE 5.8 Index of absolute differences in subject areas between 
1970-1 and 1972-3 (Subject specialization). 
Degree of subject 
specialization Procedure 
Debate Questions E.D.M.s 
(n 95) (n 90) (n 97) 
% % % 
High (0-.32) 
Medium (.33-.65) 
Low (.66- 1) 
9.5 18.9 3.1 
36.8 53.3 75.3 
53.7 27.8 21.6 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
'Subject Specialization' and Party 
In line with the hypotheses developed earlier in the analysis of the 
level of specialization, it is possible to suggest that Labour Members 
may be expected to be more highly 'subject specialized'than 
Conservative backbenchers. (68) The pattern of attention paid to 
the same subject areas in E.D.M.s, in 1970-1 and 1972-3, is indeed 
more consistent, and, therefore, more subject specialized, for Labour 
Members than for their Conservative counterparts. The cross tabulation 
in Table 5.9 between the level of subject specialization in E.D.M.s 
and party, reveals the higher level of specialization in specific 
subject areas on the Labour backbenches, but the strength of this 
association is more adequately revealed in the correlation coefficient 
(r -0.35, r2 0.12, significant at 0.001). Labour M.P.s, with a more 
coherent ideological perspective towards the signing of E.D.M.s, may 
therefore be consistently attracted to the same range of issues over 
time; whereas Conservative backbenchers, without such an obvious coherent 
framework over-arching their activity in E.D.M.s, may come to focus 
their attention disproportionately across different subject areas in 
successive sessions. 
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However, when we examine the relationship between the. level of subject 
specialization in debates and party, as the independent variable, the 
direction of this correlation is the reverse of that originally 
hypothesized. For low absolute differences (i.e. high 'subject 
specialization') tend to be associated more with Conservative rather 
than with Labour backbenchers. The correlation coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 0.001 level, but is relatively weak 
at 0.32 (r2 0.11). The differences in the profile of subject 
specialization between the two parties in debates is highlighted in 
Table 5.9 - where it can be seen that the proportion of Conservative 
M.P.s at the highest level of the index is eight times greater than 
that of Labour backbenchers. 
TABLE 5.9 Index of subject specialization cross tabulated with 
party (Conservative and Labour). 
Degree of subject 
specialization Procedure 
Debates Questions E .D.M. s 
High 
Medium 
Low 
Cons Lab 
(a) 
(n 46) (n 49) 
% % 
17.4 2.0 
41.3 32.7 
41.3 65.3 
100.0 100.0 
X2 8.93 df2 
sign 0.02 
Cons Lab 
(a) 
(n 44) (n 46) 
% % 
15.9 21. 7 
59.1 47.B 
25.0 30.5 
100.0 100.0 
X2 1.18 df2 
n sign 
(a) Includes only those Members active in both sessions. 
Cons Lab 
(a) 
(n 46) (n 51) 
% % 
0.0 5.9 
71.7 7B.4 
28.3 15.7 
100.0 100.0 
X2 4.62 df2 
sign 0.10 
Several possible explanations suggest themselves for the greater degree 
of subject specialization of Conservative backbenchers in their activity 
in debate but none in isolation provide an adequate answer. It may 
be suggested, for example, that the predominance of 'part-timers', 
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or the greater proportion of new recruits, in the Tory sample may 
influence the level of subject specialization. However, neither the 
length of service nor the amount of time spent in the House are, as we 
shall .see, significantly associated with the degree of subject 
specialization. A more pertinent explanation may lie, therefore, in 
the distinction between the supporters and the opponents of the 
Government in the House. The importance of debates as a means of 
building a reputation in Parliament has already been noted, and of 
particular significance for Conservative backbenchers at the time of 
this study was the fact that the man they sought to impress in debates 
was Edward Heath who, as Prime Minister, had a distinctive, and 
in parliamentary terms, an idiosyncratic 'style' of leadership that 
emphasized "specialization, the delegation of tasks to the expert and 
the rejection of the concept of the 'amateur layman'." (69) Hence 
ambitious Tory backbenchers may have recognized that their chances of 
promotion would be enhanced by the adoption of the subject 
specialization strategy. In contrast Labour backbenchers, as members 
of the main Opposition party, may have acknowledged that their best 
strategy on the floor of the House was to harry the Conservative 
Government on any, and every, available opportunity. Indeed, this 
opposition 'mentality' may more accurately account for the Labour 
profile of subject specialization in debates than assertions that 
"Labour M.P.s tend to be outspoken and somewhat self-indulgent, giving 
expression to their views regardless of whether the issue is within ••••• 
their area". (70) 
Subject Specialization and length of Parliamentary Service 
When the scores for absolute differences in subject areas are correlated 
with the length of parliamentary service no significant relationship is 
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to be found. In all three procedures the correlation coefficients are 
weak but positive (debates r 0.13, P.Q.s r 0.11, E.D.M.s r 0.15), and 
are, therefore, suggestive of a slightly higher profile of subject 
specialization on the part of new Members in the sample. The 
marginally higher profile of new Members can be seen in Table 5.10. 
TABLE 5.10 Subject specialization crosstabu1ated with 
Parliamentarl Generations 
Degree of subject 
sEecialization Procedure 
Debate Questions E.D.M.s 
1970 1964/6 Pre 64 1970 1964/6 Pre 64 1970 1964/6 Pre 64 
(n 26) (n 19) (n 50) (n 27) (n 17) (n 46) (n 27) (n 19) (n 51) 
% % % % % % % % % 
High 11.5 10.5 8.0 18.5 29.4 15.2 3.7 5.3 2.0 
Medium 46.2 36.8 32.0 66.7 35.3 52.2 77.8 68.4 76.5 
Low 42.3 52.7 60.0 14.8 35.3 32.6 18.5 26.3 21.6 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
X2 5.64 df4 n sign X2 2.19 df4 n sign X2 0.99 df4 n sign 
Subject Specialization and Part-time/Full-time MembershiE of the House 
It was postulated earlier that one stratagem that a 'part-time' M.P. 
may usefully adopt to maximize his activity in the House would be to 
specialize in specific subject areas. If this is the case, then we 
would anticipate that the level of subject specialization of 'part-ti~~' 
Members would be greater than that of 'full-time' M.P.s. Whilst there 
is such a positive relationship between these variables in activity in 
debates the correlation coefficient is, however, notably weak 
(r 0.05). Yet, in Questions and E.D.M.s, where the correlation 
coefficients reach a high level of statistical significance, the 
direction of the relationship is in fact the reverse of that posited 
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above. (P.Q.s r -0.30, r2 0.09, significant 0.01; E.D.M.s r -0.38, 
r2 0.15, significant 0.001). Hence, low levels of subject 
specialization tend to be associated rather more with 'part-time' 
than 'full-time' Members; so that, although 'part-timers' generally 
have a narrower spread of activity at Question Time and in signing 
E.D.M.s, they nevertheless display a greater inconsistency of attention 
to individual subject areas over time than do their 'full time' 
colleagues. 
Subjects and Parties 
There is a clear belief among backbenchers that each of the major 
parties has its own particular subject 'strengths' and 'weaknesses'. 
The 'weakness' of the Parliamentary Labour Party on agricultural 
issues, was, for example, noted by several Labour backbenchers in 
interview. A former Minister in the Department of Agriculture 
observed that on his return to the backbenches he immediately became 
a point of reference for many of his Labour colleagues on the issue of 
agriculture "as there are so few agricultural specialists in the 
Labour party". (71) In contrast the Conservative party appears well 
stocked with agricultural specialists. As Colin Mellors notes 
"Farming ••••• has a traditional importance in the ranks of the 
(Conservative) parliamentary party, especially in the rural 
constituencies", (72) though it is apparent that its importance has 
declined over the last ten years. Nevertheless 'agriculture' still 
remains an obvious Conservative 'strength'. Similarly, Conservative 
backbenchers have traditionally shown a stronger interest in foreign 
affairs and defence matters than their socialist colleagues. Indeed 
it is easy still to portray the Conservative party as being steeped in 
its colonial and imperial past. There is a strong and enduring 
colonial attachment within a significant section of the Tory parliamentary 
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party as evidenced in their encouragement of the Smith regime in 
Rhodesia and the sympathy and support for the governments of South 
Africa. Yet it should be remembered that the majority of Conservative 
Members have accepted the decline of the Empire, and with it Britain's 
reduced international role, and have supported the subsequent search 
for a new economic foundation in Europe. At the heart of this search 
has been the insistence that "Britain's trading strength and overseas 
investments were a central aspect of her defence and security" (73) 
so that defence matters and international affairs become inextricably 
intermeshed for most Conservatives. Moreover, interest in foreign 
affairs appears to be a logical corollary of the national 'focus' of 
representation, for, if the Tory party is to promote the 'interest of 
the nation' through the fostering of 'enterprise' and Britain's 
trading strength in the world economic market, then an understanding of 
world affairs appears to be a pre-requisite. Arguably~ therefore, 
the representational 'focus' of Conservative Members, and their 
definition of the 'national interest' in terms of the defence and 
sustenance of capitalism,engenders a profound interest in the policy 
areas of 'foreign affairs' and 'defence'. 
On the other hand, Labour Members, if they assume a party delegate 
orientation to their representative role, may consider the domestic 
'bread and butter' questions of working-class material well-being to 
be of greater concern than defence or foreign policy. This is not 
to say that Labour Members deny the significance of foreign affairs or 
focus exclusively upon domestic issues. Indeed 'the left' of the 
P.L.P. sees aclose link between domestic and foreign policy but, as 
Berrington points out, while "questions of foreign policy are of 
paramount interest to some socialist militants, it remains true that 
the chief purpose and justification of the Labour Party, both for many 
of its zealots and for its rank-and-file voters, lies in its commitment 
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to social welfare and full employment at home". (74) Socialist doctrine, 
electoral pragmatism and party-delegate orientations all appear to 
reinforce each other to tie Labour M.P.s to the consideration of these 
domestic issues. The commitment to the transformation of the social and 
economic position of the British working class leads many Labour 
backbenchers to focus upon welfare, housing and employment policy. But 
underpinning this ideological commitment is a sensitivity to the demands 
of the electorate; a sensitivity which is accentuated when the M.P. sees 
himself to be a delegate from his constituency. The M.P. thus becomes 
'bound' to promote the interests of his constituents 
are parochially defined by the bulk of Labour voters. 
interests which 
Thus Paul Rose 
(Labour M.P. for Manchester, Blackley) has commented upon the depressing 
lack of concern over international problems on the part of Labour voters. 
Before the election in October 1974 Rose conducted a survey of the issues 
which were considered to be the main priorities of his constituents: 
"Prices and the cost of living headed the list; foreign affairs and 
Northern Ireland tied for bottom place". (75) He sought no answer to 
his rhetorical question: "How many votes are there in the gaols of 
Indonesia or Leningrad?". 
From these general observations it is possible to hypothesize that 
Conservative backbenchers will be more likely, all things being equal, 
to be active in the subject fields of agriculture, defence, foreign 
affairs, and, that other staple Tory interest, law and order; whereas 
Labour M.P.s will generally be more concerned with housing, health 
and welfare matters. On these issues the 'direction' of the difference 
between the two parties can be predicted, but on other issues, such 
as industrial relations and industrial policy, the 'direction' of any 
difference is open to greater speculation. 
Table 5.12 sets out the mean proportion of activity expended in each 
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TABLE 5.12 Mean Proportion of Activity per Subject Area by Party 
Questions 1970-1 
Subject Full Sample Conservative Labour 
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
Agriculture 5.127 (11.17) 6.632 (12.26) 3.509 ( 9.72) 
Aid 0.764 ( 2.30) 1.140 ( 2.88) 0.358 ( 1. 37) 
Aviation 3.273 ( 9.37) 3.807 ( 9.43) 2.698 ( 9.35) 
Animals 0.473 ( 1. 86) 0.491 ( 1.58) 0.453 ( 2.13) 
Arts 0.327 ( 1. 76) 0.456 ( 2.35) 0.189 ( O.il) 
Civil Service 0.955 ( 3.07) 1.333 ( 4.01) 0.547 ( 1.42) 
Constituency 17.027 (20.83) 8.878 (13.23) 25.792 (23.86) *** 
Decimals & Metric 0.382 ( 2.46) 0.737 ( 3.39) 0.000 ( 0.000) 
Defence 1. 727 ( 4.67) 2.175 ( 5.36) 1.245 ( 3.77) 
Economy 7.555 (14.08) 8.561 (15.24) 6.472 (12.77) 
Education 2.982 ( 6.15) 3.193 ( 6.27) 2.755 ( 6.07) 
Environment 1.591 ( 4.17) 2.351 ( 5.37) 0.774 ( 2.01) * 
Employment 2.946 ( 6.44) 3.667 ( 7.98) 2.170 ( 4.15) 
Europe 5.009 (10.72) 7.175 (13.10) 2.679 ( 6.72) * 
Foreign 3.373 (11. 97) 3.298 ( 9.51) 3.453 (14.24) 
House of Commons 1. 755 ( 3.13), 1.579 ( 3.19) 1.943 ( 3.08) 
Homes 4.245 ( 9.77) 4.526 (10.94) 3.943 ( 8.42) 
Health 4.236 ( 9.38) 3.702 (10.31) 4.811 ( 8.32) 
Industry 5.700 (11. 89) 4.982 ( 7.59) 6.471 (15.28) 
Law and Order 3.918 (12.29) 5.544 (16.51) 2.169 ( 4.12) 
Legal 1.036 ( 2.98) 1.281 ( 3.48) 0.774 ( 2.32) 
Local Government 0.509 ( 1. 79) 0.632 ( 2.19) 0.377 ( 1.23), 
Media 0.464 ( 1. 60) 0.491 ( 1. 74) 0.434 ( 1.44) 
Northern Ireland 0.727 ( 5.12) 1.228 ( 7.06) 0.189 ( 0.81) 
Post Office 1.373 ( 6.74) 1.965 ( 8.93) 0.736 ( 2.92) 
Ports 0.136 ( 0.67) 0.158 ( 0.75) 0.113 ( 0.58) 
Power 1.336 ( 4.84) 0.860 ( 3.45) 1.849 ( 5.98) 
Race 0.464 ( 2.05) 0.719 ( 2.67) 0.188 ( 1.00) 
Regions 0.609 ( 2.04) 0.246 ( 0.89) 1.000 ( 2.75) * 
Science & Tech. 0.155 ( 1.03) 0.263 ( 1. 42) 0.038 ( 0.19) 
Scottish Affairs 4.309 (15.85) 1.632 (11. 25) 7.189 (19.35) 
Sport 0.200 ( 0.94) 0.316 ( 1. 23) 0.075 ( 0.43) 
Transport 3.473 ( 7.89) 5.421 (10.32) 1.377 ( 2.69) ** 
Welsh Affairs 2.318 (12.59) 1.772 (12.71) 2.906 (12.54) 
Welfare 6.491 (15.30) 5.930 (14.23) 7.094 (16.50) 
* significant 0.05 ** significant 0.01 *** significant 0.001 
---------_._-_.- --.--~--.-
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TABLE 5.12 (Continued) 
Questions 1972-3 
Subject Full Sam~le Conservative Labour 
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
Agriculture 7.911 (19.07) 8.625 (18.45) 7.264 (19.77) 
Aid 0.139 ( 1. 21) 0.250 ( 1. 73) 0.038 ( 0.27) 
Aviation 2.683 ( 8.62) 4.167 (11.12) 1.339 ( 5.23) 
Animals 0.376 ( 2.92) 0.188 ( 0.70) 0.547 ( 3.98) 
Arts 0.198 ( 1. 80) 0.375 ( 2.60) 0.038 ( 0.27) 
Civil Service 0.564 ( 2.64) 0.167 ( 0.66) 0.925 ( 3.57) 
Constituency 12.456 (18.81) 8.750 (11.82) 15.811 (23.02) * 
Decimal & Metric 0.050 ( 0.41) 0.021 ( 0.14) 0.076 ( 0.55) 
Defence 1.951 ( 5.24) 2.333 ( 4.92) 1.604 ( 5.54) 
Economy 6.901 (13.26) 8.875 (14.61) 5.113 (11. 76) 
Education 2.832 ( 6.91) 2.646 ( 5.30) 3.000 ( 8.25) 
Environment 1.188 ( 3.13) 1.583 ( 3.36) 0.830 ( 2.89) 
Employment 4.267 ( 8.95) 6.063 (11.59) 2.642 ( 5.17) 
Europe 3.218 (11.87) 3.271 ( 8.44) 3.170 (14.38) 
Foreign 3.356 ( 6.99) 4.042 ( 7.95), 2.736 ( 6.01) 
House of Commons 0.614 . ( 1.64) 0.521 ( 1. 24) 0.698 ( 1.95) 
Homes 5.416 (13.95) 4.688 (10.75) 6.075 (16.41) 
Health 3.951 ( 8.64) 2.250 ( 4.77) 5.491 (10.85) * 
Industry 4.624 ( 8.38) 4.521 ( 8.97) 4.717 ( 7.90) 
Law and Order 3.485 (11.16) 4.771 (14.74) 2.321 ( 6.33) 
Legal 1.099 ( 4.19) 1.104 ( 3.48) 1.094 ( 4.78) 
Local Government 0.455 ( 1. 96) 0.604 ( 2.60) 0.321 ( 1.11) 
Media 0.396 ( 1. 77) 0.125 ( 0.39) 0.642 ( 2.39) 
Northern Ireland 1.683 ( 9.32) 2.521 (12.53) 0.925 ( 4.89) 
Post Office 0.446 ( 1. 24) 0.625 ( 1. 51) 0.283 ( 0.91) 
Ports 0.119 ( 1.19) 0.250 ( 1. 73) 0.000 ( 0.000) 
Power 1.733 ( 5.72) 1.250 ( 4.99) 2.170 ( 6.32) 
Race 1.109 ( 4.17) 0.896 ( 2.28) 1.302 ( 5.36) 
Regions 0.456 ( 2.03) 0.125 ( 0.87) 0.755 ( 2.66) 
Science & Tech. 0.010 ( 0.10) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.019 ( 0.14) 
Scottish Affairs 4.525 (15.05) 0.021 ( 0.14) 8.604 (19.90) **k 
Sport & Recreation 0.892 ( 8.46) 1.813 (12.27) 0.057 ( 0.31) 
Transport 4.634 ( 8.72) 6.146 ( 8.24) 3.265 ( 8.98) 
Welsh Affairs 2.83 (14.07) 1.625 (10.83) 3.925 (16.50) 
Welfare 4.020 ( 8.92) 5.375 (10.51) 2.793 ( 7.06) 
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Debates 1970-1 
Subject Full Sample Conservative Labour 
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
Agriculture 3.236 (14.28) 4.053 (14.72) 2.359 (13.89) 
Aid 0.191 ( 1. 20) 0.193 ( 1.03) 0.189 ( 1. 37) 
Aviation 4.227 (15.08) 4.035 (13.32) 4.434 (16.89) 
Animals 2.22 ( 2.22) 0.439 ( 1. 98) 0.339 ( 2.47) 
Arts 0.691 ( 4.78) 1.141 ( 6.48) 0.208 ( 1.51) 
Civil Service 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Constituency 14.027 (19.17) 11.456 (14.53) 16.792 (22.98) 
Decimal & Metric 1.809 (10.59) 1. 737 ( 6.56) 1.887 (13.73) 
Defence 3.991 (10.01) 4.308 ( 9.78) 3.585 (10.33) 
Economy 8.273 (19.53) 11.281 (22.21) 5.038 (15.74) 
Education 1.873 ( 8.59) 1. 754 ( 7.53) 2.000 ( 9.69) 
Environment 0.455 ( 2.03) 0.316 ( 1. 68) 0.604 ( 2.36) 
Employment 10.418 (21.12) 8.930 (20.52) 12.019 (21. 84) 
Europe 8.372 (15.52) 9.667 (16.56) 6.981 (14.41) 
Foreign 3.509 (11.24) 6.070 (14.99) 0.755 ( 2.83) * 
House of Commons 1.773 ( 5.97) 0.825 ( 4.45) 2.792 ( 7.16) 
Homes 3.709 (12.14) 3.298 (10.63) , 4.151 (13.67) 
Health 2.136 ( 9.58) 0.526 ( 2.12) 3.87 (13.47) 
Industry 3.136 ( 9.28) 5.596 (12.25) 0.491 ( 2.29) ** 
Law 2.527 ( 9.98) 3.386 (12.89) 1.604 ( 5.34) 
Legal 2.618 ( 8.06)' 1. 789 ( 4.82) 3.509 (10.46) 
Local Government 3.082 (11.86) 2.509 (10.41) 3.698 (13.33) 
Media 0.809 ( 4.79) 1.281 ( 6.42) 0.302 ( 1. 83) 
Northern Ireland 2.036 ( 9.48) 2.158 (11.43) 1.906 ( 6.90) 
Post Office 0.155 ( 1.44) 0.263 ( 1. 99) 0.038 ( 0.27) 
Ports 0.573 ( 3.09) 0.719 ( 3.83) 0.415 ( 2.02) 
Power 2.336 (11. 47) 0.912 ( 4.68) 3.868 (15.73) 
Race 0.164 ( 0.93) 0.140 ( 1.06) 0.189 ( 0.79) 
Regions 1.709 (10.48) 0.421 ( 2.35) 3.094 (14.85) 
Science & Tech. 0.073 ( 0.76) 0.140 ( 1.06) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Scottish Affairs 2.518 (11.41) 1.649 (12.45) 3.453 (10.20) 
Sport 0.227 ( 1. 39) 0.439 ( 1. 92) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Transport 1.609 ( 8.19) 2.211 (10.35) 0.962 ( 4.95) 
Welsh Affairs 0.255 ( 2.17) 0.105 ( 0.79) 0.415 ( 3.02) 
Welfare 5.155 (13.00) 5.772 (14.38) 4.491 (11.44) 
-------------------------- ------- -- -----
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TABLE 5.12 (continued) 
Debates 1972-3 
Subject Full Sample Conservative Labour 
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
Agriculture 1.812 ( 7.72) 2.458 (10.20) 1.226 ( 4.44) 
Aid 0.89l ( 5.70) 1.875 ( 8.20) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Aviation 3.238 (10.88) 4.813 (14.56) 1.811 ( 5.62) 
Animals 0.069 ( 0.49) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.132 ( 0.68) 
Arts 0.082 ( 5.51) 0.500 ( 3.46) 1.038 ( 6.89) 
Civil Service 0.396 ( 2.03) 0.000 ( 0.000) 0.755 ( 2.76) 
Constituency 6.139 (18.88) 4.563 (11.90) 7.566 (23.52) 
Decimal & Metric 0.198 ( 1.51) 0.417 ( 2.18) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Defence 3.594 (11.33) 6.08 (15.17) 1.340 ( 5.31) * 
Economy 14.485 (22.74) 15.042 (22.06) 13.980 (23.54) 
Education 2.208 (11.09) 0.896 ( 3.144) 3.396 (14.99) 
Environment 1.475 ( 5.07) 1.688 ( 4.83) 1.283 ( 5.32) 
Employment 5.178 (16.81) 8.313 (23.07) 2.340 ( 6.75) 
Europe 1.139 ( 6.01) 2.000 ( 8.36) 0.359 ( 2.23) 
Foreign 3.762 (12.25) 4.830 (14.26) 2.792 (10.15) 
House of Commons 1.871 ( 8.01) 1.958 ( 7.67) 1. 792 ( 8.37) 
Homes 7.406 (19.49) 5.729 (16.33) 8.924 (22.02) 
Health 3.951 (13.58) 4.688 (15.56) 3.283 (11.62) 
Industry 4.465 (13.28) 5.375 (15.78) 3.642 (10.62) 
Law and Order 1.604 ( 6.78) 2.167 ( 7.64) 1.094 ( 5.91) 
Legal 1. 792 ( 7.14) 2.896 ( 9.35) 0.793 ( 4.13) 
Local Government 1.099 ( 5.02) 0.563 ( 2.22) 1.585 ( 6.59) 
Media 1.406 ( 5.97) 0.250 ( 1.36) 2.458 ( 8.03) 
Northern Ireland 4.386 (14.51) 6.313 (19.11) 2.642 ( 8.28) 
Post Office 0.218 ( 1.55) 0.250 ( 1. 73) 0.189 ( 1. 37) 
Ports 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Power 0.851 . ( 4.97) 0.250 ( 1. 73) 1.396 ( 6.65) 
Race 1.450 ( 6.18) 0.208 ( 1.18) 2.566 ( 8.33) 
Regions 0.560 ( 2.91) 0.208 ( 1.44) 0.887 ( 3.76) 
Science & Tech. 0.624 ( 4.46) 0.313 ( 2.17) 0.906 ( 5.81) 
Scottish Affairs 6.703 (20.53) 1.125 ( 7.79) 11.755 (26.48) ** 
Sport 0.149 ( 1.49) 0.313 ( 2.17) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Transport 4.624 (12.91) 5.146 (14.51) 4.151 (11.39) 
Welsh Affairs 1.535 ( 9.17) 0.792 ( 5.49) 2.208 (11.56) 
Welfare 5.277 (14.13) 5.833 (16.34) 4.774 (11.92) 
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TABLE 5.12 (continued) 
E.D.M.s 1970-1 
Subject Full SamE1e Conservative Labour 
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
Agriculture 3.627 ( 4.15) 3.193 ( 4.696) 4.094 ( 3.46) 
Aid 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Aviation 3.491 ( 3.93) 5.526 ( 4.20) 1.302 ( 1.97) *** 
Animals 0.800 ( 2.71) 0.965 ( 2.65) 0.623 ( 2.79) 
Arts 2.327 ( 3.59) 2.404 ( 2.47) 2.245 ( 4.51) 
Ci vil Service 0.091 ( 0.55) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.189 ( 0.78) 
Constituency 2.518 ( 5.05) 1.105 ( 2.14) 4.038 ( 6.63) ** 
Decimal & Metric 1.382 ( 2.58) 2.649 ( 3.09) 0.019 ( 0.14) *** 
Defence 1.145 ( 2.80) 1.912 ( 3.55) 0.321 ( 1. 22) ** 
Economy 2.500 ( 4.48) 1.649 ( 2.36) 3.415 ( 5.87) 
Education 0.818 ( 1. 73) 1.456 ( 0.29) 0.132 ( 0.52) 
Environment 0.545 ( 2.24) 0.684 ( 1.67) 0.396 ( 2.74) 
Employment 7.282 ( 5.37) 7.982 ( 5.41) 6.528 ( 5.28) 
Europe 3.909 ( 6.57) 4.298 ( 4.77) 3.491 ( 8.11) 
Foreign 16.581 (11.21) 17.281 (13.61) 15.830 ( 7.93) 
House of Commons 11.045 ( 8.99) 12.491 ( 8.56) 9.491 ( 9.27) 
Homes 1.700 ( 2.65) 0.246 ( 0.95) 3.264 ( 2.98) ** 
Health 5.927 ( 9.85) 7.404 (13.08) 4.340 ( 3.76) 
Industry 6.073 ( 5.37) 3.649 ( 3.85) 8.679 ( 5.57) *** 
Law and Order 1.136 ( 2.18) 1.561 ( 2.75) 0.679 ( 1. 21) ** 
Legal 1.736 ( 2.95) 2.088- ( 3.38) 1.359 ( 2.36) 
Local Government 1.355 ( 2.20) 1.930 ( 2.75) 0.736 ( 1.13) 
Media 3.564 ( 4.49) 4.772 ( 5.11) 2.264 ( 3.31) ** 
Northern Ireland 1.391 ( 2.29) 1.140 ( 2.33) 1.660 ( 2.25) 
Post Office 0.809 ( 2.01) 0.807 ( 1.51) 0.811 ( 2.46) 
Ports 0.355 ( 0.96) 0.526 ( 1. 20) 0.169 ( 0.58) 
Power 1.364 ( 4.97) 0.070 ( 0.37) 2.75 ( 6.92) ** 
Race 0.091 ( 0.52) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.189 ( 0.74) 
Regions 0.900 ( 2.137) 0.088 ( 0.66) 1. 774 ( 2.76) *** 
Science & Tech. 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Scottish Affairs 1.382 ( 4.21) 0.246 ( 1.85) 2.604 ( 5.53) ** 
Sport 2.409 ( 3.44) 2.509 ( 4.13) 2.302 ( 2.52) 
Transport 1.355 ( 1. 91) 0.947 ( 1.99) 1. 792 ( 1. 74) * 
Welsh Affairs 1.391 ( 6.18) 0.281 ( 1. 63) 2.585 ( 8.63) 
Welfare 7.255 ( 6.12) 3.404 ( 4.22) 11. 396 ( 5.25) *** 
- -- -
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TABLE 5.12 (continued) 
E.D.M.s 1972-3 
Subject Full SamEle Conservative Labour 
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
~gricu1ture 0.297 ( 1.42) 0.625 ( 2.02) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Aid 1.614 ( 2.70) 1.917 ( 3.35) 1.339 ( 1.93) 
Aviation 0.188 ( 0.98) 0.375 ( 1. 39) 0.019 ( 0.14) 
Animals 3.307 ( 4.61) 5.438 ( 5.75) 1.377 ( 1. 71) *** 
Arts 2.782 ( 3.62) 3.271 ( 4.35) 2.339 ( 2.77) 
Civil Service· 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Constituency 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Decimal & Metric 0.555 ( 1. 81) 1.000 ( 2.29) 0.151 ( 1.09) ** 
Defence 4.871 ( 5.16) 7.875 ( 5.59) 2.151 ( 2.65) *** 
Economy 2.545 ( 3.02) 2.500 ( 3.59) 2.585 ( 2.41) 
Education 2.713 ( 5.59) 3.292 ( 7.74) 2.189 ( 2.35) 
Environment 1.129 ( 2.28) 0.792 ( 2.41) 1.434 ( 2.13) 
Employment 7.465 ( 5.21) 5.813 ( 5.05) 8.963 ( 4.94) ** 
Europe 1.842 ( 2.72) 1.208 ( 2.58) 2.415 ( 2.73) * 
Foreign 18.257 (11. 38) 16.521 (13.03) 19.830 ( 9.49) 
House of Commons 8.852 ( 6.68) 10.813 ( 7.84) 7.075 ( 4.87) ** 
Homes 3.446 (10.46) 0.000 ( 0.00) 6.506 (15.76) ** 
Health 3.356 ( 3.58) 2.000 ( 3.19) 4.585 ( 3.49) *** 
Industry 3.901 ( 4.56) 0.979 ( 2.29) 6.547 ( 4.49) *** 
Law and Order 7.960 (13.61) 15.271 (16.89) 1.339 ( 2.13) *** 
Legal 1.198 ( 2.72) 1.292 ( 2.58) 1.113 ( 2.87) 
Local Government 0·.901 ( 1. 79) 0.833 ( 1. 92) 0.962 ( 1.69) 
Media 3.198 ( 3.79) 1.688 ( 3.51) 4.566 . ( 3.53) *** 
Northern Ireland 1.000 ( 2.58) 2.104 ( 3.44) 0.000 ( 0.00) *** 
Post Office 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Ports 0.029 ( 0.29) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.056 ( 0.41) 
Power 0.396 ( 1. 72) 0.438 ( 2.06) 0.358 ( 1. 35) 
Race 0.663 ( 1.53) 0.854 ( 1.98) 0.491 ( 0.95) 
Regions 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Science & Tech. 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Scottish Affairs 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Sport 0.069 ( 0.54) 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.152 ( 0.73) 
Transport 1.693 ( 5.34) 2.833 ( 7.52) 0.660 ( 1.19) 
Welsh Affairs 0.000 ( 0.00) 0.000 ( 0.000) 0.000 ( 0.00) 
Welfare 12.564 ( 9.82) 7.604 ( 5.99) 17.056 (10.49) *** 
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subject area for the whole sample, and the corresponding proportions 
for each of the major parties. To test whether the observed differences 
between the means of the two parties were statistically significant the 
't' statistic was computed and the significant differences noted. (76) 
From Table 5.12 it can be seen that in the subject area of agriculture 
the mean level of activity of Conservative Members is, with the 
exception of E.D.M.s in the first session, higher than that of Labour 
M.P.s. While the 'direction' of this difference is as forecast, the 
differences between the parties are not statistically significant. . The 
inclusion of 'food' and 'fisheries' in the coding cell for agriculture 
plays an important part in explaining the relatively high Labour mean 
in this area as several Labour M.P.s were particularly interested in 
the price of foodstuffs during the period under study. 
On defence matters, however, no such coding vagaries intervene, and the 
'direction' of the difference between the parties is as expected for 
all procedures and in both sessions. These differences being most 
marked in E.D.M.s (significant at 0.01 in 1970-1; and significant at 
0.001 in 1972-3) and in debates in 1972-3 (significant at 0.05). On 
foreign affairs the Conservative mean level of activity is higher 
than that of Labour M.P.s in debates in both sessions, in Questions 
in 1970-1, and in E.D.M.s in 1970-1. Only in debates in 1970-1, 
however, does the difference reach the 0.05 level of statistical 
significance. The pattern of difference between the two parties is 
somewhat clearer in the area of law and order, in that the Conservative 
mean is greater in every procedure in both sessions; yet these 
differences are significant in E.D.M.s only (significant at 0.01 in 
1970-1, and significant at 0.001 in 1972-3). 
Turning to the subjects hypothesized to be of greater interest and 
importance for Labour Members it rapidly becomes apparent that the 
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mean proportion of activity in the areas of housing, welfare and 
health is not consistently higher (i.e. across all procedures in both 
sessions) for Labour Members than that of their Conservative counter-
parts. Thus on welfare matters the Labour mean in E.D.M.s is 
significantlY greater in both sessions, yet in debates Conservative 
M.P.s display a higher mean proportion of activity on this subject. 
In the cognate area of health policy the Labour mean is significantly 
greater in Questions and in E.D.M.s in 1972-3 (significant at 0.05 
and 0.001 respectively) but elsewhere the direction of the difference 
fluctuates from procedure to procedure and fails to reach statistical 
significance. A somewhat clearer picture emerges in the area of 
housing, as Labour M.P.s in the sample devote a greater mean proportion 
of their activity to this subject than do Conservative Members. In 
activity in E.D.M.s these differences were significant at the 0.01 
leveL The exception to this pattern occurs in Questi~ns in 1970-1 
where the Conservative mean is higher than that of the Labour sample. 
A host of Questions on 'Fair Rents' (presaging the legislation of the 
following session), on council house sales and on housing improvement 
grants were tabled in this session most notably by James Hill, and 
Norman Tebbit (who was the vice-chairman of the Conservative Housing 
and Construction Committee). 
On employment matters an issue of equal importance for both 
parties the only significant difference is to be found in E.D.M.s in 
1972-3. The greater level of activity of Labour Members in signing 
Motions, in support of industrial action on the part of agricultural 
workers, gasmen, railway footmen and coal miners, highlights the 
difference between the two parties. Similarly on trade and industry 
matters another area of equal importance for both parties the 
direction of the difference between the means of the Labour and the 
Conservative samples varies from procedure to procedure. In E.D.M.s 
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Labour Members display a significantly higher mean level of activity 
in this area (significant at 0.001 in both sessions). Yet in 1970-1 
the Conservative mean level of activity on industrial matters was 
significantly higher than that of the Labour sample. Many of the 
Conservative M.P.s in the sample contributed extensively to the 
discussions on the steel industry, Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, Rolls 
Royce and to the consideration of the Industry Bill, and the Ship 
Industry Bill of this session. 
On the question of E.E.C. matters Conservative Members in the sample 
devoted, on average, a greater proportion of their questioning and 
debating activity to this subject though in neither session were 
the differences between the parties significant. Only in E.D.M.s in 
1972-3 does a significant difference appear, and then it reflects the 
higher Labour mean level of activity on E.E.C. affairs (~otions on 
such topics as sugar supplies in the E.E.C., the rights of British 
engineers to practice in Europe, and Spanish membership of the community 
attracted the support of many Members in the Labour sample). 
However the most striking difference between the two samples occurs 
in the area of 'constituency' matters. In all procedures in which 
constituency issues are coded, (77) the mean proportion of activity 
recorded for Labour M.P.s is greater than that for Conservative 
backbenchers significantlY so in P.Q.s and in E.D.M.s. And it is 
to this subject that we now turn. 
'Constituency' as a Subject Area in the House 
The relationship between the elected representative and his constituency 
is one of fundamental importance in w~ternliberal democracies. Even 
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Edmund Burke, as the defender of the trustee, argued that the 
representative should "live in the strictest union, the closest 
correspondence and the most unreserved communication with his 
constituents". Indeed his objEction to delegate theory concerned 
not the belief that the representative had a necessary duty to 
communicate with his constituents and to promote their interest, but 
rather the insistence that the Member was obliged to take instructions 
from his constituents and to promote 'local' interests over the 
'national' interest. While political scientists in North America 
have eagerly and rigorously researched into the linkages between the 
representative and his constituency, (78) British research in this 
area has been relatively sparse. The studies that have been undertaken 
tend to describe either the contents of the mailbag of M.P.s or their 
caseload at constituency surgeries; (79) more recently attempts have, 
however, been made to examine the relationship between the behaviour 
of M.P.s in the House and the nature of their constituencies. (80) 
One of the original research questions included in the design of the 
.present study sought, therefore, to discover the extent to which British 
M.P.s focused upon constituency matters in their parliamentary activity. 
A major difficulty, inherent in such an undertaking, rests in 
establishing the nature of a 'constituency' topic. Given the 
heterogeneous interests and opinions encapsulated within a geographical 
constituency, the elected Member may justifiably claim that any subject 
area in which he is active in the House is of concern to his constituents. 
Furthermore, it is often extremely difficult to unravel the entangled 
web of motivations that prompt a Member's interest in any given policy 
area. How does one, for example, determine the prime motivation 
leading to a contribution in the House on agriculture by a Member who 
is by occupation a farmer, who has close functional ties with the 
National Farmers' Union and who also represents a rural constituency? 
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Is the contribution prompted out of 'personal', 'sectorial/functional', 
or 'constituency' interest? Undoubtedly in reality there is a mutual 
reinforcement of interests, but it would be difficult, and possibly 
misleading for the researcher to argue that this Member's contribution 
in the House arose primarily out of the desire to promote his 
constituents' interest. 
In an attempt to resolve this problem, a separate subject code for 
'constituency' was included in the coding frame of subject areas. 
For a contribution to be coded as a 'constituency' matter, the M.P. had 
to make overt and explicit reference to his locality in his 
intervention. Thus, for example, a Question asked by the Member for 
North East Derbyshire on unemployment in Clay Cross would be classified 
under the 'constituency' heading, whereas a Question tabled by the 
same Member on unemployment, without the specific constituency tag, 
would be coded under 'employment'. One objection to this coding 
strategy is that 'constituency' does not constitute a 'subject area', 
in the same sense as 'agriculture' or 'employment', but rather is an 
amalgam of other subjects. Offsetting this disadvantage, however, is 
the advantage that, in employing this strategy, the decision as to 
which issues are deemed to be of importance within a constituency is 
made by the M.P. by his specific reference to his locality 
rather than arbitrarily by the researcher. 
The first hypothesis to be tested is that, given the representational 
'style' and 'focus' ascribed to Labour M.P.s, it is to be anticipated 
that their concentration upon 'constituency' issues will be greater 
than that by Conservatives in the sample. The distinctly higher mean 
proportion of activity . expended on 'constituency' matters by Labour 
M.P.s in Table 5.12 is supportive of this hypothesis. When the 
correlation coefficients for the relationship between the proportion 
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of activity spent on the consideration of 'constituency' affairs and 
political party in each procedure are computed significant 
correlations, suggestive of higher levels of activity on the part of 
Labour Members, are to be found in Questions and E.D.M.s. (See Table 
5.13). 
TABLE 5.13 Proportion of activity spent on the consideration of 
Session 
1970-1 
1972-3 
'constituency' affairs correlated with party 
and Conservative, (Pearson's r). 
Debates 
(n 108) 
r 0.14 
r2 0.02 
(n 95) 
r 0.07 
r2 0.01 
* significant 0.05 
*** significant 0.001 
Procedure 
Questions 
(n 107) 
r 0.41 *** 
r2 0.17 
(n 91) 
r 0.19 * 
r2 0.04 
Labour 
E.D.M.s 
(n 109) 
r 0.29 *** 
r2 0.09 
(n ) 
In debates,however, no significant correlations are observable. The 
weakness of the correlations in debates may be accounted for in several 
ways; firstly, the correlation for 1972-3 reflects, in part, the use 
made of the sessional index of Hansard as the prime data source for 
activity in debates in this session as it is unclear when coding 
the entries in the index, with the exception for those on adjournment 
debates, whether or not a Member makes explicit and continuous 
reference to his constituency. This caveat should, therefore, be borne 
in mind when examining Table 5.13. Secondly, the absence of a 
significant association between the level of activity on 'constituency' 
affairs and party in the first session (when no such coding vagaries 
intervene) highlights the crudity of a simple dichotomization of 
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representative role orientations between the two major parties. 
Indeed, one Conservative Member in the sample stood the premise, that 
Tory backbenchers uniformly adopt a trustee 'style', on its head with 
his statement in the House in December 1970 that: "There is now strong 
feeling in my constituency against British Summer Time and, whatever 
my personal inclination, I must represent the majority feeling in my 
vote. I still like light evenings but, if the majority of my 
constituents want to abolish B.S.T. I must vote in that way". (81) 
Clearly this statement spotlights the necessity for further research 
into Members' perceptions of their representative role! 
A second hypothesis to be tested is that Members from electorally 
vulnerable constituencies will be more inclined to make specific 
reference to their constituencies in the House than will M.P.s from safe 
constituencies. This hypothesis is, moreover, related ,to a slightly 
wider proposition that M.P.s from marginal constituencies will be 
generally less specialized in their parliamentary activity than their 
'electorally secure' colleagues. One Labour Member, in communication 
with the author, explicitly accepted this premise: "I would like to 
comment that I am not an intensive specialist because of the nature of 
my constituency. It is very marginal and, as a consequence, much of 
my activity is parish pump ••••• I am afraid that intense specialization 
is for Members with more political security". (82) To test the 
validity of this assumption, the specialization scores of M.P.s in the 
sample were correlated with the size of their electoral majorities. 
Although a positive correlation is observable between these variables 
(83) 
in all three procedures (see Table 5.14) the strength of the relationship 
is very weak. Only in debates is the association statisticallY 
significant and, even then, only three per cent of the variation is 
explained by the line of the linear regression between the variables. 
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TABLE 5.14 Index of Specialization scores correlated with size 
of electoral majority (Pearson's r) • 
Session Procedure 
1970-1 Debate Questions E.D.M.s 
(n 108) (n 107) (n 109) 
r 0.18 * r 0.08 r 0.07 
r2 0.03 r2 0.01 r2 0.01 
1972-3 (n 95) (n 91) (n 98) 
r 0.17 * r 0.10 r 0.07 
r2 0.03 r2 0.01 r2 0.01 
* significant 0.05 
Not surprisingly, therefore, when Members are grouped according to 
the 'marginality' (84) or 'safeness' of their constituencies no 
significant differences are to be found between the profiles of 
specialization of the two cohorts. (See Table 5.15). 
TABLE 5.15 Index of specialization crosstabulated with electoral 
'marginali ty' • Parliamentary Questions and Debates 
1970-1 and 1972-3. 
Level of 
Specialization 
Debates 
Procedure 
Questions 
1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 
Marginal Safe Marginal Safe Marginal Safe Marginal Safe 
(n 26) (n 82) (n 21) (n 74) (n 26) (n 81) (n 23) (n 68) 
% % % % % ., % % I. 
High 7.7 24.4 19.0 22.9 15.4 16.1 13.0 19.2 
Medium 65.4 61.0 57.2 64.9 23.1 43.2 26.1 42.6 
Low 26.9 14.6 23.8 12.2 61.5 40.7 60.9 38.2 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
X2 4.40 df2 X2 1.71 df2 x2 4.48 df2 X2 3.59 df2 
n sign n sign n sign n sign 
Furthermore, the degree of subject specialization also appears to be 
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largely unrelated to the size of electoral majority. The correlation 
coefficients for all procedures are notably weak suggesting that 
Members from electorally vulnerable constituencies are not consistently 
less specialized" in their attention to specific subjects over time 
than their 'electorally safe' colleagues, (debates r 0.06, P.Q.s r -0.08, 
E.D.M.s r -0.10). 
When we turn to consider the extent of the concentration of activity 
upon 'constituency' as a subject, it rapidly becomes apparent that" 
there is only a weak association between this variable and the size of 
a Member's electoral majority. Only in debates in 1972-3 does the 
correlation coefficient appear to be statistically significant (see 
Table 5.16), but this coefficient is artificially high, given the 
presence of three outliers on the scattergram and, as such, exaggerates 
the strength of the association. Thus as an independent variable, 
the size of electoral majority is basically unrelated to the level of 
specialization, or to the extent of 'subject specialization', or even 
to the level of concentration devoted to the subject area of 
'constituency' • What may prove to be a more powerful independent 
variable, therefore, is the perception of electoral vulnerability on 
the part of M.P.s, rather than the crude statistic of the actual size 
of electoral majority. Alan Kornberg has indeed discovered that 
Canadian legislators tend to perceive their constituencies to be 
considerably more competitive than an objective classification would 
suggest. Hence "measures which are based on the legislators' 
perceptions of the degree of competition rather than those employing 
electoral data, are more efficacious in that they are more likely to 
delineate the actual influence of constituency upon legislative 
attitudes and behaviour". (85) In Britain the need for research along 
these lines is strongly felt. 
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TABLE 5.16 Degree of concentration upon constituency correlated 
Session 
1970-1 
1972-3 
with size 
Debates 
(n 108) 
r -0.10 
r2 0.01 
(n 95) 
r 0.18 * 
r2 0.03 
of majority. (Pearson's r). 
Procedure 
Questions 
(n 107) 
r 0.14 
r2 0.02 
(n 9l) 
r 0.01 
r2 0.00 
* 
significant 0.05. 
E.D.M.s 
(n 109) 
r -0:03 
r2 0.00 
(n ) 
One independent variable which has attracted the attention of British 
political scientists in its association with constituency matters in 
the House is the length of parliamentary service. Barker and Rush 
have found that newly elected M.P.s in both major parties, and from 
safe and marginal seats alike, feel the need to "dig themselves in", 
"to establish themselves in their seats ••••• (and to) build up a good 
credit balance of personal and constituency service". (86) Obviously, 
one way for the newly elected Member to achieve this aim is to make 
overt reference to his constituency in his contributions in the House. 
On the basis of this premise it may be hypothesized that the greater 
concentration of activity upon 'constituency' matters will be associated 
more with 'new' than longer serving M.P.s. In practice, however, only 
in activity in debates in 1970-1 is such a significant association to 
be found (r -0.27, r2 0.07, significant at 0.01) undoubtedly the 
number of maiden speeches made in this session, speeches which 
traditionally make reference to the new M.P.s constituency, affects the 
strength of this association. In each of the other procedures less 
than one per cent of the variance between these variables is explained 
by the correlation coefficient. 
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A final observation worthy of note is that the level of activity in 
the area of 'constituency' in the House is significantly related to 
prior service on a local council. (87) This relationship is most 
pronounced in Questions, in both sessions, and in debates in 1970-1 
(see Table 5.17), and indicates that M.P.s with prior experience in 
local government have a slightly greater propensity to mention their 
constituencies in their dealings in the House than their parliamentary 
colleagues who have no previous service on a local council. This 
finding supports previous studies which have already established that 
clear attitudinal differences towards constituency duties, particularly 
towards the 'welfare officer' role, exist between Members according to 
prior experience in local politics. (88) 
TABLE 5.17 
Session 
1970-1 
1972-3 
Conclusion 
Proportion of activity spent on the consideration of 
'constituency' affairs correlated with local 
government service. 
Debates 
(n 108) 
r-
-0.19 * 
r2 0.04 
(n 95) 
r -0.14 
r2 0.02 
* 
significant 0.05 
** 
significant 0.01 
(Pearson's 
Procedure 
Questions 
(n 107) 
r -0.22 
** 
r2 0.05 
(n 91) 
r -0.22 
** 
r2 0.05 
r) • 
E.D.M.s 
(n 109) 
r 0.03 
r2 0.00 
(n ) 
Specialization in the House of Commons, is not the easiest of phenomena 
to analyze, there are, as we have noted, considerable methodological 
problems involved in the collection and the analysis of data on this 
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topic. Nevertheless, we have been able in this chapter to establish 
a profile of specialization for our sample of backbenchers. But this 
profile itself is not without its complexities insofar as it reflects 
the diversity of M.P.s' activities in three formal procedures in the 
House. A single aggregate index of specialization for all three 
procedures cannot reasonably be provided as there is no common unit of 
measurement available to measure 'activity' in each procedure 
activity in Parliamentary Questions is 'unlike' activity in debates, 
and in turn neither form of activity is 'like' that in E.D.M.s. An 
index which assigns equal weightings to contributions in different 
modes of activity is likely, because of the radically different costs 
of participation that each procedure exacts, to produce highly 
misleading results. (89) The profile of backbench specialization has, 
therefore, to be considered separately for each procedure, in order 
that the differing patterns of behaviour, and the different use made 
of each procedure, can be fully appreciated. 
The pattern of activity in the three procedures studied in this 
chapter resembles a series of concentric circles - with activity in 
debates being most specialized for most members, and thus forming 
the inner circle. Encircling debates is the pattern of activity in 
Parliamentary Questions which is generally more diffuse, but still 
moderately specialized. And the outer circle represents activity in 
the signing of Early Day Motions which appears to be generalized, both 
in terms of the width of attention and in the fairly even dispersal 
of activity across subject areas. The profile of activity, as 
reflected in the level of activity, the spread of attention, and the 
depth of specialization, appears furthermore to be relatively consistent 
over time for each Member in the sample. 
The relationships between the level of specialization and the key 
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independent variables identified in this study are moreover complex, 
as both the strength and the direction of the correlations vary from 
one procedure to another. The l~vel of specialization is, however, 
consistently associated with partisan allegiance in the House to 
the extent that there is a weak correlation between high index scores 
and membership of the Parliamentary Labour Party. The level of 
specialization is also positively related to the length of service in 
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the House, as there is a tendency for index scores to increase as the 
length of parliamentary experience increases; indeed in E.D.M.s and 
P.Q.s this relationship is statisticallY significant. In contrast 
the association between the degree of specialization and full-timet 
part-time membership of the House is weak in strength, and inconsistent 
in direction. Only in E.D.M.s is the direction the same, and the 
correlation coefficients statistically significant, in both sessions 
indicating that the level of specialization is generally marginally 
higher for part-timers than full-time Members in this procedure. 
Perhaps the most significant set of findings in this chapter, however, 
are those relating to the level of 'subject specialization' on the 
part of backbenchers. The level of attention paid to anyone subject 
area clearly varies considerably from one session to the next, as only 
in E.D.M.s, and to a lesser extent in P.Q.s, is activity moderately 
'subject specialized'. (And this is due in no small part to the fact 
that because backbench attention is generally focused more thinly and 
widely among subject areas in these procedures, the absolute differences 
in the proportions of activity devoted to each area are likely to be 
concomitantlY small). Thus, in line with our prediction, made in 
Part One, the level of subject specialization appears to be relatively 
low. British backbenchers appea~ indeed, to be unwilling to develop, 
and to display, their expertise in specific subject areas by protracted 
consideration of these areas in successive sessions. What our analysis 
243 
has been unable to establish, however, is whether the failure to 
specialize consistently in the same areas over time is a correlate 
of representative role orientations. Although we hypothesized (on 
the assumptions drawn from existing studies) that the 'styles' and 
'foci' of representation could be dichotomized along party lines, it 
soon became apparent that this split did not adequately reflect 
representational reality. The mix of 'styles' and 'foci' of 
representation within the major parties can only be measured, however, 
by detailed interviews with a large sample of M.P.s an undertaking 
which is beyond the resources of the present study. Future research 
may yet, however, prove (or disprove for that matter) the strength of 
representative role orientations as an independent variable in their 
association with parliamentary specialization. The present study 
has merely assembled the tools of analysis (in the form of the research 
hypothesis, and the measure of specialization), and made an initial 
reconnaissance of the terrain in preparation for further and deeper 
empirical exploration. 
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Chapter 6 
Informal Specialization: Members' Perceptions 
The activities of Members of Parliament at Westminster are not confined 
exclusively, or even necessarily in large part, to those formal 
proceedings of the House studied in Chapter 5. Whilst a measure of 
specialization can be obtained, as Punnett argues, (1) by examining 
Hansard, such a measure obviously is unable to take into account the 
pattern of activity beyond the Chamber. This may not prove to be a 
significant failing, if it is contended that activity in the Chamber 
is a reflection of a Member's concern with particular subjects in 
his general parliamentary activity. Indeed, a leading Conservative 
backbencher advised the author that "the easiest way to discover who 
takes an interest in (a given subject) is either to look up a Hansard 
for a major debate on that issue and see who has spoken, or to note 
who asks Questions about it at Question Time". (2) Other Members, 
however, were less certain that Hansard reveals an accurate profile of 
backbench activity; one northern Labour M.P. clearly asserted that 
"the records of the House Hansard, Order Papers, and so on do 
not accurately reflect the activity of some Members of Parliament". (3) 
In similar vein a Conservative backbencher counselled that "the House 
of Commons is a peculiar place in which some of the most significant 
activities for example, discussion between a group of interested 
Members in the Smoking Room - are completely informal". (4) 
Therefore, to take such considerations into account, a second phase of 
the project, designed to supplement the content analysis of the last 
chapter, sought to elicit the perceptions of M.P.s of their individual 
patterns of specialization and of the general division of labour on 
the backbenches. 
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A short postal surveY was, therefore, sent to all backbenchers in 
September 1975. The questionnaire was a development from a pilot 
survey of ex-backbenchers and serving Members in the spring of that 
year. (5) The questionnaire was sent to all backbenchers; 
Government frontbenchers, including Parliamentary Private Secretaries, 
Opposition Spokesmen, the Speaker and his deputies were all excluded 
from the survey. Of the 453 backbenchers serving in the House in 
September 1975, 161 returned completed questionnaires giving a 
response rate of 35.5%. A further 39 Members (8.6% of all backbenchers) 
returned letters stating that as an "unbreakable rule" they did not 
respond to postal surveys. The reluctance of British M.P.s to answer 
postal questionnaires, a trend which has been particularly marked over 
the last five years, is now an accepted part of research into 
parliamentary behaviour in Britain. The low response rate of the 
present survey, whilst disappointing, nevertheless compares favourably 
with the returns of other surveys. In 1973 Gregory and Alexander 
surveyed 220 backbenchers and received 77 replies, giving a return of 
35%. (6) In 1975 a survey conducted under the auspices of Justice 
from Reading University during the same period as our survey 
obtained a return of 19%. More recently Hall and Higgins, 
(7) 
and Paul Whiteley, (8) in their surveys of opinion on the Labour 
benches in 1976 obtained responses of 32% and 31% respectively. 
Indeed, Whiteley was forced to observe that "it appears that M.P.s are 
becoming over surveyed": a conclusion undoubtedly shared by many 
backbenchers, including one Conservative who told the author that she 
was 'overwhelmed' by as many as eight or nine postal surveys a week, 
many originating from North American educational institutions. (9) 
The respondents to our survey were remarkably representative of the 
total population of backbenchers along the lines of the key variables 
of party and length of parliamentary experience (see Table 6.1). 
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Although the sample is not particularly large and subsequently the 
findings of the survey are far from exhaustive, the results of the 
survey may nevertheless provide a fairly representative insight into 
some of the views on backbench specialization. 
TABLE 6.1 Composition of the House of Commons, and the survey sample, 
by party and length of parliamentary service. 
i). Partl House Backbenchers Sample 
N 
N Excluded N % N % 
Cons 277 54 223 49.2 81 50.3 
Lab 318 124 194 42.8 67 41.6 
Others 39 3 36 8.0 13 8.1 
Vacant 1 1 
635 182 453 100.0 161 100.0 
.--
.. ) 11 • Date of Entrl Partl 
Cons Lab Total (inc1. others) 
House Sample House Sam:ele House Sample 
(n 223) (n 81) (n 194) (n 67) (n 453) (n 161) 
% % % % % %. 
Pre 1964 39.5 30.9 29.4 23.9 32.5 25.5 
1964-66 14.8 17.2 29.4 28.5 21.6 21.1 
1970 19.7 23.5 16.0 17.9 17.4 20.5 
1974 26.0 28.4 25.2 29.9 28.5 32.9 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
X2 3.77 df 3 n sign 
The first question asked of M.P.s was whether in their work in Parliament 
there were any particular subject areas which attracted a majority of 
their interest and activity. (10) At this stage Members were not 
explicitly asked whether they specialized in these areas for fear of 
confusing the concept of 'specialization' with that of 'expertise'. (A 
question designed to discover Members' awareness of this distinction 
was included later in the survey). None of the respondents, however, 
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encountered any difficulty in identifying subjects upon which the 
majority of their attention was concentrated in the House. The 
pattern of the response to this question is outlined in Table 6.2. 
Overall, the profile of specialization on the part of respondents 
reveals a high degree of concentration of activity. Less than one 
in six backbenchers stated that most of their parliamentary activity 
was spread widely across six or more policy areas. While at the 
other extreme only seven per cent of the sample claimed to devote 
most of their attention to one subject area. The single largest 
group of backbenchers stated that they concentrated primarily upon 
two or three issues, and another one-third of M.P.s claimed to devote 
most of their attention to four or five subjects. 
TABLE 6.2 Number of subjects attracting a majority of activity 
and interest per Member cross tabulated with Party. 
No. of Subjects 
1 
2 - 3 
4 - 5 
6 + 
Partl 
Cons Lab 
(n 81) (n 67) 
% % 
7.4 4.5 
55.6 29.9 
28.4 46.2 
8.6 19.4 
100.0 100.0 
X2 20.38 df 6 sign 0.01 
Labour v Conservative 
Others Total 
(n 13) (n 161) 
% % 
15.4 6.8 
23.1 42.2 
23.1 35.5 
38.4 15.5 
100.0 100.0 
X2 12.39 df 3 sign 0.01 
Significant differences in the profile of specialization between 
parties are apparent in Table 6.2. On the one hand there are the 
differences between minor party Members and their major party 
colleagues; most of these differences stem from the fact that a 
greater proportion of third party M.P.s are to be found at both the 
highest and the lowest levels of the table. This paradox is largely 
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explicable by the fact that those minor party Members who claimed to 
devote their attention mainly to one subject area tended to interpret 
'subject area' somewhat more liberally than their major party colleagues. 
Thus one Liberal Member claimed that his specialism was in economic 
affairs, which to his mind "includes Treasury, Industry, Trade, Energy, 
etc". Other minor party M.P.s were, however, more precise in their 
specification of subjects. Yet most of them pointed to their 
paradoxical position in the House, for as one Member of Plaid Cymru 
noted "(our) position ••••• is rather different from that of backbenchers 
in the larger parliamentary parties. With only three M.P.s we have to 
specialize, and we divide policy areas between us". Thus, although 
called upon to specialize, the range of special isms (given the small 
number of Members in each minor party) is generally greater than that 
of M.P.s in the Conservative and Labour parties. 
On the other hand there are also significant differences to be seen in 
Table 6.2 between the profile of specialization in the major parties. 
Conservative backbenchers appear to see themselves as being more highly 
specialized than their Labour counterparts, to the extent that 63% of 
Tory Members claimed to concentrate upon three or fewer subjects, 
whereas about half of this number of Labour respondents (34%) claimed 
to specialize to the same degree. Correspondingly, two-thirds of 
Labour respondents stated that their attention was focused mainly on 
four or more issues, as opposed to just over one-third of Conservatives. 
These differences are borne out in the statistically significant 
correlation between the number of 'specialisms' claimed per Member 
and party allegiance. (11) (r 0.24, r2 0.06, significant at 0.002). 
The positive nature of the correlation indicates that Labour Members 
were generally more inclined to list a greater number of 'specialisms' 
than were Tory respondents. 
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The more specialized profile of activity on the part of Conservative 
respondents does reinforce the finding of Chapter 5 that Tory M.P.s 
in our sample tended to be more 'subject specialized' in their 
deliberations in the House than Labour backbenchers. (12) Furthermore 
the perceptions of M.P.s highlight yet again the inadequacy of the 
hypothesis that Conservative backbenchers would be expected to be less 
specialized than their Socialist counterparts. EA~lanations, other 
than a dichotomization of representative role orientations, have, 
therefore, to be sought for these party differences in the profile of 
specialization. 
One possibility may be, simply, that the responses to this question 
are unrepresentative of the distribution of attitudes in the House as 
a whole. It may be argued that those Conservative backbenchers who 
returned the questionnaire were primarily those cOIIlIllitt.ed to the 
cause of specialization in the Commons. However, if this position 
is adopted, what then needs to be explained is firstly, why 'generalist' 
Tory Members would fail to respond and, secondly, why Labour Members 
with a commitment to specialization would also fail to respond to the 
same questionnaire. Such questions are essentially unanswerable. 
Perhaps a more plausible, though still tendentious, interpretation of 
the findings of Table 6.2 is to be found by reference to Mr. Heath's 
'style' of leadership of the Conservative Party. Heath clearly 
stands out as the exception to the general executive rule of amateurism 
in British Government, in that he was, firstly, more willing to appoint 
backbench 'specialists' to his Opposition Team between 1965-70, and, 
secondly, more prepared to allocate departmental posts in accordance 
with previous opposition duties. Moreover, he initiated fewer 
f f h ' C b' h P' M" (13) reshuf les 0 1S a 1net than most ot er post-war r1me 1n1sters. 
Hence, one consequence of Heath's style of leadership, albeit unpopular 
at the time, may have been to increase the general awareness and 
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acceptance of the need for a division of labour on the part of 
Conservative backbenchers. The fact that the leadership of the 
Labour party has never been renowned, either under Wilson or Callaghan, 
for its active promotion of the norm of specialization may account 
for the differences between the backbenchers of the two main parties. 
Indeed, two Labour Members in interview both confirmed the absence 
of a commitment to specialization on the part of the Labour leadership. 
One openly spoke of "the amateur norms of the executive" and went on 
to argue that "Ministers don't want expert, specialized backbenchers 
as they make life difficult". When asked what skills Labour Ministers 
required to hold office he replied: "At the moment Ministers require 
managerial competence in their departments, and they like their 
backbenchers to be enthusiastic amateurs so as not to criticize their 
own ignorance of their briefs". (14) A supportive view came from 
a newly promoted P.P.S. who noted that there were considerable 
advantages to the Government in "keeping backbenchers unspecialized". 
He further believed that there was "a strong desire by the Government 
to keep backbenchers amateurs". (15) Hence the contrasting styles 
of leadership between the two major parties may provide a valuable 
insight into the differing development of backbench perceptions 
towards specialization. Indeed, the whole question of the 'philosophy 
of the executive' and its impact on the 'norms' of the Commons provides 
another area in need of primary research in Britain. 
Perceptions of specialization on the backbenches 
That the majority of backbenchers in the survey regard themselves as 
specialists in particular subject areas is apparent from the discussion 
thus far. However, there is no indication as to whether the same 
M.P.s regard other backbenchers to be specialists. Therefore, to see 
how far respondents believed specialization to be a common phenomenon 
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in the House they were asked to specify whether "most/quite a lot/not 
very many or very few" backbenchers concentrated their attention upon 
a few issues. Only six backbenchers felt unable to make such a 
judgement; the remainder (n 155) answered in the manner outlined in 
Table 6.3. 
TABLE 6.3 Extent of backbench specialization: responses analysed 
by party. 
Extent of backbench 
specialization Party 
Cons Lab Others Total 
, 
(n 81) (n 63) (n 11) (n 155) 
% % % % 
Most specialize 45.7 30.2 27.3 38.1 
Quite a lot 48.1 60.3 45.4 52.9 
Not very many 6.2 3.2 27.3 6.5 
Very few 0.0 6.3 0.0 2.5 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Lab v Cons X2 3.31 df2 n sign 
Members in the survey obviously perceived specialization to be a 
widespread strategy adopted by their parliamentary colleagues. 
Over one-third of respondents believed that most backbenchers 
specialized in particular areas. Conservative M.P.s were particularly 
inclined to see most of their colleagues as specialists. Labour M. P • s 
on the other hand were more reserved in their judgement on this issue, 
with 60% of Labour respondents claiming that quite a lot of Members 
specialized. However, the lowest estimate of the degree of 
specialization came from minor party Members, with over one-quarter 
believing that not very many backbenchers specialized. 
While the differences in the estimation of backbench specialization 
between the two major parties are not statistically significant they 
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are once again suggestive of a greater Conservative attribution of 
specialization in the House, both individually and collectively, than 
is the case in the Labour party. 
Parliamentary Time expended on 'specialisms' 
Having established that the majority of respondents saw themselves as 
being relatively specialized in their "interest and activity" in the 
House, a check was then made to discover whether activity on these 
specialisms occupied the majority of the respondent's parliamentary 
time. Surprisingly, perhaps, only five backbenchers were unwilling, 
or unable, to quantify the amount of time spent on their stated 
'specialisms'. What soon becomes apparent from the answers of the 
remaining Members is the substantial amount of time backbenchers 
spend in the consideration of a narrow range of issues~ Of those M.P.s 
claiming to specialize exclusively on one subject, 30% said that they 
spent approximately one-third of their time in the House on that 
subject; 40% spent around one-half, 20% around two thirds, and one 
Labour M.P. claimed to spend over three-quarters of his time on the 
subject of 'housing'. 
Table 6.4 sets out the responses of the Members focusing primarily upon 
two to five subject areas. Fully 60% of respondents in each of the 
two major parties claimed to spend at least around one-half of their 
parliamentary time on their specialisms. Approximately one backbencher 
in three in these parties indicated that two-thirds or more of their 
time was taken up in dealing with between two to five issue areas. 
Notably, no significant differences are to be found between the two 
major parties "in this table (X2 3.67 df 4 not significant). 
TABLE 6.4/ 
259 
TABLE 6.4 Parliamentary time devoted to specialisrns (2-5) 
crosstabu1ated with party. 
Time sEent on 
2-5 subjects Party 
Cons Lab Other Total 
(n 65) (n 49) (n 6) (n 120) 
% % % % 
One quarter 13.8 14.3 0.0 13.3 
One third 26.2 24.5 16.7 25.0 
One half 27.7 30.6 33.3 29.2 
Two thirds 23.1 12.2 33.3 19.2 
Three quarters 9.2 18.4 16.7 13.3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Of those Members claiming to be interested in more than five subjects 
64% (n 16) stated that their attention was indeed spread widely and 
evenly over a wide span of issues. One Labour M.P. justified his 
, 
lack of specialization thus: . "Most M.P.s have to decide, it is said, 
at some time in their membership whether to be a 'generalist' or a 
'specialist' and most, it is said, come down for the latter. I am 
resisting this 'pattern' (if it is one) and trying to avoid being 
'type-cast' ". (Labour M.P., 1964). 36%, however, argued that 
although their 'spread' of interest was fairly wide they, nevertheless, 
concentrated upon certain issues. This concentration could either 
take the form: "I spread my activities in the House over the subjects 
(urban deprivation, community work, youth work, unemployment, social 
services, rights of the individual, education) and try and concentrate 
on all of them according to what is a current problem" (Conservative 
M.P., 1974), or alternatively: "of my main subjects (six listed) I 
concentrate basically on finance and taxation" (Conservative M.P., 1974). 
Nevertheless, such Members be they 'generalists' or 'quasi-specialists', 
were far outnumbered by Members claiming to concentrate narrowly in 
their parliamentary activity. 
260 
Members were next asked to specify the areas in which they were 
particularly active. The answers were used to check the responses to 
the earlier question "how many subjects attract a majority of activity 
and interest?" and also to reveal any intra-party differences in the 
focus of concentration. As was to be anticipated from the findings 
of Chapter 5, Conservative respondents mentioned 'agriculture', 'defence'. 
'foreign affairs' and 'law and order' as the area of their special isms 
more frequently than Labour Members. Labour backbenchers in turn 
focused more upon 'education', 'housing', 'power', 'transport' and 
'welfare' • However, only in the fields of 'agriculture' and 'housing' 
were the differences in the proportions between the two parties 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. (See Table 6.5). 
Source of subject special isms 
To discover why backbenchers concentrated upon specific issues, each 
M.P. was asked to state the reasons for his original interest in a 
particular subject. Four broad categories of 'interest' were 
suggested 'personal', 'constituency', 'parliamentary' and 'party' 
as possible sources of specialization. These categories were 
formulated on the basis of published American studies (16) and from 
a study of speeches in Hansard in 1970-1. Members, by convention, 
state their 'interest' in a particular topic in preface to their 
contribution on the floor of the House. Perhaps the most common 
source of interest is personal, occupational experience of a subject. 
A clear expression to this effect came from James Hill in July 1970: 
"As I believe that in a maiden speech one's interescs should be stated 
may I state my three loves. The first two will be housing and 
planning, due to my years as Chairman of the Southampton Housing 
Committee and being my profession. The third will be aviation due to 
my 11 years service with B.O.A.C. as an aircrew member ••••• those are 
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TABLE 6.5 Subject area of stated specia1isms by Party (Cons and Labour) 
Subject Party 
Agriculture * 
Aid 
Air 
Animals 
Arts 
Civil Service 
Constituency 
Metric 
Defence 
Economy 
Education 
Environment 
Employment 
Europe 
Foreign 
House of Commons 
Homes * 
Health 
Industry 
Law and Order 
Legal 
Local Government 
Media 
Northern Ireland 
Post Office 
Ports 
Power 
Race 
Regions 
Science & Tech. 
Scottish Affairs 
Sports 
Transport 
Welsh Affairs 
Welfare 
* significant 0.05 
Cons 
n of ~ total 
mentions mentions 
(n 248) 
21 8.5 
2 0.8 
9 3.6 
o 
1 
1 
1 
o 
21 
19 
10 
7 
14 
8 
22 
1 
13 
6 
30 
14 
3 
6 
3 
2 
1 
1 
4 
o 
1 
5 
5 
1 
6 
1 
9 
0.0 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.0 
8.6 
7.7 
4.0 
2.8 
5.7 
3.2 
8.9 
0.4 
5.2 
2.4 
12.1 
5.7 
1.2 
2.4 
1.2 
0.8 
0.4 
0.4 
1.6 
0.0 
0.4 
2.0 
2.0 
0.4 
2.4 
0.4 
3.6 
100.0 
Lab 
n of -% total 
mentions mentions 
(n 263) 
10 3.8 
6 2.3 
5 1.9 
2 
2 
1 
3 
o 
13 
13 
17 
5 
13 
10 
18 
4 
26 
10 
32 
7 
5 
9 
5 
1 
1 
2 
6 
o 
5 
1 
4 
o 
11 
1 
15 
0.8 
0.8 
0.4 
1.1 
0.0 
4.9 
4.9 
6.5 
1.9 
4.9 
3.8 
6.8 ' 
1.5 
9.9 
3.8 
12.2 
2.7 
1.9 
3.4 
1.9 
0.4 
0.4 
0.8 
2.3 
0.0 
1.9 
0.4 
1.5 
0.0 
4.2 
0.4 
5.6 
100.0 
Total 
n of % total 
mentions mentions 
(n 511) 
31 6.1 
8 1.6 
14 2.7 
2 
3 
2 
4 
o 
34 
32 
27 
12 
27 
18 
40 
5 
39 
16 
62 
21 
8 
15 
8 
3 
2 
3 
10 
o 
6 
6 
9 
1 
17 
2 
24 
0.4 
0.6 
0.4 
0.8 
0.0 
6.7 
6.3 
5.3 
2.3 
5.3 
3.5 
7.8 
0.9 
7.6 
3.1 
12.1 
4.1 
1.6 
2.9 
1.6 
0.6 
0.4 
0.6 
2.0 
0.0 
1.2 
1.2 
1.8 
0.2 
3.3 
0.4 
5.0 
100.0 
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the things in which I am interested and in respect of which I hope I 
can be an asset to the House". (17) Similarly, Christopher Tugendhat 
cautioned the House, when speaking in the debate on the Second Reading 
of the Industry Bill, "I may be biased in my view because I wrote 
about it (industry) for many years as a journalist for the Financial 
Times" • (18) 
In addition, 'personal' interest in a subject may stem from 
entreprenueria1 concern, as was the case of John Wells' intervention 
in the debate on horticulture in December 1970: "Here I speak from the 
heart. I have a small commercial greenhouse in Kent". However, 
financial interest in a topic llnder debate is not always clearly 
indicated. Harold Walker, for example, felt obliged to interrupt 
Peter Mills' (a farmer with 230 acres in West Devon) speech on 
agricultural support prices and import duties to enquire: "Is it not 
a convention of the House that hone Members with an interest in the 
subject under debate declare their interest?". (19) When financial 
interest is declared it may, on occasion, be intertwined with other 
concerns. Thus John Osborn intervened in the debate on the steel 
industry in May 1971 "with some, trepidition" as his financial interest 
in the private sector of the steel industry was claimed to put him in 
competition with the public sector. However, he went on to state 
"my interest lies in the steel industry and my constituency is 
concerned with the public and private sectors". (20) 
On the other side of industry 'personal' interest in a subject may stem 
from membership of a trade union or professional organization. Walter 
Padley's unconditional opposition to the Shops (Weekday Trading) Bill 
was directly linked to "a lifetime association with the Union of Shop, 
Distributive and Allied Workers. I have had 21 years service as a 
sponsored Member of that Union in this House and 16 years as the 
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national President of the Union". (21) . 
Finally a miscellany of 'personal' reasons may stimulate an interest in 
a particular topic. Membership of a quasi-governmental, or quasi 
non-governmental body may promote an interest in a subject; take, for 
example, John Wells' interest in inland waterways which arose from his 
(22) membership of the advisory council of the tnland Waterways Board. 
Interventions in debate can, however, arise from more obscure sources 
of 'personal' interest such as childhood memories, (23) or even 
through matrimonial links. (24) 
When the responses of Members to the 1975 survey are analyzed it 
should come as no surprise, therefore, to find that 95% of backbenchers 
(Le. 152 of the 160 who responded to this question) stated that. their 
interest in at least one of their specialisms arose from 'personal' 
factors. 97% of Conservatives and 94% of Labour Members answered 
in this way, as opposed to 85% of 'other' Members. The second most 
commonly stated reason for interest in a specific issue was constituency 
'interest' • In total 73% of respondents claimed that one or more of 
their specialisms was a subject of importance to their constituents. 
However, the proportion of Labour Members listing constituency 
'interest' as a source of their specialization was significantly 
higher than in the Conservative party. (See Table 6.6). Hence, 
the party differences observed in Chapter 5, between the propensity of 
Members to mention their locality in the House, are mirrored by 
differences in the perceived importance of 'constituency' subjects as 
a stimulus to subject specialization: with Labour Members being more 
constituency oriented than their Tory colleagues. 
TABLE 6.6/ 
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TABLE 6.6 Source of subject specialisms by party 
Source of 
original interest Partl 
Cons Lab Others Total 
(n 80) (n 67) (n 13) (n 160) 
% % % % 
Personal 97.5 94.0 84.6 95.0 
constituency 61.3 89.4 
** 61.5 73.0 
Parliamentary 17 .5 28.4 * 0.0 20.6 
Party 26.5 31.3 76.9 32.5 
* 
significant 0.05 
** 
significant 0.01 
( (a) % in each column totals more than 100% due to respondents 
specifying more than one source of interest). 
The third category in Table 6.6 that of 'parliamentary' stimulus of 
interest, also reveals significant differences between Labour and 
Conservative respondents. Generally discussion in the House is a 
minor source in prompting subject specialization, but even so, a 
greater proportion of Labour Members claimed that interest in at 
least one of their specialisms originated in the House. Typical of 
Labour responses was that of one M.P., widely regarded by his fellow 
backbenchers as an expert on defence matters, who argued that his 
interest in this area had been aroused through discussions in 
Parliament as he had "never (been) much involved with it before 
election". (Labour M.P., 1974). 
Labour Members were, in addition, more likely to cite the importance 
of a subject to their party as a source of their specialisms than 
Conservative backbenchers. However, the choice of specialism in 
accordance with 'party' considerations was essentially the preserve 
of minor party Members. The delegation of 'party spokesman' duties 
to M.P.s of the minor parties prompts these Members to specialize in 
(a) 
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areas assigned by the party. In this manner over three-quarters of 
third party respondents claimed that their specialization in a 
particular area was prompted by party factors. 
Expertise and Specialization 
In Chapter 2 it was observed that one normal consequence of 
specialization is the development of expertise, whereby, through a 
division of labour, certain members of the organization gain knowledge 
in one area of its dealings, the possession of which places them in a 
position of power over other members without such knowledge. However, 
it may be questioned whether specialization makes for expertise in 
legislative assemblies or expertise makes for specialization. For it 
is possible to separate the notions of 'division of labour' and 
'expert knowledge' in representative bodies. Firstly~ it is quite 
plausible for an M.P. in the Commons to be an expert on a given 
subject say, through his professional involvement in that area 
prior to entering the House yet for him to concentrate his 
parliamentary attention upon a totally different area. A second 
possibility, noted in Chapter 5, is for a Member to specialize (i.e. 
concentrate his activity) on a particular topic in each session; but 
for the topic to change in each successive session. In this way, 
whilst the M.P. 'specializes' for short periods, expertise is not 
developed in any particular area. Thirdly, expertise and' 
specialization may be mutually reinforcing in a Member's parliamentary 
activity, in which case the 'expert' recruit to Parliament concentrates 
his attention upon the issue on which he is already knowledgeable, or 
alternatively a Member, through prolonged concentration upon a topic, 
develops a detailed understanding of that subject. 
The fact that expertise may not always be a concomitant of parliamentary 
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specialization was recognized by the participants at the Granada 
dinners, Anthony King noted that one Labour M.P. "made the point that 
it is possible for someone to be something of an expert in a particular 
field without confining himself to that field exclusively. He 
insisted that, while the specialist/generalist dichotomy may be a 
real one, the expert/generalist dichotomy is not". This Member 
proceeded to cite Frank Allaun as one example of this case: 
"Frank Allaun has a mighty range of interests. 
It just so happens that the one he's best known 
for is housing; and, if I had a question that I 
wanted to raise on housing, who would I go to, 
straight away, but Frank Allaun? But to 
suggest, if anybody is suggesting, that Frank 
Allaun is dealing with housing to the exclusion 
of everything else ••••• that just isn't true" •. (25) 
To test whether M.P.s generally were (a) willing to make this 
distinction between expertise and specialization, and (b) considered 
themselves to be expert in some field other than those they 
concentrated upon in the House, each respondent was asked: "Do you 
regard yourself to be an expert in any particular subject, as distinct 
from specializing in it in your parliamentary activity?" Only three 
Members felt unable to answer the question and of the remainder very 
few questioned the term 'expert'. Comments such as: "Expert is a 
bit strong! but yes it approximates to my position on law" 
(Conservative M.P. t 1961), or more cynically: "being an 'expert' in 
politics usually means being immune to new ideas!" (S.N.P. H.P., 1974) 
were exceptional. Exactly two-thirds (n 53) of Conservative 
respondents claimed expertise in fields other than their parliamentary 
specia1ism~ while 63% (n 41) of Labour and 62% (n 8) of 'other' M.P.s 
answered in this manner. Most of these respondents listed their 
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occupational experiences outside Parliament as the source of their 
expertise; experience which was not utilized significantly in their 
work in the House. The fact that so many Members made this distinction 
is of considerable importance in analyzing the answers to the next set 
of questions. 
Each backbencher was asked three related questions: 
i). Would you say that you are an expert in the subject area(s) 
you listed in answer to question two? 
H) • Why do you regard yourself as expert in this {these subject(s)? 
Hi) . Could you name five or six backbench Members of the House 
whom you consider to be expert in particular subject fields? 
These questions replicate those used in a series of American studies, 
originating with Buchanmet 'aI's survey of state legislators in 
1960. (26) These American surveys, however, tend to treat 'expertise' 
and 'specialization' synonymously. Thus the original question used 
by Buchanan "to examine the extent and character of 'specialization'" 
(my emphasis) was: "Is there any particular subject or field of 
legislation in which you consider yourself particularly expert I 
mean when it comes to dealing with proposed legislation in that 
field?" (27) In the British context, where formal specialization is 
not so pronounced, and where expertise is not always associated with 
legislative specialization (as the answers to the preceding question 
illustrate); Buchanan's original query may have produced ambiguous 
responses. Nevertheless, 73% (n 116) of British respondents considered 
themselves to be expert upon at least one of their specialisms. This 
figure compares favourably with the 83% of Buchanan's state 
legislators who saw themselves as experts. The Scottish Labour M.P. 
who stated: "'expert' is an extreme description. I would prefer to 
268 
say that on 'housing' I can speak with authority, and on 'defence' 
that I have done my homework", was in a minority. Though it should 
be noted that several of the 44 Members who stated that they did not 
consider themselves to be expert also questioned the notion of 
expertise generally. One established Labour backbencher was adamant 
that: "I've yet to meet an expert" and another Labour M.P., recruited 
in 1964, answered "No sir as Charles Chaplin says about humanity 
we are all only amateurs! No sir (I would) not even (call myself) 
an expert on agitation which I would aspire to be!!" 
Of the 116 backbenchers claiming to be experts, proportionately more 
Conservative M.P.s, 75% (n 61), than Labour, 71% (n 47), or 'other' 
Members, 62% (n 8), regarded themselves as experts in the areas of 
their stated specialisms. Some of the reasons stated by Members for 
regarding themselves as expert were on occasion opaque:, "because the 
media kindly tells me so" (Liberal M.P., 1966), or: "because of the 
results I achieve" (Labour M.P., 1950), and in one instance positively 
tautological: "because I know a lot about it" (Conservative M.P., 1970). 
However, with such exceptions, most responses fall into six general 
categories (see Table 6.7). 
The importance of extra-parliamentary occupation as a foundation for 
expertise in the House is apparent in Table 6.7; with over half of 
Labour and Conservative respondents claiming expertise based on 
professional knowledge. Typical of such responses were: 
"My interest in coal mining is because I was a 
coal miner (with certificates, etc)." (Labour M.P., 1964). 
"Law and legal matters as I am a barrister". 
(Labour M.P., 1964). 
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TABLE 6.7 Stated reasons for expertise by party 
Stated Reason 
Personal experience 
Occupation/Profession 
Study/Academic Training 
Visits 
Parliamentary Experience 
Writing 
Cons 
(n 91) 
% 
25.3 
59.3 
8.8 
3.3 
3.3 
0.0 
100.0 
Party 
(No. of Responses) 
Lab Other 
(n 82) (n 11) 
% % 
39.0 27.2 
51.3 45.5 
7.3 18.2 
1.2 0.0 
1.2 0.0 
0.0 9.1 
100.0 100.0 
Total 
(n 184) 
% 
31.5 
54.9 
8.7 
2.2 
2.2 
0.5 
100.0 
(a) Respondents could name more than one field in which they 
considered themselves expert hence total n. of responses 
is greater than total number of respondents. 
The second main source of expertise was 'personal experience'. For 
example, one Conservative M.P. with a stated specialism in 'arts and 
national heritage' claimed expertise in this subject because "since 
schooldays I have gathered experience and knowledge" (Conservative 
M.P., 1957). Another Member wrote that his knowledge of Northern 
Ireland affairs stemmed from the fact that "I was born in it and have 
lived most of my life in it". 
Research and formal educational qualifications in a subject area made 
up a further 9% of responses. Visits to foreign countries, 
particularly Africa and the Middle East led a number of backbenchers 
to claim expertise in the affairs of these countries. But what is 
(a) 
particularly striking in Table 6.7 is the small percentage of responses 
citing 'parliamentary experience' as a source of expertise. One of 
the few M.P.s whose expertise arose in this way was a Conservative 
backbencher, elected in 1964: 
"I am an expert because I have specialized in it. 
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(subject) for two years. I chair the party 
committee and have built up extensive contacts 
with representative organizations". 
Another Conservative backbencher, elected in 1950, cited his 
chairmanship of a select committee in the House as one, but not the 
sole, reason for his expertise in a particular area. The fact that 
so few Members mentioned 'parliamentary experience' as a foundation of 
expertise is undoubtedly a reflection of the underdevelopment of formal 
specialization, and its accompanying normative system, in the House of 
Commons. In Buchanan's survey of U.S. state legislators 18% of 
responses attributed expertise to "information or interest acquired 
as a result of experience as a committee member or a legislative 
investigator". (28) Unfortunately, the different usage of the 
terms 'expert' and 'specialist' employed in the two studies does not 
allow for direct comparison'of these results. Nevertheless, they 
are perhaps symptomatic of a deep divergence of opinion as to the 
significance of formal specialization between the two polities an 
issue which will be developed in Chapter 8. 
However, turning to the third of the related questions ("Could you 
name five or six backbench Members of the House whom you consider to 
be expert in particular subject fields?"), 80% (n 129) of British 
respondents stated that they could do so, 8% (n 13) said they could not 
and the remainder 12% (n 19) felt unable to answer. Of the M.P.s 
answering the Question, more Conservatives (44%, n 64) than Labour 
backbenchers (36%, n 54) were willing to name one or more Members as 
experts in some substantive fie1d~ Unlike the original American 
survey, in which representatives were asked to state the names and 
fields of their nominated experts (91% did so), British M.P.s were not 
explicitly asked to do so; nevertheless, 52% of Labour and Conservative 
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respondents did provide a list of experts and their fields of expertise. 
Whilst these nominations closely reflected party divisions, with Labour 
Members normally naming Labour 'experts' and Conservatives nominating 
Tories, there was notable cross-party accord on certain experts. So 
that 15 of the 165 nominations for experts on the Labour benches came 
from Conservatives and 8 of the 130 nominations for Tories came from 
Labour Members. The dispersion of experts amongst the subject areas 
is recorded in Table 6.8. Significant differences, between the 
proportion of nominations per subject area, are observable between the 
two parties. The percentage of Conservative nominations of eA~erts in 
the areas of 'aviation', 'local government', 'law and order', and 
particularly 'economics', was significantly greater than in the Labour 
party. Labour backbenchers, on the other hand, gave a greater 
percentage of their nominations to experts in the areas of 'power' 
and 'housing'. Hence, the distinctive patterns of 'interest' in 
varJing subject areas between the two major parties is once again 
apparent. 
In certain subject fields there appears to exist a degree of consensus 
upon the recognized party expert in that area. Thus, for example, of 
the six Tory nominations in the field of 'aviation' five went to 
Norman Tebbit. All four nominations on the subject of 'the arts' in 
the Conservative party went to Robert Cooke. Similarly all eight 
nominations on 'education' went to Dr. Rhodes Boyson. However, in the 
field of 'economics' a group of acknowledged experts was apparent on 
the Tory backbenches. John Biffen, Nigel Lawson, Nicholas Ridley 
claimed eight, six and five nominations respectively. But most 
nominated of all was Peter Rees with twelve nominations for his 
knowledge on taxation. Other highly nominated Conservatives included 
Peter Mills (agriculture), Timothy Renton (trade), and Michael Latham 
(housing). 
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TABLE 6.8 Fields of expertise: nominations of experts by 
subject area (Conservative and Labour) 
Subject 
Agriculture 
Aid 
Aviation* 
Animals 
Arts 
Civil Service 
Constituency 
Decimals & Metric 
Defence 
Economy *** 
Education 
Environment 
Employment 
E.E.C. 
Foreign 
House of Commons 
Housing ** 
Health 
Industry 
Law * 
Legal 
Local Government * 
Media 
Northern Ireland 
Posts 
Ports 
Power * 
Race 
Science & Tech. 
Scotland 
Sports 
Transport 
Welsh Affairs 
Welfare 
Cons 
n n % 
M.Ps Nomin Nomin 
3 5 3.9 
1 1 0.8 
2 6 4.6 
o 0 0.0 
1 4 3.1 
o 0 0.0 
o 0 0.0 
o 0 0.0 
3 S 3.9 
10 39 30.0 
1 8 6.2 
o 0 0.0 
3 3 2.3 
8 10 7.7 
3 4 3.1 
o 0 0.0 
6 8 6.2 
1 1 0.8 
6 9 6.9 
5 5 3.9 
o 0 0.0 
5 7 5.4 
o 0 0.0 
o 0 0.0 
o 0 0.0 
o 0 0.0 
2 2 1.5 
o 0 0.0 
4 4 3.1 
1 1 0.8 
Party 
Lab 
n n % 
M.Ps Nomin Nomin 
4 6 3.6 
2 2 1.2 
1 1 0.6 
o 0 0.0 
3 5 3.0 
1 3 1.8 
o 0 0.0 
o 0 0.0 
5 10 6.1 
5 9 5.5 
3 6 3.6 
o 0 0.0 
5 5 3.0 
5 6' 3.6 
9 9 5.5 
1 6 3.6 
9 33 20.0 
4 4 2.4 
5 8 4.8 
o 0 0.0 
2 3 1.8 
2 2 1.2 
3 8 4.9 
1 1 0.6 
o 0 0.0 
o 0 0.0 
3 10 6.1 
1 1 0.6 
1 5 3.0 
2 3 1.8 
Total 
n n % 
M.Ps Nomin Nomin 
7 11 3.7 
3 3 1.0 
3 7 2.4 
o 0 0.0 
4 9 3.1 
1 3 1.0 
o 0 0.0 
o 0 0.0 
8 15 5.1 
15 48 16.3 
4 14 4.7 
o 0 0.0 
8 8 2.7 
13 16 5.4 
12 13 2.0 
16 2.0' 
15 41 13.~ 
5 5 1. 7 
11 17 5.8 
5 5 1.7 
2 3 1.0 
7 9 3.1 
3 8 2.7 
1 1 0.3 
o 0 0.0 
o 0 0.0 
5 12 4.1 
1 1 O. ~ 
5 9 3.1 
3 4 l.~ 
o 
o 
o 
6 
o 0.0 0 o 
3 
o 
0.0 0 o O.C 
o 0.0 1 
o 0.0 0 
8 6.2 4 
71 130 100.0 82 
16 
165 
1.8 1 3 1.C 
0.0 0 o O.C 
9.5 10 24 8.1 
100.0 153 295 100. C 
* signO.OS .... sign 0.01 *** sign 0.001. 
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On the Labour backbenches Frank Allaun on housing (16 nominations) and 
Jack AShley on disablement and welfare matters (12 nominations) were the 
most visible experts in their respective fields. John Roper was 
nominated 5 times for his knowledge of E.E.C. matters and Colin Phipps 
was the acknowledged Labour expert on the oil industry (7 nominations). 
In the area of science and technology Arthur Palmer was the leading 
expert (5 nominations), whilst J.P. Mackintosh was the undisputed 
expert on either side of the House on 'constitutional' issues, receiving 
3 nominations each from both parties. Several other Members were 
regarded by their Labour colleagues as 'expert' in more than one 
field; Robin Cook received nominations in the areas of defence 
and 'housing, George Cunningham in social security and 'housing 
and Tam Da1yel1 in Scottish affairs, defence and foreign affairs. 
Following on from the identification of expertise an attempt was made 
to establish the extent to which informal backbench channels for the 
dissemination of such knowledge existed. Members were, therefore, 
asked whether they would consult any other backbencher for advice on 
a subject with which they were personally unfamiliar. 997. (n 159) 
readily acknowledged that they would and did. Answers to this question 
were riddled with such comments as "of course", "frequently", 
"naturally" and "all the time". Turning the question about, M.P.s 
were then asked whether other backbenchers consulted them on those 
specific areas in which they claimed to specialize. In reply 967. 
(n 154) of respondents claimed that they were approached in this way. 
Perhaps, not surprisingly an association between ,a positive answer to 
this question and length of service in the House was found: a 
significant negative correlation (r -0.16, r2 0.03, significant at 0.02), 
indicates that those Members not consulted by other backbenchers tended 
to be newly elected M.P.s. On the other hand, one established Labour 
Member, who regarded himself, and was regarded by some of his colleagues 
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to be,an expert in foreign affairs complained that he was consulted 
"frequently. In fact, too frequently!!". Although the possibility 
exists that some M.P.s in answering this question may have inflated 
their own importance as dispensers of specialist knowledge, there does, 
nevertheless, appear to be strong networks for the transmission of 
advice within each party. These channels of communication appear to 
transcend factional lines within parties, and even party boundaries 
themselves. This point was made on several occasions by Members in 
interview, one newly elected Labour Member revealed that he had 
cross-party contacts on the subject of animal welfare. Another 
Labour Member stated that he had received considerable private support 
and advice from Conservative Members on a matter of legal reform, even 
though they indicated that they would not be able to support him in 
public. However, another Labour backbencher, a former Minister, whilst 
acknowledging his own cross-party contacts did point to, the existence 
of "competing groups of speCialists in our (Labour) party. Take 
economic affairs, here there are a number of specialist cliques ranged 
along the ideological spectrum. Members have then to choos-.e which 
. f . . h " var1ety 0 econom1C adv1ce t ey want • (29) 
To see how important 'ideology' was in influencing the choice of 
specialist advice Members were, therefore, asked: "In seeking such 
advice (on an unfamiliar subject) would the ideological 'position' of 
the backbencher be more important than his expertise on the subject?". 
The responses are outlined in Table 6.9 • 
. 'lhe overwhelming majority of Members in the survey clearly indicated 
that their paramount consideration in seeking advice was the expertise 
of the Member rather than his ideological stance. The importance 
of expertise over ideology was more pronounced amongst Conservatives 
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than amongst their Labour colleagues. Correspondingly, greater 
emphasis was placed upon ideological considerations in the Labour ranks. 
But, even then, just under three-quarters of Labour respondents believed" 
expert knowledge to be of greater importance than ideological 
inc lina tions • 
TABLE 6.9 Ideological position v expertise in seeking advice 
Ideological position 
More important 
Less important 
Both important 
Specialization over time 
Cons 
(n 80) 
% 
3.7 
87.5 
8.8 
100.0 
X2 5.34 
Partx 
Lab Total (incl. 'others') 
(n 66) (n 159) 
% % 
10.6 7.5 
72.7 79.9 
16.7 12.6 
100.0 100.0 
df 2 sign 0.1 
It was observed in Chapter 5 that M.P.s' levels of specialization in 
their parliamentary activity tended to be consistent over time; in that 
a high degree of concentration of activity in one session was normally 
associated with a high concentration in the next. The degree of 
'subject specialization' was, however, found to be fairly limited. 
To see, therefore, whether this pattern reflected the nature of subject 
specialization generally, M.P.s were asked two related questions on 
this issue: 
a). Are the subjects in which you are particularly active now the 
same subjects you concentrated upon in your first session in 
Parliament? 
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b). Has there been any significant change in your interest in 
certain areas since you first entered Parliament? 
In answer to the first question 77% of respondents claimed that the 
subjects they focused upon in 1975 were the same as those they were 
particularly interested in when they first entered the House. (See 
Table 6.10). Longer serving Members, not unnaturally, perceived a 
greater change than their 'newer' colleagues. A positive relationship 
between length of service and change of special isms is apparent 
(r 0.17, r2 0.03, significant at 0.02). This association is not, 
however, so evident in the responses to the second question. Over 
one-third of all respondents noted a significant change in their 
interests in the House, with newly elected backbenchers as likely to 
claim a change of interests as their older colleagues ( r 0.08, r2 0.01, 
not significant). Conservative responden~ saw less of a change in 
their interests than either'Labour or third party M.P.s (30% of Tories 
answered 'yes' compared with 43% of Labour and 46% of 'other' 
respondents). It is notable, however, that when responses are 
analyzed in terms of 'parliamentary generations' it is the 1964/66 
cohort which claimed a greater change of interest. (30) 
Quite why the 1960's cohort should answer in this manner is not 
readily apparent. Indeed, the general 'reformist' reputation of 
this generation might have led one to expect that this group, more 
than any other, would have deepened their knowledge in certain subject 
areas by focusing consistently upon them over the years. However, it 
may be misleading to link 'reformism', and support for the development 
of services and facilities in the House, with specialization, in as 
much as a Member may support the improvement of facilities yet still 
adopt a generalist approach. 
. ~. 
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TABLE 6.10 Change of interest in Parliament over time 
cross tabulated with parliamentary generations 
a). Specia1isms 
b). 
same as in 
first session 
Yes 
No 
Significant 
chan~e of 
interests 
Yes 
No 
Pre 1964 
(n 41) 
i. 
75.6 
24.4 
100.0 
X2 9.69 df 3 
Pre 1964 
(n 41) 
% 
34.1 
65.9 
100.0 
X2 6.85 df 3 
Procedures and Special isms 
Par1iamentarl Generations 
1964/66 1970 1974 
(n 34) (n 33) (n 53) 
% % % 
58.8 81.8 86.8 
41.2 18.2 13.2 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
sign 0.05 
Par1iamentarl Generations 
1964/66 1970 1974 
(n 34) (n 33) (n 53) 
i. i. i. 
55.9 27.3 34.0 
44.1 72.7 66.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
sign 0.1 
One final question, which leads onto the consideration of formal 
All 
(n 161) 
'" 10
77 .0 
23.0 
100.0 
A11 
(n 161) 
i. 
37.3 
62.7 
100.0 
specialization, was included in the survey to establish whether some 
procedures of the House were ~~re favoured by backbenchers than others 
in the pursuit of their specia1isms. To this end, Members were 
asked to rank, in order of preference, the procedures they personally 
found to be of most use for raising an issue in the House. Four 
procedures, all of which allowed for individual backbench initiative, 
were suggested in the question. However, respondents widened the 
original choice from Questions, Early Day Motions, Adjournment debates 
and backbench party committees to include 'debates' generally, formal 
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committees of the House and informal modes of activity such as letters 
to Ministers and communications in the national press. The ranking 
of these 'procedures' is set out in Table 6.11. 
TABLE 6.11 Preferences for procedures in pursuing special isms 
in the House of Commons 
Procedure Preference 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
(n 157) (n 154) (n 123) (n 89) 
% % % % 
Questions 43.3 31.8 18.8 9.0 
Backbench Committees 27.4 29.2 21.2 20.2 
Debates 6.4 20.2 27.6 24.7 
Direct contact with 
Ministers 10.8 9.2 2.4 7.9 
Formal Committees 7.6 1.9 1.6 1.1 
Press/Letter 4.5 1.9 2.4 1.1 
E.D.M.s 0.0 5.8 26.0 36.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Most noticeably, Parliamentary Questions appear to be the most favoured 
procedure for raising an issue of special importance in the House, as 
·37% of combined first and second preferences went to P.Q.s. The 
second most popular method of pursuing an interest in a specific topic 
appears to be through raising the issue in the relevant party group. 
One senior Conservative emphasized that "Party committees are indeed 
useful. Members do tend to cluster around these committees, which 
cover the interests they are following at that time". And well over 
one-quarter of respondents listed these committees as either their 
first cr second choi:e of 'procedura'. Conservatives tended to rank 
these committees more highly than their Labour colleagues with 36% of 
Tory, as opposed to 25% of Labour, first and second nominations going 
to these groups. This inter-party difference suggests a distinction 
between the attitudes of M.P.s in the two major parties towards the 
, 
. ; 
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value of backbench party committees: a distinction which we will 
analyze more closely in the next chapter. 
Ten percent of respondents believed that direct correspondence or 
contact with the Minister responsible for a specific topic was the 
best method of pursuing a particular cause. More Labour Members 
(13%) than Tories (8%) preferred this method: so taking advantage of 
their position on the Government benches. One Labour M.P. stated 
that his I1score card" on his specialisms "is a pretty good one. This 
is due to the fact that ••••• I am on very close terms with most members 
of the Government, and have little or no difficulty in, in a sense, 
negotiating with them directly. You will find many other Members, 
particularly those in the Trade Union Group, who also prefer to do 
things directly with Ministers, rather than joining in debates, or 
tabling Questions". (Labour M.P., 1964). On the Opposition benches 
certain Conservative Members also recognized the value of direct 
communication with Ministers. A Conservative backbencher, first 
elected in February 1974, commented: " ••••• considerable knowledge 
may be gained from correspondence with Ministers and Ministries 
which rarely catches the public eye. I can think of several M.P.s who, 
not being the publicity seeking types, would not be picked out too 
easily from a review of Hansard say. Perhaps Sir David Renton's 
concern with population is a case in point; until he published his 
correspondence with Mr. Wilson over this matter it was effectively 
hidden from public view yet he was making his point, and being 
accepted as an authority on the subject in question". 
Around one in ten first and second preferences went to activity in 
debate. Although adjournment debate was specified in the question 
many Members widened 'debate' to include all debates in the Chamber. 
Several Members argued that adjournment debates were best left for 
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constituency matters: 
"The AdJ· ournment D b t f 1· . e a e, or examp e, 1S appropr1ate 
for pressing a problem affecting a particular 
constituent ••••• " (Labour M.P., ex-Minister, 1945). 
"Adjournment Debates, in my experience, tend to be 
used far more to highlight a particular parochial 
problem which has arisen in a Member's constituency. 
It is generally not regarded as a good device for 
drawing attention in depth to a major national issue". 
(Conservative M.P., 1964). 
Therefore. Members tended to speak generally of debate rather than 
confine themselves to adjournment debates. A few Members obviously 
took great delight in "interrupting Ministers on the floor", 
(Conservative M.P., 1974) or in "cross-House interruption", (Northern 
Ireland M.P., 1974) during debate. 
Only a small proportion of Nembers considered activity on select and 
standing committees to be the best method of pursuing an interest in 
the House: again, perhaps J highlighting the weakness of formal 
specialization in the Commons. Nearly as many respondents chose 
letters to the press or published articles as their first or second 
preference. However, the lowest ranking procedure in terms of first 
and second preferences was E.D.M.s. Not one of the 161 respondents 
chose E.D.M.s as their first preference in pursuing an interest in 
the House. Indeed, some Members wrote disparagingly of this 
procedure: 
"The Early Day Motion is a propaganda device which 
some Members use purely for that purpose. Many 
regard it as the parliamentary equivalent of fly 
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posting". (Conservative M.P., 1964). 
"E.D.M.s useless! Gesture politics". 
(Liberal M.P., 1964). 
But at least one Labour M.P. was convinced that E.D.M.s were useful 
tools for 'pressurizing' the Government, and cited the case of E.D.M. 
355/1975 (31) which was signed by 151 Labour Members and warned 
the Labour Prime Minister of their implacable opposition to continued 
membership of the European Economic Community. 
Conclusion 
The profile of specialization in the House of Commons as perceived 
from the backbenches is far more pronounced than the profile 
established in Chapter 5 fr"om a quantitative content analysis of 
activity. Most backbenchers appear to see themselves, and the 
majority of their backbench colleagues, to be relatively highly 
specialized in their parliamentary activity. Moreover, the vast 
majority of respondents consider themselves to be expert in the 
subject area of at least one of their parliamentary specialisms, and 
can easily identify other expert backbenchers in the House. 
Conservative M.P.s are particularly inclined to identify themselves 
and their parliamentary colleagues as being specialized. And other 
inter-party differences emerge with regard to the nomination of 
experts in specific subject fields, to the importance of ideological 
considerations in the choice of specialist advice and to the 
importance of constituency factors as a source of subject specialisms. 
Thus, while Members' perceptions generally confirm the pattern of 
specialization and the nature of inter-party differences discovered in 
282 
Chapter 5, they nevertheless tend to inflate the levels of expertise 
and specialization in the House. This is not to argue that the 
profile based on the analysis of the written record of the proceedings 
of the House is more accurate than that based on the perceptions of 
backbenchers, only to suggest that Members may unconsciously 
exaggerate their own degree of specialization. One piece of evidence 
supporting this view arises from the fact that of those Members 
claiming to concentrate upon one subject only 30% devoted two-thirds 
or more of their time in the House to the consideration of that issue; 
similarly only 32% of backbenchers who focused primarily on a range 
of between two and five subject areas claimed to devote this amount 
of time to these areas. Clearly, whether this degree of concentration 
warrants the description of high specialization is open to question; 
indeed one experienced backbencher suggested that M.P.s had a tendency 
to confuse 'specialization' with 'interest' in a subje~t: 
"An M.P. is likely to have some 'theme' or 'themes' 
in which he is more than usually interested but 
this will be a kind of continuing interest that 
will rise and subside according to pressures and 
counter pressures ••••• (although) I have 'themes' 
I could mention, I have no 'specialization' and 
do not consider myself an 'expert' in anything. 
And what I say about my life as an M.P. would 
I think be said by most M.P.s about themselves". (32) 
H owev.-er, most respondents did not concur with this view, in 
as much as they overwhelmingly accepted the term 'specialization' to 
describe their pattern of work in the House of Commons. But the 
differences of opinion among M.P.s as to the performance of their 
legislative duties, and the differences between their perceptions of 
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the pattern of activity and a quantitative analysis of such activity, 
does raise the whole question of the 'accuracy' of M.P.s perceptions 
of their work in Parliament. (33) 
2S4 
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Chapter 7 
Formal Specialization 'Mezzo-Level Structure' Party and 
All-Party Committees 
In spite of the fact that 'specialization' has attracted weighty 
parliamentary and academic attention over the last three or more 
decades, no systematic study of micro-level specialization, other than 
that outlined in Chapters 5 and 6, has been published. One reason 
for this omission is that 'specialization' has largely been viewed by 
British commentators as a macro-level phenomenon. Consequently, 
there has been a tendency to treat specialization in the House almost 
exclusively as a synonym for a formal, committee based, division of 
labour; not unnaturally such an approach obscures the significance of 
the informal pattern of specialization through treating .it simply as 
a consequence of formal specialization. Furthermore, this approach 
understates specialization at intermediate-levels of parliamentary 
organization, for the 'mezzo-level', interposed between the informal 
specialization of individual backbenchers and the formal specialization 
of the House as a corporate body, incorporates a series of 'specialized' 
party subject groups and all-party committees. 
These 'unofficial' committees are important on several distinct grounds. 
Firstly, they are notable for their very existence as they represent 
a system of specialized committees operating in a House renowned for 
its resistance to formal specialization. Secondly, they are important 
as they incorporate alternative mechanisms of choice based upon 
principles other than adversary philosophy, so that expertise and 
specialization are fostered at the 'mezzo-level' as replacements for 
adversary methods of decision-making. Indeed, in spite of both sets 
of committees including the word 'party' in their titles, it is the 
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very absence of partisan politics ( in an adversary sense) which 
facilitates the development of organizational structures based upon a 
formal division of labour. All-party committees, on the one hand, 
transcend inter-party conflict through practising ideological catholicism, 
whilst party subject committees function in the hermetically sealed 
atmosphere of their respective doctrinal monotheisms. (1) In either 
case the key propellant of British parliamentary activity in the 20th 
century adversary pOlitics is missing. Backbenchers serving 
on these 'unofficial' committees are called upon to make their own 
decisions rather than act in strict compliance with the wishes of 
their party leaders. Without the simplistic dichotomization of 
alternatives, so characteristic of debate in the Chamber, backbenchers 
are required to choose between multiple possibilities and to do so on 
the basis of their own expertise and political judgement. Hence it 
is not simply coincidence that a formal committee system emerges as 
a mechanism of choice at this' 'mezzo-level' in the absence of adversary 
considerations. 
Party Committees 
The present extensive system of backbench subject committees dates 
essentially from the immediate post-war years of 1945-1946. Both 
parties had utilized subject committees before the war. The 
Conservative party had an agricultural committee in existence before 
1914 and developed a number of 'specialized' groups dealing with the 
armed services, foreign affairs, finance, and trade and industry in 
the train of the 1922 Committee. Correspondingly, the Labour Party, 
by the late 1930s, was operating a number of advisory subject committees. 
However, it was only in the period of post-war reconstruction that 
these subject groups became a formal part of party organization, Labour 
subject groups were confirmed in 1945 and the formal system of party 
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committees in the Conservative party followed in 1946. Both sets of 
connnittees (2) are now an established feature of party organization 
in the House of Commons. The range of subjects covered by party 
connnittees in 1970-1 (the first session of the quantitative analysis in 
Chapter 5) and 1974-5 (the session of the postal survey in Chapter 6) 
is set out in Table 7.1 •. 
Party committees are of significance not only in the functioning of the 
major parties but also in the working of the House as a whole.. "Much 
of an M.P.'s time is", as Crick notes, "spent in unofficial party groups 
and committees". (3) One member of the Conservative Emp10yrr~nt 
Committee, in interview, estimated that he normally devoted five to 
six hours per week to the business of this committee. This weekly 
total had, however, soared on several occasions in the 1970-1974 
Parliament; most notably during the passage of the Industrial Relations 
Bill in 1971, and latterly d~ring the disruption of the early months 
of 1974. Whilst this Member was a particularly active and conscientious 
official on the committee, his estimation of his colleagues' activity 
was not much lower than his own. 
Of more importance than the amount of backbench time occupied by party 
committee business is, however, the influence which backbenchers are 
capable of exercising over their respective leaderships in these 
committees. Twenty years ago Richard Body M.P. went so far as to argue 
that "No matter which party is in power, if one of its committees at a 
representative meeting disapproves of a certain measure or wishes 
something done that the Government has failed to do hitherto, then 
there is either a change of heart by the Government or a first class row 
culminating in one or two resignations. NeEdless to say, the first is 
the more usual of the two consequences. There lies the influence of 
the party committee". (4) Body's assessment undoubtedly exaggerates 
TABLE 7.1 
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Conservative Party Committees and Labour Subject Groups 
1970-1 and 1974-5 
Conservative Party Committees Labour Subject Groups 
1970-1 1974-5 1970-1 1974-5 
Agric. Fish & Food 
Arts & Amenities 
Aviation Supply/ 
Aviation 
Broadcasting and 
Communications 
Defence 
Education 
Employment 
/Energy 
/Environment 
Finance 
Foreign & Common-
wealth Affairs 
Health & Soc Security 
Housing and 
Construction 
Industry 
Legal Committee 
* * 
* * 
* 
* 
* '* 
* * 
* '* 
* * 
'* 
* 
* * 
* '* 
* '* 
* * 
* * 
* * 
Local Gov & Deve lopment * * 
Agriculture & Food 
Arts & Amenities 
Aviation Supply/ 
Aviation 
/Broadcasting and 
Public Information 
Defence/ 
Defence & Services 
/Disablement 
Economic and Finance 
Education and Science 
Employment 
/Energy 
Environment 
Europe 
/Fisheries 
/Forestry 
Foreign and 
Commonwealth 
Health & Soc Security/ 
Health 
/Housing and 
Construction 
/Illdustry 
/Legal & Judicial 
/New Towns & Urban 
Development 
/Northern Ireland 
Overseas Aid 
Parliamentary Affairs 
/Planning & Local 
Government 
/Ports Group 
Post Officel 
Posts & Te1ecomm'ns 
'* '* 
* * 
* 
'* 
'* 
* 
'* 
'* 
* '* 
* '* 
* '* 
'* 
* '* 
* '* 
'* 
'* 
* * 
* 
'* 
'* 
'* 
'* 
'* 
* 
* '* 
'* '* 
'* 
'* 
'* 
'* 
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1970-1 1974-5 1970-1 
Power and Steel 
* 
/Prices and /Prices and 
Consumer Affairs 
* 
Consumer Protection 
/Shipping 
/Small Business * /Social Security 
/Sports 
/Steel 
Trade 
* * 
Trade & Industry 
* 
/Trade 
Transport Industries 
* * 
/Transport 
(Source F.W.S. Craig, The Political Companion, No.8, September, 1971; 
No. 21, Spring, 1975). 
1974-5 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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the influence of these bodies for, from the few detailed studies of 
their involvement in the formulation of public policy, it is apparent 
that their potentiality for influence far exceeds their actual 
capacity to determine policy. The practical limitations upon party 
influence are clearly revealed in Ronald Butt's classic study of the 
passage of the Bill to abolish Retail Price Maintenance in 1964. 
~~i1st the Conservative opponents to this Bill, working through the 
backbench Trade and Industry Committee, did have some success in 
amending the Bill, their importance rested in "the psychological 
lengths that Heath had to go to in order to placate them. He had to 
accept meetings and negotiations of a character no other Minister had 
been obliged to enter with the 'other ranks' of the Parliamentary 
Party". (5) Ultimately, however, the dissidents in the Committee were 
unable to kill the Bill, or even to persuade Heath to postpone its 
introduction until after the general election. In this specific 
sense the Trade and Industry Committee failed in its attempt to 
determine party policy but did, nevertheless, provide a clear expression 
of backbench opinion for the Conservative leadership to note. 
The importance of Conservative party committees as forums for the 
expression of backbench opinion was apparent in the 1970-4 Parliament. 
Several committees, most notably the Finance and Industry Committees, 
served as the forums in which dissenters could meet and express their 
views. Conservative opposition to the 1972 Industry Bill was thus 
expressed primarily through the Industry Committee. However, although 
backbench critics of this measure managed to win minor amendments in 
the form of increased accountability and parliamentary scrutiny, they 
failed to prevent the Government from completing its U-turn on 
industrial policy. Similarly the 'neo-1ibera1' dissenters in the 
Finance Committee, while vehemently opposing the Government's reversals 
on economic policy after 1972, were unable to seriously impede the 
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progress of its counter-inflation and public expenditure policies. But 
the importance of such committees lies not so much in their ability to 
directly influence executive policy but in the fact that they provide 
"dissenters with authoritative forums through which to express their 
dissent, an authority which they could not obtain within the 
parliamentary party as a whole". (6) Nevertheless the Government 
may not always seek out such expressions of backbench opinion, for 
example, Home Office Ministers held a number of meetings with 
Conservative backbenchers following the defeat on the Immigration 
Rules on 22nd November 1972 only one of which was with the Home 
Affairs Committee. Most consultation on this issue was on the basis 
of ad hoc meetings with backbenchers. (7) 
In the Labour Party, party groups are more concerned with 'policy', as 
opposed to tactical and business matters, than their Conservative 
counterparts. (8) Yet, in the 1970-74 Parliament they met less 
frequently than Conservative party committees and were not serviced 
by a Research Department Officer in the way that Conservative committees 
were. For all their greater discussion of policy matters Labour 
groups have, however, been adjudged to be "less effective than the 
corresponding (Conservative) committees". (9) J.P. Mackintosh has 
most visibly questioned the significance of subject groups in the 
Labour Party. In 1968 he wrote: " ••••• as a ~lember of four of these 
Committees, I have found no evidence of any such influence, the meetings 
being irregular with no minutes kept, there is no fixed membership, and 
no concerted conclusions or action". (10) Elsewhere he noted: 
"When Conservatives are in office their backbench 'subject groups' on 
agriculture, defence, foreign affairs and so on have some influence; 
but, though such groups also exist on the Labour Party side, they are 
less active and influential". (11) J.J. Lynskey found that 
Mackintosh's view on the ineffectiveness of these groups was shared by 
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other of his Labour colleagues. In fact several Labour M.P.s 
contended that the real significance of the subject groups lay in 
their use by frontbenchers as a method of controlling backbench 
dissidence. In their eyes the regulations concerning official 
membership of party groups served as a mechanism whereby controversy 
could be confined to a group of backbenchers arguing in the confines 
of small subject committees. (12) Yet in arguing their case the 
above M.P.s probably overstated the importance of 'official membership', 
for, even under the regulations in force between 1970-76, Labour 
backbenchers still felt free to attend more than their official quota 
of committees. (13) Indeed the real significance of 'official 
membership', in the eyes of at least one backbencher, was not to 
restrict attendance at committee meetings but rather to control the 
elections of the officers at the beginning of each session. The 
relaxation of the rules concerning membership of subject groups in 
1976, which allowed M.P.s to'vote in up to six committees, was 
particularly welcomed by this Member. (14) 
At the same time as this change in 1976, the P.L.P. also adopted new 
procedures designed to enhance the status of its subject groups. A 
working party, initially under the chairmanship of John Horam, had 
been established in May 1976 to consider the position of these party 
groups. It ultimately recommended, in July 1976, formal procedures 
whereby departmental Ministers were required to discuss proposed 
legislation with the relevant group and generally to keep the group 
informed of activity in their department. James Callaghan as Prime 
Minister endorsed these recommendations. In the words ot one group 
officer: "Jim issued a very firm directive that Cabinet Ministers 
must keep in touch with the various subject groups and discuss with 
them the action they propose to take, and the door of the appropriate 
Cabinet Minister is always open to Chairmen of subject groups". (15) 
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Most Labour group chairmen agree that the influence of their committees 
has increased with the adoption of these new procedures. One Chairman 
contended that "there is ample evidence to prove that given the right 
form of leadership they (subject groups) can be of substantial 
(16) influence in their dealings with Ministers and Departments". 
However, reservations as to the true impact of these changes still 
persist: 
"There is a greater willingness for all (subject) 
Ministers to come along and talk to the (subject) 
Group. What all this amounts to in practice, I 
am not quite sure. I remember a member of our 
Group saying to a senior Cabinet Minister, after 
one and a half hours discussion ' ••••• do you 
really take any notice of what we say?' The 
Minister replied that he found the discussions, very 
interesting, he weighed the expression of opinion 
very carefully indeed, and then he went away and 
did what he thought was right". (17) 
What is important for present purposes, however, is not a detailed, 
comparative assessment of group influence but rather the specification 
of the source of their potentiality for influence. This potentiality 
exists, in short, because party committees function on a specialized 
basis. Through the formal division of labour each committee or group 
'shadows' a major department, in so doing the membership of each 
committee deepens its collective and individual knowledge and also 
serves as a reference point for party colleagues. Hence the 
potentiality of these groups is founded upon the combination of 
specialized knowledge and political judgement. But it is essential 
to recognize that the organizational structure at the mezzo-level is 
engendered from the special combination of political and representational 
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features of the intra-party environment. Firstly, as noted earlier, 
intra-party debate is shorn of the adversarial posturing which is so 
characteristic of debate on the floor of the House. Choice, within 
the confines of party, is no longer presented as a zero-sum game 
with only two, mutually exclusive, options on offer. Principles 
other than simple allegiance to one's party leaders have, therefore, 
to guide backbench decision-making. In which case a systematic, 
formal division of labour appears to provide an alternative, rational 
mechanism of choice. 
Yet the non-adversarial style of intra-party deliberation is not, in 
itself, a sufficient base for the development of specialization. Of 
equal importance is the representational element in this compound 
for the existence of specialist party committees is one manifestation 
of the strength of notions of party representation in Britain. In 
theory the party focus of representation enables a backbencher to 
specialize, in the knowledge that the view he adopts on his own 
specialism will be virtually the same as that of his party colleagues 
had they personally been active in that area. Similarly, he is 
conscious of the fact that his opinion will be reflected in those areas 
in which he is not a 'specialist' by other party Members committed to 
the same electoral programme. In practice, however, the unity of 
party monotheism is fragmented by the existence of ideological 'sects' 
which actively compete with one another to advance their respective 
conceptions of 'true' socialism or conservatism. The ideational 
fragmentation is, of course, most pronounced, and most visible, in the 
Parliamentary Labour Party, wherein the elections of officials for 
the major subject groups represents open competition between the main 
factions. Indeed, it is possible to suggest that one of the reasons 
why backbench groups in the Labour ?arty have failed to develop in 
influence, and in the level of expertise, equal to that of Conservative 
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committees may rest in the ideological divisions within the Labour 
Party. Thus the intra-party division of labour in the latter comes 
to resemble an intra-factional division of labour. While there is a 
tendency towards 'policy party' representation in the Conservative 
party, as witnessed in the Finance Committee of 1972-3, for example; 
there does, however, appear to be a wider consensus on the nature of 
conservatism, and subsequently a greater emphasis upon subject 
expertise rather than upon ideological position in the backbench 
committees (though the latter still remains of importance). 
Overall, therefore, in both parties the party focus of representation, 
and to a lesser or greater extent the 'policy party' focus, enables a 
division of labour to be rationalized. Indeed, to remove the party 
delegate orientation is to make the justification of specialization 
all the more difficult in view of the other British theories of 
representation. Thus to argue that "the House has something to 
learn from the maligned parties which compose it in the matter of 
intelligent organization" (18) is indeed true. But, as we shall 
argue in the next chapter, the lessons to be learned are as much 
political and representational as they are organizational. 
Before developing this argument it is of value to analyze the pattern 
of backbench specialization on these party groups. As of yet no 
systematic study of activity in these groups has been published. 
Although P.G. Richards and, more notably, R.M. Punne~provide useful 
insights into the structure and influence of party committees, neither 
provide a clear indication of the extent or depth of specialization on 
these committees. There is, however, an "inherent difficulty" (to use 
a Crick euphemism) (19) in carrying out such an analysis: proceedings 
of all party committees are held to be confidential, so that enquiries 
concerning activity in these committees can place helpful Members in 
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" 1· h d· ff • 1 " . h . a s 19 t 1 1CU ty 1n as muc , as one Member expla1ned, "that it is 
technically a Breach of Privilege to communicate what goes on inside a 
party committee in the House of Commons you may recollect that ••••• 
Garry Allighan was actually expelled from the House for doing this". (20) 
In the Conservative party another restraining influence appears to be 
in force; the secretary of one committee declined to answer any questions 
on the working of his committee with the comment "I am afraid that 
under the rules of the 1922 Committee, all proceedings of backbench 
Conservative committees are private and cannot be divulged". (21) 
Fortunately, not all Members felt so inhibited by these regulations. 
The profile of specialization in party committees was established from 
two sources. Firstly, backbenchers were asked, as part of the 1975 
survey, about their attendance at these groups and about the 
relationship between their personal specialisms and activity in party 
groups. Se90ndly, key officials of the major fifteen committees in 
each party were asked their opinion upon the extent of specialization 
and the nature of expertise evident on the part of committee members. (22) 
Twenty of the thirty officials canvassed, nine Conservative and eleven 
Labour, replied to the queries. The responses of these officials, 
taken in combination with the answers of Labour and Conservative 
backbenchers to the 1975 survey, provide the basis for the first 
systematic analysis of activity in party committees. 
The importance of party committees as a backbench means of pursuing 
subject special isms in the House was noted in Chapter 7. Further 
testimony as to their importance can be found in the observation that 
89% (n 132) of Labour and Conservative respondents in 1975 claimed to 
attend one or more subject groups on a regular basis. Marginally more 
Conservatives claimed to be regular at tenders than did their Labour 
counterparts (93%, n 75; to 85%, n57). Yet those inter-party 
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differences are not as great as one might have been led to expect from 
the comments made by Labour M.P.s at the Granada dinners. Here 
attendance at Labour subject groups was claimed to be very irregular, 
as the number of Members attending subject groups was adjudged to be 
"very, very few, whether around this table or throughout the P.L.P. 
Very, very few". (23) Th' • d b h L b 1S V1ew was supporte y anot er a our 
representative whose personal record on subject groups was seen to be 
"as appalling as the vast majority of my colleagues. I just don't 
go". (24) The intervening years between the Granada dinners (1972) 
and the postal survey (1975) appear to have marked a change in the 
pattern of attendance of Labour backbenchers at these committees. 
The return to office and the questioning of the backbench role within 
the Labour party after 1974 undoubtedly stimulated Labour interest in 
the work of subject groups. Nevertheless, even so, there remains an 
undercurrent of scepticism over the value of subject groups, which 
reflects a more fundamental division of opinion between the two parties 
than the attendance figures by themselves suggest. Critical comments 
upon the value of party committees were the exclusive preserve of 
Labour respondents; one respected Labour academic, for example, stated 
that he did not regularly attend meetings of subject groups as "they 
are worthless in my opinion". (Labour, 1966). In similar vein one 
of his older colleagues remarked: "Parliamentary party committees are 
a wasted time as Ministers still rule". (Labour, 1950). Another 
Labour Member claimed that his infrequent attendance at group meetings 
was the result of restricted interest in their activities apart from 
"securing a responsible chairman and officers: and supporting them at 
any critical time". (Labour, 1964). Such comments were notably 
absent from the responses of Conservative Members. 
Overall, Conservative backbenchers restricted their regular attendance 
to fewer party committees than their Labour counterparts. The number 
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of subject committees attended by each Member on a regular basis is 
set out in Table 7.2. 
TABLE 7.2 Number of Party Subject Groups regularly attended per 
backbencher crosstabulated with party (Conservative and Labour). 
No. of subject 
committees 
regularly attended 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Cons 
(n 75) 
% 
14.7 
26.7 
32.0 
16.0 
9.3 
1.3 
100.0 
X2 ·9.28 df 4 
(Combine 5 + 
Party 
Lab Total 
(n 57) (n 132) 
% % 
7.0 11.4 
28.1 27.3 
19.3 26.5 
36.8 25.0 
5.3 7.6 
3.5 2.2 
100.0 100.0 
sign 0.1 
6). 
In part this pattern may be indicative of a more 'professional' 
attitude on the part of Conservatives to their activity on these 
committees, in that Tory party committees meet more frequently and 
require of their members a greater commitment, so that the more effort 
demanded of Members on anyone committee the less energy there is 
available to attend others. 
Other inter-party differences were noticeable in the response to the 
request for the names of each committee regularly attended by M.P.s. 
Committees concerned with industry, defence, foreign affairs, health 
and social security matters attracted roughly the same proportion of 
nominations in both parties. Conservative respondents, however, 
showed a greater predilection for attendance at the agriculture, 
300 
aviation, economic and legal committees, whilst Labour backbenchers 
nominated the groups dealing with education and housing matters more 
frequently. Yet only on agriculture and housing did the proportion 
of nominations on these subjects differ significantlY between the 
parties (significant 0.05). Overwhelmingly, regular attendance at the 
meetings of a particular subject committee was a consequence of the 
Member's prior interest in that subject. 91% (n 126) of backbenchers 
stated that their interest in an issue led them to attend a specific 
committee in the first instance. Correspondingly few M.P.s (7% in 
total, 4% of Conservative and 11% of Labour Members) claimed that 
interest in a subject aroused at a party group meeting had spurred 
them into concentrating upon that topic in their parliamentary activity. 
The remark of one Conservative barrister best summarizes the 
relationship between personal interest and attendance at party 
committees: "I attend committees because of my interests. I don't 
wander into committees at random wondering what I shall hear". 
(Conservative, 1955). 
Members were then asked whether they frequently attended party 
committees dealing with subjects other than their stated specialism. 
Over half of the respondents in fact claimed not to do so. (See Table 7.3). 
TABLE 7.3 Attendance at Party Committees outside area of stated specialisms 
Attend committees 
outside special 
interests 
Yes 
No 
Party 
Cons Lab 
(n 78) (n 67) 
% '" 10 
51.3 40.3 
48.7 59.7 
100.0 100.0 
X2 1.34 df 1 n' sign, 
Total 
(n 145) 
., 
10 
46.2 
53.8 
100.0 
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To some their restricted committee involvement was a source of regret: 
"I would like to do so as my political interests 
are fairly widespread. However, the timetable 
allows for only one specialization (sic)". 
(Conservative, 1970). 
To others it was inevitable: 
"I only attend (other committees) when some important 
issue arises where I feel that I should be informed 
as to what's happening and how my colleagues think. 
I doubt if any Member attends committees outside 
his special interests the pressure of time is 
too great". (Conservative, 1970). 
This estimation of the general pattern of attendance does appear 
nonetheless, on the evidence of Table 7.3, to be basically inaccurate. 
Indeed, over half of this Member's own party colleagues challenged his 
assessment by claiming regular attendance at committees outside their 
special interests. Three broad categories of reasons for attending 
subject groups beyond one's own specialisms were apparent in M.P.s 
answers. Most commonly, interest in what an outside speaker had to 
say attracted backbenchers to other committee meetings: 
"The prominence of invited speakers whom one hopes 
have something to contribute to the 'war of ideas' 
leads me to attend (other groups)". (Labour, 1959). 
"If there is a speaker of particular interest on an 
important issue then I'll attend". (Conservative, 1964). 
Of almost equal importance, the topicality of an issue often stimulated 
attendance at groups outside a Member's chosen specialisms: 
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"To brief myself on subjects which are of major 
national importance, e.g. Direct Grant Schools 
at the moment". (Conservative, 1972). 
"To keep an eye on a particular hot potato". 
(Conservative, 1966). 
Constituency interest provided the third major stimulus to attend other 
party groups: 
"Constituency importance agriculture's big in 
my constituency so I go to the agricultural 
committee". (Conservative, 1974, whose own 
special interests were industrial matters, penal 
reform and international affairs). 
"Only as and when constituency interests require 
it, e.g. became member of Industry Group". 
(Labour, 1964, stated special isms in foreign 
affairs, Eutope and defence). 
A few Members also believed that intervention in a committee discussion 
outside of their own immediate interests, may be of value to the 
regular membership therein: 
"(I attend other committees) when it looks as though 
a principle is at stake and there is danger of the 
committee losing sight of the wood for the trees". 
(Conservative, 1945). 
Finally, a belief in the generalist role led one M.P. to attend subject 
groups almost at random: 
"I am basically a non-specialist with a little 
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knowledge in a wide area. If I am interested in a 
speaker /subject then I will attend". (Labour, 1974). 
M.P.s were next asked whether their membership of a party committee 
increased their activity on that subject in the House. Around 
three-quarters of respondents claimed that it did. Typical of the 
examples given was the case of the Conservative Employment Committee 
in 1971. One member of this committee claimed that generally the 
membership was busily engaged in the passage of the Industrial Relations 
Bill: "In committee we made the bullets, mostly to fire ourselves but 
sometimes we let others do the firing". (Conservative, 1970). A 
further 3% of respondents felt that their involvement in the House on 
a specific issue was occasionally affected by their membership of a 
subject committee (see Table 7.4). The remaining 24% held that 
membership of party committees made no impact on their activity in the 
House. 
TABLE 7.4 Activity in the House and Party Committee membership 
Does your membership of a party subject group increase your activity 
in the }louse on that subject? 
Party 
Cons Lab Total 
(n 78) (n 66) (n 144) 
% % % 
Yes 78.2 68.2 ·73.6 
No 19.2 28.8 23.6 
Occasionally 2.6 3.0 2.8 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
Certain Members who responded negatively did, nevertheless. perceive 
positive benefits (unlinked with levels of activity) to be gained 
from party committee membership. One Labour backbencher, elected in 
1974, remarked that although his efforts in the House were not 
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increased through membership of subject committees he did, nevertheless, 
believe that his 'effectiveness' on his specialisms was heightened. 
Another, more experienced, Labour M.P. further suggested that activity 
on a given subject in the House could actually be reduced due to 
committee involvement: "(It is) possible to get Ministerial assurances 
in the groups. This obviates the need for parliamentary pyrotechnics". 
The responses to the 1975 survey do, therefore, point to a fairly 
clear consensus upon the pattern of activity on party subject committees 
on both sides of the House. What remains unclear from these responses, 
however, is the level of expertise brought to bear on the consideration 
of subjects by these committees. In order to answer this question 
officials from each of the major subject committees of both parties 
were asked (i) whether they could identify a core of consistent 
attenders at committee meetings, and (ii) whether this nucleus formed 
an expert base for decision-making on particular topics. 
Of the eleven Labour group officers who replied, all easily identified 
a regular core of between six to twelve backbenchers at group meetings. 
In each group the consistent at tenders formed only a small proportion 
of the official membership; which ranged from fifty to over eighty 
backbenchers depending on the subject. On the Conservative side of 
the House there is no formal membership of party commitees, membership 
is open to any M.P. holding the Conservative Whip. As a result there 
is a considerable fluctuation in the number of M.P.s attending any 
particular committee from one meeting to the next. This inconsistency 
was noted by one official who observed that: "Every member of the 
party is a member of every committee and, depending on the importance 
of the business which that committee is discussing, virtually all 
members of the party will attend or, if the matter is not of wide 
importance, the attendance will dwindle". The highest actual 
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attendances noted were, however, 120 and 90 respectively. Yet, despite 
the fluctuations in membership, each of the nine Conservative committee 
officials identified a group of consistent attenders. The size of 
these committee cores ranged from eight to twenty Member's. Certain 
officials, in addition to specifying the number of committed committee 
members, went on to suggest reasons for such regular attendance. The 
most succinct summary was provided by one official who argued that 
'core members~ fell into four main categories: "(a) Far the largest 
group is those Members who have a constituency interest in ••••• (b) 
Those who have been professionally engaged in some branch of (the 
subject) in the past that includes three of the present officers, 
(c) Those who have held Ministerial office connected with ••••• , (d) A 
tiny proportion who just happen to be particularly interested in it 
for entirely unique reasons". This classification was basically 
repeated by other officials, Labour as well as Conservative, though in 
most cases constituency interest was usually de-emphasized. 
The inter-party concord between group officials, over the identification 
of regular attenders, disappeared markedly in their responses to the 
second query. For Conservative committee officials were far more 
disposed to see their regular members as 'experts' in their field than 
were their Labour counterparts. Indeed, one Conservative official was 
prepared to make his own inter-party comparison on this point: 
"The term 'expert' is grossly abused, but I would 
say that most of the active participants at committee 
meetings were Members who had far more extensive 
knowledge and first hand experience of (this subject) 
than you would find amongst the whole of the 
Parliamentary Labour backbenchers". 
Other Conservatives restricted their comments solely to the 'nature of 
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their own committee's expertise, yet almost to a man they described 
the committee nucleus as expert in its own right: 
"People who attend the committee regularly acquire a 
degree of expertise both because of the calibre of 
the people who go and address the committee, and 
also because they establish personal relationships 
with some of our visitors which enable them to 
meet informally and keep up to date on current 
problems and options". 
"It is perfectly true that there tends to be a nucleus 
of regular attenders at party meetings which are in 
theory open to all Conservative M.P.s ••••• Though 
some members attending did so out of general interest, 
and could not be considered expert, there were, a 
surprising number who had specialist knowledge". 
On the Labour benches few group officials unambiguously accepted the 
term 'expert' as one appropriate for their regular members. Only one 
Member openly admitted that "I: would not consider them (regular 
attenders) experts in the subject, nevertheless they have a reasonable 
grasp of at least part of a very wide field that the committee covers". 
Other group officials were more equivocal: 
"Whether such people could be considered 'experts' 
in the subject is obviously a most subjective 
consideration. They certainlY take considerably 
more interest in matters relating to (the subject) 
than the generality of Members, but outside 'experts', 
because of their exceptional specialization, would 
probably regard none of us as being particularly 
'expert' • " 
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"Whether these people and myself should be called 
'experts' depends whether you are using the word in 
the parliamentary or the proper sense of the word. 
Few, if any, Members of Parliament are truly expert 
in a subject. We have to dabble in too many 
matters to be able to give anyone of them enough 
time to become worthy of that name. In so far 
as we are experts we are so because of our 
concentration on this subject within the House 
rather than because of activities outside it". 
This last point was taken up by an official of another key Labour group 
who implied that the expertise of his committee colleagues was as much 
the product of parliamentary specialization as of pre-parliamentary 
experience. For, in his own words: "I do not think that many of our 
side have much experience (on this vital subject) outside the House". 
Significantly, such a distinction between expertise stemming from 
parliamentary specialization, and expertise gained from occupational or 
personal involvement in a subject field, was made only by Labour 
officials. Conservatives universally equated the expertise of the 
committee nucleus with outside contact with an issue, whereas only a 
minority of Labour officials believed extra-parliamentary activity to 
be the primary source of group expertise. 
Whatever the source of expertise, however, the benefits of possessing 
such knowledge in party committees only accrue to the party at large if 
the nuclei are capable of disseminating their knowledge. As the locus 
of informed opinion, a party subject group or committee has to operate 
both as a channel of communication between backbenchers and the party 
leadership, and also as a transmitter of information among ordinary 
backbenchers. In either case committee views are listened to not 
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simply, or even primarily, because of their expert content but because 
they represent an expression of specialist knowledge, tempered by party 
doctrine. Out of this syncretism of factual and political elements 
springs the potentiality for influence of subject committees. The 
'judgement' of party groups has long been recognized (if not always 
readily appreciated) by frontbenchers in their soundings of backbench 
opinion. Equally, backbenchers see these committees as repositories 
of informed opinion. Some indication of their value in this connection 
was apparent from the comments of Members in interview and in 
correspondence, for example, the Secretary of a leading Conservative 
Committee indicated that committee members were constantly being asked: 
"'What do you think of such and such?' or 'Are we taking the right 
line on this issue?'. You see what they are after is not only our 
knowledge but also our judgement". (25) In turn he recounted how he 
sought the opinions of Conservatives on the Foreign Affairs Committee 
for guidance on East European affairs because, although he was 
interested in this area, he did not have the time to conduct his own 
research in this field. Similarly on the Labour backbenches subject 
groups play a valuable role in the transmission of opinion. One 
ex-Minister wrote: "The Subject Groups of the P.L.P. are of considerable 
importance both in dealing with the business actually before Parliament, 
and in helping to shape future party policy. In my experience it is 
quite common for backbenchers to consult each other in this way, and 
I think this is most desirable. 
be a pool of expert knowledge". 
One of the functions of a Party is to 
(26) 
A formal division of labour provides a key mechanism for the maintenance 
of the water-level of this pool, firstly, through the regular interchange 
of ideas by informed party members at committee meetings; secondly, 
through the injection of outside expert opinion into these intra-party 
discussions; and, thirdly, through the dissemination of expertise by 
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party group members. In acting as 'cue-givers' to their party 
colleagues committee members are in a position to influence, indirectly, 
party policy. But it has been the more direct mode of influence. 
through attempts to change frontbench opinion, which has attracted 
most attention. In practice the potentiality for exercising 
influence over the frontbench reaches its peak in times of opposition 
when the party leadership "is managing party affairs, not affairs of 
government" • (27) In theory, however, the influence of party 
committees in the making of public policy should reach its height 
when the party is in power. While Ministers, of both parties, do 
seek the counsel of their respective party committees, they appear to 
be more concerned, however, with opinion as to what their backbenchers 
will stand for rather than with what backbenchers actually want. Thus 
one Labour P.P.S. indicated that he frequently attended the party 
group which shadowed his Ministry "to take note of significant trends 
of opinion and, where necessary, to secure a meeting for the Secretary 
of State with group members; so that he can make the departmental 
point if opinion has veered away from the executive line". (28) 
Implicit within this statement is a tension between the 'us' of the 
executive and the 'them' of backbenchers in the party groups. 
This divide between Ministers and backbenchers provides the third 
part of the equation for predicting the parameters of committee 
influence. It has long been recognized, to recapitulate, that subject 
groups are most effective in influencing the party leadership during 
periods in opposition. In opposition the party can afford to stress 
the purity of its dogma, to emphasize party notions of representation 
and to develop its organizational structure free from the rigid 
hierarchy of roles associated with government. Even in periods in 
office, government backbenchers still maintain that this compound of 
ideological, representational and organizational elements should 
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effectively structure decision-making in the party. But the significant 
transition between opposition and government occurs in the minds of 
frontbenchers - with the development of what one backbencher described 
as an "executive mentality" on their part. (29) From the perspective 
of Whi tehall the political, representational and organizational bases 
of party committee influence become suspect. Firstly, party ideology 
may appear to be an encumbrance to Ministers, when pressed by their 
departmental officials to see the 'practicalities' of an issue. Indeed, 
party doctrine can prove to be a positive embarrassment to Cabinets 
intent upon executing policy 'U-turns'; for the officers of the state 
ship, in undertaking such manoeuvres, do not appreciate the howls of 
disgust emitted by their party passengers as the backbenchers survey the 
chart of the manifesto to note any deviation from the proposed course. 
Secondly, the focus of representation in the party theory becomes 
restrictive for Cabinet Ministers who are called upon to view 'the 
nation' as their prime focus of representation. It is perhaps not 
without significance that all three Prime Ministers in the 1970s have 
evoked the concept of 'the national interest' to defend their incomes 
and prices policies against attack from their own backbenchers. Thirdly, 
and finally, the executive mentality inculcated in Whitehall regards 
sustained and informed criticism from 'specialized' groups of backbenchers 
as anathematic. Hence party groups, which were treated as partners and 
valuable sources of advice in opposition, become suspect in times of 
office because of their quite detailed knowledge. (30) In this manner 
the value of a formal division of labour, even in the apposite political 
and representational setting of the mezzo-level, is undermined in the 
super-imposition of the hierarchical differentiation between Ministers 
and backbenchers. The centrality of this executive-backbench divide to 
the debate on formal intra-House specialization will be considered in 
Chapter 8, before then, however, the division of labour as instituted 
in all-party committees is worthy of examination. 
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All-party committees 
All-party committees, as their name suggests, operate in the hinterland 
of adversary politics. Often called 'non-party committees', these 
groups deal essentiallY with issues upon which there is no clear 
bifurcation of attitudes between the major parties. In practice 
this means that their bipartisan activity is confined to minority 
interests or to what Richard Body disparagingly calls the "small fry" 
of parliamentary politics. (31) Indeed the overall pattern of 
all-party groups is amoebic in form; with a core of persistent groups 
surrounded by a host of ad-hoc and intermittent committees operating 
at any given time. Unlike party subject groups, all-party committees, 
therefore, do not form a systematized division of labour. In certain 
fields, such as foreign affairs, the coverage of all-party activity 
is quite extensive by the end of the 1970-1 session there were 
47 groups of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, 10 area groups of the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and 19 non-affiliated groups 
listed in this area. (32) In other areas, however, the range of 
all-party committees is far more restricted: with 9 committees dealing 
with social and welfare issues, 11 groups active in the related fields 
of technology, trade and industry, 4 environmental groups and numerous 
ad-hoc miscellaneous groups functioning sporadically in this session. 
The absence of a systematic framework of all-party committees makes an 
assessment of their role in the House all the more difficult. One 
clue as to their significance can, of course, be gleaned from the 
comments of backbenchers themselves. A Conservative Member made the 
point, for example, that: 
"A senior Member and ex-Minister like myself may well 
be engaged in a great deal of non-party (or all-party) 
activity which, nevertheless, is useful to Parliament, 
one might say essential to the life of Parliament. 
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Membership of the groups takes time and cuts right 
across normal party divisions. Yet it is, of 
course, specialization of a kind". (33) 
However, the level of such specialization is generally low. A11-party 
committees neither operate on a sufficientlY systematic basis across 
the breadth of public policy; nor, on those topics with which they 
are involved, do they gear themselves to perpetual activity. Their 
'specialized' nature tends, therefore, to owe more to their contacts 
with outside sources of expertise than to the committees' own research 
initiatives. Organized interests readily take advantage of all-party 
committees to feed information into the House and also to influence 
parliamentary opinion. The reciprocal nature of committee-interest 
group communion was remarked upon by one newly-elected Member: 
"All-party committees are more real (than party. 
groups). They allow outside groups access into 
the House and to its Members. I've found they 
provide M.P.s on the group with specialist 
information. In return we play the system by 
tabling Questions or sponsoring E.D.M.s to 
publicize their case ••••• But one thing's 
certain, the committee acts as an important channel 
of communication with outside". (34) 
Several notable all-party groups have, in fact, been colonized by 
organized interests. The clearest documentation of this process is 
provided in connection with the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee, 
which for two decades up until the late 1950s functioned as a "scientist's 
lobby". (35) In the 1970s the monthly meetings of the Committee are 
still "most often d~minated by outsiders". (36) The work of other 
all-party committees is also influenced by their contacts with 'outside' 
( 
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opinion. The Inland Waterways Group had as its Chairman in 1970-1, 
John Wells, who also served on the advisory council of the British 
Waterways Board, and in addition maintained very close contacts with 
the Inland Waterways Association. In March 1971, for example, the 
Association's views on the Bristol Docks Bill were presented to the 
all-party group by the Chairman of the Association himself. Likewise, 
the R.S.P.C.A. finds ready support from the Animal Welfare Group for 
its sponsorship of legislation in its field; the British Limbless 
Ex-Service Men's Association has the all-party B.L.E.S.M.A. Group 
active on its behalf; and the Temperance Group, still in existence, 
was originally formed on the basis of National Temperance Federation 
support and currently has a committee liaising with the Free Church 
Council. (37) More recently the Council for Nature played an 
instrumental role in the creation of the Committee for the Conservation 
of Species and Habitats. (38) 
All-party committees may, therefore, serve as channels for the 
representation of functional interests in Parliament. Yet their 
importance in the decision-making process rests not solely in their 
transmission of outside information, but rather in the fine-tuning and 
careful amplification of opinion for the ears of Ministers. Clearly, 
the influence of these committees is at its strongest when the expertise 
of sectional interests is wedded to the parliamentary nous of group 
Members, in the pursuit of a specific objective beyond the mainstream 
of partisan conflict in the House. One of the most influential groups 
in the 1970-74 Parliament was in fact the Disablement Committee which, 
through its co-ordinated activity inside and outside the House, brought 
disablement matters out of the parliamentary shadows. Indeed, the 
Committee was closely involved in the passage of the Chronically Sick 
and Disabled Persons Act 1970, particularly at the committee stage, 
where most group members were appointed to the Standing Committee. 
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The Third London Airport Group also provides another important example 
of all-party influence in the 1970-4 Parliament. Formed after the 
1970 general election, the Third London Airport Committee was closely 
involved in the campaign to prevent the siting of the proposed airport 
at Wing in Buckinghamshire. In their analysis of the I.L.A. Committee's 
campaign, Kimber and Richardson identified four main tactics employed 
by the group. Firstly, they arranged a series of meetings and visits 
largely aimed at informing and persuading M.P.s. Next, through 
press releases, the committee obtained widespread media coverage of 
its activity. Thirdly, to marshall backbench opposition to the choice 
of an inland site, a carefully worded Early Day Motion was sponsored 
to coincide with the publication of the Roskill Report. Finally, the 
committee emphasized the depth of feeling on the airport issue through 
its "stage-management" of the debate in the House. The result of this 
concerted action was that: "Whatever the Government's reasons for 
choosing Foulness, the committee by demonstrating considerable cross-
bench opposition to an inland site, together with the massive extra-
parliamentary campaign waged by W.A.R.A. (Wing Airport Resistance 
Association) managed effectivelY to close off one of the Government's 
(39) 
main options". 
That certain all-party committees have effectivelY influenced public 
policy is apparent from these and other examples, but the closely 
prescribed circumstances in which such influence is exercised needs 
reiteration. First, and of fundamental importance, is the bipartisan 
or non-partisan nature of the committees' subject matter. In effect, 
therefore, all but the narrowest of policy issues are excluded from 
their consideration. In an era in which even the traditional 
bipartisan approach to such issues as race relations, Northern Ireland 
and Rhodesia is under question it appears ingenuous to argue that "all-
party committees could become the focus for greater backbench influence 
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providing the backbenchers can develop an issue before the party lines 
have a chance to harden". (40) But even when an issue has been 
'developed' by an all-party committee the result has not always been 
an outstanding success as the case of the Parliamentary and Scientific 
Committee illustrates. (41) Moreover the development of bipartisanship 
in itself does not serve as an impediment to the future reinstatement 
of party conflict. The bipartisan approach on scientific matters 
which developed in the immediate post-war years underwent a radical 
transformation in the early 1960s, as the major parties adopted the 
electioneering themes of 'scientific revolution' and 'modernization'. (42) 
This process of the 'po1iticization' of science as an issue was 
accompanied by a reduction in the sphere of influence of the all-party 
Committee. However, the ramifications of 'po1iticization' extended 
beyond the all-party group to affect the intra-party organization of both 
major parties and, ultimately, the 'official' Committee .on Science and 
Technology created in 1966. Both parties established a party committee 
on science and technology, after the appointment of Lord Hailsham as 
Minister of Science in 1959, in recognition of the partisan advantages to 
be gained from 'scientific expansion'. These groups, following the 
pattern of other subject groups, developed their own links with outside 
interests, and acted generally as co-ordinating bodies for the activity 
of interested M.P.s in the House. The fact that neither group was 
initiallY successful in influencing science policy simply highlights 
the constraints upon subject group influence. 
The 'po1iticization' of science as an issue in the period 1959-64 was, 
moreover, to have significant repercussions for the working of the 
Select Committee on Science and Technology, as the scope for influence 
of this specialist committee was effectively restricted even before 
its inception. In effect the partisan divide, manufactured in the 
early 1960s,confined the Select Committee to the consideration of 
issues which were not a matter of contention between the parties. For 
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its Members, particularly its Chairman, were aware that the Committee 
would only be able to command attention within the House, and in 
Whitehall, if it acted as a cohesive unit. Nevertheless, partisanship 
(43) did surface in the Committee on occasion. 
The second major constraint upon the extent of all-party group influence, 
concerns the type of information that they can 'retail' to the executive. 
When, as normally is the case, policy is the product of secret and 
structured bargaining between the Government, its agencies and affected 
functional interests then the impact of all-party contributions is 
likely to be negligible. The kind of knowledge required to exert 
influence in this process is an understanding of the options open for 
consideration rather than an 'academic' knowledge of the complexities 
of the subject. Where all-party groups have been able to exert most 
influence, therefore, is in the areas in which the Government has few 
formalized contacts with sectorial interests. As the transmitters and 
amplifiers of functional expertise in these marginal, but still important, 
areas, all-party committees have achieved their greatest successes. 
Conclusion 
Bipartisanship and the representation of functional expertise provide 
the combination of elements endowing all-party committees with their 
potentiality for influence. However, in practice this combination is 
apparent in all but the narrowest range of subjects. Hence all-party 
committees do not form a systematic network of groups covering the 
whole field of public policy, rather they are confined to the margins 
beyond the party battle. Their claim to be considered 'specialized', 
therefore, rests upon the linkage of interested M.P.s with outside 
sources of expertise and specialist interests. But the very 
specification of the bases of their influence reveals the inherent 
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constraints upon the potentiality of all-party committees. It is 
difficult, therefore, to concur with Kimber and Richardson when they 
argue: "clearly there is scope for further development of the committees 
as an instrument of backbench power". (44) They would have been 
better advised to have heeded Walkland's prescient stipulation that 
"more awareness on the part of more M.P.s of the need to exclude 
politics from the analysis and assessment of problems of public policy 
and to confine it to the end decisions is prior to any structural 
reform of Parliament". (45) Without the exclusion of adversary 
conflict from the broader areas of policy the scope of all-party 
influence will remain limited. 
Party subject committees, on the other hand, have the potentiality to 
exercise influence across the gamut of party policy. Indeed, party 
subject committees represent the most extensive system o~ specialized 
committees in the House a fact worthy of attention in itself. And 
this 'specialized' structure is a product of a synthesis of political 
and organizational considerations. In the first instance, emphasis is 
placed upon rational methods of decision-making at the intra-party 
level partly because of the absence of adversary criteria for judgement. 
Secondly, intra-party specialization is also sustained by the theory of 
party representation, for, under the common ideological frame of the 
party manifesto, each party is able to organize a division of labour 
within its own ranks. The actual extent of this division of labour 
being dependent upon the nature of the intra-party consensus on values. 
Propitious representational and political circumstances thus combine 
to determine the organizational structure at the mezzo-parliamentary 
level, and to facilitate a formal division of labour within each party. 
However, to proceed to argue that these unofficial committees "assist 
in preparing the ground for specialist advisory committees" (46) in 
the House is unwise. 
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The significant change in the political and representational mix 
between the intra-party and the House levels has a significant 
bearing upon the development of formal specialization at the macro-
level. For the failure of structural reform of the House in the 
past, and the likelihood of such failure in the future, can be 
accounted for in the political and representational traditions of the 
Commons. 
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Chapter 8 
Formal Specialization: Committees in the House of Commons 
The guiding proposition for reformers of the House of Commons over 
the last fifty years has been, and continues to be, the need for 
structural re-organization based upon a formal division of labour. 
The advocates of reform clearly believed that the solution to the 
problems encountered by the House in coping with ever increasing 
and ever more complex issues was to be found in the canons of 
organizational theory. Indeed, as the scope of government activity 
and the size of the bureaucracy expanded so the frequency of demands 
for reform of the legislature also increased. This cycle has been 
particularly pronounced over the last fifteen years, as the Study 
of Parliament Group observed: "the intensification of procedural 
adjustment and almost continual study of procedural possibilities 
since the mid-sixties has been influenced by the ever-increasing 
load of work which the House has had to assume". (1) Increasingly, 
Members of the House came, during this period, to share the view 
expounded by Sir Bernard Braine that "as Government business becomes 
more complex, more hurried, and less well thought through, Members 
on all sides are less capable of making informed contributions to 
the process of decision-making and of leading public opinion". (2) 
Attention, not surprisingly, came to focus upon an organizational cure 
for this dilemma: 
"We therefore need a very great degree of 
specialization. We need to spread the expertise. 
That is what every other major organization does. 
The companies and public corporations which are 
most effective are those which have learned how 
to spread expertise over the widest possible area. 
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They are those which have learned how to use 
economies of scale by getting groups of 
people together who raise their expertise 
one of another. This is what we must do". (3) 
Or stated more succinctly: "Parliament must respond by creating an 
efficient machine of its own, which means'a coherent sophisticated 
committee system ••••• " (4) 
Judged solely in terms of decision-making theory the strength of 
these proposals is irrefutable. Yet in the unique political and 
representative setting of the British House of Commons their logical 
force can appear to be less than compelling. In the last chapter 
the point was stressed that the importance of political and 
representational influences on organizational structure ,should not 
be underestimated: there it'was argued that an effective formal 
division of labour would develop when other, more cost efficient, 
modes of decision-making were essentially inapplicable. Hence at the 
mezzo-level in the House a system of intra-party specialized 
committees developed in the absence of adversarial mechanisms of 
choice: so that, even though ideological disputes remained a key 
element in intra-party debate, conflict at this level was conceived 
of as being basically positive-sum rather than as the zero-sum clash 
of 'adversary politics'. Secondly, the mechanism of choice based 
upon a simple acceptance or rejection of the executive's prior 
decision, or an acceptance of the hierarchically structured authority 
patterns between Government and backbenchers, was often inappropriate 
at the mezzo-level. Finally, specialization was also facilitated at 
this level in so far as the theory of party representation actually 
supports an intra-party division of labour under the shared ideological 
frame of the party manifesto. 
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Thus in line with the model, developed in Chapter 3, the mezzo-level 
structure of party committees is a direct reflection of the propitious 
representative and political circumstances present at that level of 
parliamentary organization. Our argument has been that the extent of 
specialization is dependent upon the particular mix of key 
representative and political contextual factors; a relationship which 
is outlined again in Diagram 8.1. 
DIAGRAM 8.1 Political and representational influences upon the 
extent of formal specialization 
Extent of formal 
specialization Political and Representational Variables 
Highly 
developed 
Restricted 
development 
Nature of 
ideological 
conflict 
Ideological -
non adversary 
Le. positive 
sum 
Ideological -
adversary 
Le. zero-sum 
Authority 
Structures 
Non 
hierarchical 
decentralized 
Hierarchical 
centralized 
Representative 
style and focus 
Functional) focus 
Party ) 
'Delegate style 
National ) f 
. • 1) ocus Terr~tor~a 
Trustee style 
On this basis it is possible to predict that a highly developed formal 
division of labour would develop when a non-adversarial style of 
decision-making is combined with non-hierarchical authority structures 
and an emphasis on delegatory styles of representation. Alternatively, 
a legislature organized on an adversarial basis, with a clear distinction 
between executive and non-executive Members in the Chamber and an 
emphasis on trustee styles of representation would be less likely to 
develop a systematic division of labour. Between these two extremes 
the extent of formal specialization would be anticipated to vary in 
accordance with the specific mix of political and representational 
elements of the legislative environment. 
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In Chapter 4 the utility of this model, in the context of legislatures 
in the United States, was briefly eX3mined, and it may prove to be of 
value at this juncture to restate those findings. and to further the 
comparative analysis of specialization by examining the bases of the 
committee system of the West German Bundestag. In the United States 
Congress it is clear that each of the three environmental elements, which 
have been identified as being conducive to the development of systematic 
specialization, are in fact present. In accordance with the first 
element of our model it is apparent that partisan-adversaria1 conflict is 
not a major feature of Congressional decision-making. Although party 
considerations are of importance to individual Congressmen, seldom are 
they the crucial factor in determining Congressmens' votes. Thus the 
occasions of 'party voting', when 90% of one party votes against 90% of 
the other, is extremely limited. Julius Turner. for example. found that 
only 17% of all roll-calls between 1921-1948 had this degree of party 
h . (5) co eSl.on. In a revised version of Turner's work, Edward V. Schneier 
found that 'party voting' varied from 8% in 1959 to only 1% in 1966. (6) 
Thus, as a general rule in Congress, the more important an issue is 
perceived to be, the greater the tendency for Congressmen to emphasize 
non-party facets of their legislative role. Correspondingly, it is of no 
surprise to discover that 'ideology' generally plays little part in 
influencing most Congressmen's decisions. Matthews and Stimson 
discovered from their interviews with Representatives that very few 
made decisions "largely on the basis of ideology". (7) Only 5% of 
Congressmen believed that ideological considerations were "almost 
always" a major factor in determining their vote, just under half (48%) 
claimed that such considerations "seldom" affected their vote and at 
least 107. claimed that ideology "never" featured in their decisions. 
The significance of these results for our model is that ideology "as 
an elegant solution to the problem of making reasoned choices from 
limited information on matters of great complexity" through its 
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invocation "of uniform criteria to handle disparate issues" (8) is 
remarkably under-developed in the U.S. Congress. 
The second element of the model involves an examination of the nature 
of the authority hierarchies within the legislature. If we start 
with the executive hierarchy, by which we mean the differentiation of 
representatives into strata according to their tenure of executive or 
non-executive positions, then it is possible to suggest that where 
such differentiation is absent centralized leadership, which is 
'authoritative' due to the possession of superior knowledge derived 
from expert bureaucratic advice, and 'authorized' by the support of 
the majority of representatives in the assembly, will also be lacking. 
Without such leadership, which provides a central focus for decision-
making and which demands of non-executive members only that they 
ratify or reject executive decisions, representatives are forced to 
adopt other criteria of choice. This is not, of course, to argue 
that even with a formal separation of powers the executive does not 
provide a focus of leadership within the legislature. Indeed, the 
case of the U.S. Congress demonstrates that the President does provide 
some form of leadership within the legislature; clearly, the Presidential 
programme consumes the bulk of Congressional energies and constitutes 
the greatest number of public laws enacted, even though it constitutes 
only 5% of th~ total number of bills introduced· into Congress. (9) 
Yet executive influence remains of restricted significance in 
determining Congressional choice. For: 
"the President's position on legislative proposals 
helps define the nature of the issue to Congressmen 
more than it serves as an authoritative evaluation 
for them in a situation of nearly total ignorance, 
members find it handy to know where the President 
stands, especiallY (but not only) if the President 
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is of the Congressman's party. This, however, may 
have relatively little to do with how they vote". (10) 
Significantly what the constitution rends asunder in terms of 
centralized executive leadership in Congress, party leadership and 
seniority leadership has been unable to piece back together. (11) 
The 'style' and 'focus' of representation forms the third crucial 
part of our model. In line with the hypothesis expounded in Chapter 
3, that specialization is compatible in theory with only a restricted 
range of representative theories, the implicit assumption of the model 
is that a formal division of labour will be most highly developed 
where a delegate style and a specific focus of representation are 
pronounced. The American representative practice appears to support 
this contention as there is a strong tradition of delegatory 
orientations within Congress. Indeed some commentator~ argue that 
the strength of delegatory styles and narrow foci in the House of 
Representatives has a detrimental effect on Congressional policy-making: 
"The country at large has become urban, suburban and 
metropolitan. Its economic, social, educational and 
technological activities are increasingly performed 
by huge national bureaucratic organizations. But on the 
Capitol Hill the 19th century ethos of the small town, 
the independent farmer, and the small businessmen is 
still entrenched behind the institutional defences 
which have developed in this century to insulate 
Congress from the new America". (12) 
While Huntington's argument is perhaps over-stated, there is sufficient 
empirical evidence to show that most members of the House of 
Representatives acknowledge the need to pay attention to the views of 
their constituents: 70% of all members of the House of Representatives 
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were found by R.iese1bach to pay heed to the wishes of constituents on 
at least some occasion, (13) and 65% held their district to be their 
prime focus of representation. (14) One consequence of such 
pronounced delegate orientations is that Congressmen normally seek 
direct "constituency pay-offs" from their legislative activity. Direct 
benefits for the constituency accruing most effectively from service 
on one of the so called "pork and interest" connnittees such as 
Agriculture, Interior, Public Works, Merchant Marine and Fisheries. (15) 
So that there is an observable relationship between connnittee membership 
and representative role orientations, for as W.L. Morrow states: "The 
source of many stable connnittee roles is due in no small part to the 
fact that most connnittees are dominated by members whose constituencies 
are heavily concerned with the committee's work". (16) Hence the 
highly developed formal division of labour cultivated in the vacuum 
of the non-adversarial, non-hierarchically structured (17) environment 
of Congress is further propagated by its compatibility with the 
prevailing notion of representation. Each of the three elements 
specified in the model on page 324 as being conducive to the development 
of a formal division of labour are thus present in the U.S. Congress. 
Yet it may be argued that the model is in fact 'tailor-made' to 
reflect the particular political and representational environment of 
the U.S. Congress and therefore is of little value in predicting the 
extent of formal specialization in other national legislatures. A 
more rigorous test of the model, therefore, is perhaps provided by an 
examination of the bases of the connnittee system of the Bundestag in 
West Germany. The Bundestag has, since its inception in 1949, operated 
a system of standing committees, supplemented on occasion by special 
and investigatory committees. Initially 39 standing connnittees were 
established, but by the sixth Bundestag (1969-1972) this number had 
been reduced to 15; although the number did increase to 19 after the 
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general election of 1972. Each committee 'shadows' a department of 
state and considers the legislation within that area. Although 
formally the whole House is supposed to discuss the basic principles 
of a bill before referring it to a committee for detailed consideration, 
in practice parliamentary discussion begins in committee and in many 
instances effectively ends there. While committees do report back 
to the House outlining changes and major differences of opinion 
during their deliberations the chances of rejection of their proposals 
in the Chamber are remote. (18) In addition to legislative 
proposals, the standing committees also have referred to them 
Government reports, resolutions and other discussion documents for 
investigation, and most committees regularly interrogate Ministers on 
their "annual departmental appropriation as well as other problems of 
interest to the committee, whether specifically referred to them by 
the Bundestag or not". (19) The importance of standing committees 
within the West German Federal Parliament is. therefore. considerable. 
Indeed, one reflection of their significance is to be seen in the fact 
that the Bundestag is outstanding amongst the national Parliaments in 
the European Economic Community as the best informed and most 
influential controller of its national government's policy in Brussels. 
The greater influence of the Bundestag than other national Parliaments 
is accredited by Juliet Lodge as being "largely a result of the reliance, 
for the discharge of parliamentary business, on committees since the 
bipartisanship this involves is more effective in bringing concerted 
pressure to bear on the Government than the 'verbal pyrotechnics' in 
debates associated with the old-fashioned business of ••••• British 
Parliamentary procedure". (20) 
The very mention of 'bipartisanship' leads onto a consideration of 
the significance of partisan-adversary politics in the Bundestag. 
In contrast to the style of the U.S. Congress, partisan allegiances 
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are pronounced in the West German legislature. From the origins of 
a multi-party system in 1949, when ten parties gained representation 
in the Chamber, recent experience has witnessed the establishment of 
a three-party system of CDU-CSU, SPD and FDP. (21) In turn, the 
dominance of these parties has led to "a strongly polarized and 
competitive system of two rival parties, or party coalitions, the 
rationale of which has become more or less similar to that of 
English-style alternating party government". (22) In other words a 
system which favours 'winner take all' strategies where the victorious 
majority expect and is expected by the electorate to translate 
the political programme into practice. Governments (both CDU-CSU and 
SPD-FDP) have been aided in this task by the high degree of party 
cohesion within the Bundestag. In the third Parliament (1957-1961), 
for example, on the 46 ballot votes taken, an average of 98% of Members 
voted with the plurality of other Members in their respective parties. 
More recently J.P. Mackintosh observed that the small majority of the 
SPD-FDP coalition after the 1976 general election meant in effect that 
"every member had to stand in line" (24) in voting in the House. 
But party unity has deeper roots than simple political expediency, for 
cohesion is essentially a product of German party history, of the class 
basis of parties and the ideological commitment of their foundation. 
Above all, however, unity, in Loewenberg's eyes, is a consequence of the 
high degree of party organization which "permits the parties to 
negotiate their internal differences in private and to reach a caucus 
decision which its members are willing to support solidly in public". 
The conditions for 'adversary politics', as defined by Nevil Johnson as 
"the maintenance of relationships of political competition through 
a mode of argument which assumes that political questions can best be 
resolved if expressed in terms of two and only two contrasting 
alternatives", (26) thus appear to be ripe in the Bundestag. But 
(23) 
(25) 
331 
such a conclusion would misrepresent the true German experience. 
Firstly, the ballot votes analyzed above are a procedural device used 
exclusively for political gain to highlight differences of opinion 
between the party groupings. It is only to be expected, therefore, 
that bipolarization and party unity would be most pronounced on these 
occasions, and in practice ballot votes form only a minute proportion 
of votes in the legislative proce3S. On other votes the tradition 
of the Bundestag has been one of a remarkable consensus between 
government and opposition parties. In the early 1960s, for example, 
the Opposition SPD party supported the legislative proposals of the 
Government in 90% of the votes of enactment. (27) Ultimately, 
therefore, although the potential for an adversary style of 
parliamentary behaviour exists, and occasionally manifests itself, in 
practice the tendency towards bipolarization is cut across by 
countervailing forces most notably those of the relationship 
between the executive and the legislature, and of the representative 
tradition in Germany. 
The relationship between the executive and legislative branches of 
government in Germany is more intricate and involved than that in 
either the United States or Great Britain. In practice the Chancellor 
and his Cabinet are recruited from the Bundestag and are, therefore, 
both "in and of" Parliament; but at the same time parliamentary and 
public conceptions of the role of the Bundestag still emphasize the 
established belief that the legislature should act as a corporate 
opponent to the executive. "Traditionally" as Nevil Johnson remarks 
"Government and Parliament have kept each other at arms' length". 
Whilst this distance has shortened in the Federal Republic there 
remains no single continuous authority hierarchy in the Bundestag 
(28) 
whereby the Government acts as the sole source of leadership, as the 
'authoritative' voice in determining the choices of its supporters. 
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For in the Bundestag the authority hierarchy is fragmented, with the 
leadership of the executive and the leadership of the party being 
divorced. Unlike the position in the British executive there exists 
a complete separation between the organization of the Cabinet and 
of the parliamentary party leadership. "This element of organizational 
discontinuity" not only complicates the relations between leaders and 
followers in the parliamentary parties but also "reinforces the 
disposition that German M.P.s would have in any case to regard 
themselves as ••••• members of the Bundestag first and members of their 
party second". (29) Moreover, in the fragmentation of the leadership 
structure, and the reinforcement of the 'independent' position of the 
non-executive M.P.s, one simple mechanism of choice that of 'voting 
with the leadership' is subverted. Other mechanisms of choice 
have consequently to be utilized; most particularly those rational 
methods based upon expertise and the development of spe~ialization. 
But, as already argued, it is not a sufficient condition for the 
development of a formal division of labour merely that either criteria 
for decision-making, namely partisan allegiance or 'leadership 
hierarchies', should be de-emphasized, but, of considerable importance 
also, is the requisite of support in the political culture for 
representative theories capable of supporting, or at the very least 
j;ustifying, specialization within the legislature. In line with the 
third element of our model, therefore, it is of significance that there 
exists in the German political culture a strong and continuous 
tradition of functional representation in the legislature. In the 
Second Empire the strength of notions of functional representation 
was confirmed, as new economic and social groups organized in the 
wake of industrialization, sought to defend their interests by 
delegating parliamentary spokesmen. As Loewenberg argues it was 
pointless in this period for a Parliament, constitutionallY cut off 
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from the exercise of executive functions, to express general views on 
governmental policy. M.P.s could nevertheless be quite effective 
in the defence of special interests; as parliamentary approval was 
required for enactment of legislation and appropriations. Thus 
representatives in Parliament regarded themselves, and were regarded 
by their electorates, as agents for particular economic and social 
interests. The same pattern of representation was repeated in the 
Weimar Republic when again representatives "were accustomed to 
regarding themselves, and to being regarded, exclusively as instructed 
delegates of special interests". (30) This conception of 
representation is still prevalent in the Federal Republic, and its 
survival is in no small part encouraged by the proportional element of 
the electoral system which allows parties to make nominations according 
to the 'interest' to be represented. 
Moreover, notions of representation which emphasize a delegate 'style' 
and a specific 'focus' also logically promote specialization on the 
part of individual representatives, and are generally accowmodative 
to a formal division of labour within the representative assembly. 
It is perhaps no coincidence, therefore, to find that the procedural 
arrangements of the Prussian House of Representatives (which have 
had a considerable effect on the subsequent development of 
parliamentary procedure in Germany) provided for a system of 
specialized committees at a time when the representative function was 
conceived purely in terms of delegatory theory. (31) Similarly, 
it is possible to argue that the continuing strength of functional 
theory faci Htated the re-ado'ption of a specialized committee sys tern 
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in 1949. 
Functional-delegatory orientations towards representative duties 
also facilitate the development of bipartisanship in the Bundestag's 
standing committees. For, in spite of committee memberships being 
determined in proportional strength to that of the parties in the 
House party control of these committees is noticeablY weak. 
Indeed, as Loewenberg notes "the system of party appointment of 
committees, designed to assure party influence on committee decisions 
in proportion to their strength, today allows the committees to 
escape from the control of the parties, as well as from the Government 
and Opposition and constitutes them as autonomous preserves of the 
major interest groups within their field of jurisdiction". (32) 
In effect, therefore, interest representatives (along with senior 
parliamentarians) appoint themselves to the relevant committee and in 
so doing severely limit the discretionary powers of party selection 
committees. The ability of interest representatives (33) to gain 
places on specific committees is best illustrated in the case of 
'domestic' committees. On the Social Policy, Labour and Economic 
Affairs committees, for example, the functional representatives within 
the CDU/CSU and the SPD-FDP combine to defend their interests across 
party lines. In this manner specialized functional knowledge becomes 
the main criterion of decision in committee rather than party 
directives. Indeed the flow of influence between party leadership and 
committee members is often the reverse of that in Great Britain, for 
in the Bundestag party leaders are frequently dependent upon the 
expertise of their committee colleagues in the formulation of policy. 
It is clear, therefore, that the political and representational 
environments of the Bundestag and the U.S. Congress, whilst being 
substantially different, do, nevertheless, contain the three essential 
(34) 
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features identified in our model as pre-requisites for the development 
of a highly organized and effective internal division of labour. In 
each case there is a marked absence of both adversary politics and 
centralized leadership within the legislature. And, moreover, in 
both pOlitical cultures there continues to exist strong strands of 
representative theories, emphasizing delegatory 'styles' and specific 
'foci' of representation, which are capable of rationalizing a formal 
division of labour within the representative assembly. When we come 
to consider the environment of the British House of Commons, however, 
the position is radically different. 
Committees in the House of Commons 
"Advocacy of an extended House of Commons committee 
system has so long a history in this century and 
has enjoyed such persistent support from political 
theorists (some of whom have also been practising 
pOliticians) that it is tempting to ascribe to 
obscurantism the refusal of the Commons to act 
on the advice offered to them". (35) 
The resistance of the House to a systematic division of labour is 
more profoundly based, however, than on simple 'obscurantism': the 
political constraints upon structural reform of the House are real 
and seemingly overwhelming. For all three of the elements, identified 
in the preceding model, as being anti-thetical to the development of 
formal specialization are in fact central to the operational and 
normative system of the Commons. Partisan competition, the 
differentiation of executive from non-executive roles in the House 
and the absence of supportive theories of representation combine 
together to impede a systematization of the committee structure. Indeed 
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the existing committee 'structure' in the Commons is perhaps the 
classic illustration of organizational malformation arising out of a 
specific mix of pOlitical and representational factors. Never have 
committees exercised policy-making functions on behalf of the House 
as a whole: rather they have been regarded primarily as tools for 
expediting government business, through the consideration of the 
technical details of legislation, or for performing duties for which 
the House as a corporate body is unsuited, such as the collection and 
analysis of technical data. Never, in other words, have committees 
of the House provided for systematic specialization in the Commons. 
Standing Committees 
Nowhere is organizational mutation better illustrated than in the 
standing committees of Westminster. Standing committees are permanent 
in title only. In practice 'each committee is reconstituted for each 
separate bill, so that in 1970-1 the eight standing committees acted as 
fifty distinct groups in considering fifty Bills and in 1972-3 the 
eight committees considered forty-five Bills in forty-five different 
groups. (36) Unlike their counterparts in the U.S. Congress and West 
German Bundestag, modern British legislative committees make no claim 
to be specialized in the sense of heightening group expertise through 
constant attention to a single issue area. Modern practice in this 
instance marks a retreat from the original intentions of the creators 
of the standing committee scheme, for initially three committees, 
dealing respectively with the issues of law, commerce and Scottish 
matters, functioned on a specialized basis between 1882 and 1906. (37) 
Since 1907, and the implementation of the lettered system of committees, 
only the two Scottish Standing Committees have operated on a specialized 
basis, albeit in the heterogeneous realm of 'Scottish' legislation. 
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However, the Report of the 1977-8 Select Committee on Procedure 
dissents from the view that British standing committees operate in 
an unspecialized manner. In particular the Committee disagreed 
with the Study of Parliament Group's claim that "it is not generally 
appreciated the extent to which specialization and permanence are 
lacking in the present system of standing commitees", (38) preferring 
instead the view that "while permanence is certainly lacking, we 
believe that the present standing committee system embodies precisely 
the kind of specialization which is appropriate to the consideration 
of bills, namely the participation of those Members who have either 
a specialized knowledge of, or interest in, the subject matter of 
the particular bill under consideration" ~ . (39) Some twenty years 
earlier Sir Kenneth Wheare had reached a similar conclusion that 
standing committees "by adjusting their membership to members' 
interests give much more scope to special knowledge and interest than 
might seem possible at first' sight". (40) Wheare's assessment 
was made at the time of the 'two-tier' system of membership of 
standing committees whereby a 'nucleus' of twenty Members were 
selected for service on a lettered committee for the duration of a 
session and M.P.s with 'specialist' knowledge were then added for the 
consideration of individual bills. The theory behind this scheme 
was that a degree of expertise would be brought to bear in the 
scrutiny of legislation on two counts: firstly it should have been 
possible for the nucleus to develop some minimal competence in a 
particular subject area if bills from a particular department were 
considered regularly by the same committee. Secondly, the 'first-hand' 
knowledge of the 'added' Members should have contributed to increasing 
the level of expertise on the committee. The practice, however, was 
radically different from the theory. In a study of the scrutiny of 
legislation from the Ministries of Agriculture and Fisheries, and 
Housing and Local Government, Kimber and Richardson found, for example, 
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that the nucleus system did little to raise the level of specialization 
in standing committees primarily because "the House, while sending 
the bills of the two departments virtuallY to the 'same' committee 
each time (A and D respectively) managed to send a different set of 
members to discuss the bill so that virtually all that two consecutive 
committees on the same topic had in common was the identifying letter 
of the alphabet". (41) By 1959 the Select Committee on Procedure 
had also come to recognize that the distinction between 'nucleus' 
and 'added' members was "artificial and serves no useful purpose" 
and went on to recommend that in future membership of standing 
(42) 
committees should be appointed in respect of each bill, taking into 
account the composition of the House and the qualifications of Members. 
In accepting this recommendation the House sought not to increase 
parliamentary specialization in the consideration of bills, but 
rather to bring the available expertise possessed by individual Members 
of Parliament to bear in specific instances. Yet assessments of 
this change, made by British academics, tend to obfuscate the distinction 
between expertise as specialist knowledge and specialization as the 
process of division of labour. Thus Crick contends that "the change 
in the composition of standing committees in 1960 towards greater 
specialism was more apparent than real"; (43) Kimber and Richardson 
in a more empirical vein adjudged that "the degree of specialization 
changed very little after the abandonment of the nucleus system, and 
although the committees were slightly more specialized, they were not 
significantly so". (44) H.V. Wiseman stands out, therefore, for 
the precision of his analysis that "the abolition of the distinction 
between the nucleus and the added members was only marginally, if at 
all, a move towards specialization. The changes in 1960 simply 
recognized that it was individual Members who specialized and all 
that was needed was to get them on to the committee". (45) 
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The confusion over the usage of the term 'specialization'; either to 
mean the product of (i.e. expertise), or the process of, a division 
of labour has continued to plague the subsequent debate on the position 
of standing committees. A good illustration of the different usage 
of the term is provided in the conflicting assessments of the extent 
of specialization made by the 1977-8 Procedure Committee on the one 
side, and the Study of Parliament Group, on the other. In this 
dispute (46) 'the Study Group conceived of specialization as the 
process of a division of labour whilst the Committee interpreted 
specialization to mean expertise on the part of individual M.P.s. Yet, 
in claiming that this latter form of 'specialization' was the kind most 
appropriate for the consideration of bills, the Committee appear to 
have been unaware of the inconsistency of their argument. For 
'expertise' in Parliament, as revealed in Chapters 6 and 7. largely 
derives from extra-parliamentary activity, in as much as, outside 
occupation and other 'personal experience' appear to be the main sources 
of specialist knowledge in the House. Yet as John Page M.P. argued in 
the House, for such 'expert' M.P.s to maintain their status they are 
required to continue with their extra-parliamentary activities. 
"My view is that the contributions that people make 
••••• in the House are in exact measure to their 
personal and current experience of the matter 
under discussion. I therefore hope that the 
honourable Member will not fall into the trap 
that some of his honourable friends have done 
and divorce himself from his previous existence -
his previous way of earning his living so 
that he can keep fresh a~d topped up with his 
knowledge of affairs outside the House; otherwise 
he will find that he tends to become only the 
(47) 
mouthpiece of journalists". 
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If this is the case, then outside employment provides not only the 
source of expertise but also detracts from the time available for 
Members to serve on standing committees: as such occupations are 
normally pursued in the mornings and early afternoons the very 
times of standing committee sittings. Not unnaturally, therefore, 
businessmen, barristers and solicitors are groups of habitual 
absentees from standing committees. Members of the legal profession 
in particular appear to have established an almost recognized right 
not to be called upon to serve on these committees. (48) 
The onus of active standing committee membership would appear, 
therefore, to fall particularly heavily on full-time Members who in the 
Page- Fairlie mould (49) are not held to be true experts. However, 
academic observers such as J.A.G. Griffiths have been able to identify 
"specialists and experts on particular matters" who serv~ frequently 
on standing committees dealing with such issues as housing and 
planning, health services, etc. Notably Griffiths cites as the 
source of expertise in these instances "chairmanship or membership of 
select committees of the House", (50) so that the benefits of 
parliamentary specialization, through service on select committees, 
appear to be reaped occasionally in legislative activity. The 
relationship between select and standing committee activity will be 
considered shortly, for the moment, however, let us consider the 
selection process for membership of legislative committees. 
Members of standing committees are officially chosen by the Committee 
of Selection, but in practice the Whips of either party select the 
representatives for their respective sides. Hence loyalty to the 
leadership's line is a key determinant of a backbencher's chances of 
selection. Expertise or interest in the subject under consideration 
tends, therefore, to be a subsidiary but still important factor. The 
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importance of specialist knowledge is, however, elevated when a party 
is in Opposition and the need for a 'team' of knowledgeable backbenchers 
to support the frontbench spokesmen in committee is acknowledged by 
the Whips. When the party is in office the necessity for an expert 
advisory team of backbenchers is removed, as the Minister then has 
the services of the bureaucracy to call upon. Hence, the Government 
Whips often expect their backbenchers to make a contribution in 
committee solely through their presence, as John Roper M.P. explains: 
"Government backbenchers often exclude themselves 
from debate, whichever party is in power. The 
Whips ask them to do so in order to expedite the 
passage of legislation ••••• I am sure that to the 
public it seems very foolish when they see 
honourable Members sitting upstairs in committee 
for hours or days on end saying nothing, not 
because they have nothing constructive to say 
but because the Government is worried about time". (51) 
Work in standing committees for Government backbenchers can, therefore, 
often appear tedious and time-consuming, and in consequence the Whips 
may encounter problems in recruiting members for committee service on 
all but the most contentious pieces of legislation. 
The importance of specialist knowledge as the criterion for decision-
making by government backbenchers in committee tends, therefore, to be 
undermined in this process. Invariably more powerful influences 
than expertise in a subject s~ay their vote. The stance adopted by 
the Minister; his claim to authoritative pronouncement on the issue 
(a claim based upon the differentiation of parliamentary and executive 
roles, and the advice of functional agencies) are powerful determinants 
of backbench decision-making. Frequently Ministers confront their 
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backbench colleagues with legislative 'packages', worked out in detail 
with the affected interests and the bureaucracy, and which they are 
unwilling to see amended in the confines of standing committees. 
Indeed Michael Thomas M.P. notes: 
"So necessary, apparently, has it become for the 
Government to consult and to bargain with pressure 
groups on both major planks of policy and the most 
extensive range of detailed matters that 
Parliament is faced constantly with faits accomplis. 
In matters of legislation and executive decision, the 
political majority is wheeled out to rubber-stamp the 
compromises to the corporate state. Parliament is 
often even kept in ignorance of the alternative 
courses of action considered in the horse-trading 
of interest groups with each other and the executive. 
This will usually have been conducted in an 
atmosphere of secrecy which is preserved within the 
Government by the doctrine of collective responsibility 
and in the interest groups by enjoinders not to 
encourage Parliament to upset the carefully 
stitched together compromise package eventually 
presented to it for fear that one change will 
undo a carefully sewn-up garment". (52) 
A second feature undermining the importance of specialist knowledge as 
a criterion for decision-making is the adversary procedure of standing 
committees. Although in theory cross-voting would appear to be 
encouraged by the more intimate nature of committee activity, and 
the possibility of the Government reversing any defeat on Report; in 
practice the effects of bipartisanship are negligible. (53) For 
the most part standing committees can best be regarded, therefore, as 
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the House operating with a smaller quorum. Party dictate invariably 
relieves individual backbenchers of the necessity of deciding upon 
the merits of a particular clause for themselves: 
"In practice, backbenchers are faced consistently 
with the problem of lack of resources, information 
and sheer time and are often driven at the end of 
the day to decide issues not on their merits but on 
the grounds of whether it is a serious enough 
matter to be worth the opprobrium of upsetting 
the party Whips or joining the 'rock the boat' 
school. When that happens, even when the party 
political content of the decision is imperceptible 
even with a microscope and to the most determined 
observer, when Parliament is constantly 
predisposed by the system, by its procedure an,d 
by the inclinations of the frontbenches to 
operate like this, it is not surprising that the 
Government of the day effectively propose and 
dispose on all but the most important or the 
most trivial matters". (54) 
For the most part, therefore, the influence of government backbenchers 
remains potential rather than actual. Executive dominance, founded 
upon party loyalty, effectively reduces the backbench role to one of 
providing ballast on most committees. 
On the Opposition benches on standing committees, however, the role 
of the backbencher is somewhat different and the value placed upon 
the specialist knowledge of backbenchers is considerably higher. In 
the first instance, the rigid hierarchy of roles between frontbenchers 
and backbenchers is less apparent, with 'teamwork' being more 
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pronounced and with spokesmen actually welcoming knowledgeable support 
from their backbench colleagues in the absence of departmental 
information and briefing. As Wa1k1and points out, on most bills the 
Opposition forms an ad hoc organization to draft amendments and to 
consider any government or other amendments tabled in committee; the 
nucleus of these ad hoc groups being recruited from the relevant 
backbench party subject groups. (55) In addition, backbenchers on 
a standing committee may regularly meet with the frontbench spokesman 
to discuss strategy. In this way the Opposition effort in committee 
tends to be more internally co-ordinated, with the frontbencher acting 
much more as a party spokesman than the Minister who acts primarily 
as the departmental spokesman and only secondarily as the voice of 
the party. 
Contributions to standing committee deliberations by opposition 
backbenchers (and government "backbenchers for that matter) may also 
be welcomed when the Member speaks 'authoritatively' for some 
organized, affected interest. Indeed pressure groups have long 
. 
nurtured contacts with ~1.P.s serving on standing committees, in their 
attempts to secure amendments to bills and to gain further information 
on the intentions of the Government. These contacts have been 
developed to such an extent that at times, "this servicing by 
professionals and experts comes close in its drafting and briefing 
to the service provided for the Minister by his department". (56) 
It is not without significance, therefore, that the importance of 
specialist knowledge is highlighted in the Opposition party in those 
periods when the 'authority hierarchy' separating frontbenchers and 
backbenchers is not rigidly reinforced by the parallel differentiation 
between members of the Government and backbenchers; and when the 
representation of functional interests can be accommodated into the 
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partisan challenge of the Government's programme. Yet ultimately 
the dominant elements of the parliamentary environment impinge upon 
the operation of standing committees to reduce the value attached to 
the possession of specialist knowledge. Adversary confrontation 
and executive dominance within the committee removes the necessity 
of making decisions according to a detailed understanding of the issues 
involved and renders choice into the much simpler form of whether to 
support or to oppose the prior decisions of the party leadership. 
Select Committees 
In 1970-1 and 1972-3 no fewer than twenty-two select committees sat in 
each session. The functions of these committees varied enormously 
fromp·urely domestic administration of the House's own affairs, (57) 
through investigatory work, (58) to ad hoc committees .on legislation 
and on specific policies. (60) Yet these committees were not 
organized on a systematic basis; rather they constituted, in the 
opinion of one M.P., a "total hotchpot" (61) and were likened by 
another Member to a "patchwork quilt, which covers part of the 
administrative bed much more completely than is needed, and does not 
cover other, parts at all". (62) 
The reasons for the failure of the House to develop a system of 
committees an extensive formal division of labour are not hard to 
find given the ascendency of the executive, the adversary procedure 
and the prevailing conceptions of representation within the Commons. 
Indeed, in the peculiar political cauldron of the British House of 
Commons agreement has never even been reached on the advisability, 
let alone the necessity, of formal specialization. The compromise 
reached in the long-running debate between 'committee men' and 'floor 
men' in the House has resulted in the patchwork pattern whereby select 
(59) 
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committees have been appointed in restricted fields and with very 
little autonomony. In essence the committees have corne to perform "the 
work for which the House itself is not fitted finding out of 
the facts of the case, the examining of witnesses; the sifting of 
evidence, the drawing up of reasoned conclusions". (63) 
The advocates of reform of the House through specialization chose, 
in the 1960s, to base their case for the development of the committee 
system upon the existing compromise. The operation of the 
investigatory-advisory committees such as the Public Accounts, Estimates 
and Nationalized Industries Committees was cited as the precedent for 
further innovation. The reformist strategy seemingly hinged upon 
the need to convince the House and the executive alike of the 
incremental nature of their demands, of the simple progression from the 
existing base to some more structured pattern of committee activity. 
In this manner the model of inVestigatory-advisory committees then in 
existence the model of compromise became the stepping stone 
towards greater parliamentary specialization. Yet, precisely because 
it was the model of compromise, a compromise forged in the specific 
political and representative flux of the House, the model contained 
within it inherent limitations as to its capacity to develop into an 
effective, systematized division of labour. The reformers, whose 
avowed interest was to exercise greater control over the executive 
through the development of the committee system, chose nevertheless 
to overlook these restrictions or even to argue that they were not 
constraints at all. Thus, paradoxically the Public Accounts, 
Estimates and Nationalized Industries Committees were regarded as 
suitable precedents for reform, not because they threatened the 
Government's control of the Commons, not because they challenged the 
partisan procedure in the House, but precisely because they refrained 
from posing such threats. 
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The precursors of the 1966 extension of the select co~ittee 'system' 
all functioned primarily as information gatherers and sifters. The 
Public Accounts Committee (P.A.C.), assisted by the Comptroller and 
Auditor General and the staff of the Exchequer and Audit Department, 
concerned itself with the 'facts' relating to the regularity of 
expenditure and to waste, extravagance and overspending by central 
departments. But as a fact-finder the P.A.C. did not always know 
where relevant information was to be found, nor have access to all 
information, nor even present its facts in the best possible manner. 
Similarly, the original remit of the Estimates Committee was to elicit 
information, but this time on the details of the Annual Supply 
Estimates; though the Committee soon ceased examining in detail the 
figures published in the Estimates, preferring instead to enquire into 
the manner in which public money was being spent, and the extent to 
which government policy behind such expenditure was baing fulfilled. 
Yet the success of the Committee in either role was limited for, as 
(64) 
(65) 
Sir Richard Clarke comments: "taking the whole experience (of the 
Committee since) the war ••••• it must be debated whether the contribution 
was commensurate with the amount of effort of Members concerned and of 
officials who were the main witnesses. Not very many of the reports 
had much impact on Ministers and Whitehall, and influenced what actually 
happened: nor did they always perform the other equally important 
role of Select Committee reports, to inform Parliament and public 
opinion and create better public knowledge and improve the quality of 
public debate". (66) 
Thirdly, the Nationalized Industries Committee also sought to check 
the actions of the executive, in relation to their dealings with the 
public corporations, through the collection and publication of 
information. Indeed, since its inception in 1956 the Select Committee 
has provided a mass of information on the capital requirements and the 
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financial objectives of the Nationalized Industries. More than a~y 
other, the Select Committee on the Nationalized Industries was regarded 
as the model for future reform through specialization. Crick, in 
the vanguard of the reformist movement in 1964 argued: "beyond doubt 
the Committee's work has led to significant changes in administration, 
even in policy, and to a far greater knowledge of the subjects in 
question among M.P.s". (67) However, a step back from the frontline 
of the reform movement provides a better perspective from which to 
view the achievements of the Committee. From this position Coombes 
provided a more reserved judgement on the Select Committee's impact, (68) 
and a former chairman of the Committee counselled " ••••• the Committee 
should be judged (on the) ••••• influence of its reports and evidence on 
debate in the House. Here I am sometimes disappointed. I know some 
of our reports have been long and fairly solid reading, but I am not 
convinced that many of my fellow M.P.s actually read the~. Members 
cry out for more information'on many topics. When it is provided they 
say it is for the expert and do not always trouble to study it". 
But in- following the candle light of reforming zeal the 1960's 
reformers were willing to stumble over a few misgivings about the 
(69) 
impact of committees without lowering the flame to see exactly what 
the obstacle was. The beauty of the established select committees 
for such people was that they operated on bipartisan lines. Both the 
Estimates Committee and the Nationalized Industries Committee were 
willing to consider questions of policy but issues which were 
mainly beyond the boundaries of party conflict. The bipartisan ethos 
was willingly stressed by the reformers but, significantly, the inherent 
limitations upon the scope of party concord went unremarked; 
limitations which were plain to see, even to the Chairman of the 
Estimates Committee: 
"The Committee is enabled by its restricted remit 
to conduct its enquiries ••••• in a non-party 
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atmosphere, which makes it easier for reports to 
be agreed to and eliminates almost entirely the 
need for divisions". (70) 
Limitations which were apparent also to academic observers, hence 
David Coombes noted in the case of the Nationalized Industries Committee 
that "it is in the Committee's own self interest not to deal with 
matters which would divide its members on party lines. If the 
Committee did so divide, its proceedings would be bogged dO"Nn in 
deliberations and debate". (71) 
In addition to bipartisanship, however, the established committees 
were also attractive to the incrementalist reformers of the 1960s as 
they did not undermine the convention of ministerial responsibility. 
To salve ministerial sensitivities, advocates of an exte~sion of the 
committee system persistently pointed to the fact that the established 
select committees did not infringe executive prerogatives. Harry 
Hanson adopted this stratagem in 1964 when he claimed: "in a sense 
the pass (for a coherent system of committees) has already been sold 
by the establishment of the Estimates Committee and the Select Committee 
on the Nationalized Industries, both of which have proved their capacity 
to give useful advice without either interfering with the processes of 
administration or invading the territory of ministerial responsibility". (72) 
In similar vein Crick regarded the Nationalized Industries Committee 
as a healthy precedent for reform which did not pose a challenge to 
ministerial responsibility, though he was forced to admit that the 
Committee's investigations had "taken place in a unique area where toe 
Government does not want to take full responsibility and where cross-
bench opinion about such investigations has been remarkably unanimous". (73) 
Nevertheless, the unique context of the investigations of the 
Nationalized Industries Committee did not restrain Crick from proposing 
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an extension of the committee system into areas in which Ministers 
clearly had responsibilities. Indeed, there is little reason why 
Crick should have felt any restraint as he never challenged the 'right' 
., 
of ministerial decision nor the executive's 'right' to pass 
legislation unimpeded by Parliament. 'Strong' government, based upon 
the existing party structure of the House, in combination with 'strong' 
opposition provided for in the probings of committees of "advice, 
scrutiny and investigation" were the keystones of his view of 
Parliament. The contradictions in this schema have led other 
academics to criticize Crick on the grounds that "nowhere ••••• in his 
writings is there an awareness of the difficulty of reconciling his 
twin aims of strong single party government on the one hand with 
comprehensive bipartisan investigatory powers for the House on the 
O ther" • (74) Y t h • l' 11 . d e suc an awareness 1S not oglca y requ1re on 
Crick's part because, for all his talk of parliamentary.control; 
control in the literal sense of the 'command, restraint and regulation' 
of government actions was ultimately in the hands of the electorate. (75) 
Parliament was to be revitalized not as a direct check on the government 
but as the "centre of information, something that broadcasts ideas 
and facts relevant to political decisions". (76) Parliament's true 
function, therefore, was as a link between the public and the executive; 
informing each of the other's opinions. In this model the 
communication function becomes the dynamic of the system, with 
'information' being the key ingredient in the process hence the 
suitability of investigatory committees, charged with the collection 
and dissemination of information, to promote understanding on the part 
of the electorate of the actions of government. Moreover, in the 
collection of information, the committees had no need to question 
ministerial responsibility for policy initiatives; neither were their 
memberships required to adopt adversary stances; for, as long as the 
committees were simply advisory bodies, the necessity of decision was 
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removed from their remit. In turn, as long as parliamentary control 
was defined, or more accurately redefined, to mean 
". f1 d' • ln uence, not lrect power; advlce, not command; 
criticism, not obstruction; scrutiny, not initiation; 
and publicity, not secrecy" (77) 
then the essentials of 20th century parliamentary government were not 
challenged. In this manner, by redefining 'control' to mean its 
opposite, and by propounding a theory of communication which leaves 
the electorate as the sole check upon the executive, Crick evades the 
need to reconcile the contradictions inherent in a model of 
parliamentary control over a strong executive. 
Whilst Crick provides one of the more comprehensive, if nevertheless 
devious, rationales for an extended system of committees; his acceptance 
of executive dominance and adversary procedures in the Commons is far 
from being unique amongst reformers. Indeed, the genealogy of 
reform through specialization has throughout its strongest branch an 
implicit acceptance of the existing political and representational 
environment.. in which the House functions. Thus, back in the 1930s, 
H.J. Laski whilst proposing a series of advisory 'departmental' 
committees to watch over the process of administration and to discuss, 
confidentially, the principles of .bills was at pains to explain that 
such activity was not meant to question the executive function of 
Ministers • Rather committees "would be useful to (a Minister) by 
enabling him to test his policies upon a sample of public opinion before 
they have reached the stage where they can hardly be altered without a 
blow to his prestige, and they would serve the useful purposes of 
training Members in the art of administration, of giving some real 
assurance that debate would be informed, and of bringing civil servants 
into direct contact with Members of the Commons ••••• ". (78) And he 
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went on to argue that "such an enlargement ought not to interfere with 
the Cabinet's control of the main stream of parliamentary activity ••••• 
those who ask for abrogation of any considerable measure of Cabinet 
control are in fact asking for what would be bound to develop into 
the destruction of ministerial responsibility". (79) 
In the desire to be seen not to be challenging Cabinet control some 
later reformers were willing to "lean over backwards to allay the 
suspicions of the executive". (80) Perhaps the epitome of this 
approach was the scheme suggested by Hanson and Wiseman in their 
evidence to the 1958 Procedure Committee. They saw fit, for tactical 
reasons, to suggest a series of investigatory committees which would 
normally be non-voting, which would adopt a non-partisan approach to 
their work and which would keep any communication between Ministers 
and committees entirely confidential. (81) Whilst such a scheme 
may certainly have allayed ministerial fears it would just have equally 
subduced the entire rationale of a formal division of labour. Hanson 
and Wiseman's schema, therefore, represents possibly the nadir of the 
reform movement which sought quantitative reform without qualitative 
change. 
Indeed a characteristic feature of the reform movement, throughout 
the 1960s, was that its political realism, in recognising that change 
could only occur with the support of the executive, was not matched 
by a realistic appraisal of what impact investigatory committees 
could make upon the same executive in a partisan, government dominated 
Chamber. In roundly condemning an earlier proposal, designed to 
"overthrow the existing system of single ministerial control, 
supported as it was by joint Cabinet responsibility" through submitting 
the departments of state to "committee control (in which case) not 
only would the system of single Ministerial control go, but the two 
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party system would go with it", (82) the 1960's generation of 
reformers revealed their innate conservatism. Because, for all that 
Jowett's proposals lacked sophistication and, for all that his analogy 
of 'municipalization' was misplaced, his analysis of the impediments 
to effective parliamentary control through committee specialization 
was as direct and clear as later analyses tended to be tortuous and 
opaque. Not for Jowett were committees separated from policy-making, 
whose influence depended upon investigations designed to 
"a) open up an issue allowing outside opinion to 
focus on the problem before a decision was taken, 
b) inform M.P.s so that debates and questions in 
the House would be more relevant and therefore 
testing for Ministers, c) force departments and 
pressure groups to explain their assumptions, ,and 
d) bring public attention back to the Commons as 
it was the place where these investigations were 
made, as debates then became more informed and as 
the outside interest groups and the public found 
that pressure through the House could occasionally 
persuade governments to modify their policies". (83) 
For just as Jowett's plans have been criticized for being idiosyncratic 
and for "discredit(ing) later and more sophisticated plans for Commons 
committee work", (85) so can the 1960's generation of reformers be 
faulted for the superficial prognosis of the potentialities of their 
schemes for controlling the executive. Nevil Johnson in particular has 
consistently argued that "it was simply naive to assume that the House 
of Commons could be strengthened vis-a-vis the Executive just by 
improving its possibilities for scrutinising the activity of government 
and for making information available". (86) The experience of the 
(84) 
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established select committees should have informed the reformers of the 
sixties of the inherent restrictions upon increasing parliamentary 
'control' through committee investigations in the unique setting of the 
House of Commons. The strength of the-two-party system and the 
dominance of the executive effectively confined committee investigations 
to the margins of politically controversial issues. Furthermore, the 
committees had no autonomous power of decision; acting purely as advisory 
bodies to the House as a whole. Yet for the benefits of a formal 
division of labour to be appreciated an essential requirement_lsthat the 
specialized group of M.P.s on a committee 'control' the decisions made 
within their subject area. It makes little sense, if the rationale of 
the committee system is to provide penetrating scrutiny, for decision to 
be made by the totality of Members on the floor of the Chamber most 
of whom are unable to comprehend the complexities, or are even unaware, 
of committee reports. Yet more than any other legisla~ure in Western 
Europe or North America the Houee of Commons has seen fit to perform 
its major functions on the floor of the Chamber. Control of the 
Government has thus traditionally been exercised through debate on the 
floor of the House, and supporters of this tradition argue that the 
House "is a political forum which protracts the essential debate in the 
electorate, that is a representation of the people which is constantly 
watching Government, constantly asking it questions, striking the 
finger upon weak places ••••• (I)t dOeS this in a particular way, it is 
the power to force a Minister in the Chamber to make a case and to 
sustain that case, whether he is arguing the question that Clause 33 
of a Bill Stand Part or whether he is arguing a major matter of 
Government policy". (87) Even opponents to this view of 'control' 
are willing to acknowledge that general debates "are invaluable as 
occasions on which the Government is forced to explain their actions or 
intentions before a partly hostile audience which can gain the maximum 
of publicity". (88) 
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The continued pre-eminence of debate in the Chamber has much to do with 
the adversary foundation of parliamentary politics and with executive 
proclivity for general deliberation rather than detailed scrutiny. 
However, underpinning such political factors is the essential fact 
that the prevailing conceptions of representation in Britain all tend 
to stress the significance of general debate in the House. Burke, 
as noted in Chapter 3, clearly viewed Parliament as the "deliberative 
assembly of one nation". Similarly Liberal theory emphasized the 
importance of deliberation; to quote J.S. Mill: 
"Representative assemblies are often taunted by 
their enemies with being places of mere talk and 
bavardage. There has seldom been more misplaced 
derision. I know not how a representative assembly 
can more usefully employ itself than in talk, when 
the subject of talk is the great public interests of 
the country, and every sentence of it represents 
the opinion either of some important body of persons 
in the nation, or of an individual in whom some such 
body has reposed their confidence. A place where 
every interest and shade of opinion in the country 
• (89) 
can have its cause even passlonately pleaded ••••• 
The Whig and Liberal emphasis upon deliberation continues to shine 
through the defence of the Charrber by modern parliamentarians, Brian 
Walden echoed this representative tradition in claiming that "the main 
function of a Member of Parliament as a Member of Parliament is in the 
Chamber and his main duty is to have some imagination and some flair 
and some understanding of popular sentiment". (90) But the most 
trenchant defence of the role of the Chamber has rested with Michael 
Foot and Enoch Powell, both of whom have been willing to invoke 19th 
century notions of the Commons as a corporate check upon the executive. 
356 
Thus Foot maintains that: "it is only because of the power and 
authority of the House of Commons, of the floor of the House of Commons 
over the whole of the Palace of Westminster, that minorities have 
access to it and the ability to turn those minorities into majorities 
on major matters, major matters covering the whole field of politics". 
Similarly Enoch Powell (before his membership of the 1977-78 Procedure 
Committee) argued that: 
"The power of this House has always consisted, and 
must by nature consist,: of vote after debate. 
Vote alone is potent, but ••••• vote upon a Question 
proposed at half-past three in the afternoon, 
because the matter has been considered by a 
committee, is not an effective method of discharging 
the control and power of the House. It is the 
combination of debate and vote wherein that power 
lies ••••• There is no substitute in parliamentary 
control for debate and vote". (92) 
The conception of the House acting as a corporate check upon the 
executive appears somewhat anachronistic in the partisan atmosphere of 
the modern House. But the party clash itself can be seen as a sound 
justification for maintaining the Cha~ber at the centre of parliamentary 
activity. Thus Michael Foot has on occasion seen fit to wed notions 
of party representation to the traditional formulations of 
representation and to argue that debate in the Chamber should reflect 
the "clash at elections". (93) A similar marriage of ideas is to 
be found in John Mendelson's belief that "the proposal to create more 
and more specialist committees could completely undermine one cf the 
major purposes of the House of Commons, namely, at all times to carry 
on the great national debate on the important issues of the day". 
His basic fear being that specialist committees would promote a 
(91) 
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tendency towards consensus politics in the House which "could ultimately 
destroy the main element in the functioning of Parliament, which is 
the ability to mount a real political challenge by one side against 
(94) 
the other ••••• " The spectre of consensus politics developing in 
select committees haunts other Labour Members, less certain of the 
pivotal role of debate in the Chamber. Dennis Skinner, for example, 
recently argued in the House that "it is hardly likely that Select 
Committees will go away. They have been with us for a considerable 
number of years. Of course, we may be upset from time to time about 
some of the reports that they produce, but we need to ensure that 
they are fashioned so that they represent conflict as opposed to 
consensus". 
(95) 
Clearly behind all of these statements is a distinct view of the M.P. 
as a party delegate. In the Foot-Mendelson model, individual party 
representatives need to be active across the whole range of public 
affairs in accordance with the first formulation of the theory of 
party representation (96) hence their emphasis upon debate on the 
floor of the House to the detriment of committee specialization. The 
Skinnerian view, on the ether hand, conforms to the second statement 
of party theory; whereby an intra-party division of labour is 
permissible. Yet it may be argued that the model of reform advocated 
in 1975 by Skinner and the National Executive Committee's Study 
Group (97) is one of specialization within the House rather than 
simply within the party. However, if the detail, what little there is, 
of this scheme is examined, then in practice the departmental committees 
would appear likely· to split into party sub-committees, each with their 
own political advisers and each probably producing separate reports. The 
impact that such internally divided committees would be likely to make 
on the executive (which would effectivelY control the majority on 
the committees) is open to question. What appears to be beyond 
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doubt, however, is that the proposed departrr~nta1 committees would 
produce a parallel system of party sub-committees which would 
effectively constitute an intra-party division of labour rather than 
formal specialization within the House as a corporate body. 
The absence within the British political culture of an accepted notion 
of representation which is supportive of a formal division of labour is 
but one more obstacle to the development of specialization. Ultimately, 
however, the dominance of party notions of representation and the 
continuing strength of Liberal and Whig 'independence' theories may 
prov2 to be a far greater impediment to specialization in the House of 
Commons than is presently realized. (98) 
The 1966-70 Specialist Committee Experiment 
As background to the study of backbench activity in committe~ in our 
selected sessions of 1970-1 and 1972-3, it is of value to briefly 
consider the developments of the committee system in the preceding 
Parliament of 1966-1970. Given the hostility of the political and 
representational environment of the Commons it is difficult, in 
retrospect, to fully understand why the reformers of the 19605 
believed that the 'guerilla incursion' of specialist committees would 
lead to a 'revolution' in the parliamentary 'control' of the executive. 
Any guerilla raid is ultimately dependent upon succour from the 
immediate environment but as the preceding paragraphs demonstrate 
the unique mix of political and representational elements in Britain 
was-positivelY hostile to reform through specialization. It also 
helps if the g~erilla battalions are adequately armed yet the only 
weapons deemed necessary by the reformers were facts and information. 
Furthermore, the supply of such weapons was controlled by the executive 
the very target of the guerilla attack. Finally, a clear strategy 
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is vital to the success of any insurgent group. Here again, however, 
there was no clear idea of the exact role specialist committees were 
to perform at the outset of 1966. It was hoped that the committees 
would make governments more accountable; it was believed that back-
benchers and the public would beco~~ more informed about executive 
activity and at the very least it was eh~ected that they would keep 
(99) 
"some of the more restless among the new intake (of M.P.s) happy". 
Essentially, therefore, the reformist strategy rested upon the executive 
surrendering its own prerogatives, as specialist committees themselves 
were clearly not designed to attack the fundamental conventions of 
Cabinet Government. 
In practice the Government proved reluctant to relinquish any of its 
own powers. From the outset it was apparent that the 1966 committee 
experiment was controlled and judged by the Government aJ;ld not by the 
committees themselves. And 'long before the end of the 1956 Parliament 
the Labour Cabinet appeared to have decided that it did not wish to 
continue with, or expand upon, the type of scrutiny committee with 
which it had experimented. (100) The first casualty of the executive's 
retrenchment became the Select Committee on Agriculture which found to 
its cost that the Government's reclassification of specialist committees 
into 'subject' and 'departmental' categories was more than a question 
of semantics. For, through being classified as a departmental 
committee the Committee was condemned to a very short life in view of 
the Government's decision that "departmental committees should be of 
limited duration". (101) The demise of the Agriculture Committee in 
1969 simply highlighted the vulnerability of the specialist committee 
experiment to control by the executive; particularly as the Committee 
itself could do no more than "deplore the decision to disband the 
Committee ••••• at a time when it was becoming familiar with its task, 
developing its expertise, and had identified so many questions which 
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urgently call for further investigation". (102) 
The fate of the Agriculture Committee did prompt general expressions 
of concern within the House; but, significantly, the 1968-69 Procedure 
Committee, in its examination of the system of expenditure scrutiny, 
contented itself with the bald statement that attention h3d been drawn 
to the problems facing specialist committees by the Agriculture 
Committee. (103) The Procedure Committee did proceed to list certain 
difficulties of the specialist committee experiment (104) without 
mentioning, however, that such problems were largely premeditated on the 
part of the Labour Government. In an attempt to rescue the specialist 
committee experiment from its difficulties the Procedure Committee 
recommended the creation of a Select Committee on Expenditure. The 
new committee, working through functional sub-committees, was to be 
charged with the consideration of the activities and estimates of the 
Departments of State and the efficiency of their administration. The 
hope was that a new coherence would be brought to the scrutiny of 
executive actions through co-ordination of the work of the 'specialized' 
sub-committees. 
The new Conservative Government rapidly established the Expenditure 
Committee in January 1971. In part the speedy establishment resulted 
"from a government assessment of the role that it could play in 
assisting ministerial objectives". (105) However, the speed with 
which the Government acted did not prevent it from substantially 
weakening the move towards systematic specialization suggested by the 
Procedure Committee. The remit o[ the new Committee wa~ cautiously 
framed so that its orders of reference were but marginally wider than 
its predecessor, the Estimates Corr~ittee; the sub-committees were not 
to be allowed to consider the expenditure projections for the Department 
or Departments in their fields, as initially suggested in the 1968-69 
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Report, and a further blow to systematic specialization in sub-committees 
was dealt by limiting the committee's membership to forty-nine instead 
of the proposed seventy-two. One reason adduced by the Leader of the 
House for the restriction placed upon the size of the Expenditure 
COIil!llittee was: 
"that it was impossible to go the whole way 
with a very large Committee on Expenditure while 
at the same time preserving the Select Committee 
on Nationalized Industries, the Select Committee 
on Race Relations and Immigration and the Select 
Committee on Science and Technology all of which 
••••• had provided a valuable part of the House's 
work" • (106) 
In trying to find "the best balance" between the new Committee a:1d the 
existing committees the Government succeeded in simultaneously limiting 
the size of the Expenditure COIDrrlittee and restricting the number of 
specialist committees allowed to continue in the new Parliament. The 
relevance of the addage about "killing two birds with one stone" was 
perhaps not lost upon the more cynical of backbench observers at this 
time. 
Backbench Specialization in Parliamentary Committees 
It is against this backcloth that our analysis of backbench 
specialization in committee takes place. Amazingly, in spite of the 
centrality of the debate over committee-based specialization in recent 
years very few detailed studies of the extent of specialization 
upstairs have been completed. The notable exceptions being provided 
in Kimber and Richardson's (107) and R.L. Borthwick's (108) studies 
of standing committee activity, and E. Oram's (l09) analysis of 
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specialis~ committee work. Yet even these are limited respectively 
to a single type of committee, and each in their own way fail to 
fully analyse or measure specialization. 
The prime purpose of the analysis of our sample's activity 'upstairs' 
.is, therefore, to discover the pattern of specialization across the 
entire range of their performance in committee. To this end activity 
in both standing and select committee is treated as a single unit of 
analysis. Whilst this approach is open to the criticism that it blurs 
the distinction between 'investigatory' and 'legislative' duties, 
it does nevertheless allow for a profile of specialization to be 
developed for committee work as a whole. In this way it is possible to 
discover the extent to which backbenchers simultaneously concentrate 
their attention upon the same issue areas on both types of committees. 
The measure of activity used to compute the index of specialization· 
for committee work ""is the recorded attendance of each backbencher for 
each committee served upon. The data for select committee attendances 
was based upon the information recorded in the Returns of Select 
Committees. (110) Although the Returns do not provide a perfect 
measure of activity, in as much as they merely list the presence of a 
Member in committee rather than the actual amount of time or effort 
expended therein, they do nevertheless provide the best single piece 
of evidence as to activity in committee. (111) For standing 
committees information on attendance was gathered from the individual 
Reports of the Proceedings of each committee. And from these various 
sources the subject area of each committee a Member was assigned to, and 
his attendance at each committee, was recorded. 
The exact extent of backbench concentration of attention in committee 
can be gauged from Table 8.1. The range of issues covered per M.P. is 
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noticeably narrow; far narrower than for any of the other procedures 
studied in Chapter 5; in both sessions the mean spread of attention 
was less than two subjects per Member and a sizeable proportion of 
backbenchers concentrated upon only one subject in each session. 
Conversely very few M.P.s were active in more than three issue areas. 
TABLE 8.1 Number of subject areas covered by each Member* in 
committee 1970-1 and 1972-3. 
( * Conservative and Labour .Members all Tables in 
Chapter 8 refer to Conservative and Labour Members only). 
No. of subjects 
1 3 
4 10 
11 35 
Mean 
Median 
St. dev. 
1970-1 
(n 90) 
% 
90.0 
10.0 
0.0 
100.0 
1.97 
1. 78 
1.02 
1972-3 
(n 85) 
% 
95.3 
4.7 
0.0 
100.0 
1.9l 
1. 79 
0.96 
However, in contrast to the other procedures, the correlation between 
the number of subjects considered by each backbencher in each session 
in committee 'is noticeably weak (r 0.21, r 2 0.05, (n 75) significant 
at 0.05). So that M.P.s who focused upon only one issue in one session 
were liable to spread their activity more widely in the next and vice 
versa. 
Neverthele5s, the very restricted overall focus of backbench attention 
is reflected in the increased level of specialization in committee 
work: with the coefficients of variation being much higher than in 
any other procedure. As Table 8.2 reveals, over three-quarters of 
Members in the first session, and two-thirds in the second, were 
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considered to be highly specialized. 
TABLE 8.2 Index of Specialization 
Level of specialization Session 
1970-1 1972-3 
(n 90) (n 85) 
% % 
High 76.7 65.9 
Medium 23.3 32.9 
Low 0.0 1.2 
100.0 100.0 
Mean 5.04 4.91 
Median 5.09 4.90 
St. dev. 0.87 0.92 
There were, however, considerable fluctuations in the level of 
specialization on the part of backbenchers from one session to the next. 
The product-moment correlation coefficient (r) highlights these 
fluctuations by its very weakness (0.10). Indeed this correlation 
is much weaker than the corresponding correlations for debates, 
Questions and E.D.M.s. So that, although the focus of attention is 
much narrower and the level of specialization is much higher in committee 
work, individual M.P.s do not appear to be as consistent in their 
concentration of attention as in the other procedures studied. 
Costs of Participation of Committee Activity 
The highly specialized profile of backbench activity 'upstairs' in 
committee is undoubtedly a reflection of the very high 'costs of 
participation' exacted by committee service. There can be little 
doubt that committee work is definitely a time-consuming, expensive 
procedure. Firstly, the preparation costs for legislative and 
365 
investigatory duties alike are, in theory, high. On standing committees 
backbenchers on both sides may be required to attend preparatory 
meetings to be briefed upon the purposes of particular clauses and the 
tactics to be adopted in committee. The frequency and importance 
of such meetings tending to increase in the Opposition party. (112) 
On select committees the costs of preparation may be greater still; 
particularly for those backbenchers intent upon asking detailed and 
pertinent questions of expert witnesses. Such Members may be required 
to devote considerable effort to personal research, especially when 
the committee does not possess the services of a specialist adviser, (113) 
and the individual M.P. does not employ a research assistant. In 
practice not all Members are willing to expend the requisite amounts of 
energy, with the consequence that select committee examination of 
witnesses can on occasion be "superficial" and "ineffectual". (114) 
Differences in the level of preparation may even be apparent amongst the 
membership of a single committee. For example, the effectiveness of 
the Conservative Members on the 1974-5 Wealth Tax Committee was 
attributed by Ann Robinson to the fact that not only were they "selected 
with an eye to existing expertise in fields connected with wealth and 
its administration, but perhaps more important than prior expertise 
was the effort they put in preparing for evidence sessions". (115) 
On the other hand, Labour Members on the same committee were 
"generally apathetic and did not take such an active part in the 
questioning of witnesses". 
Added to the high costs of preparation for committee work are also high 
costs of performance. On standing committees these latter costs vary 
in accordance with the number of sittings required to consider any 
specific piece of legislation. Some bills require only one sitting 
(in 1970-1 and 1972-3, 21 and 20 bills respectively) whilst others 
require over ten sittings (6 and 8 bills in 1970-1 and 1972-3 
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respectively). The Immigration Bill of 1970-1, which required 24 
sittings, and the Social Security Bill of 1972-3, which needed a 
total of 30 sittings, were the most time-consuming measures in the two 
sessions under scrutiny. However, one of the best recent examples of 
expensive costs was provided in the intermediate session of 1971-2 
with the committee stage of the Housing Finance Bill. As one Member 
of this committee was later to ruefully remark: "I was lumbered on 
the Standing Committee which considered the Housing Finance Bill and 
cost me precisely 257 hours of my life". (116) Although the 
performance costs exacted by this committee were exceptional, service 
on standing committees generally can be a time~consuming occupation. 
Indeed, the differing costs of performance from one committee to the 
next and from one session to another may go some considerable way to 
explaining the fluctuations in the level of specialization noted earlier. 
The performance costs of select committee duties also appear to be 
comparatively greater than those incurred in the three other procedures 
examined in Chapter 5. Evidence sessions of the investigatory 
committees are especially time-consuming: so that a committee 
undertaking a large scale enquiry may hold one or more three-hour 
evidence sessions per week. (117) The expenditure of backbench 
time in select committees has not gone unremarked upon by critics of 
investigatory committees. Indeed, a common allegation made against 
select committees is that they harm the Chamber by drawing Members 
away from the floor of the House: 
"The more that select committees ••••• prol1ferate, 
the fewer Members there are .to take part in 
debates o~ the floor of the House. That is one 
phenomenon of our modern Parliament. As the 
number of committees is increased, fewer Members 
find it possible to attend debates on the floor 
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of the House". (118) 
But, by its very nature, activity in committee is a cost inefficient 
mode of activity. Firstly, the costs of preparation and performance 
are uniformly higher 'for committee service than for activity in any 
of the other procedures, which entails, in theory, a greater 
expenditure of energy. Secondly, the opportunity to reap the 
rewards of such industry may be closely circumscribed particularly 
in the case of government backbenchers on standing committees. For 
although they are required by their Whips to be briefed and-regular 
in their attendance, prolonged intervention in debate on the part of 
government backbenchers is often frowned upon by their Ministerial 
colleagues. Opposition backbenchers on the other hand may find 
activity in legislative committees to be more cost-efficient in so far 
as the time spent in preparation and in actually being present at the 
committee meetings secures a tangible reward of column inches in the 
official Report of Proceedings of the committee. More importantly, 
perhaps, the Opposition backbencher may increase his standing amongst 
. • f G 'd (119) h1s party colleagues and even ga1n the respect 0 the overnment S1 e 
through his reasoned contributions. 
However, backbench performance in committee is not normally regarded 
as the most effective mode for advancing one's parliamentary career. 
Government backbenchers rarely endear themselves to their Cabinet 
colleagues through submitting government legislation and policy to 
detailed scrutiny as Brian Se-dgemore M.P. found to his cost in 1978 
when, after an acrimonious exchange with the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in the general sub-committee of the Expenditure Committee, 
he was dismissed from his post as P.P.S. in the Department of Energy. (120) 
In line, therefore, with the discussion in Chapter 5, it would appear 
that committee service does not provide the most cost-effective 
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procedure for the politically ambitious backbencher to participate in. 
Furthermore, given that most backbenchers seemingly aspire to 
Ministerial office, and few are willing to play the 'maverick' role 
in the House: the influence of both standing and select committees 
may correspondingly be undermined. 
Service on committee may also appear to be an ineffective form of 
activity for the backbencher who ranks 're-election' as his primary 
goal. For seldom do backbench contributions in committee receive 
widespread publicity; and when public interest is focused upon 
parliamentary proceedings it is generally directed towards the 
floor of the House. Even for the M.P. motivated primarily by a 
concern with the 'making of good public policy', committee activity 
may be regarded as being of limited effectiveness in view of the 
high costs involved. Overall, committees in the House ,of Commons 
have little direct impact upon the formulation and administration 
of government legislation and policy. (121) Nevertheless, in 
spite of such a verdict, the backbench M.P. who is concerned primarily 
with the goal of influencing policy may assess his own contributions 
to this process, not in any absolute sense but, in accordance with the 
relativities of the parliamentary context. Hence the very sensation 
of feeling to be doing something constructive 'upstairs' in committee, 
irrespective of the final impact on policy, may be preferable to the 
sensation of 'floundering' so often experienced on the floor of the 
House. 
Specialization and Party 
When the profile of backbench specialization is analyzed using party 
as the independent variable only marginal differences are to be found 
between Conservative and Labour Members in the sample. A'weak 
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negative correlation between the number of subjects considered in 
committee activity and party allegiance indicating a more 
restricted focus of attention on the part of Labour backbenchers ~ 
was found in both sessions. (In 1970-1 r -0.10, r2 0.01, not 
significant; 1972-3 r-0.20, r2 0.04, significant at 0.05). The 
slightly narrower spread of attention of Labour M.P.s is shown below. 
(Table 8.3). 
TABLE 8.3 Number of subjects considered in committee Eer 
backbencher crosstabulated with Partz 
No. of subjects Partz 
1970-1 1972-3 
Cons Lab Total Cons Lab Total 
(n 49) (n 41) (n 90) (n 43) (n 42) (n 85) 
% % % % % % 
1 36.8 46.3 41.1 32.5 42.9 37.6 
2 30.6 34.1 32.2 37.2' 47.6 42.4 
3 22.4 9.8 16.7 23.3 7.1 15.3 
4 + 10.2 9.8 10.0 7.0 2.4 4.7 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Mean 2.06 L85 1.97 2.09 1.71 1.91 
Median 1.93 1.61 1. 78 1.97 1.65 1.79 
St. cleve 1.01 1.04 1.02 1.07 0.81 0.96 
In turn the index of specialization reflects the narrower range of 
attention of Labour backbenchers (see Table 8.4). The differences 
between the two parties, though still substantially small, were most 
pronounced in session 1972-3. 
The most notable feature in Table 8.4 is not, however, the inter-party 
difference, but rather the change in the profile of specialization 
within the Conservative party between 1970-1 and 1972-3. For, even 
though Tory backbenchers did not significantly increase their spread 
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of attention, the aggregate profile of specialization decreased 
markedly from one session to the next. What appears, therefore, to 
have happened in the Conservative ranks is that the mean number of 
attendances increased from an average of 15 in 1970-1 to 21.7 per 
Member in 1972-3 (st. deviation 14.05 and 16.26 respectively) with 
the corollary that a number of Tory backbenchers came to concentrate 
their attention more evenly on various issues than had been the case in 
the first session. In the opposition party on the other hand the 
mean number of committee attendances fell from 16.7 (st. deviation 
12.72) in 1970-1 to 14.7 (st. deviation 14.03) in 1972-3. Yet this 
should not be taken to mean that there is a strong and simple linear 
relationship between specialization scores and activity levels '.in 
committee, for as Table 8.5 reveals the levels of specialization of the 
most active cohorts of Members are still remarkably high. 
TABLE 8.4 Index of specialization cross tabulated with Party 
1970-1 and 1972-3 
Level of 
specialization 
High 
Medium 
Low 
Mean 
Median 
St. dev. 
1970-1 
Cons Lab Total 
(n 49) (n 41) (n 90) 
% % % 
73.5 80.5 76.7 
26.5 19.5 23.3 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
4.91 5.18 5.04 
4.64 5.50 5.09 
0.91 0.81 0.87 
x2 0.28 df 1 n sign 
(exclude low) 
r 0.15 
r2 0.02 
'* significant 0.05 
Party 
1972-3 
Cons Lab 
(n 43) (n 42) 
% % 
55.8 76.2 
41.9 23.8 
2.3 0.0 
100.0 100.0 
4.73 5.10 
4.51 5.23 
0.97 0.84 
x2 3.07 df 1 sign 
(combine medium + 
r 0.20 '* 
r2 0.04 
Total 
(n 85) 
% 
65.9 
32.9 
1.2 
100.0 
4.91 
4.90 
0.92 
0.1 
low) 
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TABLE 8.5 Index of specialization cross tabulated with the level 
of activi tl. Committees 1970-1 and 1972-3 * 
Level of 
SEecialization 1970-1 1972-3 
Activitl Activitl 
V Hi~h High Medium Low V Hi~h High Medium Low 
(n 15) (n 18) (n 19) (n 38) (n 20) (n 15) (n 14) (n 36) 
% % % % % % ., % 10 
High 66.7 66.7 73.7 86.8 55.0 60.0 71.4 72.2 
Medium 33.3 33.3 26.3 13.2 40.0 40.0 28.6 27.8 
Low 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* activity measured in number of attendances at committees. 
Low = 1 - 9 attendances 
Medium • 10 - 19 attendances 
High = 20 - 29 attendances 
V. High = 30+ attendances 
Specialization and length of service in the House 
The level of specialization in committee appears, from the evidence of 
our sample, to be largely independent of the length of service of M.P.s 
in the House. In both sessions only very weak, positive correlations 
were found (r 0.14, 1970-1; r 0.02, 1972-3). Correspondingly, when the 
index of specialization was cross tabulated with the parliamentary 
generations no significant differences between the three cohorts 
emerged. (See Table 8.6). 
TABLE 8.6 Index of Specialization cross tabulated with 'Ear1iamenta~ 
generations'. Committees 1970-1 and 1972-3 
Level of 
SEecialization Parliamentary Generations 
1970-71 1972-73 
1970 1964-66 Pre 1964 1970 1964-66 Pre 1964 
(n 29) (n 18) (n 43) (0 24) (0 18) (0 43) 
% % % % % % 
High 75.9 72.2 79.1 62.5 83.3 60.5 
Medium 24.1 27.8 20.9 37.5 16.7 37.2 
Low 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
x2 0.35, df 2, o sign x2 3.05, df 2, 11 sign 
(exclude low) (combine medium and 10lV') 
' .. -~-.--.----" ------ _. __ ._--------------
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In contrast, therefore, to the procedures with low costs of participation 
(E.D.M.s and P.Q.s), where marked generational differences were 
observable, committee work appears to impose a uniformity of behaviour 
on both 'old' and 'new' M.P.s alike. 
Where significant differences did emerge between the generations, 
however, was in the overall level of activity, as measured by attendance 
at committees. The more recently recruited M.P.s were seemingly more 
active than their longer serving colleagues, as a significant negative 
relationship between the number of attendances at committee and the 
number of years spent in the House was to be found (r -0.16, r2 0.03, 
significant at 0.05, 1970-1; r,-0.2l, r2 0.05, significant at 0.02, 
1972-3). In part the greater propensity of the newer recruits to 
serve on committees may reflect their generally greater commitment to the 
establishment of a formal division of labour within the Commons. Other 
studies have already found that 'new' Members tended to strongly favour 
the development of the committee structure of the House. Barker and 
Rush, for example, found in their 1967 survey that the two new intakes 
of the 1960s were stronger supporters of an extension of the specialist 
committee experiment than were their longer serving parliamentary 
colleagues. (122) In their replicated survey of 1972 the same 
authors also established that the 1970 'generation' of M.P.s over-
whelmingly supported the development of a system of select committees 
to examine major policy fields. (123) Given such orientations towards 
committee work it was perhaps to have been expected that the 'newer' 
Members in our sample should have been more active 'upstairs' than 
their more traditionally minded senior colleagues. 
In light of the findings from the sample, a wider examination of select 
committee memberships for the whole of the 1970-74 Parliament was 
undertaken in an attempt to establish whether the espoused ,'commitment' 
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TABLE 8.7 Membership of the Select and Specialized Committees 1970-4: 
the 'Generational' composition 
Select Committees 
Parliamentar~ 
Generation Committee 
Expenditure P .A. C. N. I. S. I. Total Bb. Eoo1 
(n 74) (n 29) (n 22) (n 14) * (n 139) (n 451) 
% % % % % % 
1970 40.5 13.8 27.3 21.4 30.9 28.0 
1964-66 19.0 51. 7 31.8 35.7 29.5 21.0 
Pre 1964 40.5 34.5 40.9 42.9 39.6 51.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Specialist Committees 
Parliamentar~ 
Generation Committee 
Ov Aid Race R. Sc & Tech Sc. Affs P.C.A. Total Bb. Eoo1 
(n 15) (n 17) (n 18) (n 16) (n 13) *(n 79) (n 451) 
% % % % % % % 
1970 20.0 47.1 44.5 50.0 23.1 38.0 28.0 
1964-66 20.0 35.3 22.2 12.5 0.0 19.0 21.0 
Pre 1964 60.0 17.6 33.3 37.5 76.9 43.0 51.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* Total number of M.P.s, i.e. number of M.P.s having served at any 
time in 1970-4 Parliament. 
TABLE 8.8 Mean % attendance at Select and Specialist Connnittees in 1970-1 and 1972-3 crosstabulated with 'Parliamentary Generations' 11 
(a) Select Connnittees 
Connnittee 
Expenditure Public Account Nat. Indust. Stat. Ins. 
Parliamentary 1 70-1 19 2-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 
I . . I 
Generation 
* 
n mean n mean n mean n mean n mean n mean n mean n mean 
% % % % % "'I % % I. 
atten atten atten atten atten atten atten atten 
1970 15 78.3 12 65.8 0 0.0 2 75.0 2 74.0 3 69.0 1 65.0 2 25.0 
1964-66 8 68.8 12 61.4 4 47.8 4 50.8 4 77 .5 4 68.8 4 74.0 3 72.3 
Pre 1964 21 73.0 17 65.9 6 73.7 7 45.9 8 68.9 5 75.8 5 37.4 2 29.5 
----
(b) Specialized Connnittees 
Committee 
Overseas Aid Race Relations Sc. & Tech. Se. Affs. 
Parliamentar~ 1970-1 1972-3 Ie 70-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 
Generation 
* 
n mean n mean n mean n mean n mean n mean n mean n mean 
% % % % % % % % 
atten atten atten atten atten atten atten atten 
1970 0 0.0 4 82.3 3 70.7 6 72.6 5 59.2 6 59.5 8 80.3 N.A. 
1964-66 3 83.3 1 93.0 5 58.3 3 90.0 2 72.0 3 74.7 1 67.0 N.A. 
Pre 1964 5 93.4 4 71.3 2 63.3 2 91.5 4 71.8 4 76.5 5 8/ •• 6 N.A. 
-
* n = UlllfIDer of Members who served throughout the session. 
\ I 
P.C.A. 
1970-1 1972-3 
n mean n . mean 
% % 
atten atten 
0 0.0 2 67.0 
0 0.0 0 0.0 
9 60.7 8 73.9 
_. 
Total 
1970-1 1972-3 
, 
n meat:. n mean 
% % 
atten atten 
If, 77 .0 19 63.0 
20 65.4 23 62.3 
40 67.8 31 60.6 
.. - ------~ 
Total 
1970-1 1972-3 
n mean n mean 
% % 
atten atten 
16 71.9 18 69.8 
11 73.7 7 83.9 
25 79.4 18 75.8 
W 
'...I 
~ 
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of new Members actually translated into activity 'upstairs'. In fact 
the commitment of the newer generations to service on select committees 
is illustrated by their over-representation on these bodies in 
proportionate terms to their number on the backbenches as a whole. 
The 1970 'generation' was most notably over-represented in the membership 
of the specialist committees, whilst the 1964-1966 'generation' was 
over-represented on the sessional select committees. This latter point 
is perhaps noteworthy given that it is commonly accepted that specialist 
committees were created partly to keep the 1960's generation happy: 
for, by the 1970 Parliament, this 'reformist' generation appears to 
have forsaken the specialist committees for the traditional select 
committees (see Table 8.7). Of particular interest is the fact that the 
1960's 'generation' appeared to favour the established Public Accounts 
Committee rather than the new Expenditure Committee throughout this 
period. 
However, if the mean percentage attendance (124) at committee meetings 
is taken as an additional measure of 'enthusiasm' for committee work, 
then it would appear that in the two selected sessions of 1970-1 and 
1972-3 the members of the pre-1964 cohort were generally no less 
committed to activity 'upstairs' on select and specialist committees 
than were their junior colleagues. (see Table 8.8). 
Subject Specialization 
Backbench activity in committee is clearly specialized, both in the 
sense of being restricted to a narrow range of issues and also in the 
sense of being unevenly distributed amongst subject areas within this 
range. Yet, for this pattern of specialization to reap benefits for 
the individual backbencher and the House alike, it requires of each 
committee member that they concentrate upon the same subject areas over 
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a period of time. In this way expertise in the House is fostered. 
However, consistency in the attention paid to specific subject areas by 
backbench committee members appears to be a limited phenomenon, at 
least amongst the M.P.s in our sample. For although a greater 
proportion of Members fall within the highest category of our index of 
subject specialization (125) than in any of the other three procedures 
examined (see Chapter 5, Table 5.8), just under one-half of committee 
members rank as low subject specialists. Thus for most M.P.s in the 
sample the proportion of their activity devoted to the consideration of 
anyone issue varies considerably from one session to another (see 
Table 8.9). 
TABLE 8.9 Index of absolute differences in the proportion of 
activitl devoted to subject areas between 1970-1 and 1972-3 
(Subject specialization) 
Level of subject 
specialization Partl 
Cons Lab Total 
(n 39) (n 38) (n 77) (a) 
% % % 
High 12.8 31.6 22.0 
Medium 28.2 28.9 28.6 
Low 59.0 39.5 49.4 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
x2 4.55, df 2, n sign. 
r -0.20 * 
r2 0.04 
* significant 0.05 
(a) n - number of M.P.s active. in committees in both sessions. 
Whilst the cross tabulation in Table 8.9 does not yield any statisticallY 
significant differences between the two major parties, there is, 
nevertheless, a significant, weak and negative correlation to be found 
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between the scores of absolute difference and partisan allegiance. The 
direction of the correlation indicates that high absolute differences 
in the proportion of attention paid to anyone subject over the two 
sessions are associated more with Tory than Labour backbenchers. 
To some degree the overall fluctuations of attention, and the inter-
party differences in this matter are explicable in terms of the 
constantly changing topography of the Government's legislative programme. 
One consequence of which is that backbenchers may be called upon to 
serve on standing committees dealing with differing subject areas from 
one session to the next. Government backbenchers in particular, given 
the greater number of committee seats to be filled, may be called upon 
to examine a diverse range of subjects in different sessions. Indeed 
as Table 8.10 reveals, over one-half of Tory backbenchers had no common 
subject area in their standing committee work between 19.70-1 and 1972-3, 
whereas, just under two-thirds of Opposition backbenchers served on at 
least one standing committee in both sessions dealing with the same 
subject area. On select committees the differences between 
Conservative and Labour M.P.s are not so pronounced, and the consistency 
of attention to one or more subject areas is that much greater 
(x2 5.51, df 1, significant at 0.02 'total' column for standing 
committees v. 'total' for select committees). 
TABLE 8.10 Correspondence of subject area in committee activity 
1970-1, 1972-3. / 
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TABLE 8.10 Correspondence of subject area in committee activity 
1970-1, 1972-3 
CorresEondence Type of Committee of subject area 
1970-1, 1972-3 Standing Select 
Cons Lab Total Cons Lab Total 
(n 39) (n 31) (n 70) (n 13) (n 16) (n 29)* 
% % % % % % 
One or more 
subject areas 
considered in 
both sessions 43.6 61.3 51.4 76.9 81.3 79.3 
No subject 
overlap 56.4 
100.0 
38.7 
100.0 
48.6 
100.0 
23.1 
100.0 
18.7 
100.0 
20.7 
100.0 
x2 1.52, df.l, n sign x2 0.24, df 1, n sign 
* Number of M.P.s serving in both sessions. 
'Over-specialization' 
The evidence provided by the index of subject specialization and by the 
above table does not suggest that the committee members are exceptionally 
specialized in their attention to specific subject areas. Yet a 
constant fear held by opponents of the development of formal 
specialization within the House is that committee subject specialists 
would "monopolize debates on their particular subjects on the floor of 
the House and to some extent defeat the purposes of debates in the 
House". (126) So far, however, the only serious attempt to measure 
the extent to which service on committee does produce 'over-specialized' 
M.P.s has been provided by E. Oram, and even then his study is limited 
solely to an examination of specialist committees. 
On the basis of a survey of parliamentary opinion on the 1966 committee 
experiment, and a quantitative analysis of the Index of Hansard, Oram 
reached the conclusion that the fear of 'over-specialization' is 
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misplaced. Firstly, because backbenchers themselves are sceptical 
of the view that committee service makes them undesirably narrow in 
their interests and activities; and secondly, because his analysis of the 
questioning and debating performance of M.P.s in the 1961-2 and 1967-8 
sessions revealed that, if anything, committee Members appeared to have 
been slightly less specialized than other backbenchers. Unfortunately, 
in reaching this conclusion Oram fails to recognize that his quantitative 
data is not a measure of subject specialization at all and as such 
provides no real test of the 'over-specialization' argument. (127) 
It, therefore, remains for an examination of the extent to which 
committee subject specialisms are carried over into other parliamentary 
activities to be conducted. 
The methodology employed for the purposes of this examination is 
somewhat cruder than that used to measure subject speci~lization 
elsewhere in this study, but still provides a clear indication of the 
degree of subject overlap from procedure to procedure. A 'subject 
specialism' in the following section is taken to mean the single most 
important subject area for each M.P. in each procedure. A 'subject 
specialism' in committee, therefore, represents the subject attracting 
most attendances; in debate the issue occupying the greatest proportion 
of column inches and in Questions the area attracting the greatest 
proportion of oral and written Questions. Thus if a Member is truly 
a subject specialist, the same subject should recur as his specialism 
in committee, in debate and in Questions. (128) 
In actuality, however, the extent of overlap of subject specialisms is 
remarkably limited. In the first session of our study only just over 
one-quarter of the sample had the same subject special isms in debate and 
in committee, and only 30% of backbenchers focused primarily upon the 
same issue in both their questioning and their co~~ittee activity. 
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TABLE 8.11 The over1aE of subject specia1isms in Committee, 
Debate and Questions 
(a) Session 1970-1 
Correspondence 
of subject 
sEecialisms Procedure 
Debate Questions 
Cons Lab Total Cons Lab Total 
(n 49) (n 41) (n 90)* (n 48) (n 41) (n 89) * 
% % % % % % 
Specialism 
the same as 
in committee 22.5 31. 7 26.7 22.9 39.0 30.3 
Specialism 
different 
to that in 
committee 77 .5 68.3 73.3 77 .1 61.0 69.7 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
x2 0.56, df 1, 11 sign x2 2.01, 'df 1, n sign 
(b) Session 1972-3 
CorresEondence 
of subject 
sEecial isms Procedure 
Debate Questions 
Cons Lab Total Cons ~Lab Total 
--
(n 42) (n 41) (n 83)* (n 40) (n 38) (n 78) * 
% % .., % % .., 10 I. 
Specialism 
the same as 
in committee 28.6 31.7 30.1 22.5 36.8 29.5 
Specialism 
different 
to that in 
committee 71.4 68.3 69.9 77 .5 63.2 70.5 
---
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
x2 0.005, df 1, n sign 2 x 1.30, df 1, n sign 
* Excluding M.P.s with no recorded activity. 
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TABLE 8.12 Activitl in Debate and Questions uEon the same 
subject area as Committee subject specialism 
(a) Session 1970-1 
Extent of 
Activity Procedure 
Debates Questions 
Cons Lab Total Cons Lab Total 
(n 49) (n 41) (n 90)* (n 48) (n 41) (n 89) * 
% % % % % ", 10 
Active upon 
corom subject 
specialism 41.8 51.2 45.6 56.3 63.4 59.6 
No activity 
upon comm 
subject 
specialism 59.2 48.8 54.4 43.7 36.6 40.4 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
x2 0.60, df 1, n sign x2 0.22, df 1, n sign 
(b) Session 1972-3 
Extent of 
Activitl Procedure 
Debates Questions 
Cons Lab Total Cons Lab Total 
(n 42) (n 41) (n 83) * (n 40) (n 38) (n 78) * 
% % % % % % 
Active upon 
comm subject 
specialism 52.4 51.2 51.8 55.0 52.6 53.8 
No activity 
upon comm 
subject 
specialism 47.6 48.8 48.2 45.0 47.4 46.2 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
x2 0.01, d£ 1, n sign x2 0.00, df 1, n sign 
* Excluding M.P.s with no recorded activity. 
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Similarly in 1972-3 less than one-third of committee members carried 
over their committee specialism into either thl:!-fr questioning or their 
debating activity. The overwhelming majority of backbenchers in our 
sample, therefore, were not 'over-specialized' in so far as their 
.subject specialism in committee (129) was different to the special isms 
in debate and in Questions. (See Table B.ll). Indeed, only lB 
committee members in 1970-1. and 16 in 1972-3, recorded the same 
subject specialism in each of the three procedures. And only 5 
backbenchers (i.e. 6% of the total of active committee members in both 
sessions) had as their specia1isms the same subject in all of the 
procedures in both sessions. 
Even when the stringent requiremen~of Table B.ll are relaxed to allow 
for an analysis of the extent to which backbenchers speak or table 
Questions at all in the area of their committee subject specialism 
it rapidly becomes apparent that subject specialization in committee 
does not dramatically colour M.~'s other parliamentary activities. As 
Table B.12 illustrates, approximately one-half of committee members in 
the sample failed totally to speak in debate, or alternatively to table 
Questions, in the field of their committee specialism. 
Membership Overlap on Select and Standing Committees 
The relationship between activity on the floor of the House and 
concentration upon a subject area in committee has been seen to be 
substantially weak. Yet even within the limited realm of committee 
activity, seemingly little overlap between the memberships of standing 
and select committees examining the same subject area is to be found. 
The knowledge gained by members of select committees from their 
investigations appears to be neither consistently nor systematically 
brought to bear in the consideration of government legiSlation in 
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related subject fields. One reason for this low level of overlap 
between select and standing committee memberships may arise out of 
timetabling clashes, whereby M.P.s may be unable to serve on both 
types of committee dealing with the same issue, as the committees sit 
at the same time. Alternative, some Members serving on investigatory 
committees may be unwilling to burden themselves with additional duties 
on standing committees. However, the Whips appear to be largely 
unsympathetic to pleas for exemption on such grounds. (130) And, 
if anything, service on select committees far from reducing activity 
on standing committees, tends to be associated with greater expenditure 
of energy on legislative duties. (131) 
But the point at issue here, however, is not simply whether or not 
service on select committees detracts from activity on standing 
committees, but rather whether concentration upon a spec~fic subject 
area in investigatory committees is closely associated with concentration 
upon the same area in legislative committees. Unfortunately, the 
restricting factor in undertaking such an analysis is that so few 
pieces of legislation correspond exactly to the areas of interest of 
select committees in anyone session. Thus, in examining the patterns 
of membership of select and standing committees in 1970-1 and 1972-3 the 
widest possible interpretation of select committee interest was used. 
The title of the committee or sub-committee became the main criterion 
for the classification of subject interest rather than the actual 
subject area of its investigations in that particular session. 
Even then only six and eleven Government Bills in 1970-1 and 1972-3 
respectively fell unambiguously within the area of interest of any 
select committee in the House. In the first session three Bills fell 
directly within the scope of select committees: the Coal Industry Bill 
was of direct concern to the Nationalized Industries Committee; the 
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Immigration Bill was of key significance for members of the Race 
Relations Committee and the Finance Bill (132) was of concern to 
both members of the Expenditure and Public Accounts Committees. Three 
other pieces of legislation, the Social Security Bill, the National 
Insurance Bill and the Industry Bill fell broadly within the areas of 
concern of either the Employment and Social Services, or the Trade and 
Industry sub-committees of the Expenditure Committee. Of these six 
measures only in the cases of the Immigration and Finance Bills was 
there a substantial overlap in the compositions of the standing 
committee and the 'interested' select committee. Over one-half 
(58%, n7) of the Race Relations Committee served on the standing 
committee examining the Immigration Bill, contributing one-fifth of the 
membership of the legislative committee. (133) On the Finance Bill 
slightly over one-third of the backbench membership of the standing 
committee were also concurrently members of either the Expenditure 
or the Public Accounts Comnittees. In contrast, only one member of 
the Nationalized Industries Committee served on the Coal Industry Bill, 
a measure which sought to extend the government's power to make grants 
to the National Coal Board as well as to increase the Board's statutory 
level of accumulated deficit. On the sta~ding committees on 
the Social Security, the National Insurance and the Industry Bills no 
members from the relevant Expenditure sub-committees were to be found. 
In the second session of our study members of the Expenditure Committee 
and P.A.C. were well represented on the committee considering the 
clauses of the Finance Bill. Again, one-third of the standing 
committee's backbench membership was drawn from the two financial 
select committees. (134) The other major economic measure taken in 
standing committee in 1972-73, the Counter Inflation Bill, also attracted 
members of the Expenditure Committee: with one-sixth of the seats 
being filled by Expenditure Committee members. However, select committee 
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m~mberswere less in evidence on standing committees in other policy 
areas. On the Coal Industry Bill only two members of the Nationalized 
Industries Committee served on the standing committee; and of the five 
Bills falling within the general scope of the sub-committees of the 
Expenditure Committee only two attracted a single member from the 
Select Committee. (135) No member of the Trade and Industry 
sub-committee was to be found amongst the members of the standing 
committee considering the Fair Trading Bill. Service on this 
sub-committee, which sat on a total of thirty-eight days, may have 
been a deterrent in itself to service on the standing committee dealing 
with the same issues. However, the same argument is less than 
persuasive in explaining why only one member of the Select Committee 
on Race Relations served on the standing committee considering the 
Pakistan Bill, which was essentially concerned with the question of 
citizenship. 
Little overlap seemingly is to be found, therefore, between the 
membership of select and standing committees in the two sessions under 
study. This is not to say that information gathered through the 
investigations of select committees is not utilized in standing 
committees, but simply to note that select committee members only 
infrequently bring their specific subject knowledge personally to bear 
in standing committee deliberations. The effects of this disjunction 
of memberships could no doubt be mitigated in part through the process 
of subject specialization in standing committees so that the same 
Members sat on committees considering the same issues over a period of 
years. Yet this process has remained largely undeveloped in the House 
of Commons. An earlier study of subject specialization in standing 
committees in the period 1945-1959 found a marked lack of continuity 
in the membership of standing committees in the areas of agriculture, 
pensions and national insurance and housing. In the field of agriculture 
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only 16% of members appointed to standing committees were appointed 
to four of the fourteen Bills considered, and in the area of pensions 
and national insurance the corresponding percentage was 11%. Only 9% 
of appointees to standing committees dealing with housing Bills 
served on four or more of the fourteen Bills. (136) In the period 
of our study, Bills in the areas of social security, national insurance, 
coal industry, civil aviation and finance were introduced in both 
sessions. An examination of the membership of those standing committees 
dealing with similar legislative measures reveals nonetheless a 
substantial turnover from one session to the next. The two committees 
considering the Social Security Bills had only one backbench Member in 
common (i.e. a 6% stability factor), (137) whilst the two committees 
examining the National Insurance Bills retained two backbench Members 
(a 14% stability factor). On the respective Coal Industry Bills 
five backbenchers served on both committees (a 22% stability factor). 
In the field of civil aviation the membership of the four standing 
committees active in 1970-1 and 1972-3 appeared relatively stable. 
Out of a total of forty-nine seats on these committees, twelve were 
occupied by just four Members (that is, each backbencher sat on three 
of the four committees), a further eleven backbenchers served on two 
committees taking up twenty-two more seats and the remaining fifteen 
seats were occupied by fifteen different Members. So t~at of the total ~ 
of thirty-one backbenchers engaged in the four standing committees in 
the subject area of civil aviation over half of them (52%, n 16) 
served on two or more of these committees. But the stablest membership 
of all was to be found on the standing committees dealing with the 
Finance Bills in this period, for sixteen backbenchers served on both 
committees resulting in a stability factor of 48% over the two sessions. 
This comparatively high level of continuity of membership ties in with 
the earlier finding of substantial overlap of select and standing 
committee memberships in the field of economics, to suggest the 
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development of the process of subject specialization in this area 
upstairs. (138) 
Conclusion 
The paradox of backbench activity upstairs in the House of Commons is 
that for most Members work in committee represents their greatest 
individual division of labour, yet at the same time the level of 
subject specialization remains remarkably low. The differentiation 
between legislative and investigatory committees, the minimal overlap 
in the memberships between the two, the lack of continuity of 
membership on standing committees and the relativelY high turnover 
on select committees all serve to fragment the bases of subject 
specialization. Only in the field of economics and finance does there 
appear to be a semblance of subject specialization founded upon 
consistent study of the policy area in select and standing committees. 
In other subject areas the development of subject expertise through 
committee activity remains a restricted phenomenon. Thus the fears 
of the opponents of the extension of committee activity over the last 
decade, that committee members would become 'over-specialized', have 
largely been proved to be unfounded. Indeed, such fears were 
misplaced in the first place given the structure of committees and 
their place in the British parliamentary system. The ad hoc growth 
of committees is in itself a significant pointer to their status in 
the House, as they have never been conceived of as a system of 
specialized sub-units of the House, and the House has not seen fit to 
discharge its main functions through committees. Hence conmittees, 
both standing and select, are not decision-making bodies in any but the 
narrowest of senses. Legislative committees, on the one side, are 
confined to the consideration of a legal draft of a Bill, as the 
important decisions have already been taken at the formative stage in 
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Whitehall and ratified at Second Reading in the House. Select committees, 
on the other side, as advisory-investigatory bodies merely report back 
to the House where the 'decision' on their findings is made (or 
normally deferred). In both cases, however, activity in committee is 
shaped by wider political considerations, which essentially means that 
such activity is structured to accommodate the desires of the executive 
and also to fit within the partisan organization of the larger 
parliamentary setting. Indeed, it is only through recognizing that 
the committee structure is a reflection of the uneasy compromise between 
diverse structural principles between the organizational principle 
of the division of labour, between the political realities of executive 
dominance and adversary procedures, and between representative 
principles that the failure to develop a systematic, formal 
division of labour in an era of complexity can be understood. 
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Summary and Speculation 
" ••••• the role of the backbencher as an 
all-rounder ••••• has been typical of the British 
Parliament. That is not to say that there has 
been no specialization, but it has not been as 
common as it is in the United States Congress, 
where a Member going into Congress expects from 
the outset to specialize in a very fundamental 
way". (1) 
Testing the validity of this commonly held belief has been a major 
objective of this thesis. Indeed Part Two of our study provides the 
first systematic profile of backbench specialization in the House of 
Commons. This profile clearly indi~ates the pronounced, yet still 
closely circumscribed, tendency for British backbenchers to informally 
divide their labour within the House. In fact, the pattern of 
specialization for most Members in our sample represents a series of 
concentric circles, with activity heavily concentrated in committee 
in the centre circle, surrounded by a somewhat wider focus in debate 
and encircled in turn by still more generalized activity in Questions 
and Early Day Motions. Overall, however, very few Members can be 
regarded as being highly specialized in their activity in the House; 
as most backbenchers appear to concentrate upon different subjects 
in each of the procedures. In particular the linkage between informal 
and formal subject special isms appears to be remarkably loose and 
fragmented unlike the position observed in the American Congress. 
So that subject specialization (as defined in Chapter 5) is notably 
weak across procedures and across time amongst our sample of backbenchers. 
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All the more surprising, therefore, is the finding that the majority of 
respondents to the postal survey of opinion considered themselves, and 
the bulk of their parliamentary colleagues likewise, to be highly 
specialized in their parliamentary work. This, of course, raises the 
general question of the accuracy of Members' perceptions as a guide to 
their actual patterns of behaviour in the House. Indeed John 
Mackintosh cas t doubt upon the usefulness of politicians' descriptions 
of their behaviour when he observed that "British government is overlaid 
with myths which are repeated again and again by the participants 
themselves ••••• This gap between what people say about themselves and 
what is the case is intensified by the fact that most performers in 
politics are poor observers; they can perform but not describe the 
process". (2) Indeed, a fruitful area for further research would 
be to analyze the behaviour and the perceptions of a given group of 
backbenchers to examine the nature and the extent of, the divergence 
between beliefs and behaviour. For our purposes, however, it is 
sufficient to note that the discrepancy between behaviour and perception 
suggested by our findings, mirrors a similar disjunction found in the 
studies of Congressional specialization. 
That backbenchers do specialize in the House has never been in question 
only the extent to which they divide their labour has been open to 
speculation. The finding that subject specialization is restricted 
on the backbenches is therefore of value in its own right, but it is 
of further significance in confirming the predictive value of the 
model of legislative specialization developed in Part One. For it was 
possible to predict a low level of specializdtion given the pec~liar 
representational and political mix in Britain. This contextual mix has 
effectivelY subverted structural reforms, needed to cope with the 
increasing scope and complexity of legislative business, by confronting 
the House with a series of dilemmas. 
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The first dilemma arises out of the inherent contradiction in 
organization theory between the requirements of authority based upon 
hierarchy and those founded upon the division of labour. In spite of 
the fact that legislatures have historically been organized in 
accordance with the principle of equality (as institutionalized, for 
example, in the equality of voting rights for all members), hierarchical 
structures whether organized around party, executive or legislative 
roles have in fact developed. In Britain the major roles have become 
conjoined in a centralized hierarchy with executive, majority party and 
house leaderships being conterminously located in the office of the 
Prime Minister and his Cabinet. Authority in the House basically 
derives from tenure of office rather than from the possession of 
specialist knowledge. The rights of superordinates in the executive 
hierarchy have come, therefore, to be asserted in the House, and these 
rights have been affirmed by the normative system of the, Commons. 
Indeed, the norms of the House, as with any other dominant value system, 
reflect the predilections of the most powerful actors and so support 
the existing distribution of power and the status quo. In conforming 
with these norms, backbenchers have been led to accept as imperative 
the need for party loyalty, the primacy of deliberation on the floor of 
the Chamber, and, above all, the advisability of performing the 
generalist role within the House. Moreover, backbenchers have been 
socialized into the belief that conformity will positively assist their 
career prospects in the House, and that "it is not the narrow specialists 
who get to the top". (3) 
Inextricably linked with the nature of the authority hierarchies in ~:'e 
House is the nature of partisan competition. The second impediment to 
specialization, therefore, concerns the adversary nature of party 
politics. The adversary system provides the individual backbencher 
with a relatively cost-free mode of decision-making as his vote on 
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most issues is determined by a choice between two mutually exclusive 
alternatives. In adhering to the 'party-line' the backbencher is 
provided with a simple, yet effective, partial solution to the problem 
of choice in an era of complexity. As a consequence, the value of 
informal specialization, with its attendant costs in the expenditure 
of time and energy to develop personal expertise, is undermined. 
The third dilemma confronting the House arises out of the contradiction 
postulated between the demands of organization theory for a division of 
labour and the demands of representative theory. Although this 
contradiction is normally posited in the form of universal opposition 
between highly specialized expertise and the principle of representation, 
it is in fact possible to identify a series of theoretical relationships 
between these two factors not all of which are necessarily 
antithetical. Indeed, specialization would appear to be logically 
compatible with a conception 'of the representative role which combines 
a delegate style with a specific, homogeneous focus of representation. 
At the other extreme, however, the adoption of a trustee style in 
conjunction with a geographical, heterogeneous focus of representation 
would appear to preclude the development of extensive legislative 
specialization. While, in practice, these roles may be held serially 
or simultaneously, it still remains the case that the individualistic 
mix of style and focus will influence the extent of the division of 
labour. Indeed, where the range of the predominant representative 
theories in a political culture are skewed in favour of one pole of 
the trustee-delegate continuum, then this bias will be reflected in 
the levels of informal and formal specialization. 
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Speculation 
"Whenever M.P.s discuss the need to strengthen the 
activities of the legislature, the idea of select 
committees is mentioned". (4) 
Formal specialization, through a system of select committees, has 
indeed held the centre of the reformist stage throughout most of the 
20th century. The organizational logic of this reform is impeccable 
yet, as we have argued throughout this thesis, the political and 
representational setting of the House has proved to be far from 
conducive to the instituting of a systematic, formal division of 
labour. Only belatedly have cany academics and parliamentarians 
come to acknowledge that the key to the structural reform of the 
House lies in transforming the political context in which it operates. 
Nevertheless, the orthodoxy of the reform movement continues to be 
that procedural reform is the precursor of political change. However, 
'heretics', most notably Walkland and Johnson, have recently found 
increasing support for their view that political change is the 
necessary prerequisite for structural reform of the House. Their 
premise is that the experience of the 1960s proved that the Commons 
will:only be revitalized to the extent to which it is willing to 
redefine the terms upon which the political parties interact within it. 
The practical implication for reform being "that a drastic change in 
one of the key concepts of British politics, the idea of adversary 
politics, has to be contemplated. We should have to turn away from 
asserting the value of a two-party system and the virtues of a constant 
competition between Government and Opposition, and recognize that the 
continuance of this mode of politics is the basic reason why no serious 
change can be made in the manner in which we manage our political life. 
In other words, it is adversary politics and the two-party syndrome 
which are inexorably destroying the political vitality of Parliament 
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itself" • (5) Electoral reform and the fractionalization of the 
party system within the House, thus commends itself to Walkland and 
Johnson as the catalyst of change. 
The assumptions of the new 'electoral reform school' need, however, 
to be questioned. First, implicit in their argument is the 
presupposition that a multi-party Parliament, in which single-party 
government would become improbable, would automatically redress the 
imbalance between the executive and the legislature. However, the 
existence of coalition government, in itself, provides no guarantee 
that backbench influence over executive policy will be reasserted, 
nor, for that matter, that future policy outputs will be any more 
'consensual' than at present. Indeed, it is possible to contend 
that as each of the major parties has traditionally constituted a 
coalition of diverse interests and opinions, the mode of, policy-
making within single-party government is already characterized by 
bargaining and compromise. Hence the mechanism of choice in a 
multi-party government may not be significantly different to that 
operating within single-party majority government. Whether the nature 
of the resultant compromises in any future Liberal-Labour, or Liberal-
Conservative, coalition would differ dramatically from those within 
single-party governments is,of course, a matter of conjecture. 
Clearly the advocaesof electoral reform hope that policy would become 
firmly rooted in the mystical 'centre-ground' of British politics. 
Yet equally the prospect of a Liberal-Labour coalition may arguably 
provide a "brew (which) could prove a good deal stronger and more 
radical than hoped for by those who see a coalition as a happy retreat 
from too much government". (6) 
What is perhaps more certain, however, is that multi-party govern~2nt 
need not necessarily lead to the reassertion of the influence of the 
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House, as a corporate body, over the executive. A change to a 
multi-party Parliament may not alter the present position in which 
policy is the result of intra-party, rather than intra-House, 
compromises and in which the "House as such has been reduced to the 
role of a pianola playing out jaded tunes that have been recorded 
elsewhere". (7) Under the conditions of coalition government the 
bargaining process may well remain confined to Members of the governing 
coalition to the exclusion of Members in the opposition parties. 
This would particularly be the case if the bonds of party loyalty 
and intra-party cohesion were to be maintained. Obviously the 
assumption of the 'electoral reform school' is that the independence 
of the individual party Member would be enhanced in a multi-party 
House. Yet, conceivably, as Berrington points out, the introduction 
of proportional representation with the single transferable vote 
"might actually serve to increase discipline at Westminster by enabling 
moderate M.P.s to defy their local parties, and to express their 
loyalty to the parliamentary leadership in the division lobbies. 
Right-wing Labour M.P.s would be able to call in the virtues of the 
new electoral system, to redress the imbalance of the old". (8) 
More generally, it may be argued that so long as the convention of 
ministerial responsibility persists with governments continuing to 
make every major issue a vote of confidence then rigid voting 
patterns would continue to differentiate the supporters of the Government 
(whether single-party or coalition) from their opponents in the 
Opposition parties. In which case the adversarial nature of 
parliamentary proceedings would continue. (9) 
The transference of power from the executive to the legislature need 
not, therefore, be a logical corollary of multi-party government in the 
House of Commons. Neither is there necessarily a causal link between 
this model of government and the development of formal specialization, 
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as the Study of Parliament Group appears to suggest in its statement 
that the "mode 1 of a multi-party Parliament ••••• is ••••• normally a 
system in which the subordinate agencies of the assembly, especially 
the committee structure, tend to become the main forum through which 
Parliamentary influence is executed, an important point to bear in 
mind when specific reforms of the House of Commons are being canvassed." 
Equally important for the development of formal specialization is the 
extent to which authoritative leadership (and hence power) is centralized 
within the legislature. Where power is fragmented amongst distinct 
executive, party and house structures in other words, where no 
strict hierarchy of roles exists then formal specialization can be 
accommodated into the decentralized system. This process of 
accommodation can be clearly seen where executive roles are differentiated 
from party leadership, as in the West German Bundestag and, more 
formally, in the U.S. Congress; for the diffusion of authority derived 
from the possession of expertise does not pose a radical challenge to 
the existing centrifugal configuration of power within the legislature. 
However, where authority is founded upon a centralized hierarchy of 
leadership, as in the House of Commons, then an increase in specialization 
poses the classic organizational dilemma of the conflict between the 
requirements of hierarchy and those of the division of labour. Thus 
it has been our contention that the degree to which power is centralized, 
and the extent to which the norms of the legislature legitimize the 
existing distribution of power, also need to be borne in mind "when 
specific reforms of the House of Commons are being canvassed". 
Arguably, the most radical remedy to resolve this dilemma, in favour 
of increased specialization, would be the formal differentiation of 
executive from party leadership roles through a constitutional 
separation of powers. Yet as John Mackintosh observes "a total 
separation whereby the Prime ~inister and his colleagues were not in 
(10) 
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Parliament and Parliament could never exercise its (largely dormant) 
power to defeat a Prime Minister, is probably too radical a departure 
ever to be contemplated in Britain". (11) Obviously, the major 
party leaders would be unlikely to countenance any such change so 
long as they believed that there remained a sporting chance of 
securing office, and thereby exercising the prerogatives of government. 
Executives, and potential executives, therefore, have a vested interest 
in maintaining the centralization of power within the House of Commons. 
Any attempt to fragment the existing hierarchy of roles, through a 
separation of powers, can thus expect to be met with the same degree 
of hostility that has attended successive attempts to decentralize 
power through the systematization of a formal division of labour in 
the House. Ultimately the logic of either reform is essentially that 
of Catch 22; (12) as the reassertion of Parliament's power is 
dependent upon the fragmentation of the executive's power but the 
centralization of power in the hands of the Government effectively 
means that it alone has the capacity to sanction the decentralization 
of power necessary to rejuvenate the legislature. In the parliamentary 
'card-game' of reform "all the cards are stacked against the backbencher, 
and the Government invariablY hold all the aces". (13) 
The Catch 22 syndrome appears to manifest itself in the most recent 
scheme for reform suggested by the Select Committee on Procedure 1977/8. 
The objective of the Committee is to strike a new balance in the 
relationship between the executive and the legislature, and to bring 
about the position in which "the duty of the executive should be to 
assist the House in exercising surveillance over its own work". (14) 
To achieve this goal the Committee is explicit in its rejection of 
"changes of a fundamental or revolutionary character in the formal powers 
of the institutions concerned"; preferring instead "changes in 
practice of an evolutionary kind, following naturally from present 
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practices". (15) But present practices are the very ones supportive 
of executive dominance within the Chamber - hence the catch. The 
creation of twelve new, independent select committees, each charged 
with the examination of all aspects of expenditure, administration and 
policy in the field of the responsibility of a single government 
department, would not in itself tilt the balance of advantage in 
favour of the legislature. Particularly as the philosophy of their 
creation closely resembles that enunciated in the 1964/5 and 1968/9 
Procedure Committees' Reports: 
"In the long run the departmentally-related 
committees may well become the 'eyes and ears' 
of the House in relation to Government 
departments, drawing the attention of Members 
to matters which require further political 
consideration and providing Members .with advic~ 
and informed comment which can nourish the work 
of the House in scrutinizing and criticizing 
• (16) the activities and proposals of the Executive". 
Where, however, the 1977/8 Report differs from its predecessors is in 
its recognition that its aim of providing the House with more effective 
means of scrutiny can only be achieved if the Government's ability to 
control the new committee system is closely delimited. The new 
departmental committees must be independent. Significantly, therefore, 
the Procedure Committee seeks to insulate committee members from 
executive hegemony, and the dominant value system, by developing a 
normative 'sub-culture' and an alternative career structure within the 
House. In this respect one of the most important recommendations, 
which appears innocuous enough at first sight, is that the chairmen of 
select committees should receive extra payment for their additional 
parliamentary duties. For all that the Committee seeks to present 
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this as an evolutionary change, (17) the radical threat to executive 
hegemony is revealed in the statement that: 
"Although it may be premature to regard select 
committees as providing an alternative 'career 
structure' for Members there are indications that 
some Members do regard select committee work in 
this light, and our structural proposals, if 
implemented, are likely to further that tendency • 
••••• We believe that (the payment of) the 
chairmen of select committees would be both 
desirable for its own sake, and could also 
provide some element of a career opportunity in 
the House not wholly in the gift of the party 
Leaders". (18) 
But the payment of committee chairmen, taken in isolation, would be· 
insufficient to generate new backbench attitudes towards committee 
service. Ultimately the attractiveness of service on committee is 
determined by the power and influence of that body. The experience 
of the existing select committees, particularly specialist committees, 
has revealed their essential powerlessness in the face of executive 
intransigence. Their very existence, their membership and chairman-
ship, the amount and nature of information released, and the timing 
of observations and debate on their reports is effectivelY controlled 
by the executive. "In a sense", as the Study of Parliament Group has 
been led to observe, "the impact of a committee on central government 
is a self-inflicted blow". (19) The Procedure Committee therefore 
recognizes that the masochistic tendencies of government will only be 
increased by a restatement of the powers of the investigative committees 
of the House. Consequently it recommends that all of the new 
committees should be appointed under permanent standing orders and 
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that their members should be nominated for the duration of each 
Parliament. While chairmen should continue to be appointed by 
committee members, and so be drawn from the majority party; the 
Committee does, however, advocate the extension of the present 
convention whereby Members of the Opposition parties chair certain 
committees. On the question of the formal powers of the departmental 
committees, the Report categorically states that "the powers of 
committees, and the procedure for enforcing those powers, need 
strengthening to bring them into line with the central requirement of 
select committees to secure access to the information held by the 
Government and its agencies". (20) Subsequently, select committees 
should be empowered by the House to order the attendance of Ministers 
to give evidence and also to order the production of papers and 
records by all Ministers, including Secretaries of State. Furthermore, 
to counteract the executive's propensity to delay the publication 
. (21) 
of its observations on the reports of select committees, the 
Procedure Committee recommends that, in the future, observations should 
be required to be produced within two months of the date of the 
publication of a report. Additionally, the Committee suggested that 
eight days per session should be set aside for debates on reports 
from committees. Although the final choice of reports for debate 
would rest with the Government, the motions put before the House should 
stand in the name of the committee chairman and should be in whatsoever 
form the committee desired (whether simply 'to take note', or to move 
the approval of a report, or to seek the approval of the House for 
certain recommendations contained in a report). 
In total the recommendations of the Procedure Committee, if they were 
to be enacted, would appear to provide select committees with both the 
means and the will to assert their independence from the executive. 
Nevertheless, as with preceding schemes for reform through 
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specialization, the Procedure Committee's recommendations are trapped 
by the circuitous logic of Catch 22. Clearly their intention is to 
redress the balance between the executive and the legislature. 
However, before the House can exert control over the Government it 
requires the executive to voluntarily relinquish its prerogatives over 
the appointment of committees and their memberships, along with its 
powers controlling the release of information, etc. The simple fact 
remains that the House cannot consistently control the executive 
unless the executive itself decides to submit to such control. Indeed, 
in the unlikely event of a future government accepting all of the 
recommendations made by the Procedure Committee, there still remains 
sufficient scope for it to effectively curb the independence of the new 
investigatory committees. 
The return of a majority government in May 1979, means that the lVhips 
in the majority party could theoretically secure the election of committee 
chairmen sympathetic to the Government's cause. Furthermore, the 
departments of state could effectively continue to refuse to release 
information to the House, safe in the knowledge that, under the procedure 
advocated by the Procedure Committee, the debate on the Motion for an 
Address or an Order for the Return of Papers "would be on matters of 
major principles of concern to Members as a whole, and possibly engaging 
the confidence of the House in the Government". (22) Should this 
prove to be the case then past experience suggests that the Government 
would be loyally supported by its own backbenchers. (23) Moreover, 
given that the discretion in the choice of reports to be debated lies 
with the Government, it would perhaps not be too surprising to find that 
it selected the more anodyne reports for debate. Indeed, whether the 
majority of reports would be anything other than anodyne, given the 
partisan composition of the committees and the sensitive areas of policy 
and administration within their remit, is, of course, open to question. 
410 
Obviously the Procedure Committee anticipates that the new investigatory 
committees would operate along bipartisan lines. Yet, bipartisanship 
in the past has normally been achieved by steering committee 
investigations away from the mainstream of contentious party issues. 
On the occasions when select committees have ventured into areas within 
dUsmainstream, party confrontation has tended to replace bipartisanship 
within the committees. (24) 
The successful implementation of the Procedure Committee's 
recommendations, therefore, depends upon the House's willingness to 
surmount the obstacles which have defeated previous attempts to 
systematize the formal division of labour. TraditionallY executives 
have refused to surrender any of their prerogatives to the House and 
the reluctance of the Labour Government in February 1979 to do anything 
more than simply discuss the Procedure Committee's Report suggests 
that this tradition continues. The fact that only three members of the 
Labour Cabinet greeted the Report with any kind of enthusiasm (25) is 
perhaps an indication of the grip of the 'executive mentality' on 
Ministers • Though arguably the most convincing single piece of 
evidence to support the existence of 'a Whitehall perspective of 
Westminster' is provided in Michael Foot's admission that "it is true 
that one's presence in the Government is bound to tinge the views that 
one may hold on this subject (of procedural reform)". (26) Recogni don 
of this Whitehall perspective indeed led Ian Mikardo to express his 
pessimism of his party leadership's commitment to reform "because there 
is no sharper vested interest than that of Ministers and civil servants 
to keep what they know to themselves and away from backbench Members who 
are liable to criticize it". (27) 
The new Conservative government is, however, committed to the 
implementation of the major proposals of the 1977-8 Report., In Opposition, 
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leading members of the Conservative Shadow Cabinet voiced their 
support for the Report; thus Norman St. John-Stevas pledged that the 
next Tory government would give the House the opportunity to take a 
decision on the proposals. So reaffirming the promises made earlier 
by Francis Pym (in speeches at Cambridge and at the Conservative Party 
Conference in October 1978) that positive proposals based on the Report 
would be presented to Parliament by a Conservative Cabinet. These 
assurances were, at the time, greeted with scepticism from both sides 
of the House. William Hamilton clearly believed that "if the 
Conservatives ever man the Government benches, they will take exactly 
the same conservative views on these matters as has every Government 
that I have seen in the House over the past quarter of a century. 
There is a vested interest in maintaining the enormous gulf between the 
executive and the legislature. It exists in executives of all political 
persuasions". (28) Similarly, Fred Silvester from the ,Conservative 
backbenches stated: "I have no more trust in my side of the House 
than in the Government side. It is true always that when they are in 
power, people have a completely different view of this matter from when 
they are in Opposition. It is true also that some of my honourable 
friends, tempted as they will be not only by the pleasures of office 
but by the legitimate desire to get through something in which they 
passionately believe will be less than keen to be subject to greater 
scrutiny". (29) 
Nevertheless, the Queen's Speech of 15th May, 1979, contained the 
proposal that "Members of the House of Commons will be given an 
opportunity to discuss and amend their procedures particularly as they 
relate to their scrutiny of the work of government". But the enthusiasm 
of the new Government for an extension of the select committee system 
appears to stem more from its desire to allow M.P.s to monitor more 
effectively the activities of individual Whitehall departments, with 
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the accent on cutting out waste and reducing expenditure, rather than 
satisfying the growing demands for a redistribution of power within the 
House of Commons. Yet there are, perhaps, grounds for optimism that 
the limited objectives of the Conservative Government will be broadened 
by backbench pressure, as there now exists a stronger all party 
consensus on the need for structural reform in the House than existed 
at the time of the Crossman experiment. The influx of new Members, 
with professional attitudes of mind, at the last five general elections; 
the experience of minority government and its wider scope for independent 
backbench action have contributed towards a significant re-orientation 
of backbench opinion in the House. Many Members no longer appear to 
be content with their conventional supportive role in the Commons. 
One manifestation of this change of attitude is the fact that the 
1974-79 Labour Government suffered a greater number of defeats in the 
lobbies than any other in the 20th century, many of which were inflicted 
by its own backbenchers. Whether or not this pattern of behaviour 
will continue in a Parliament with a majority government is open to 
speculation. But the experience of the 19705 does suggest that the 
seed of greater independence in the House, which was planted in the 
first Parliament of the decade, (31) may yet bear fruit in the 1980's. 
The will of backbenchers to effect radical change is now greater perhaps 
than at most times in recent history whether the will is transformed 
into action remains to be seen. 
Even in the event of the Procedure Committee's recommendations being 
implemented, there still remains a fundamental doubt as to the capacity 
of backbenchers to generat~ sufficient levels of expertis~ in cornmitt~es 
to check the actions of the executive. In the absence of justificatory 
theories of representation, which are capable of supporting a corporate 
division of labour, the will to develop specialization to its logical 
conclusion may ultimatelY prove to be lacking in the House. Indeed 
(30) 
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the significant point about the two strongest arguments against 
committee specialization in the House is that they both rest upon 
distinct conceptions of the role of Parliament which reflect specific 
notions of representation. On the one side are those Members who 
fear that committees would blur the party divide and provide forums 
of consensus in the House. Clearly these M.P.s subscribe to the 
party theory of representation whereby individual representatives are 
delegates of the party pledged to support its manifesto and to assist 
its leadership in the fulfilment of the electoral commitments. In its 
strictest formulation the theory holds that each M.P. should be actively 
concerned in the House in the deliberation of all the issues of concern 
to the party (and so becomes intertwined with the second objection to 
committee specialization, namely that committees detract from the status 
of the floor of the Chamber as the forum of debate). However, in its 
second. formulation the theory of party representation is ,capable of 
supporting a formal division of labour but only at the intra-party 
level. The logic of the party theory effectively excludes an intra-House 
division of labour. Thus the scheme proposed by the National Executive 
Committee of the Labour Party in 1978 for a system of parliamentary 
investigatory committees contains an inherent contradiction. On the 
one hand the N.E.C.'s working group advocates increased control of the 
executive by the House, yet on the other, it denies the capacity of the 
House to act as a corporate entity (and indeed the logic of party 
representation makes this conclusion inevitable). In practice, therefore, 
the proposed committees would be House committees in title only; 
effectively they would operate as party sub-committees with an intra-
party division of labour: 
"Membership of these committees would reflect the 
composition of the House of Commons. Since we 
see no future in consensus government by all-party 
committees these investigatory committees would, in 
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addition to being supported by the necessary 
secretariat, be staffed and advised by specialists 
and on party political lines. It is, indeed, 
essential for the party groups on these committees 
to have adequate research and administrative 
support ••••• Effectively, the establishment of such 
committees would disperse power in Parliament and 
out of it to the political parties, and to those 
groups and individuals who support political 
parties". (32) 
Indeed, given the emphasis upon party factors in this schema and 
the continuance of the centralized authority hierarchy in the House, it 
is difficult to see how the party M.P.s, charged with helping "the 
executive push its policies through against opposition in Parliament", 
can at the same time be reasonably expected to "check the executive". (33) 
Particularly as the N.E.C.'s proposals are neither designed to "put 
policy firmly in the hands of backbench Members" nor to "weaken the 
party pOlitical debate and with it the whole ethos of Cabinet government". 
Indeed, there can be no reassertion of the corporate power of the House 
given the tenets of the party theory of representation. (35) 
The vision of the House as the corporation of the nation, with its 
Members acting as the trustees of the national interest, nevertheless 
guides the second line of attack against committee-based specialization. 
Those Members who see their representative duty in this way necessarily 
believe that the floor of the House should be the forum of national 
debate. Sydney Irving neatly articulated this belief in his 
contribution to the debate on Procedure in February 1979: 
"In recommending these new-style committees, the Select 
Committee opts for a degree of specialization which so 
(34) 
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far has been largely foreign to Parliament and which, 
over the years, many hone Members have resisted. 
In taking the recommendations as they stand ••••• 
it would mean the end to the role of the backbencher 
as an all-rounder, which has been typical of the 
British Parliament ••••• As the subject becomes more 
specialized, the more will the real debate take 
place in committee. The House will be even less 
likely than it is at present to be the forum of the 
nation". (36) 
The same sentiment was expressed by Michael Foot who chose to represent 
the House, on this occasion, as a corporate check upon the executive: 
"" ••••• there need not be a great conflict between 
having select committees and keeping the Chamber ••••• 
as the focal point of debate. I understand that 
argument (but) ••••• I believe that access to the 
Chamber by an individual Member, throughout his whole 
parliamentary career, is the supreme attribute of the 
House of Commons which distinguishes it and makes it 
the place that it ought to be. I believe that if that 
attribute is broken, injured or impaired, great 
injury will be done to the House. It is no use any 
hone Members believing that the establishment of these 
committees, with the special access to Departments, 
will not interfere with the position of individual Members 
who want to raise the subjects covered by the 
committees and the whole range of Government 
action will be covered by those specialist committees". (37) 
The primacy of the deliberative role, and echoes of 18th and 19th century 
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doctrines of representation, reverberate throughout these statements. 
But even those M.P.s who are prepared to argue that the scrutiny of 
the actions of the executive can be more usefully conducted away from 
the floor of the House, are willing to acknowledge the restrictions 
that the performance of the representative role place upon the 
development of legislative specialization in Britain. 
Beith was led to comment: 
Thus Alan 
"The right hon. Member for Dartfort (Sydney Irving) 
took the view it is a quite widespread view 
that specialization would bring many dangers with it 
and that Members would not any longer engage in a 
wide range of activities and would not be the good 
all round chaps that he obviously thinks we are ••••• 
I have no great inclination to be highly specialized, 
but if I had my constituents would soon stop it. 
They write to me on every subject under the sun and 
they expect me to take an interest in an enormous 
range of subjects. Consequently, I do so. 
are some things in which I am particularly 
interested, but I can never become completely 
specialized". (38) 
There 
Consequently, should the challenge to the dominance of the executive 
in Britain ever be mounted through effecting changes in the adversary 
procedure of the House and through a systematization of the formal 
division of labour, the development of adequate levels of 
specialization may still be impeded by the nature of the prevailing 
theories of representation in the British political culture. The 
fundamental dilemma for the legislature remains that posited by Karl 
Dietrich Bracher: "an elected representative cannot, by the nature 
of the thing, be equal to the many-sided detailed problems with which 
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society and bureaucracy confront him". (39) As the modern state 
increases in size and complexity so the need for an increasing division 
of labour in the British House of Commons will become even more 
apparent, as indeed will the contradictions inherent in the 
parliamentary role: 
"Leaving aside the constitutional niceties, we 
might sum up this muddle by saying crudely that 
we find it difficult to decide whether our M.P.s 
ought to be predominantly 'us' or 'them' ••••• 
We wish our Member of Parliament both clever 
and eloquent, but at the same time we want him 
to be a true mirror of average men and women, 
who are neither. We prefer him to be independent 
and a man of character, yet many of us are 
determined to make him carry our complaints 
before the seats of the mighty in the most 
slavish manner. He must be a sleepless watchdog 
over the Executive, and yet decently subservient 
to the party whip; professional enough to take on 
the Civil Service at its own game, and yet 
sufficiently amateur to know how the other half 
lives". (40) 
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Appendix A 
The Sample 
The sample used in this survey was a proportionate stratified random 
sample of the 451 backbenchers in the 1970-1 House of Commons. Excluded 
from the sample were (i) Members of Her Majesty's Government (including 
Parliamentary Private Secretaries), (ii) Opposition Spokesmen, (iii) the 
Chairman and Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means. 
The major stratification factors were (i) party, (ii) occupation and 
(iii) length of parliamentary service. The data on occupation was 
derived from Andrew Roth, The Business Background of M.P.s, (Parliamentary 
Profiles, London, 1972) and was crosschecked with the raw data utilized 
by Colin Mellors in his Socio-economic Backgrounds bf M.P.s 1945-70 (M.A. 
dissertation, Sheffield University, 1972; now published as The British M.P., 
Saxon House, Farnborough, 1978). The four categories in the sample 
reflect the standard classification of occupations into four main 
groupings professions, business, miscellaneous, workers. 'Primary' 
occupation, as defined in Chapter 5, was used as the criterion of 
classification. The data on length of service represents the length of 
service of each M.P. as of the last day of the 1970-1 parliamentary 
session. Backbenchers were divided into three cohorts on the basis of 
(i) one years service or less (entry corresponding to the 1970 general 
election and subsequent by-elections), (ii) two to seven years service 
(entry at the 1964 and 1966 general elections and subsequent by-elections) 
and (iii) eight or more years service in the House of Commons (entry 
at general and by-elections before 1964). The data was collected from 
A. Roth, (op cit). 
The other stratification factor was the activity of M.P.s at Question 
Ti~~. The aggregate data was collected from F.W.S. Craig and E.P. Craig, 
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The Political Companion, (Political Reference Publications, Chichester, 
No.9, October/December 1971). This factor was included in the sample 
design to ensure that the sample generally reflected the profile of 
activity on the backbenches. A fair representation of activity levels 
was deemed necessary because one of the original research hypotheses 
was that the level of specialization would be anticipated to be strongly 
associated with the level of activity in the House. 
The tables listed below provide the details of the population and the 
sample. (Tables Al.4 and Al.5 refer to Conservative and Labour Members 
only a sample of minor party Members was used throughout the survey; 
data on their activity was collected and analyzed. Given the small 
number of third party Members in the sample, the results presented in 
the text do not include data for these M.P.s). 
TABLES 
ALI Compo s i tion of the House of Commons 1970-1 - Party 
Backbench Sample 
Party Population % (Stratification factor 
n n 
Conservative 229 50.8 57 
Labour 210 46.6 53 
Other 12 2.6 3 
451 100.0 113 
A1.2 Composition of the House of Commons 1970-1 Date of Entry 
Date of Backbench 
Entry Population % Sample 
n n 
Pre-1964 230 51.0 58 
1964+66 94 21.0 23 
1970 127 28.0 32 
451 100.0 113 
p 
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Al.3 Level of Parliamentary Activity 1970-1 - Parliamentary Questions 
Backbench 
No. of Questions Population % Sample 
n n 
0 
- 39 262 58.1 67 
40 + 189 41.9 46 
451 100.0 113 
A1.4 Conservative Party 1970-1. Occupation by date of entry 
Occu,Eation Date of Entry 
Pre-1964 1964 + 66 1970 
Bbs % Sample Bbs % Sample Bbs % Sample 
n n n n n n 
Professions 48 39.3 12 14 41.1 3 23 31.5 6 
Business 53 43.4 13 11 32.4 3 39 53.4 10 
Miscellaneous 20 16.4 5 9 26.5 2 11 15.1 3 
Workers 1 0.9 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 
122 100.0 30 34 100.0 8 73 100.0 19 
A1.5 Labour Party 1970-1. Occupation by date of entry 
occupation Date of Entrl 
Pre-1964 1964 + 66 1970 
Bbs % Sample Bbs ., Sample Bbs % Sample 10 
n n n n n n 
Professions 41 38.3 10 29 50.9 7 24 52.2 6 
Business 11 10.3 3 7 12.3 2 4 8.7 1 
Miscellaneous 41 38.3 10 12 21.1 3 16 ~~ 34.8 5 
Workers 14 13.1 4 9 15.7 2 2 4.3 0 
107 100.0 27 57 100.0 14 46 100.0 12 
Note 
There is a degree of controversy ov~r the legitimate use of nonparametric 
tests in the case of stratified samples. H.M. Blalock in Social Statistics. 
(McGraw Hill, New York. 1960. p.405) suggests that samples, other than 
simple random ones, create problems in the use of sophisticated statistical 
techniques. Similarly J.A. Davis in Elementary Survel Analysis, 
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(Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1971, p.59) states that inference techniques 
normally assume simple random sampling. However, both authors agree 
that stratified samples of a given size may be equivalent in efficiency 
to somewhat larger random samples, and that confidence limits are broader 
for sophisticated probability samples than simple random samples of the 
same size. Indeed, Davis (pp.59-60) argues that S.R.S. formulas be 
used anyway as "you are using a consistent decision maker which, 
fallible as it is, is more objective than the eyeball method of 
determining significance ••••• Everybody does it anyway". A recent 
example of the use of inferential statistics in this manner is provided 
in K. Newton's Second City Politics, (Clarendon, Oxford, 1976, p.41 ff) 
where significance tests are used for a disproportionate stratified 
sample even though such a sample does not meet the normal distribution 
assumptions necessary for such tests. 
As our sample is a proportionate random sample our confidence in using 
tests of significance is increased, foras C.A. Moser and G. Kalton stress 
in Survey Methods in Social Investigation, (Heinemann, London, 1971, 2nd 
ed., p.85), "Stratification does not imply any departure from the 
principle of randomness. All it means is that, before any selection 
takes place, the popUlation is divided into a number of strata; then a 
random sample is selected within each stratum. If the sampling fraction 
is the same for every stratum, this procedure is almost certain to be an 
improvement on a simple random sample because it makes sure that the 
different strata in the population are correctly represented in the 
sample ••••• Thus stratified random sampling with a uniform sampling 
fraction tends to have a somewhat greater precision than simple random 
sampling" • 
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Appendix B 
Subject Codes 
01. Agriculture, Food and Fisheries. 
02. Aid (Overseas). 
03. Aviation (Military-Civil). 
04. Animal Protection and Welfare. 
05. Arts, Museums, Libraries. 
06. Civil Service. 
07. Constituency matter. 
08. Decimals and Metrication. 
09. Defence. 
10. Economy, Finance and Taxation. 
11. Education. 
12. Environment. 
13. Employment (including industrial relations). 
14. Europe - E.E.C. 
15. Foreign and Commonwealth. 
16. House of Commons, (including electoral law). 
17. Homes (Housing, rents, construction industry). 
18. Health, hospitals and disabled. 
19. Industry (trade, industry, nationalization and consumers). 
20. Law (police, prisons, courts, 'law and order'). 
21. Legal (law reforms, privacy, safety, asylum). 
22. Local Government. 
23. Media (Press, T.V., Cinema). 
24. Northern Ireland. 
25. Post Office. 
26. Ports. 
27. Power (coal, gas, electricity). 
28. Race (relations and immigration). 
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29. Regions (regional policy, development areas). 
30. Science and Technology. 
31. Scottish Affairs. 
32. Sport and recreation. 
33. Transport. 
34. Welsh Affairs. 
35. Welfare (social security, pensions). 
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Appendix C 
Recorded Backbench Activity in the House of Commons 
C.l Ques dons 
A quantitative content anaylsis of the Official Report of the House of 
Commons (Hansard) was performed for the 1970-1 and 1972-3 parliamentary 
sessions. For each Member in the sample the number of oral and written 
Questions appearing in his name in the pages of Hansard was counted. 
The subject area of each Question was coded in accordance with the 
coding frame outlined in Appendix B. The categories in this frame 
represent a refinement of those used by R. Oakley and P. Rose in 
The Political Year 1971, (Pitman, London, 1971, p.24l). This 
classification was preferred to the more frequently utilized, 
departmentally based, categorization found in the Sessional Index of 
the Official Report. The latter classification produces broad categories 
which often represent amalgams of more discrete subject areas (e.g. 
after the reorganization of 1970, the Department of Environment 
encompassed the subjec~of housing, local government, environment, 
transport and ports). Supplementary oral Questions were not included 
in the count as the aim of the survey was to analyze the deliberate 
and premeditated actions of backbenchers. Thus only those Questions 
actually tabled by each M.P. were included in the analysis. 
Supplementaries were, however, used to guide the classification of the 
subject content of Questions where the precise subject focus of the 
initial oral Question was obscure. (There is an increasing tendency for 
backbenchers to ask the !-Iinister concerned for a list of his engagements 
on a specified date; or to ask whether the Minister will visit the 
Member's constituency etc. the actual subject of concern fer the 
M.P. is revealed only in the supplementary Question). 
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The commonly used technique of collecting data from the Sessional Index 
of Hansard (see R.M. Punnett, Frontbench Opposition, Heinemann, London, 
1973; P.G. Richards, The Backbenchers, Faber, London, 1972; E. Oram, 
Investigative Select Committees in the 1966 House of Commons, Unpublished 
Ph.D., University of Strathc1yde, 1974; M. Keating, The Role of the 
Scottish M.P. in the Political System, Unpublished Ph.D, C.N.A.A., 1975) 
was rejected for the present study as an accurate count and 
classification of Questions was required. The Index does not give an 
exact count of the number of Questions asked by each M.P. Instead Index 
references against an individual's name are to the columns of Hansard 
in which that Member's Questions (including supplementaries to oral 
Questions) are recorded. Where an M.P. asks more than one Question, but 
his contribution fits into a single column then the Index only records 
one column reference (unless the Questions are on different subjects, in 
which case they will be categorized separately in the Index). 
The same limitations in using the Index apply, if anything more 
forcefully, to the analysis of written Questions. Oram has asserted, 
however, that "with Questions to which written answers are given ••••• 
only rarely are individual Questions not separately categorized; thus, 
each M.P.'s column references in the Index usually equal the number of 
written Questions asked". (ibid, p.490). Yet this is not in fact 
the case. The Index references for written Questions still refer 
simply to the number of columns, rather than the number of Questions; so 
that where more than one Question on the same issue 'is fitted into 
one column the Index will only note a single column entry, (e.g. Vol. 821, 
1970-1, Col. 343 this single column entry in the Index for Jack 
Ashley covers three Questions on the Chronically Sick and Disabled 
Persons Act). The inaccuracy of the Index as a precise indicator of 
the level of activity is more vividly illustrated where three or more 
conse~utive single column entries occur (e.g. Vol. 821, 1970-1, the· 
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Index entries Col. 266-7, 268, 269, 270 cover thirteen written Questions 
tabled by Ashley on the subject of deaf children; similarly the entries 
for Col. 240, 241, 242-3 in the same vo1u~ cover ten Questions on 
hearing aids}. 
A further problem arising from the use of the Sessional Index as the 
primary source of data is the random errors that occur through printing 
errors (e.g. the Index entry for John Page, Vol. 824, 1970-1, p.752, 
lists only four entries; the remaining entries, which occupy one and 
three quarter columns, are listed under Graham Page's name). 
C.2 Debates 
The use of the Sessional Index of Hansard to analyze activity in debate 
in the House is fraught with problems. The major difficulty is that for 
each M.P., the Index refers to any column of the Official Report in which 
the M.P. spoke, or was seen by the Hansard reporters to have attempted 
to speak. The Index does not therefore distinguish between attempted 
interventions, single word contributions and full column speeches per 
Member. Thus, as most researchers acknowledge, the Index provides only 
the crudest of measures of activity on the floor of the House. Some 
students, however, compound the inherent inaccuracy of the Index by 
using the length of entry under each Member's name as a measure of their 
activity in debate (see P.G. Richards, op cit, pp.78-8l; w.O. Muller, 
The Kept Men, Harvester, Sussex, 1977, p.205). The results gained from 
such an exercise are largely meaningless, because, in addition to the 
problems outlined above, the length of an Index entry is as much a 
factor of the printing conventions of Hansard as it is an indication of 
the level of activity in debate. 
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The data for the present study for the 1970-1 Session was collected 
from the text of Hansard. Each contribution made by each Member in the 
sample was measured in terms of the column inches taken up in the 
Official Report. All single, isolated, contributions of less than 
two column inches were excluded from the total count for each Member 
to eliminate attempted interventions and short interjections (which 
cannot be regarded as speeches as such). The figure of two column 
inches was decided upon after a pilot study of the activity of a small 
group of Members had been conducted. Two column inches represents 
fifteen lines of the printed Record, and effectivelY encompasses the 
vast majority of interjections. However, as with the measurement of 
Questioning activity, the precision of measurement gained by this process 
exacted massive costs in terms of the time consumed in the collection 
of data. Indeed, so great were these costs that a decision was taken, 
before the second phase of data collection, to utilize tbe Index of 
Hansard for the Session 1972-3. 
In the light of the experience gained from the first phase of data 
collection it was decided to exclude all single, isolated, column entries. 
in the Index as the overwhelming majority of these refer to Members' 
attempts to intervene, or short interjections. in debate. wbere a 
sequential series of single column references were listed in the Index, 
a check was made to ensure that these references did not in fact 
represent a lengthy speech, fragmented by a series of interjections. 
Furthermore, an additional check was made on all two column references 
to ensure that these entries did not simply record short interjections 
starting at the bottom of one column and continuing onto the top of the 
next column. With these restrictions in force the number of columns 
entered for each Member, coded by subject area, was noted. EVen with 
these safeguards, however, the data for the 1972-73 Session represents 
a less accurate measure of activity in debate than that for the 1970-1 
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Session. 
C.3 Early Day Motions 
The data for Early Day Motions for Session 1970-1 was collected from 
the Daily Order Papers of the House. The subject area of each Motion 
was noted and the number of Motions signed by each Member was recorded. 
As there are no cumulative lists of signatures appended to each Motion 
every consecutive Order Paper had to be examined to discover which 
Motions the Members in our sample supported. The raw data for Session 
1972-3 was provided by Professor Hugh Berrington and Dr. John Leece 
from the data bank of E.D.M.s held at the University of Newcastle. As 
with the 1970-1 data each E.D.M. was subject coded and the number of 
Motions signed by each Member in the sample was recorded. 
C.4 Committees 
Select Committees 
The measure of activity in select committees represents the recorded 
attendance of each backbencher at each committee on which he served. 
The data on attendance was gained from the information recorded in the 
Returns of Select Committees (H.C. 635, Session 1970-1; H.C. 473, 
Session 1972-3). The number of attendances per Member, along with the 
subject areas of the various committee investigations, were recorded. 
There are, however, inherent weaknesses in using the information 
recorded in the Returns as a measure of activity not least of which 
is the fact that "the lists of Members present at the sittings.; ••• do 
not reveal how long they actually stay. They come and go during 
meetings in a manner often disconcerting for witnesses" (N. Johnson, 
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Parliament and Administration, Allen and Unwin, London, 1966, p.22). 
Neither do the Returns provide any indication of the nature of a 
Uember's contribution when he is actually present at a connnittee 
sitting. Nevertheless, the Returns do provide perhaps the best single 
piece of evidence on attendance at committee sittings and the level of 
activity spent on investigative committee work. 
Standing Committees 
The measure of activity in standing committee represents the recorded 
attendances of each Member for each committee to which he was assigned. 
The data was collected from the Offical Report of Proceedings of each 
standing committee; the attendance lists for every recorded sitting 
were analyzed. The subject area considered by each committee was also 
recorded. 
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Appendix D 
Index of Specialization 
As noted in Chapter 5 there are considerable failings with commonly used 
'indexes of specialization'. To overcome these failings the coefficient 
of variation was used as the basis for the index of specialization in 
this study. 
The formula for the coefficient of variation is simply 
v = s 
-X 
or in words: 
coefficient of variation of X • standard of deviation of X 
mean of X 
To understand this coefficient it is necessary to comprehend the standard 
deviation. The standard deviatio~ is a measure of dispersion related 
to the mean as a measure of central tendency and is defined as the 
square root of the arithmetic mean of the standard deviations from the 
mean. (See H.M. Blalock, 02 cit, p.67, fn.l; N.H. Nie, C.H. Hull, 
J.G. Jenkins, K. Steinbrenner, D.H. Bent, Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1975, 2nd ed., p.l84). 
s I: i • 1 
N X) 2 
N - 1 
The standard deviation will be zero where all scores have the same value 
(Le. the value of the mean) and will reach maximum r.lagnitude when scores 
are divided between the extreme ends of the scale. 
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The index was computed in the following manner (taking the example of 
Questions the process remained the same for the other three procedures). 
For each H.P.: 
i) the number of Questions tabled in each of the thirty-
five subject areas was recorded 
ii) using the SPSS programme the standard deviation of the 
dispersion of Questions amongst these areas was 
calculated 
iii) the standard deviation was then divided by the mean 
number of Questions to produce the coefficient of 
variation. 
The coefficient score for each Member was calculated in accordance with 
this procedure. In measuring the dispersion of activity across a constant 
number of subject areas the index has both a maximum (5.92) as well 
as a minimum (0) value. A score of 0 means that the activity of an M.P. 
is divided equally amongst all thirty-five subject areas; and such a 
Member can therefore be regarded as a true generalist. In practice, 
however, the lowest score in the sample was 1.16. A score of 5.92, on 
the other hand, means that a Member's activity is focused solely upon a 
single subject area and he can therefore be regarded as a true specialist. 
Examples of the computation of the Index of Specialization 
a). The 'True Specialist' 
e.g. a Member asking a total of thirty-five Questions in a single 
sUbject area. (Subject area 01). 
i)·x 35 . - . 35 1 
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ii). Subject area 01 
Xl '"' 35 
(Xl - X)2 '" (35 - 1)2 = 1156 
iii). The remaining subject areas 02 .•• 35 
(X2 - X)2 • (0 - 1)2 = (-1)2 x 34 (remaining areas) 
= 34 
iv). ~ N 
i • 1 
(Xi - X)2 = 1156 + 34 = 1190 
v) • 1: N (Xi - X)2 1190 ... 35 i = 
• 1 
N - 1 34 
N 
- X)2 
-r t i '"' 1 (Xi .. 5.92 - N - 1 
vii) • s • 5.92 
viii) ; V • s • 5.92 • 5.92 
-
-1-
X 
b). The 'True Generalist' 
e.g. a Member asking a total of thirty-five Questions, a single Question 
in each of the thirty-five subject areas. 
i). X • 35 • 1. 
3S 
ii) • Subject areas 01. •• 35 
Xl' •••••• ,X35 
• 1 
(Xl - :()2 • (1 - 1)2 
iii) • t N (Xi - :()2 • 0 i 
• 1 N-l 34 
iV)'jE N (Xi - :{)2 s i 
• 1 -
N-1 
v) • V • 5 • 0 • 0 
X 1 
= 0 x 35 (subject areas) = 0 
'" 
0 
F 
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Index of Subject Specialization 
This index is based upon the measure of the absolute differences between 
the proportion of each M.P.~ activity devoted to each of the thirty-five 
subject areas in 1970-1 and the equivalent proportion in 1972-3. The 
proportion of activity in each subject area in 1972-3 was subtracted 
from the respective proportions in 1970-1; providing a score in a 
range from 0 to 2. The scores were, therefore, divided by 2 to bring 
the index within the range of 0 to 1. In this index the M.P. who 
devoted exactly the same proportion of his activity to exactly the same 
subject areas in both sessions would receive a score of O. Whilst the 
Member who spread his activity across completely different subject areas 
in 1972-3 to those of 1970-1 would score 1. The higher the score in 
this index the lower the level of subject specialization. 
Examples of the computation of the Index of Subject Specialization 
a). The 'True Subject Specialist' 
i.e. a Member whose activity is fully concentrated in the same 
subject area in both parliamentary sessions. 
Subject 
Area 
01 
02 
03 
'" 35 
Proportion of 
activity per 
subject area 
1970-1 
Xl 
1.0 
0 
0 
'" 
0 
1.0 
Proportion of 
activit~ per 
subject area 
1972-3 
X2 IXI - X21 
1.0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
'" '" 
0 0 
--
1.0 r\Xl X21 
2 
= 0 
435b 
b). The 'Non-Subject Specialist' 
i.e. a Member whose activity is focused upon totally different 
subject areas in each of the two parliamentary sessions. 
Subject 
Area 
01 
02, 
03 
.j. 
35 
ProEortion of 
activitl Eer 
subject area 
1970-1 
Xl 
1.0 
0 
0 
.j. 
0 
1.0 
ProEortion of 
activity Eer 
subject area 
1972-3 
X2 I Xl - X2! 
0 1.0 
1.0 1.0 
0 0 
+ 
'" 0 0 
1.0 r\X1 X2 J 
2 
= 2 = 1 
2" 
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Appendix E 
1975 Postal Survey 
The questionnaire was sent to all 453 backbenchers in September 1975. 
In total 161 ~lembers returned completed questionnaires giving an 
initial response rate of 35.5%. This response rate compares 
favourably with other recent survey responses (see Chapter 6). 
In retrospect the timing of the survey was perhaps inauspicious insofar 
as the questionnaire became caught in the logjam of mail confronting 
Members on their return to the House from holiday. Indeed typical of 
many replies was the letter from one senior Conservative backbencher 
which stated "It (the questionnaire) arrived at the worst possible 
moment since there was an enormous back-log of correspondence after my 
return from holiday, and I have been extremely busy every since". 
(Letter dated 13th October, 1975). 
However, the greatest single reason advanced for not completing the 
questionnaire was that the demands made upon M.P.s in answering postal 
surveys was becoming intolerable. Indeed many Members returned printed 
letters/postcards with a statement to the effect that "Mr •••••••. regrets 
that he no longer findsit possible to fill in questionnaires. Many 
are received and it has become impossible to deal with them". 
Given the strength of feeling held by many Members against postal 
surveys it was decided, after the initial response, not to send out 
reminders to non-respondents. Undoubtedly such a procedure would have 
improved considerably the response rate 
of the goodwill of many other Members. 
but probably at the expense 
The survey was deliberately kept as short and as concise as possible 
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on the advice of most of the Members responding to the pilot survey 
circulated in May 1975. 
Questionnaire list of Questions 
Q.l In your work in Parliament is there any particular subject 
area(s) that attracts a majority of your interest and activity 
in the House? 
(a) One subject (Please tick) 
(b) a few subjects (2 - 3) 
(c) 4 - 5 subjects 
(d) more than 5 subjects. 
Q.2 Would you please state the subject area(s) in which you are 
particularly active? 
Q.3 Which procedures do you find useful in pursuing this/these 
subjects in the House? 
Parliamentary Questions 
Early Day Motions 
Debate (adjournment) 
Backbench party committee 
Other (please specify) 
(Please number in 
order of preference) 
Q.4 i) In answering question one, if you ticked box (a) approximately 
how much of your parliamentary time is expended on this subject? 
(a) 1 (b) 1/3 (c) ! (d) 2/3 (e) ! (Please circle). 
ii) If you ticked either box (b) or (c), approximately how much 
of your parliamentary time is expended on these subjects? 
(a) ! (b) 1/3 (c) I (d) 2/3 (e) ! (Ples;e circle) 
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iii) If you ticked box (d) do you spread your activity over a wide 
range of subjects without concentrating on anyone/few in 
particular? 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
(Comments) 
(Please tick). 
Q.5 From which of the following sources did your original interest 
arise in the subject(s) you concentrate upon. 
(a) Personal interest (e.g. through pre-parliamentary occupation; 
membership of an association or group etc). 
Please specify the subject. (Comments). 
(b) Constituency interest (e.g. the subject is of special 
importance in your constituency). 
Please specify the subject. (Comments). 
(c) Interest arising from discussion of this subject in Parliament. 
Please specify the subject. (comments). 
(d) Party interest (e.g. the subject is of particular relevance 
to your party). 
Please specify the subject. (Comments). 
(e) Other interest (please specify). 
Q.6 Do you regard yourself to be an expert in any particular subject, 
as distinct from specializing in it in your Parliamentary activity? 
Q.7 (a) Would you say that you are expert in the subject area(s) you 
listed in answer to question 21 
(Please specify the subject). 
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(b) Why do you regard yourself as expert in this /these subjects? 
(Please specify the subject). 
(c) Could you name five or six backbench Members of the House 
whom you consider to be expert in particular subject fields? 
Q.8 Would you say that most/quite a lot/not very many/very few/ 
backbenchers specialize (i.e. concentrate their activity on a few 
subject areas). (Please tick). 
Q.9 Would you consult any other backbencher for advice on a subject 
with which you are personally unfamiliar? 
Q.lO In seeking such advice would the ideological 'position' of the 
backbencher be more important than his expertise on the subject? 
Q.ll Do other backbenchers consult you upon the specific areas in which 
you specialize? 
Q.12 i) Are the subjects on which you are particularly active now, 
the subjects you concentr!'ted upon in your first session in 
Parliament. (Comments). 
ii) Has there been any significant change in your interests in 
certain subject area(s) since you first entered Parliament? 
(Comments). 
Q.13 If I may briefly move on to the topic of party backbench committees/ 
groups, may I ask 
i) Are you a regular attender at party subject committees/groups? 
(regular • a majority of committee meetings). 
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ii) Please name the committees/groups which you attend 
on a regular basis. 
Q.14 If you regularly attend party committees/groups outside of the areas 
of your special interests (listed in question two) please state 
the reason(s) why. (Comments). 
Q.15 Does your membership of a party subject committee/group increase 
your activity in the House on that subject? 
Q.16 i) Did your interest in the subjects upon which you concentrate 
in the House initially arise from attendance at a subject 
committee/group. (If your answer is yes, please specify 
the subject(s) ). 
ii) Did your interest in a specific subject lead you to attend a 
particular subject committee/group in the first instance? 
(If your answer is yes, please specify the subject(s». 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
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Annex 1 
Specialization and Occupation (Following from Chapter 5). 
TABLE A1.1 Number of subject areas covered per Member* in Debate 
1970-1 and 1972-3 
No. of 
Subjects 
* Conservative and Labour Members (All tables in Annex 1 
refer to Conservative and Labour Members only). 
Occupation 
Prof. Business Misce1 Worker 
1 - 3 
4 - 10 
11 - 35 
TABLE A1.2 
No. of 
Subjects 
1 - 3 
4 - 10 
11 - 35 
1970-1 1972-3 
(n 43) (n 39) 
% % 
41.9 51.3 
55.8 43.6 
2.3 5.1 
100.0 100.0 
Number of SUbjec't 
1970-1 and 1972-3 
Prof. 
1970-1 1972-3 
(n 43) (n 38) 
% % 
18.6 34.3 
46.5 36.8 
34.9 28.9 
100.0 100.0 
1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-; 
(n 32) (n 27) (n 28) (n 24) (n 5) (n 5: 
% % % % % % 
46.9 63.0 46.4 50.0 60.0 60.0 
53.1 37.0 50.0 50.0 40.0 40.0 
0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
areas covered Eer Member in Questions 
Occupation 
Business Misce1 Worker 
1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-; 
(n 31) (n 27) (n 27) (n 23) (n 6) (n 3) 
% % % % % % 
9.6 22.2 22.2 17.4 16.7 33.3 
45.2 55.6 22.2 47.8 33.3 0.0 
45.2 22.2 55.6 34.8 50.0 66.7 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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TABLE A1.3 Number of subject areas covered per Member in E.n.M.s 
No. of 
Subjects Occupation 
Prof. Business Misce1 Workers 
1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 
(n 43) (n 39) (n 32) (n 28) (n 28) (n 26) (n 6) (n 5) 
% % % % % % % % 
1 - 3 0.0 0.0 6.2 10.7 7.1 3.8 0.0 0.0 
4 - 10 23.3 41.0 18.8 39.3 14.3 30.8 16.7 0.0 
11 - 35 76.7 59.0 75.0 50.0 78.6 65.4 83.3 100.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
TABLE A1.4 Number of subject areas covered per Member in Committee 
No. of 
Subjects Occupation 
Prof. Business Misce1 Worker 
1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 
(n 38) (n 38) (n 28) (n 29) (n 19) , (n 23) (n 5) (n 5) 
% % % % % % % % 
1 - 3 89.5 86.8 89.3 86.2 94.7 82.6 80.0 80.0 
4 - 10 10.5 13.2 10.7 13.8 5.3 17.4 20.0 20.0 
11 - 35 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
TABLE A1.5 Index of sEecia1ization crosstabu1ated with Occupation -
Debate 1970-1 and 1972-3 
Level of 
sEecialization Occupation 
Prof. Business Miscel Worker 
1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 
(n 43) (n 39) (n 32) (n 27) (n 28) (n 24) (n 5) (n 5) 
% % % % % % % % 
High 23.3 17.9 18.8 29.6 17.9 12.5 20.0 60.0 
Medium 53.4 61.6 65.6 66.7 67.9 70.8 80.0 20.0 
Low 23.3 20.5 15.6 3.7 14.2 16.7 0.0 20.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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TABLE A1.6 Index of specialization cross tabulated with occupation _ 
Questions 1970-1 and 1972-3 
Level of 
Specialization Occupation 
Prof. Business Misce1 Worker 
1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 
(n 43) (n 3S) (n 31) (n 27) (n 27) (n 23) . (n 6) (n 3) 
% % % % % % % % 
High 16.3 21.1 16.1 lS.5 lS.5 13.0 0.0 0.0 
Medium 39.5 36.S 38.7 33.3 29.6 47.8 66.7 33.3 
Low 42.2 42.1 45.2 48.2 51.9 39.1 33.3 66.7 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
TABLE Al.7 Index of specialization crosstabu1ated with occupation -
E.D.M.s 1970-1 and 1972-3 
Level of 
Specialization Occupation 
Prof. Business Misce1 tJorker 
1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-·1 1972-3 
(n 43) (n 39) (n 32) (n 28) (n 28) (n 26) (n 6) (n 5) 
% % % % % % % % 
High 0.0 0.0 6.3 7.1 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 
Medium 0.0 2.6 3.1 17.9 7.1 0.0· 0.0 0.0 
Low 100.0 97.4 90.6 75.0 92.9 96.2 100.0 100.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
TABLE Al.S Index of specialization crosstabu1ated with occupation -
Committees 1970-1 and 1972-3 
Level of 
Specialization Occupation 
Prof. Business Misce1 Worker 
1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 1970-1 1972-3 
(n 38) (n 34) (n 28) (n 26) (n 19) (n 21) (n 5) (n 4) 
% % % % % % ." 10 % 
High 71.1 61.8 89.3 65.4 73.7 66.7 60.0 100.0 
Medium 28.9 38.2 10.7 34.6 26.3 28.6 40.0 0.0 
Low 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7. 0.0 0.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Annex 2 
Survey responses analyzed by length of parliamentary experience. 
(Following from Chapter 6). 
TABLE A2.1 Number of subjects attracting a majority of interest and 
activity in the House cross tabulated with 'parliamentary 
generations' • 
No. of Subjects 
1 
2 - 3 
4 - 5 
6 + 
Pre-64 
(n 41) 
% 
4.9 
51.1 
22.0 
22.0 
100.0 
Par1iamentarl 
1964-66 
(n 34) 
% 
5.9 
47.1 
29.4 
17.6 
100.0 
Generations 
1970 1974 
(n 33) (n 53) 
% % 
12.1 5.7 
45.5 30.2 
42.4 45.3 
0.0 18.8 
100.0 100.0 
TABLE A2.2 Par1iamentarl time devoted to specia1isms (2 - 5) 
crosstabu1ated with 'parliamentarl generations ' .• 
Time spent on 
2 - 5 subjects Parliamentarl Generations 
Pre-64 1964-66 1970 1974 
(n 29) (n 24) (n 28) (n 39) 
% . % % % 
One quarter 10.4 20.8 10.7 12.8 
One third 27.6 12.5 25.0 30.8 
One half 27.6 ·33.4 35.7 23.1 
Two thirds 17.2 20.8 25.0 15.4 
Three quarters 17.2 12.5 3.6 17.9 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total 
(n 161) 
% 
6.8 
42.2 
35.5 
15.5 
100.0 
Total 
(n 120) 
% 
13.3 
25.0 
29.2 
19.2 
13.3 
100.0 
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TABLE A2.3 Source of subject specialisms cross tabulated with 
, parliamentary generations' • 
Source of 
original interest Parliamentar}: Generations 
Pre-64 1964-66 1970 1974 Total 
(n 40) (n 34) (n 33) (n 53) (n 160) 
% % % % % 
Personal 95.0 94.1 93.9 96.2 95.0 
Constituency 82.5 67.6 60.6 76.9 73.0 
Parliamentary 12.5 20.6 27.3 22.6 20.6 
Party 35.0 29.4 30.3 34.0 32.5 
«a) % in each column totals more than 100% due to respondents 
specifying more than one source of interest). 
TABLE A2.4 Do lOU re~ard ~ourself to be an eXEert in anl Earticular 
subject z as distinct from sEecia1izing in it in lour 
Earliamentary activitl? ResEonses anal}:zed bl 
'parliamentary gener a tion ' • 
Parliamentary Generations 
Pre-64 1964-66 1970 1974 Total 
(n 41) (n 34) (n 30) (n 53) (n 158) 
% % % % % 
Yes 68.3 58.8 70.0 62.3 64.6 
No 31.7 41.2 30.0 37.7 35.4 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
TABLE A2.5 Would you sa}: that }:ou are expert in the subject area(s) 
lOU listed in answer to question 27 Responses ana1lzed 
by 'parliamentary generation'. 
Parliamentar}: Generations 
Pre-64 1964-66 1970 1974 Total 
(n 41) (n 34) (n 32) (n 53) (n 160) 
% % % % % 
Yes 82.9 64.7 71.9 69.8 72.5 
No 17.1 35.3 28.1 30.2 27.5 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(a) 
- 446 
TABLE A2.6 Could lOU name five or six backbench Members of the House 
whom rou consider to be expert in Earticu1ar subject fields? 
Responses analyzed by 'parliamentary generations'. 
Par1iamentarz Generations 
Pre-64 1964-66 1970 1974 Total 
(n 36) (n 29) (n 30) (n 47) (n 142) 
% % % % % 
Yes 83.3 79.3 100.0 97.9 96.8 
No 16.7 20.7 0.0 2.1 9.2 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
TABLE A2.7 Would rou sa~ that most/suite a lot/not ver~ manz/verr few 
backbenchers sEecia1ize? ResEonses ana1rzed br 
'parliamentarr generations' • 
Parliamentarr Generations 
Pre-64 1964-66 1970 1974 Total 
(n 38) (n 34) (n 31) (n 52) (n 155) 
% % % % % 
Most specialize 42.1 29.4 38.7 40.4 38.1 
Quite a lot 50.0 58.8 58.1 48.1 52.9 
Not very many 2.6 5.9 3.2 11.5 6.5 
Very few 5.3 5.9 0.0 0.0 2.5 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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